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CLASSICS IN THE HISTORY OF LIBERTY

ARISTOTLE, *THE POLITICS* (C. 320 BC)
VOLUME II: NOTES ON ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS

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EDITION USED

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[NOTES ON ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.](#)

[BOOK I.](#)

1. 1. ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν κ.τ.λ.

The order of the first paragraph is disturbed by the repetition of the statement that every community aims at some good. The meaning will be clearer if drawn out in a technical form:

*Every community aims at some good:
Every city is a community; and therefore
Every city aims at some good.*

Upon which rests a second syllogism with added determinants:

*Whereas all communities aim at some good,
the highest aim at the highest good:
The city is the highest community; and therefore
The city aims at the highest good.*

Compare the opening of the Nicom. Ethics, i. 1. § 1,—

πάντα τέχνη καὶ πάντα μέθοδος ὁμοίως δὲ πρώξις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι
δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφώνησαντο τὰγαθὸν οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται.

Similarly the Metaphysics begin with a general proposition, πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἶδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει; and the Posterior Analytics, πάντα διδασκαλία καὶ πάντα μάθησις
διανοητικῇ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως.

The connexion of what follows in § 2, if there be any, is not easy to trace: 'But a community is a complex organisation;' Or, 'But we must not suppose the different forms of communities to be the same;' Or, the agreement described in the first sentence may be contrasted with the difference of opinion in the second;— 'We are all agreed about the end of the state, but we are not equally agreed about the definition of the ruler.'

1. 2. Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν κ.τ.λ.

The starting-point of Aristotle's enquiry here, as in many other passages, is a criticism of Plato. See Politicus, 259 C, φανερόν ὡς ἐπιστήμη μία περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ πάντα· ταύτην δὲ εἴτε βασιλικὴν εἴτε πολιτικὴν εἴτε οἰκονομικὴν τις ὀνομάζει, μηδὲν αὐτῷ διαφέρωμεθα.

This criticism is further worked out in ii. c. 1-5; cp. especially, c. 2. §§ 2-8, where Aristotle shows that the state is composed of dissimilar elements. An opposite view is maintained, or appears to be maintained by Socrates in Xen. Mem. iii. 4. § 12, where he says, ἡ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν; and § 7, where the good οἰκονόμος is said to be the good στρατηγός. This is a paradoxical way of insisting on the interdependence or identity of different callings; Aristotle rather dwells upon their diversity.

1. 2. οἶον ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων. Sc. ἄρχων ἤ, or ἄρχῃ.

A general notion gathered from the words πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν κ.τ.λ.

1. 2. καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.,

sc. τὸν ἄρχοντα λέγουσι.

1. 2. τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης,

sc. πολιτικῆς, to be supplied either from the previous part of the sentence, or from the word πολιτικὸν which follows:—'According to the principles of the science which deals with this subject.' Cp. i. 8. § 7, θάλατταν τοιαύτην, where τοιαύτην is to be explained

from ἀλειείας which precedes: and in the same chapter, § 9, τοιαύτη κτήσις, where τοιαύτη (meaning 'in the sense of a bare livelihood') is gathered from αὐτόφυτος and μὴ δι' ἀλλαγῆς in the previous section; and ii. 4. § 4, δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν; where τοιούτους, meaning 'disunited,' is a notion supplied from the preceding words,—ἦπτον γὰρ ἔσται φιλία κοινῶν ὄντων τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν: and ii. 6. § 22, ὡς μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνιστάναι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν, where the idea of an 'imperfect' state, like that contained in Plato's Laws, has to be gathered from the whole preceding passage.

1. 3. κατὰ τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον.

i. e. the method of analysis which resolves the compound into the simple. Cp. c. 8. § 1, ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι τῆν.

ὑφηγημένην, 'which we have followed,' not merely in the Ethics, as Schneider and others; for the same expression occurs N. E. ii. 7. § 9 (κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον), and therefore can hardly refer to them, but 'generally' or 'in this discussion.' The μέθοδος, like the λόγος in Plato, goes before and we follow. Cp. De Gen. Anim. 3. 758 a. 28, and note on c. 13. § 6.

1. 3. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαιρεῖν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλάχιστα μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται σκοποῦντες ὁψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐηθέντων.

τούτων may either refer 1)* to ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται, i. e. the elements of the state which he is going to distinguish in this book; or 2) to the different kinds of rule mentioned in the preceding paragraph (Bernays, Susemihl): in the latter case it is paraphrased by περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐηθέντων, in the next clause. (For the vague antecedent to τούτων cp. supra c. 2. §§ 2, 12, etc., etc.) Aristotle treats of 'the kinds of rule' in Book iii. cc. 7, 8, and in the fourth and sixth books.

καὶ, according to the first explanation = 'as about the state so about the elements of the state,' according to the second, = 'about kinds of government as well as about other things.' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις . . καὶ περὶ τούτων is repeated or resumed in ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν τούτοις at the beginning of the next paragraph, c. 2. § 1.

The argument is to the effect that if we analyse forms of government into their parts, or into their kinds, we shall see that they differ in something besides number—e. g. in the nature of the authority exercised in them, or in the character of their magistracies, or in the classification of their citizens. (Cp. iv. 4. § 7 ff.) That states consist not only of their elements, but have in them something analogous to the principle of life in the human frame, is a truth strongly felt by Plato (Rep. v. 462 D), less strongly by Aristotle (infra c. 2. § 13).

2. 1. εἰ δὴ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέψειεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ' ἂν οὕτω θεωρήσειεν.

Aristotle does not mean that politics are to be studied in the light of history; but rather that the complex structure of the state is to be separated into the simple elements out

of which it appears to be created. Yet the two points of view are not always distinguished by him; and his method of procedure is often historical (e. g. in Book v) as well as analytical.

2. 2. καὶ ἐν . . . φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι, οἶον αὐτὸ, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον.
- Aristotle, like Plato (Symp. 186), attributed sex to plants, male and female being combined in the same plant. The analogy of plants and animals is drawn out; De Gen. Anim. i. c. 23.
2. 2. ταῦτα ποιεῖν,
- sc. τὰ προορώμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄρχοντος, another instance of the vague antecedent (c. 1. § 2 and c. 2. § 12).
2. 3. τῆν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν.
- Evidently an instrument that could serve other purposes than that of a knife. Compare the ὀβελισκολύχνιον mentioned in iv. 15. § 8. The Delphian knife is described by Hesychius as λαμβάνουσα ἔμπροσθεν μέρος σιδηροῦν, 'having an iron part added to it in front.' The name is in some way connected with the sacrifice at Delphi, and is said in the appendix to the Proverbiorum Centuria, 1. 94 (p. 393 Schneidewin) to have passed into a proverb directed against the meanness of the Delphians in taking a part of the sacrifices and in charging for the use of the sacrificial knife. (See Goettling, Commentatio de Machaera Delphica, Jena, 1856.) We may agree with Schlosser in thinking that the matter is unimportant.
2. 4. τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, . . . γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου.
- 'Among barbarians women are slaves. The reason is that all barbarians are equally slaves: there is no ruling principle among them such as gives the true relation of husband and wife, of master and slave; they are all upon a level.' Cp. infra, cc. 12, 13.
2. 5. ὁἰκία; κον μὲν πρῶτιστα γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ' ἄροτῆρα.'
- Compare Wallace's Russia (p. 90. ed. 8). 'The natural labour unit (i. e. the Russian peasant family of the old type) comprises a man, a woman, and a horse.'
2. 5. εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν.
- 'For wants which recur every day,' and therefore can never be left unsatisfied.
2. 5. ὁμοκάπνους.
- 'Sitting in the smoke of one fire' is read by MSS. of the better class, P⁴, L^S, corr. M^b, William de Moerbek; ὁμοκάπους by the rest (Sussemihl). The meaning of the latter word 'fed at the same manger' is better suited to the context.
2. 5. ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἐφ' ἡμέρου κώμη.

There was a time when the κώμη or village community had an important place in Greek life. Cp. iii. 9. § 14, where it is joined with γένος (πόλις δὲ ἢ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους), and Thucydides, i. 5: ib. 10 (κατὰ κώμας δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπων οἰκισθείσης, sc. τῆς Σπάρτης). Such communities lasted into historical times in Ætolia, Acarnania, Arcadia, and even in Laconia. During the life of Aristotle himself the villages of Arcadia had been united by Epaminondas in the city of Megalopolis (cp. note on ii. 2. § 3).

πρώτη. To be taken with the words which follow: 'When they began no longer to regard only the necessities of life.'

2. 6. μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἔοικεν ἢ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι· οὓς καλοῦσι τινες ὁμογάλακτας, παῖδάς τε καὶ παίδων παῖδας.

'The tie of relationship is still acknowledged in the village, which in its most natural form is only a larger family or a colony of the family.' (There should be a comma in the Greek after ὁμογάλακτας; the words παῖδάς τε κ.τ.λ. though construed with καλοῦσιν, being really an explanation of ἀποικία.) The form of the village community is most natural, not when composed of individuals combined by chance, say, for the purposes of plunder or self-defence, but when the family becoming enlarged leaves its original seat and finds a new home. The expression ἀποικία οἰκίας is not strictly accurate, for the village might grow up on the same spot.

Cp. Cicero de Officiis, i. 17, 'Nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant lubidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso conjugio est: proxima in liberis: deinde una domus, communia omnia. Id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicae. Sequuntur fratrum conjunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque; qui cum una domo jam capi non possunt, in alias domos tanquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur connubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui. Quae propagatio et soboles origo est rerum publicarum.'

ὁμογάλακτες, a rare term for γεννήται or φράτερες.

2. 6. διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη· ἐκ βασιλευμένων γὰρ συνήλθον. πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει Ὅμηρος,

ἴθμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος

παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων.'

σποράδες γὰρ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾗσκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύοντο· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

The argument is as follows: The rise of the village from the family explains also the existence of monarchy in ancient Hellas. For in the family the eldest rules. This rule of the eldest in the family is continued into the village, and from that passes into the state. In support of his opinion Aristotle quotes what Homer says of the Cyclopes (a passage also quoted by Plato, Laws 680, in a similar connexion), and he further

illustrates it by men's ideas about the Gods, to whom they attribute a regal or patriarchal form of government, such as their own had been in primitive times.

τὰ ἔθνη here as in ii. 5. § 2 (see note in loco), a general term for barbarians.

ἐκ βασιλευμένων γὰρ συνῆλθον.

Aristotle is here speaking of one kind of monarchy, which may be called the patriarchal. In iii. 14. § 12, he attributes the rise of monarchy to the benefits conferred on the inhabitants of a country in peace or war by distinguished individuals, whereas in this passage he assigns to it a patriarchal origin. Both accounts have probably a certain degree of truth in them. And doubtless in history either form of monarchy may have taken the place of the other; a series of undistinguished kings may have been interrupted by the hero or legislator, and the hero or legislator may have transmitted his power to his posterity. Cp. also iv. 13. § 12.

διὰ τῆν συγγένειαν.

Either 'the relation of the members of the κώμη (γένος) to one another,' or 'to the original οἰκία.'

'θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἧδ' ἄλόχων.'

Odyssey ix. 114; again alluded to in Nicom. Ethics x. 9. § 13, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἧδ' ἄλόχου.

ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

This is especially true of the Greeks, who limited the divine by the human; in other mythologies the idea of a superior being who could not be conceived, led to extravagance and grotesqueness. And even among the Greeks, the light of fancy was always breaking in, though not in such a manner as to impair the harmony of the poetical vision.

2. 8. τέλειος πόλις.

Opposed to πρώτη (§ 5).

2. 8. γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εἶ ζῆν.

'The state is created for the maintenance of life, but when once established has a higher aim.'

οὖσα partly derives its meaning from γινομένη, 'having a true being' opposed to 'coming into being' (cp. οὐσία and γένεσις).

2. 8. ἧ δὲ φύσις τέλος &illegible;στί.

By Aristotle the end of a thing is said to be its nature; the best and alone self-sufficing

development of it. From this transcendental point of view the state is prior to the individual, the whole to the part (§ 12). But he is not always consistent in his use of language; for while in this passage he speaks of the state as the end or final cause of the οἰκία, in Nic. Ethics viii. 12. § 7 he also speaks of the οἰκία as prior to the state and more necessary (πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως). Cp. Categories c. 12, 14 a 26.

2. 8. εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι.

'If the original elements of the state exist by nature, the state must exist by nature.' But is the argument sound? are not two senses of the word nature here confused?

2. 9. τῶν φύσει ἢ πόλις.

i.e. because it is the end, the fulfilment, the self-sufficing, the good: yet there is another sense of the word φύσις, which is not applicable to the state.

2. 10. φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, ὅτε περ ἄζυξ ὦν ὡσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς.

Lit. 'For the alien, who is by nature such as I have described, is also a lover of war.'

The margin of one MS. supported by the old Latin Version (which gives 'sicut in volatilibus') reads πετεινοῖς. πετοῖς is the reading of one late MS., πεττοῖς apparently of all the rest. In support of the last a very difficult epigram of Agathias (Pal. Anthology, ix. 482) is adduced in which the term ἄζυξ occurs in the description of a game played with dice and similar to our backgammon; the game is not however called πεττοί, nor does the description answer to the game of πεττοί. The word ἄζυξ, when applied to a game, may mean either 'exposed' or 'blocked,' and so incapable of combination or action. With ἐν πετεινοῖς, ἄζυξ might be interpreted of birds of prey which fly alone, the solitary opposed to the gregarious: cp. παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου in the next sentence.

But neither ἐν πεττοῖς nor ἐν πετεινοῖς can be precisely explained. The variations of reading (omission of ἄζυξ ὦν, alteration into ἀνευ ζυγοῦ τυγχάνων) shew that the copyists were in a difficulty. We can only infer that whether applied to birds or to the pieces of a game, the word ἄζυξ is here used as a figure representing the solitude of a savage who has no city or dwelling-place.

2. 10. διότι.

Either 1) *'why,' or 2) 'that.' In either case the reason is supplied from what follows (§ 11):—'Man has the faculty of speech, and speech was given him that he might express pleasure and pain, good and evil, the ideas which lie at the basis of the state.'

2. 12. ἢ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.

τούτων, sc. 'of these perceptions,' or rather 'of those who have these perceptions.' For the vague antecedent see note on § 2.

2. 12. καὶ πρότερον δ' ἢ τῆι φύσει κ.τ.λ.

In idea the state is prior to the family, as the whole is prior to the part, for the true or

perfect family cannot exist until human nature is developed in the state: but in time, and in history, the family and the village are prior to the state. The state is φύσει πρότερον, but the family χρόνῳ πρότερον. See above, note on § 8, and Categ. c. 12, 14 a, 26.

2. 13. διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη.

Referring either 1) to ὁμωνύμως:—‘When the powers of the hand are destroyed (διαφθαρεῖσα) it will only be such in an equivocal sense;’ or 2) *το ὡσπερ λιθίνη ‘it will be like a stone hand.’ Cp. Sir J. F. Stephen’s *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, p. 128, ‘A man would no more be a man if he was alone in the world, than a hand would be a hand without the rest of the body.’

2. 14. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἢ πόλις καὶ φύσει καὶ πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος, δῆλον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθεὶς, ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἕξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον.

This is a resumption of the words; καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῆς φύσει κ.τ.λ. in § 12. ‘That the state exists by nature and is prior to the individual is proved by the consideration that the individual is not self-sufficing; he is therefore a part, like every other part, relative to the whole and so implying it.’

2. 14. ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.

Compare the old scholastic aphorism derived from Aristotle that ‘the man who lives wholly detached from others must be either an angel or a devil;’ quoted by Burke, ‘Thoughts on the causes of the present discontent,’ vol. i. p. 340, edit. 1826.

2. 15. φύσει μὲν οὖν ἢ ὁρμή.

‘True, the political instinct is implanted in all men by nature: yet he who brought them together in a state was the greatest of benefactors’: or 2) with a less marked opposition: ‘The political instinct is natural; and he who first brought men together [and so developed it] was the greatest of benefactors.’

Here as elsewhere Aristotle presupposes a given material, upon which, according to the traditional Greek notion, the legislator works. Society is born and grows, but it is also made.

2. 16. ὁ δ’ ἄνθρωπος ὄπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τᾶναντία ἔστι χρῆσθαι μάλιστα.

1) *ὄπλα ἔχων = ὀπλισμένος, the words φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ being datives of the instrument. It seems strange at first sight to speak of φρόνησις and ἀρετή as capable of a wrong direction. We might rather have expected Aristotle to have distinguished φρόνησις from what in Nic. Eth. vi. 12. § 9, is called δεινότης, (an intellectual capacity which may receive a good direction and become φρόνησις; but may also when receiving a bad direction become πανουργία) and ἀρετή, from what in the same passage of the Ethics is spoken of as mere φυσικὴ ἀρετή (Nic. Eth. vi. 13. §§ 1 and 2) or in the Magna Moralia i. c. 35, 1197 b. 39, as ὁρμαὶ τινες ἄνευ λόγου πρὸς τὰ ἀνδρεία καὶ τὰ δίκαια κ.τ.λ., which may become injurious unless directed by reason (ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι, Nic. Eth. vi. 13, § 1). But the transfer of certain words from a good to

a neutral sense or from a technical to a general one is common in Aristotle; and in the fluctuating state of philosophical language may be expected to occur. We must not suppose that he always employed words in the same senses; or that he had a scientific vocabulary fixed by use and ready on all occasions.

2) Bernays and others translate 'Man is by nature equipped with arms or instruments for wisdom and virtue;' i. e. Man has a natural capacity which may be developed into φρόνησις and ἄρετή, or may degenerate into their opposites. This gives an excellent meaning and agrees in the use of words as well as in thought with the passage in the Ethics referred to above. But the construction of the dative in the sense of 'for' after ὅπλα ἔχων is impossible. Or if 3) the datives are taken with φύεται, a construction which is quite possible, the words ὅπλα ἔχων become pointless. In this uncertainty of the construction the general meaning is clear; viz., that 'man has intelligence and an aptitude for virtue, gifts which are in the highest degree capable of abuse.'

ἐπὶ πάντων ἔστι χρῆσθαι μάλιστα. There is an inaccuracy in these words; for it is not virtue and knowledge which can be turned to the worst uses (cp. Rhet. i. 1355 b. 4) but the finer nature which is alone capable of virtue. Cp. Goethe's Faust, Prologue in Heaven, where Mephistopheles says, 'Er nennt's Vernunft und braucht's allein nur thierischer als jedes Thier zu sein;' and Nic. Eth. vii. 6. § 7, ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας Φοβερώτερον δέ. Compare also Plato Repub. vi. 495 A, B, where it is said that the best, i.e. the greatest natures, if they are ill educated, become the worst:—καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοι πᾶς πόλεις γίνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ οἱ τὰ γαθὰ, οἱ δὲ τὰ τούτῳ τύχῃσι μισθύντες· μικρὰ δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὔτε πόλιν δρῶν.

2. 16. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.

'But the virtue of justice unites men in states (i.e. is the quality opposed to the lawlessness which makes men lower than the beasts), and executive justice is the ordering of political society and the decision of what is just.'

In this passage δίκη is the 'administration of justice': δικαιοσύνη, 'the virtue of justice': τὸ δίκαιον, 'the principle of justice to be applied in each case.'

3. 1. οἰκίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν ἀφίθις οἰκία συνίσταται· οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων.

ἀφίθις = 'in turn.' 'As the state is made up of households, so the household in turn is made up of lesser parts; and a complete household includes both slaves and freemen.' Of these elements of the household Aristotle now proceeds to speak.

3. 2. πάντα δ' ἐστὶ δεσποτικῆ καὶ γαμικῆ (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητικῆ.

Not finding common words which express his idea, Aristotle gives new senses to γαμικῆ and τεκνοποιητικῆ. In ordinary Greek they would have meant 'of or referring to marriage,' and 'to the procreation of children': here he extends their meaning to the whole marital or parental relation. It was natural in the beginning of philosophy to make new words, or to give new meanings to old ones; cp. Plato, Theæt. 182 A, where he

calls ποιότης an ἀλλόκοτον ὄνομα, and Nic. Eth. v. 6. § 9, where the relation of husband and wife is termed by a periphrasis τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον, or τὸ πρὸς γυναῖκα δίκαιον: cp. also c. 12. § 1 infra, where πατρική is used for what is here called τεκνοποιητική. That Aristotle found many words wanting in his philosophical vocabulary, we gather from Nic. Eth. ii. 7. §§ 2, 3, 8, 11, De Interp. c. 2 and 3, and infra iii. 1. § 7, where similar remarks are made upon ἀναισθησία, upon the anonymous mean of φιλοτιμία and ἀφιλοτιμία, upon ἀφοβία the excess of courage, and upon ὄνομα ἀόριστον, ἕψιμα ἀόριστον, ἀόριστος ἀρχή.

3. 2. ἔστωσαν δ' αὖται τρεῖς ὡς εἶπομεν.

'Let us assume the relationships, by whatever names they are called, to be three, those which I have mentioned.' Cp. περὶ τριῶν § 1 above. The passage would read more smoothly if αἱ were inserted before τρεῖς: 'let there be those three.'

3. 4. τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν.

Many traces of this sophistic or humanistic feeling occur in Greek Poetry, especially in Euripides: some of the most striking are collected by Oncken, *Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles*, vol. ii. pp. 34-36:—

Eurip. Ion, 854-856,—

ἔν γάρ τι τοῖς δούλοισιν αἰσχύνην φέρει
τοῦνομα· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα τῶν ἐλευθέρων
οὐδεὶς κακίων δοῦλος, ὅστις ἐσθλὸς ἦ.

ib. Helena, 726 ff.,—

κακὸς γὰρ ὅστις μῆ σέβει τὰ δεσποτῶν
καὶ ξυγγέγηθε καὶ ξυνωδίνει κακοῖς.
ἔγω μὲν εἶην, κεῖ πέφυχ' ὑμῶν λάτρις,
ἐν τοῖσι γενναίοισιν ἠριθμημένος
δούλοισι, τοῦνομ' οὐκ ἔχων ἐλεύθερον
τὸν νοῦν δέ.

ib. Melanippe, fr. 515,—

δοῦλον γὰρ ἐσθλὸν τοῦνομ' οὐ διαφθερεῖ
πολλοὶ δ' ἀμείνους εἰσὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων.

Philem. apud Stobæum,—

κἄν δοῦλος ἦ τις, οὐθὲν ἦιπτον, δέσποτα,
ἄνθρωπος οὐτός ἐστιν, ἄν ἄνθρωπος ἦ.

ib. fr. 39,—

κἄν δοῦλός ἐστι, σάρκα τῆν σὺτῆν ἔχει·
φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ·
ἦ δ' ἀφ' Τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο.

3. 4. βίαιον γάρ.

Either 1) * = παρὰ φύσιν or simply 2) 'brought about by violence;' βία may be opposed either to φύσις or νόμος or both.

4. 1. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ὠρισμ&illegible;ναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἔν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεία ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀποτελεσθήσασθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν.

The first six words ὥσπερ . . . τέχναις are read as in Bekker supported by some MSS. There is also MS. authority for the omission of δὲ; and for the omission of both δὲ and ἐν.

Retaining Bekker's reading, we must either 1) *translate, as in the text, making the apodosis to ἐπεὶ οὖν begin with καὶ ἢ κτητική; or 2) δὲ after ὥσπερ may be regarded as marking the apodosis; or 3) the sentence may be an anacoluthon; as frequently after ἐπεὶ in Aristotle (cp. Rhet. ii. 25, 1402 b. 26 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν κατηγορῶν δι' εἰκότων ἀποδεικνυσιν κ.τ.λ.). If we omit δὲ, the apodosis still begins with ὥσπερ.

ταῖς ὠρισμέναις τέχναις: The arts which have a definite sphere, such as the art of the pilot, or of the carpenter, contrasted with the ill defined arts of politics or household management, cp. c. 13, § 13 ὁ γὰρ βάνουσος τεχνίτης ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν.

Instead of Bekker's reading οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν another reading οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν has been proposed on the authority of the old translation (Moerbek) 'sic et yconomico.' But τῶν οἰκονομικῶν is more idiomatic and has the support of the greater number of MSS. Sc. οἰκεία ὄργανα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν.

4. 2. καὶ ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων.

Not 'instead of' but 'taking precedence of':—the slave is in idea prior to the tool which he uses. He is an instrument, but he is also a link between his master and the inferior instruments which he uses and sets in motion.

For the use of πρὸ cp. the proverb quoted in c. 7. § 3 δοῦλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότης. So the hand is spoken of as ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων (De Part. Anim. iv. 10, 687 a. 21).

4. 3. εἰ γὰρ ἢδύνατο κ.τ.λ.

The connexion is as follows:—'There are not only lifeless but living instruments; for the lifeless instrument cannot execute its purpose without the living.'

4. 4. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κτήμα πρακτικόν. ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος ἕτερον τι γίνεται παρὰ τῆν χρῆσιν αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῆς κλίνης ἢ χρῆσις μόνον.

It was said that a possession is an instrument for maintaining life, and there seems to be no reason why both κτήματα and ὄργανα should not be regarded as different aspects of wealth (cp. infra c. 8. § 15, ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος ὀργάνων πλῆθος ἐστὶν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν, and Plato Politicus 287 D, who feels the difficulty of specialising the notion of an ὄργανον: 'there is plausibility in saying that everything in the world is the *instrument* of doing something'). But here the term instrument, used in a narrower

sense, is opposed to a possession, and regarded as a mere instrument of production. A parallel distinction is drawn between production and action, and the slave is described as the instrument of action. But he is also spoken of as the 'instrument preceding instruments' (§ 2), words which rather indicate the minister of production. Aristotle passes from one point of view to another without marking the transition.

He wants to discriminate the household slave from the artisan; but in the attempt to make this distinction becomes confused. The conception of the slave on which he chiefly insists is that he is relative to a master and receives from him a rule of life: c. 13. §§ 12-14. He therefore differs from the artisan.

τὰ λεγόμενα, e.g. instruments such as the shuttle, etc.

4. 5. ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὗ ποιησὶς ἔστιν· διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τήν πρᾶξιν.

'Life is action, and therefore the slave, i.e. the household slave, is the minister of action, because he ministers to his master's life.'

4. 5. τὸ γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἔστι μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἄλλου.

Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 6. § 8, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἄν τί πηλικὸν καὶ μὴ χωρισθῆι, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ.

4. 5. ὅλως ἐκείνου.

The master although relative to the slave has an existence of his own, but the slave's individuality is lost in his master.

5. 1. τῷ λόγῳ θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle distinguishes between reasoning and facts, the analogy of nature supplying the theory, the observation of the differences which exist among mankind, the fact. Cp. infra vii. 1. § 6, and Nic. Eth. i. 8. § 1; ix. 8. § 2; x. 1. § 4, and Plato (Polit. 278 D), who speaks of the 'long and difficult language of facts.' The verbal antithesis of λόγος and ἔργον, which in Thucydides is often merely rhetorical, enters deeply into the philosophy of Aristotle. There is however no real opposition between them any more than between the *a priori* and *a posteriori* reasoning of modern philosophers, which are only different modes of proving or of conceiving the same fact.

5. 2. εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς.

'From their very birth,' or, with a logical turn, 'to go no further than the state of birth;' cp. c. 13. § 6, καὶ τοῦτο εὐθύς ὑφήγηται περὶ τήν ψυχὴν and infra § 4, τὸ δὲ ζῆλον πρῶτον κ.τ.λ.

5. 3. ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει, τὸ δὲ ἄρχεται, ἔστι τι τούτων ἔργον.

'As ruler and subject, they may be said to have a work or function—the one to command, the other to obey, apart from any other work or function.'

5. 3. εἴτ' ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτ' ἐκ διττηρμένων.

For the division of quantity into continuous and discrete, cp. Categ. 6. 1, p. 4 b. 20, and Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 4. The human frame would be an instance of the first, musical harmony or a chorus or an army of the second. The πόλις may be said to partake of the nature of both in being one body and having many offices or members.

5. 4. καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψύχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἐστὶ τις ἀρχή, οἷον ἀρμονίας.

1) The connexion is as follows: 'This principle of a superior is found in living beings, but not confined to them. *It is derived from the universal nature, for it pervades all things, inanimate as well as animate' (so Bernays). It is remarkable that Aristotle recognises a common principle pervading alike organic and inorganic nature.

2) Or ἐκ is partitive; see Bonitz, Index Arist. 225 b. 11 ff. 'Out of all the kingdom of nature this is found [especially] in living beings' (Stahr, Susemihl). But according to this interpretation, the addition of μάλιστα after ἐνυπάρχει, suggested by Susemihl, appears to be indispensable to the meaning.

οἷον ἀρμονίας.

Either 1)* 'as in musical harmony there is a ruling principle determining the character of the harmony,' or 2) 'as harmony is a ruling principle governing the combinations of sounds.' The first accords best with the common meaning of the word ἀρμονία and with the use of the genitive.

5. 4. ἐξωτερικωτέρας.

'Somewhat foreign to the present subject,' not in the sense of ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι.

5. 4. τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δ' ἄρχόμενον.

i. e. 'the living creature, as soon as we begin to analyse it, is found to consist of soul and body.'

The opposition expressed by δὲ in τὸ δὲ ζῷον is as follows: 'not to speak of the whole of nature, but of the living creature only.'

For πρῶτον (which is to be taken with συνέστηκε) meaning either 'to go no further,' or 'as the first result of analysis,' cp. πρῶτον ἐν ζῴῳ θεωρῆσαι infra § 6, and the similar use of εὐθὺς supra § 2.

5. 5. δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὸ φύσει καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις.

Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 9. § 8 and Cicero Tusc. Disput. i. 14 'num dubitas quin specimen naturae capi deceat ex optima quaque natura?'

5. 6. ἐστὶ δ' οὗν ὡσπερ λέγομεν.

A resumption of the words τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον above.

5. 6. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ κ.τ.λ.

Psychology, like logic, is constantly made by Aristotle and Plato the basis or form of politics. The individual is the image of the state in the complexity of his life and organisation, and the relations of the parts of the state are expressed and even suggested by the divisions of the soul, and the relations of mind and body.

5. 7. τυγχάνει γὰρ σωτηρίας οὕτως.

5. 8. Cp. supra c. 2. § 2 ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν. εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς ἐϊρημένοις.

I.e. for the animals, for the body, for the female sex, for τὸ παθητικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, to which he has just referred as inferiors.

5. 9. διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστίν.

'Because he is by nature capable of belonging to another, he does belong to another.'

5. 9. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῷα οὐ λόγου αἰσθανόμενα, ἀλλὰ παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ· καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρόν.

'The difference between the slave and the animal is that the slave can apprehend reason but the animal cannot; the use of them is much the same.'

Aristotle is chiefly dwelling on the resemblance between the slave and the animal: but in nothing the difference, he has not duly subordinated it to the general tone of the passage. Hence an awkwardness in the connection.

5. 10. βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δ' ὀρθὰ καὶ ἄχρηστα πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται δι' ἡρημένος εἷς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν χρείαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηλικήν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοῦναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματ' ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχάς.

'Nature would in fact like, if she could, to make a difference between the bodies of freemen and slaves . . . but her intention is not always fulfilled; for some men have the bodies and some the souls of freemen: that is to say, they are deficient in the other half. The bodies of freemen and the souls of freemen are found indifferently among freemen and slaves: or, referring τοὺς μὲν to the freemen and τοὺς δὲ to the slaves: 'the one (the freemen) may have the bodies only of freemen, i. e. the souls of slaves, the others (the slaves) may have the souls of freemen.'

ἐλευθέρων must be taken both with σώματα and ψυχάς.

βούλεται expresses, first of all, 'intention' or 'design;' secondly, 'tendency.' The personal language easily passes into the impersonal. Cp. for the use of βούλομαι Nic. Eth. v. 8. § 14, βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον, sc. τὸ νόμισμα, and infra c. 12. § 2. For the general thought, cp. Theognis (line 535 Bergk), οὔποτε δουλείη κεφαλῇ ἰθεῖα πέφυκεν ἢ ἄλλ' α

ἰεὶ σκολιή, κατ'ὕχένα λοξὸν ἔχει.

5. 11. ἄλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἑἴδειον ἰδεῖν τὸ τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.

The connection is,—‘There is as great difference between souls as between bodies or even greater, but not in the same degree perceptible.’ For the ‘sight of the invisible’ cp. Plat. Phaedr. 250 D, ‘For sight is the keenest of our bodily senses, though not by that is wisdom seen,’ and the words preceding.

5. 11. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, φανερόν·

οἱ μὲν and οἱ δὲ are not subdivisions of τινὲς, which is itself partitive, but there appears to be a pleonastic confusion of two constructions; 1) τινὲς μὲν ἐλεύθεροι τινὲς δὲ δοῦλοι: and 2) οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι. In other words the construction beginning with τινὲς has varied into οἱ μὲν—οἱ δὲ.

6. 2. ὥσπερ ἐήτορα γράφονται παρανόμων.

‘But a convention by which captives taken in war are made slaves, is a violation of nature, and may be accused of illegality like the author of an unconstitutional measure.’ The more common view is expressed in Xen. Cyr. vii. 5. § 73, νόμος γὰρ ἐν πάσιν ἀνθρώποις ἀϊδιός ἐστιν, ὅταν πολεμούντων πόλις ἀλφῆ, τῶν ἐλόντων εἶναι καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὰ χρήματα.

6. 3, 4. αἴτιον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετῆ τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστιν αἰεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός, ὥστε δοκεῖν μῆ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τῆν βίαν, ἀλλ' ἂν περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τῆν ἀμφισβήτησιν. Διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν εὐνοία δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον, τὸ τὸν κρείττονα ἄρχειν, ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων οὐτ' ἰσχυρόν οὐθὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετῆν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν.

ὃ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους, κ.τ.λ. Not ‘makes the reasons ambiguous’ (Liddell and Scott), but ‘makes the arguments pass from one side to the other,’ or, ‘makes them overlap’ or ‘invade each other’s territory,’ as in the Homeric phrase, ὁμοίου πολέμοιο | πεῖραρ ἐπαλλάξαντες (Il. xiii. 358, 9), and in iv. 10. § 2,—τυραννίδος δ' εἶδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τῆν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πῶς αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τῆν βασιλείαν. vi. 1. § 3,—ταῦτα γὰρ συνδουαζόμενα ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπαλλάττειν, ὥστε ἀριστοκρατίας τε ὀλιγαρχικῆς εἶναι καὶ πολιτείας δημοκρατικωτέρας. See also infra c. 9. § 15. Virtue and power are opposed: but from one point of view the arguments cross over or pass into one another, because there is an element of virtue in power and of power in virtue. Cp. Plat. Rep. i. 352 ff.

Διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ. The translation given in the text nearly agrees with that of Bernays: the phrase τούτων τῶν λόγων in § 4 refers, not to the τοὺς λόγους of § 3, but to the two positions which immediately precede; the first, that justice is benevolence; the second, that justice is the rule of a superior. These two positions, according to Aristotle, have a common ground, which explains why such a difference of opinion can exist (§ 3). This common ground is the connexion between ἀρετῆ and βία; the point in dispute being whether the principle of justice is benevolence or power (§§ 3, 4). If these two propositions are simply kept apart and not allowed to combine, there will follow the silly and unmeaning result that the superior in virtue is not entitled to rule:

'but there is no force or plausibility in this' [and therefore they cannot be kept apart, but must be combined]. Aristotle is arguing from his own strong conviction, which is repeated again and again in the Politics, that the superior in virtue has a right to rule. He continues: 'There are others who maintain that what is legal is just; but they contradict themselves, for what is allowed by law may be in a higher sense illegal. Captives taken in war are by law usually enslaved, yet the war may be unjust, and the persons may be 'nature's freemen,' and unworthy to be made slaves. But all these views are untenable; and so Aristotle shews negatively that his own view (expressed in c. 6. §§ 1 and 3) is right, namely, that there is a slavery which is natural and just, because based on the superior virtue of the master, and therefore combining power and right; and that there is a slavery which is unnatural and unjust, because based on mere violence; also that the argument from the right of the conqueror is invalid.

The chief difficulties in this complicated passage are the following:—

(1) The opposition of justice to virtue, which is, perhaps, only to virtue in the lower sense of the word.

(2) What is the meaning of διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο (§ 4)? See Eng. text.

(3) Is εὔνοια *a*) a principle excluding slavery (Bernays), or *b*) justifying slavery, as existing for the protection of the inferior races (cp. 5. § 11, οἷς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεῦν, 6. § 10 and iii. 6. § 6)? The thesis that 'justice is benevolence' is held by Aristotle to be not inconsistent with slavery, that is, with the just rule of a superior.

(4) Do the words διαστάντων χωρὶς = *a*)* 'being kept apart and not combined, placed in bare opposition,' or *b*) 'being set aside?' Both uses of διίστασθαι are justified by examples; in support of the former we may quote Ar. de Caelo, ii. 13, 295 a. 30, ὅτε τὰ στοιχεῖα (sc. of Empedocles) διειστῆκει χωρὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους, and supra c. 5. §§ 2, 8; and this meaning agrees better with the context.

(5) Do the words ἄτεροι λόγοι refer *a*) to one of the two preceding propositions, or *b*) to a further alternative? It is doubtful whether they are Greek, if taken in the sense of 'the latter,' or 'one of these two propositions.' It is better to translate 'the other view,' which is explained by what follows, ὡς οὐ δεῖ κ.τ.λ., being the view which denies the natural right of the superior in virtue to rule, and which here as elsewhere, iii. 13. 25, is regarded by Aristotle as absurd. (See discussion of this passage in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society, Vol. II.)

No philosopher is known to have asserted that δικαιοσύνη is εὔνοια. Aristotle in Nic. Eth. viii. 1. § 4, 9. §§ 1-3 notes some resemblances between δικαιοσύνη and Φιλία: and we may cite as parallel the Christian maxim, 'Love is the fulfilling of the law.'

6. 5. ὅλως δ' ἀντεχόμενοι τινες, ὡς οὔονται, δικαίου τινός.

'There are some again who identify law and justice.' Ὅλως may be taken either 1) with τιθέασι, 'they maintain in general terms,' i.e. holding to some general notion of justice; or 2)* with ἀντεχόμενοι, 'holding absolutely to a kind of justice.'

6. 5. ἄμα δ' οὐ φασιν.

'But in the same breath they say the opposite,' i.e. they are compelled by facts, if they think for a moment, to contradict themselves. The language is slightly inaccurate; for it is not they who contradict themselves, but the facts which refute them.

6. 5. τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δικαίαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἢν Φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι.

Either one or two distinct grounds are alleged: 1)* the cause of war may be unjust, and then the slave ought not to be a slave; or 2) the cause of war may be unjust, and also the slave, being a Greek, ought not to be a slave.

6. 6. διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους.

Cp. Xen. Hell. i. 6. § 14, κελευόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων ἀποδόσθαι καὶ τοὺς Μηθυμναίους οὐκ ἔφη [ὁ Καλλικρατίδας] ἑαυτοῦ γε ἀρχοντος οὐδένα Ἑλλήνων εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου δυνατόν ἀνδραποδισθῆναι, and Plat. Rep. v. 469 B, C, where Plato indignantly prohibits Hellenes from becoming the owners of other Hellenes taken in war.

6. 7. ὥσπερ ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἑλένη φησι.

Theodectes was a younger contemporary, and, according to Suidas, scholar of Aristotle. During the earlier portion of his life he had studied rhetoric under Isocrates, and is said by Dionysius to have been one of the most famous of rhetoricians. His works are often quoted by Aristotle, e.g. Rhet. ii. 23, 1399 a. 7, παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἠσέβηκεν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν, ὧν ἡ πόλις νομίζει; Nic. Eth. vii. 7. § 6, οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἠπτάται ἢ λυπῶν, θαυμαστὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγγνωμονικόν, εἰ ἀντιπείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχως πεπληγμένος, and in several other passages. See Bonitz.

6. 8. ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐθενὶ ἀλλ' ἢ ἀρετῆ; καὶ κακίᾳ διορίζουσι τὸ δοῦλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον.

'When they speak of Hellenes as everywhere free and noble, they lay down the principle that slave and free are distinguished by the criterion of bad and good.'

6. 8. ἡ δὲ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις οὐ μέντοι δύναται.

Not 'nature sometimes intends this and sometimes not,' for she always intends it; nor 'nature always intends this, but often cannot accomplish it,' which does violence to the order of the words πολλάκις οὐ μέντοι: but 'this nature often intends, when unable to accomplish it,' πολλάκις adhering to both clauses.

6. 9. ὅτι μὲν οἶν ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις.

ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις, sc. the objection to slavery with which chapter 6 commenced, ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶναντία φάσκοντες.

6. 9. καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι.

'And that men are not by nature, the one class [all] slaves and the other [all] freemen, is evident,' repeating ὅτι. Aristotle had maintained at the end of chapter 5, ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, φανερόν: here he affirms the

opposite of his former statement; but he does not explain in what way the two statements are to be reconciled with one another. 'Nature has divided mankind into slaves and freemen, but she has not consistently carried out the division; and there are slaves and freemen who were not the creation of nature.'

The words εἰσὶ καὶ are inserted before οὐκ εἰσὶν by Bekker, (ed. 2); 'if there are some who are by nature slaves and some who are by nature freemen, there are some who are not.' The change has no authority, and is not required by the sense.

6. 9. ἔν τισι διώρισται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὧν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν.

'Such a distinction has been made in some cases, and in these it is expedient that one should serve another rule'; ὧν is substituted for οἷς, that it may be in regimen with τῷ μὲν.

6. 9. ὥστε καὶ δεσπόζειν.

'And consequently the master over his slaves,' i.e. if they and he are fitted, the one to serve, the other to command.

6. 10. διὸ καὶ συμφέρον ἔστι τι καὶ φιλία δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 11. § 7, ἢ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ἢ δὲ ἄνθρωπος. The qualification contained in the last three words shows the contradiction of Aristotle's position.

7. 1. Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων.

Aristotle returns to the thesis with which he commenced; 'From these considerations, too, i.e. from the natural and permanent difference of freemen and slaves, our old doctrine (i. 1. § 2) that the rule of a master differs from that of a king or statesman, the art of governing a family from the art of governing freemen,' is clearly proven.

7. 3. ἔστι γὰρ ἕτερα ἑτέρων κ.τ.λ.

'Slaves have various duties, higher and lower, and therefore the science which treats of them will have many branches; and there is a corresponding science of using slaves, which is the science of the master; yet neither is implied in the terms master or slave; who are so called not because they have science, but because they are of a certain character.' Yet the two propositions are not inconsistent: Plato would have said that the master must have science, and not have denied that he must be of a certain character.

7. 3. δοῦλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου.

Aristotle clearly uses the word πρὸ in the sense of precedence as supra c. 4. § 2, ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων. Such a hierarchy among servants as well as masters is not unknown in modern society.

7. 5. But compare iv. 6. § 6, where he says that the rich having to take care of their property have no leisure for politics.

7. 5. ἡ δὲ κτητικὴ ἕτερα ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, οἷον ἡ δικαία, πολεμικὴ τις οἷσα ἡ θηρευτικὴ.

The passage is obscurely expressed. The writer means to say that the art of acquiring slaves is not to be identified either with the art of the slave or of the master: it is a kind of war (vii. 14. § 21) or hunting. The words οἷον ἡ δικαία imply that Aristotle is not disposed to justify every mode of acquiring slaves from inferior races: (compare below c. 8. § 12, ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς κτητικῆς], ἣ δὲ εἰ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἄρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, ὡς φύσει δίκαιον τοῦτον ὄντα τὸν πόλεμον). The awkward manner of their introduction leads to the suspicion that they are a gloss, suggested by the passage just cited. The sense of οἷον is explanatory and so corrective; not, as Bernays, 'for example, the art of justly acquiring slaves approximates to the art of war or hunting;' for this would apply equally to every mode of acquiring slaves, and the meaning given to τις is feeble; but 'I mean to say,' or 'I am speaking of the just mode of acquiring slaves which is a kind of war or of hunting.' (See Bonitz, *Index Arist.*, s.v. οἷον.)

8. 1. ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι τῆν.

'We have been speaking (τῆν) of the possession of slaves which is a part of property, and according to our usual method of resolving the whole into its parts, we will now proceed to consider generally the other parts of property.' For ὑφηγημένον cp. note on c. 1. § 3.

8. 1. πότερον ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ αὐτῆ τῆ οἰκονομικῆ ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle proceeds to show that the art of money-making is not the same with the management of the family; it is only subordinate to it. But subordinate in what way? Bearing in mind his own distinction of instrumental and material, he argues that it provides material to the household, but is not the same with household management.

8. 3. ὥστε πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. = 'the question arises' or 'we are led to ask first of all, whether tillage is a part of the management of a household; or rather whether we must not include all the various ways of providing food,' which are then described at length.

The digression which follows is intended to contrast χρηματιστικὴ in all its branches with οἰκονομικὴ, and to prepare for the distinction between the natural and unnatural modes of acquisition.

The sentence is irregular, the clause ὥστε πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. following as if ἔστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρήσει without εἰ had preceded. The words ἔστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ κ.τ.λ. are to be repeated with πότερον μέρος τι.

8. 4. ἀλλὰ μὲν εἶδη γε πολλὰ τροφῆς.

'The question has been asked, Is the whole provision of food a part of money-making?—But then we should remember that there are several kinds of food.'

8. 5. πρὸς τὰς ἐαστώνας καὶ τῶν αἵρεσιν τῶν τούτων.

τὰς ἑαστώνας κ.τ.λ. 'For their convenience and the obtaining'; the words may also be regarded as a hendiadys, 'for the opportunity of obtaining.'

τούτων. Sc. καρποῦ, ζῴων, understood from ζῴοφάγα, καρποφάγα.

8. 6. According to the common notion the life of the hunter precedes that of the shepherd; Aristotle places the shepherd first, apparently because the least exertion is required of him. The remark arises out of the previous sentence, in which he divided the lives of men according to the facility with which they obtained food. Cp. Mill, Polit. Econ., Preliminary Remarks.

8. 7. θάλατταν τοιαύτην.

Sc. συμφέρουσιν πρὸς ἀλιείαν. Cp. note on c. 1. § 2.

8. 8. αὐτόφυτον.

Either 1)* 'immediately obtained from the products of nature' = ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως, or 2) = αὐτουργόν, 'by their own labour.'

8. 8. τὸν ἐνδεέστατον βίον.

Bernays reads ἐνδεέστερον without MS. authority, but there is no need to make any change. The meaning is that they supplement the extreme poverty (ἐνδεέστατον) of one kind of life by another: the two together give them a comfortable subsistence.

8. 10. σκωληκοτοκεῖ.

Cp. De Gen. Anim. ii. 1, 732 b. 10, τῶν δ' ἀναιμῶν τὰ ἔντομα σκωληκοτοκεῖ. The term 'vermiparous' is not strictly correct: for all animals are either viviparous or oviparous. But Aristotle appears not to have been aware that the larva of the insect comes from an egg.

8. 10. τῆν τοῦ καλουμένου γάλακτος φύσιν.

A pleonasm common in Aristotle: cp. τῆ τῆς ἀτμίδος, τοῦ σπέρματος, τῶν καταμηνίων, φύσις, Hist. Animal. *passim*. (See Bonitz, *Index Arist.*, p. 838 a. 8 ff.)

8. 11. ὥστε ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οἰητέον τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἔνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῴα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἡμερᾶ καὶ διὰ τῆν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τῆν τροφήν, τῶν δ' ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ γε πλεῖστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοήθειας ἔνεκεν, ἵνα καὶ ἐσθῆς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν.

Aristotle is tracing the design of nature in the creation of animals and plants, first at their birth, secondly at their maturity. She has provided food taken from the parents in various forms for the young of animals at or about the time of their birth, and, after they are born, she has provided one to sustain the other, plants for the sake of animals, animals for the sake of man. The principle that the lower exist for the sake of the higher is deeply rooted in the philosophy of Aristotle. The belief that the animals are intended for his use is natural to man because he actually uses a small part of them. Yet Plato would remind us (Politicus 263 D) that 'a crane or some other intelligent animal' would

have a different account to give of the matter.

Compare Butler, *Analogy*, Pt. I., ch. vii.: 'It is highly probable, that the natural world is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the moral, as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies for minds.' Yet how far the idea of design is applicable to nature, how far we can argue from a fact to an intention, and how far such a conception, whether in ancient or modern times, has enlightened or has blinded the minds of philosophical enquirers,—are questions not easily determined.

The opposition is between the young of animals before and after birth, answering imperfectly to κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν, and εὐθύς καὶ τελειωθεῖσι: the first is illustrated in § 10, the second in § 11. There is no necessity for omitting (with Göttling and Bernays) γενομένοις, which is found with a slight variation, γενωμένοις, in all MSS. and confirmed by Moerbeke who has 'genitis.' For the use of γενομένοις = 'after they are born' cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 12. § 5, τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι αἰτίοι (sc. οἱ γονεῖς) καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι.

8. 12. ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς πολεμικῆς).

Cp. Plat. *Soph.* 222 C, where hunting is the genus of which war is a species: and Laveleye (*Primitive Property*, c. 7, p. 100, English trans.), who speaks of the warlike character of hunting tribes, citing this passage.

8. 13. ἔν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἔστιν.

In this sentence two clauses are compressed into one:—'one kind of acquisition is according to nature, and this is a part of household management.'

κατὰ φύσιν is equivalent to ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἔστι, and is best taken, not with οἰκονομικῆς (Bernays) but with κτητικῆς, as is shown by the use of the words infra § 15: ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δι' ἧν αἰτίαν, δῆλον.

8. 13. ὃ δεῖ ἦτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχει, ὧν ἔστι θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων πρὸς ζωτῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας.

ὃ δεῖ is a confused expression referring grammatically to εἶδος κτητικῆς or τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος, but in sense to the property with which this art of acquisition is concerned. It is needless to read with Bernays καθ' ὃ δεῖ, for the inexact antecedent is common in Aristotle.

αὐτὴν refers to κτητικῆ or possibly to φύσις: the nominative to ὑπάρχει is either the same as to ὑπάρχειν, i. e. ὃ = κτήματα understood from εἶδος κτητικῆς, or θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων ὃ ἔστι πρὸς ζωτῶν ἀναγκαῖα, the genitive ὧν being substituted by attraction for the nominative = ὅπως ὑπάρχει χρήματα ὧν ἔστι θησαυρισμὸς. It must be admitted that the words ὧν ἔστι would be better away: they read awkwardly, and, if this were a sufficient reason for rejecting them, might be deemed spurious.

8. 14. πλούτου δ' οὐθὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται.

Solon, Fr. xii. 71 Bergk. The line is also found in Theognis 227 with a slight variation, ἀνθρώποισι for ἀνδράσι κείται.

8. 15. κείται γὰρ ὡσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις.

A slight inaccuracy; either 1) πλούτῳ understood = τῆ τέχνῃ τοῦ πλούτου: or 2) ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις may be taken to mean the subjects of the other arts: or vaguely = 'in the other arts': or 3) τῆ κατὰ φύσιν κτητικῆ may be supplied from the beginning of the sentence.

8. 15. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἀπειρον οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶ τέχνης οὔτε πλήθει οὔτε μεγέθει, ὃ δὲ πλοῦτος ὀργάνων πλείθος ἐστὶν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν.

Life, according to Aristotle, is subject, like the arts, to a limit, and requires only a certain number of implements.

Cp. the passage in the Republic (i. 349, 350) in which it is shewn from the analogy of the arts that the just and the wise do not aim at excess. Here as elsewhere 'the good is of the nature of the finite,' whereas evil is undefined. Cp. also Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 14, τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπειρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἰκαζον, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου: and Mill, Polit. Econ., Preliminary Remarks, 'the definition of wealth as signifying instruments is philosophically correct but departs too widely from the custom of language.'

8. 15. δι' ἣν αἰτίαν.

Sc. because provision has to be made for the uses of life.

9. 1. δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας.

'Owing to which,' or 'to the nature of which,' 'there appears to be no limit,' etc.

9. 1. ἔστι δ' ἣ μὲν φύσει ἣ δ' οὐ φύσει.

So Plato divides κτητικῆ into θηρευτικῆ and ἀλλακτικῆ, Soph. 223 ff.

9. 2. ἐκάστου κτήματος διπλῆ ἢ χρῆσις.

Cp. Adam Smith's 'Value in use' and 'Value in exchange'; Wealth of Nations, Book i. c. 4, though the order of the two ideas is inverted. For to Aristotle the value in use or teleological value is the truer and better, to Adam Smith as a political economist the value in exchange is prior in importance.

9. 4. ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς.

Sc. τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

9. 5. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκοινωνοῦν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἑτέρων· ὧν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαῖον ποιέσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις.

Bernays inserts ἕτεροι before ἑτέρων, which he would translate 'different persons want

different things; and he assumes the idea of want to be implied in *κεχωρισμένοι*. But it is difficult to understand this explanation. A fair meaning may be elicited from the text, as it stands:— 1)* 'In families they shared in all things alike; when they were dispersed they had many things as before, but not all the same': or 2) *καὶ ἑτέρων* may be taken more simply: 'they shared in many things as before, and had many other things as well'; i. e. the enlargement of society gave rise to new wants. The word *ἑκοινωνου* = *κοινὰ εἶχον* is not equally applicable to both clauses; in the second clause some other word like *εἶχον* or *ἐκτῶντο* is wanted.

For *κεχωρισμένοι* compare ii. 2. § 3, *Διοίσει δὲ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνους ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ᾧσι κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἷον Ἀρκάδες.*

οἱ μὲν, sc. *οἱ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ*, 'mankind in the first stage of society'; *οἱ δέ*, sc. *πλειονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὔσης* further explained by *κεχωρισμένοι*, 'mankind after their dispersion.'

ᾧν in the words which follow is to be connected with *τὰς μεταδόσεις*.

9. 5. *καὶ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν ἔθνῶν.*

καὶ which is found in all the MSS., though omitted in William de Moerbeke, merely emphasizes the whole clause 'As moreover some barbarian nations still do.' There is no need to introduce *νῦν* after *καὶ* without MS. authority, as Bernays has done.

9. 6. *εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐτάρκειας.*

Lit. 'to fill up what was wanting of the self-sufficingness intended by nature;' or 'to fill up what nature demanded in order to make man self-sufficing,' = *εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνδείας ὥστε αὐτάρκη εἶναι.*

9. 7. *κατὰ λόγον.* 'In a natural way'; 'as might be expected.'

9. 7. *ξενικωτέρας γινομένης τῆς βοήθειας.*

'When the supply began to come more from foreign countries,' etc.

9. 7. *ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἣ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις.*

'Of necessity there arose a currency.'

Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 371 B, *νόμισμα σύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα.* Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 11, *οἷον δ' ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην.*

9. 8. *ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὃν εἶχε τῆν χρείαν εὐμεταχείριστον.*

'Money belongs to the class of things which are in themselves useful and convenient for the purposes of life,' although there may be circumstances under which it is a mere sham (*λατῆρος*); see § 11.

9. 9. *πορισθέντος οὖν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ἴσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δι'*

ἐμπειρίας ἤδη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλεῖστον ποιήσει κέρδος.

θάτερον εἶδος, i.e. 'other' than what Aristotle before called ἐν εἶδος κτητικῆς (c. 8. § 13) which he had not yet distinguished from καπηλική. He admits that the simpler forms of exchange are necessary; but he also supposes that there are two uses to which the art of money-making may be applied, the one, the storing up of the necessaries of life, which he approves, the other, retail trade which he condemns. A prejudice against money, which is further developed in the condemnation of usury (c. 10. §§ 4, 5) underlies the whole tone of thought. We may note that καπηλική, though here applied to trade in general, carries with it the disparaging association of shopkeeping.

πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον is dependent on δι' ἐμπειρίας.

9. 11. For the story of Midas see Ovid, Met. xi. 90-145. It is obvious that Midas would have suffered equally if his touch had produced food or clothing or any other article of commerce. In his account of money Aristotle seems to be perplexed between its usefulness and its uselessness, and between the good and bad consequences which flow from it.

9. 12. τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς.

Money is the element, i.e. the instrument of exchange. It is also the limit or end of it. Exchange is not possible without money and seeks for nothing beyond it.

9. 13. καὶ ἄπειρος δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλοῦτος.

There is no limit to the art of making money any more than to medicine or other arts; for we want to have as much health and wealth as we can. But there *is* a limit if we regard wealth as only a means to an end, i.e. to the maintenance of a household. The passage is not very clearly expressed, owing partly to the double meaning of the word πέρας, (1) 'limit' or 'measure,' as opposed to the infinite or indefinite ἄπειρον, and (2) 'end' as opposed to 'means.' Aristotle probably intends to say that the art of money making is unlimited, having no other end but wealth, which is also unlimited; whereas in the art of household management, the limit or end is fixed by natural needs.

There is another confusion in this chapter. Aristotle tries to make a difference in kind between the legitimate and illegitimate use of exchange, but the difference is really one of degree. Trade is not rendered illegitimate by the use of coin, which is natural and necessary. The source of the confusion is that he never regards exchange on the great scale as the saving of labour, but only as the means of creating superfluous wealth.

9. 13. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς ἄπειρον ἔστι καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἄπειρον (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ ἐκεῖνο βούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἄπειρον (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων κτῆσις.

'The art of money-making, like the other arts, is limited in the means, but unlimited in the end; as the physician seeks health without limit, so the money-maker seeks wealth

without limit.' Yet the analogy is defective; for there is no accumulation of health in the same sense in which there may be an accumulation of wealth. The physician stands really on the same footing with the manager of the household; for both equally seek to fulfil to the utmost their respective functions, the one to order the household, the other to improve the health of the patient, and there is a limit to both. The opposition of means and ends is also questionable; for the end may be regarded as the sum of the means, and would not an unlimited end, if such a conception is allowable, imply unlimited means, or the unlimited use of limited?

9. 14. τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς οὐ χρηματιστικῆς ἔστι πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον.

Lit. 'the art of household management which is not concerned with money-making has a limit; for this (sc. ὁ τοιοῦτος, the unlimited making of money described above) is not its business.'

9. 15. ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ τῆς χρήσεως τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὗσα ἑκατέρωθεν τῆς χρηματιστικῆς.

'For the two uses of money-making being concerned with the same thing, namely coin or wealth, they run into each other.'

τῆς χρήσεως governs both τῆς χρηματιστικῆς and τοῦ αὐτοῦ. The emendation of Bernays ἑκατέρωθεν τῆς χρηματιστικῆς is unnecessary.

9. 15. τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ χρήσεως κτήσεως, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταύτόν, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἕτερον τέλος, τῆς δ' ἡ αὐξήσεως.

χρήσεως κτήσεως. 'For acquisition belongs to the same use of χρηματιστικῆς,' i.e. in all acquisition chrematistic is used in the same way, though the ends differ, for the end in the one case is external, i.e. the supply of the household, in the other case, mere accumulation.

9. 16. ὅσοι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν ἐπιβάλλονται, τὸ πρὸς ταῦς ἀπολαύσεις ταῦς σωματικὰς ζητοῦσιν, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ κτήσει φαίνεται ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ.

Even good men desire pleasures, and therefore wealth, just because these (τοῦτ') depend on wealth. Cp. τοῦτο, § 15, referring to χρηματιστικῆς.

9. 17. ἀνδρίας γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ θάρσος.

I. e. whereas the virtue of courage, the art of medicine or of military command have severally ends of their own, they are perverted to the unnatural end of money-making.

10. 1. δῆλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ χρηματιστικῆς ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ.

τὸ ἀπορούμενον see supra c. 8. §§ 1, 2.

τοῦτο, sc. τὰ χρήματα, understood from χρηματιστικῆς as infra § 3 τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν refers to τὰ χρήματα. ἀλλὰ δεῖ is the other alternative of the ἀπορία, implying the answer to the question: 'whether the art of money-making is the business of the

manager of the household and of the statesman or whether [this is not the case, but] the possession of wealth must be presupposed? [We reply, the latter.] For as the art of the statesman receives men from nature, even so must nature, that is to say land or sea or some other element, provide them with food.'

10. 1. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεῖ ἡ πολιτικὴ, ἀλλὰ λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρῆται αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τροφῆν τῆν φύσιν δεῖ παραδοῦναι γῆν ἢ θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι.

The last words γῆν ἢ θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι are either 1)* in apposition with τῆν φύσιν, or 2) accusatives after παραδοῦναι. In the first case γῆν and θάλατταν are an explanation of τῆν φύσιν. In the second case τροφῆν is a remote accusative, 'nature gives land and sea for the supply of food.' The latter way of taking the words is forced. Nature is here said to provide food, but no real distinction can be drawn between the provision of food by nature and the acquisition or appropriation of it by the labour of man, cp. § 3.

10. 1. ἐκ δὲ τούτων, ὡς δεῖ, ταῦτα διαθεῖναι προσήκει τὸν οἰκονόμον.

ἐκ τούτων, 'thereupon,' i. e. ἐκ τοῦ λαβεῖν παρὰ φύσεως; ταῦτα διαθεῖναι, 'to order them,' i. e. the things which nature gives [for the use of the household]; or ἐκ τούτων = 'from what is given by nature.' ταῦτα διαθεῖναι, 'to set in order,' i. e. to select and arrange the things necessary for the household.

10. 2. καὶ γὰρ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις.

'Were this otherwise' (as in the translation) i. e. 'if the duty of the manager of a household consisted in producing and not in using, then he would be equally concerned with money-making and with medicine. And so he is to a certain extent concerned with both, but unlike the physician or the maker of money only to a certain extent, whereas they pursue their vocations without limit.'

10. 3. καὶ περὶ ὑγείας.

About health as well as about wealth.

10. 3. μάλιστα δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, δεῖ φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν.

τοῦτο refers to some general idea, such as 'the means of life,' to be gathered from τὰ χρήματα in the preceding sentence.

10. 3. παντὶ γάρ, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, τροφή τὸ λειπόμενον ἐστίν.

τὸ λειπόμενον = τὸ λειπόμενον ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, the residuum or that from which the offspring parts, i. e. milk, white of egg, etc.: cp. De Hist. Anim. i. 5, 489 b. 8, φόν . . . ἐξ οὗ γίνεται τὸ γινόμενον ζῷον ἐκ μορίου τῆν ἀρχήν, τὸ δ' ἄλλο τροφή τῷ γινομένῳ ἐστίν: and supra c. 8. § 10.

10. 4. διὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ πᾶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων.

Fruits and animals are the gifts of nature and intended for the subsistence of man (cp. c. 8): hence (διὸ), with some equivocation, the trade in them is said to be natural.

10. 5. ὁ δὲ τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα νομίσματος.

Cp. Arist. Nub. 1286, τοῦτο δ' ἔσθ' ὁ τόκος τί θηρίον; Thesm. 845, ἀξία γούνην εἶ τόκου τεκοῦσα τοιοῦτον τόκον.

Cp. also Shakspeare's Merchant of Venice, Act i, Scene 3,—'A breed of barren metal.'

It has been customary, since Bentham wrote, to denounce Usury Laws on the ground 1) that they are ineffectual, or worse, 2) that they are unjust both to lender and borrower, because they interfere with the natural rate of interest. But in primitive states of society, as in India at the present day, they may have been more needed and more easy to enforce. In a simple agricultural population where the want of capital is greatly felt, and land is the only security, the usurer becomes a tyrant: hence the detestation of usury. The other and better side of usury, that is to say, the advantage of transferring money at the market rate from those who cannot use it to those who can, was not understood by Aristotle any more than the advantage of exchanging commodities. Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 555 E; Laws v. 742.

11. 1. τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τῆν δ' ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν.

1*) 'To speculate about such matters is a liberal pursuit; the practice of them is servile.' In modern language 'a gentleman may study political economy, but he must not keep a shop.' Cp. infra § 5, περί ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν: and iv. 15. § 4, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν· οὐ γάρ πω κρίσις γέγονεν ἀμφισβητουμένων περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος· ἔχει δὲ τιν' ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν: also iii. 8. § 1, τῷ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδὲ τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τῆν περὶ ἕκαστον ἀλήθειαν.

Or again 2) 'Speculation is free; but in practice we are limited by circumstances;' i.e. speculation on such matters may go to any extent or take any direction, but in practice we must restrict ourselves to the necessities of the case, e. g. the nature of the soil, climate, neighbourhood, etc. § 5 infra may be quoted in defence of either explanation, the words χρήσιμον πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας supporting the second, φορτικὸν τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν the first. ἐμπειρίαν connects with ἔμπειρον which follows: 'experience of live-stock is one of the useful parts of money-making.'



SYNOPSIS OF THE VARIOUS DIVISIONS OF κτητική, in c. 11. §§ 1-4.

11. 3. ναυκληρία, φορτηγία.

ναυκληρία = 'commerce by sea,' φορτηγία = 'commerce by land.' The word ναυκληρία may also be taken in the narrower sense of 'owning of ships'; and φορτηγία in the sense of 'carrying whether by sea or land.' But this explanation of the words does not afford so natural a division.

11. 3. διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἕτερα ἐτέρων τῷ τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν

τῆν ἐπικαρπίαν.

It is not certain whether in this sentence Aristotle is speaking of trades in general without reference to the three previous divisions, or, of the divisions themselves, commerce by sea being the more profitable, commerce by land the more secure mode of trading. The opposition of τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δὲ favours the more general application of the words.

11. 4, 5. οἷον ὑλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική. αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ ἤδη περιείληφε γένη· πολλὰ γὰρ εἴδη τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλλευομένων ἐστίν.

In these words Aristotle is illustrating 'the third or mixed kind of chrematistic,' which is concerned not only with fruits of the earth and animals, but with other products dug out of the earth and manufactured by man.

ἤδη, 'mining again is not a simple art, but already—or, not to speak of other species—contains in itself many subdivisions.'

11. 6, 7. εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τῆς τύχης, βαναυσόταται δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα, δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλείστα χρήσεις, ἀγεννέσταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνίοις γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, κ.τ.λ.

The connexion is with the word καθόλου in § 5. Aristotle, although he declines to go into the particulars of these arts, gives some general characteristics of them.

In the sentence which follows, the clause ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν skips the intervening passage εἰσὶ δὲ . . . ἀρετῆς, and goes back to the previous subject. In another author we might suspect a gloss. But there are many such dislocations in Aristotle's Politics; e. g. iii. 4. §§ 11-13. For the meaning cp. Rhet. i. 4. 1359 b. 31, ἀναγκαῖον τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐρημένων ἱστορικῶν εἶναι.

11. 7. οἷον Χάρητι δῆ.

δῆ is to be taken with οἷον like ὅπως δῆ, οὔτω δῆ, καὶ δῆ with a slight emphasis, and sometimes with a word interposed, e. g. καὶ πλούτῳ δῆ, Nic. Eth. iv. 1. § 6.

11. 8. Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλησίου.

Thales is referred to in the Nic. Eth. vi. 7. § 5 and by Plato in the Theaetetus (p. 174 A) as a type of the unpractical philosopher. 'But even he could have made a fortune, if he had pleased.'

11. 8. τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι ὄν.

Cp. § 12. The device attributed to Thales is only an application of the general principle of creating a monopoly.

11. 11. ἐπώλει μόνος, οὐ πολλῆν ποιήσας ὑπερβολὴν κ.τ.λ.

I. e. he bought up all the iron when it was very cheap, and having a monopoly sold it

rather, but not very, dear.

11. 12.

ὄραμα θάλεω.

ὄραμα, which is the reading of all the MSS., is used in the metaphorical sense of 'idea' here required, only in Pseudo-Demosthenes, 1460. 26, perhaps a sufficient authority for the meaning of a word.

* εὔρημα (Camerarius): θεώρημα (Coraes): δροῦμα (Prof. Campbell) may be suggested. Cp. Plat. Theaet. 150 A.

12. 1.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη, κ.τ.λ.

The apodosis is lost; the suppressed thought that 'all three parts are concerned with man' is resumed in the next chapter.

12. 1.

καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχειν καὶ τέκνων.

Sc. τὸν ἄνδρα. Supply for the construction either τὴν μέρος οἰκονομικῆς or εἴρηται αὐτὸν from the preceding words.

12. 2.

ἐξ ἴσου γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τῶν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηθέν. ὅμως δέ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄρχῃ τὸ δ' ἄρχηται, ζητεῖ διαφορὰν εἶναι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὡσπερ καὶ Ἄμασις εἶπε τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδανιπτήρος λόγον.

βούλεται sc. ἡ πολιτεία or ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρχή, understood from ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς: 'where there is a πολιτεία, political equality is implied. All other differences, such as titles of honour, are temporary and official only.' The construction of ζητεῖ may be similarly explained. Or both may be taken impersonally.

Ἄμασις, who made his foot-pan into a god, as he had himself been made into a king, cp. Herod. ii. 172. The connexion is as follows: 'Among equals, where one rules and another is ruled, we make an artificial distinction of names and titles, but this is not the case in the relation of husband and wife, because the distinction between them exists already and is permanent.'

12. 3.

τὸ δ' ἄρρεν ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.

Resuming the words in § 1 γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς, and adding the distinction that the relation between husband and wife, unlike that between ruler and subject in a πολιτεία, is permanent (ἀεὶ). This permanence of relation between husband and wife makes it rather an 'aristocratical' than a 'constitutional' rule, and in Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 5 and Eud. Eth. vii. 9. § 4 it is so described.

13. 2.

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕξεων.

Supply ἀρετὴ τις before τῶν ἄλλων—assisted by οὐδεμία in the following clause. Cp. infra § 13, σκυτοτόμος δ' οὐθείς, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν. The words τῶν τοιούτων are used inaccurately 'of such habits,' meaning the habits which have virtues like these.

13. 5.

ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν ἀμφοτέρους ἀρετῆς, ταύτης δ' εἶναι διαφορὰς, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχομένων.

'Both require virtue, and of these virtues there will be different kinds since the natural subject differs [from the natural ruler]'; or, with Bernays, 'corresponding to the difference in the subject classes,' cp. infra clause 7. But why only in the subject?—a difficulty which seems to have been felt by those copyists or editors who, supported by Moerbeke, insert ἀρχόντων καὶ before ἀρχομένων. Better: 'There will be differences of virtue in the ruling and subject classes, similar to those which [we have already noted to exist] in the natural subject.'

13. 6. καὶ τοῦτο εὐθύς ὑφήγηται περὶ τῆν ψυχὴν.

1) '*And this is immediately suggested by the soul': or 2) 'And this, without looking further, is the leading or guiding principle in the soul.' There is a rule of superior and inferior, not only in states, but in the soul itself.

The verb ὑφήγηται in this passage is taken passively by Bonitz, 'and this distinction was indicated in the soul.' Cp. Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. i. 2. 3, ὅτι καθάπερ ὑφήγηται περὶ τούτων λεκτέον. But in most other examples of its use the word must be, or is better, construed actively, and it is safer to take it so in this passage. Cp. supra c. 5. §§ 2-6.

13. 6-8. ὥστε φύσει τὰ πλείω ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἄνῆρ παιδός· καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον· ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἀτελής. ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς.

By inserting ἐπεὶ before φύσει, altering τὰ πλείω ἄρχοντα into πλείω τὰ ἄρχοντα, and omitting ἀναγκαῖον before ἔχειν a few lines lower down, Bernays has ingeniously fused the whole train of thought with its many involutions, into a single consistent sentence. But in such a complex passage, an anacoluthon seems more probable, and Bernays' alterations are considerable and unsupported by MS. authority. Cp. Nic. Eth. iii. 5. § 17, for a similar passage, which has also been arranged so as to form a continuous sentence; also c. 8. § 3; c. 12. § 1; iii. 9. § 6, and note. The words ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον go back to ταύτης εἶναι διαφορᾶς.

13. 9. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἠθικῆ ἀρετῆ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτῆ σωφροσύνη κ.τ.λ.

'Moral virtue is to be attributed to all these classes and [as they differ in character so] their virtues differ.'

13. 10. καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες κ.τ.λ.

In the Meno of Plato (p. 73), Socrates argues for the necessity of some general definition of virtue against Gorgias, who, being unable to apprehend such a general idea, confuses the whole of virtue with its parts. Either from an imperfect recollection of the passage or perhaps also from the party spirit which made him or his school professional adversaries of Plato (see note on ii. 4. § 2), Aristotle takes a view of his meaning which, when compared with the context, is seen to be untenable. For the Platonic Socrates is maintaining what Aristotle is elsewhere quite ready to allow, — that there must be a common idea of virtue; this Gorgias the Sophist in the infancy of

philosophy is unable to understand, and in reply can only enumerate separate virtues. The tendency in the Aristotelian writings to refer to Plato, the mention of Gorgias, and the opposition between the general idea of virtue and the particular virtues sufficiently prove that the passage in the Meno is intended.

13. 13. καὶ ὁ μὲν δοῦλος τῶν φύσει σκυτοτόμος δ' οὐθείς.

Aristotle is contrasting the lot of the slave and of the artisan. The slave is in one respect better off than the artisan because he is directed by a master, whereas the artisan has no intelligence but his own by which to guide his life. He too is a slave without the advantages of slavery. Thus Socialist writers, like Lassalle and others, in recent times have contrasted unfavourably the lot of the modern operative with that of the mediæval serf. We may note in modern times the civilizing influence of domestic service on the homes and manners of the poor. Many a household servant in England has received an impress from a master or mistress, and in Aristotle's language, 'has derived a virtue from them.' Cp. iii. 5. § 4, τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων οἱ μὲν ἐνὶ λειτουργοῦντες τὰ τοιαῦτα δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινοὶ βάνουσοι καὶ θῆτες, where, in a similar spirit, Aristotle contrasts the duties of the artisan, which are rendered to the community, with the duties of the slave, which are rendered to the individual.

13. 14. ἀλλ' οὐ τῆν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων δεσποτικήν.

These strange words may be translated literally: 'But not in so far as he possesses an art of the master such as would direct the slave in his particular employment;' i. e. it is not as the teacher of a craft but as a master that he imparts virtue to his slave.

The slave is relative to the master. His virtues are all received from him, and cannot be imparted by any chance instructor. Nor does the master instruct him in any art. But the artisan stands in no relation to another; he has a separate art (§ 13) which he exercises independently. He is without any ennobling influence external to himself, whereas the slave is inspired by his master.

13. 14. διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρῆσθαι μόνον· νοουθητέον γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.

These words may mean: either 1)* 'who do not allow us to converse with slaves,' or 2) 'who do not allow to slaves the gift of reason.' In either case there is a reference to Plato, Laws, vi. 777, 778.

13. 15. περὶ δὲ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρὸς, τῆς τε περὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοῦ ὁμιλίας, τί τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἐστὶ, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ διώκειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπελθεῖν.

This is one of the many promises in the Politics which are unfulfilled. Cp. iv. 15. § 3, a passage which is sometimes quoted in this connexion. But the reference is only to the office of παιδονόμος and γυναικονόμος.

BOOK II.

1. 1. ἔτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ' αὐτῶν ἕτερον μὴ δοκῆι πάντως εἶναι σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων.

τὸ ζητεῖν is the nominative of μὴ δοκῆι: πάντως is to be taken closely with μὴ, 'and that our object in seeking for a new state is not at all to make a display of ingenuity; but to supply defects in states which are known to us, both in those which are actually existing and also in theoretical states like that of Plato.' μὴ δοκῆι and δοκῶμεν are dependent on εἶνα.

1. 1. ἐπιβαλέσθαι τῆν μέθοδον.

'To undertake' or 'take upon oneself,' a curious and idiomatic use of the word, found also in Plato and Thucydides. See Bonitz (Liddell and Scott), s. v.

1. 2. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος εἷς ὁ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολῖται κοινωνοὶ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως.

εἷς ὁ τῆς is required by the sense and is supported by the old Latin Translation. All the Greek MSS. however read ἰσότης.

1. 3. ἐν τῇ πολιτεῖ τῇ Πλάτωνος, either the title of the book (cp. iv. c. 4. § 11; c. 7. § 1), or 'in the state which is described by Plato.'

The comments of Aristotle on Plato's Republic and Laws, contained in this and the following chapters, can hardly be dealt with properly in single notes. They are full of inaccuracies and inconsistencies. But the nature of these comments, which throw great light on the character of ancient criticism in general, will be best appreciated when they are brought together and compared with one another in a comprehensive manner. I have therefore reserved much of what has to be said about them for an essay 'On the Criticisms of Plato in Aristotle.' Both in the essay and in the notes I have been much indebted to Susemihl.

2. 1. δι' ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετῆσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ὃ φησὶ τῇ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὥς μὲν εἴρηται νῦν, ἀδύνατον. πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν οὐδὲν διώρισται.

δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, sc. unity.

'The argument of Socrates does not show that these enactments are to be approved for the reason which he gives [viz. as tending to unity]; and, regarded as a means to the end which he attributes to the state, unless some new explanation of them is offered, they are impossible.' Bernays places a comma after πρὸς, which he takes with ἔτι: cp. πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι (Meteorol. i. 8, 346 a. 10); πρὸς δὲ ἔτι (Herod. iii. 74). The construction is thus made simpler; but the adverbial use of πρὸς hardly ever occurs in Aristotle. 'Moreover, the end, viz. unity, which he attributes to the state upon his own showing is impossible.'

The first of these propositions, τὸ μίαν ὅτι μάλιστα εἶναι τῆν πόλιν is discussed in the remainder of this chapter,—the second at the commencement of chapter 3.

ὥς μὲν εἴρηται νῦν, 'as it is described in his book,' or 'as it is actually described.' Cp.

infra c. 5. § 23, νῦν γε οὐδὲν διώρισται.

πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν. Sc. τὸ τέλος, or generally 'what Plato means by unity.'

For the use of διελεῖν in the sense of '*to interpret,' cp. Herod. vii. 16, εἰ δὲ ἄρα μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο τοιοῦτο οἶον ἐγὼ διαιρέω, ἀλλὰ τι τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχον, σὺ πᾶν αὐτὸ συλλαβῶν εἴρηκας. διελεῖν may also be taken in the more common sense of 'to distinguish,' i.e. how we are to distinguish or define unity and plurality (cp. iii. 13. § 6: εἰ δ' ἴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶεν ὀλίγοι πάμπαν οἱ τῆν ἀρετῆν ἔχοντες, τίνα δεῖ διελεῖν τὸν τρόπον;).

2. 3. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων.

The equality among citizens which is elsewhere (iii. 16. § 2; iv. 11. § 8; vii. 8. § 4) said to be the true and natural principle, is not inconsistent with a difference of character and of pursuits.

2. 3. διοίσει δὲ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνους, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ᾧσι κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἶον Ἀρκάδες.

The clause ὅταν μὴ κ.τ.λ. may be a description either 1)* of the ἔθνος, 'when the inhabitants of a country are not yet distributed in villages'; or 2) of the πόλις, 'when they are no longer dispersed in villages.' According to 1), the Arcadians are placed below, according to 2), above the ordinary condition of village communities.

1) Taking the first rendering, we may compare Plato's Symposium, 193 A, νυνὶ δὲ διὰ τῆν ἀδικίαν διφκίσθημεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καθάπερ Ἀρκάδες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων. But Arcadia was also the most backward state in Hellas, the type of primitive simplicity. Hence, without referring to the dispersion of the Mantineans by the Lacedaemonians (Xen. Hell. v. 2. 6) it is possible that Aristotle is speaking, not of their actual, but of their primitive and traditional state. 2) On the other hand he may be using the Arcadians as an example, not of the ἔθνος but of the πόλις, and contrasting their condition, when centralized in Megalopolis by Epaminondas, with the ruder life of earlier times. They would certainly have furnished the latest illustration of a συνοικισίς. We may paraphrase 'When they are not scattered in villages, but, like the Arcadians, have a central city.'

It may be argued on the other side that Aristotle would not have used the Arcadians who were the most backward of Hellenes, as the type of a civilized, but of a semi-barbarous, nation.

To Aristotle the ἔθνος is a lower stage than the πόλις. He had no idea of a nation in the higher sense; nor did he see how ill adapted the Greek πόλις was to the larger order of the world, which was springing up around him, or how completely it had outlived its objects.

2. 3. ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ ἔν γενέσθαι, εἴδει διαφέρει.

The state like the nation is not a mere aggregate, but has an organic unity of higher and lower elements.

2. 4. διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἴθικοῖς εἴρηται

πρότερον.

Euclid in his 6th Book uses ἀντιπεπονημένοι to express the relation of reciprocal proportion. Probably the ethical significance of the term among the Pythagoreans was derived from its mathematical use. Cf. Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 1, and Alex. Aphrod. on Met. i. 5, τῆς μὲν δικαιοσύνης ἴδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς τε καὶ ἴσον, etc. (Scholia in Arist. Ed. Berol. 539 b. 12.)

ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς. Here, and in vii. 13. § 5, Aristotle quotes the Ethics in the Politics, as he quotes the Politics in the Rhetoric (i. 8, 1366 a. 21). But probably the references have been interpolated.

2. 5. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μετέβαλλον οἱ σκυτεῖς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μῆ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ σκυτοτόμοι καὶ τέκτονες ᾗσαν.

These words are a reflection on the proposed arrangement, not unlike the satirical remarks of Socrates in the Memorabilia (i. 2. § 9), and in the Republic ii. 374. But the connexion is imperfectly drawn out:—Aristotle, while making this reflection upon the inconvenience of the practice, admits in the next sentence that the alternation of rulers and subjects is in some cases the only arrangement possible. To Plato it seemed essential that the division between rulers and ruled should be permanent, like the division of labour in the arts, between one craftsman and another. Aristotle says, 'yes, if possible,' but this permanence is not always attainable, for where there is equality and freedom among the citizens, they must rule in turn (vii. c. 9; cp. also infra, c. 11. § 13).

2. 6. ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατόν . . ἕξ ἀρχῆς.

'However desirable it may be that the same should rule, yet, if they cannot, but justice requires that all, being by nature equal, should share in the government, then they must rule by turns.'

2. 6. ἐν τούτοις δὲ μιμεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἴκειν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἕξ ἀρχῆς.

ἐν τούτοις, sc. among those who are naturally equal and have a right to share in the government.

μιμεῖσθαι, 'to imitate,' i.e. to come as near as we can to 'this principle of succession,' dependent on βέλτιον.

τοῖς ἕξ ἀρχῆς, sc. εἴκουσιν. Like 'the original rulers, who have yielded to them;' or, without supplying εἴκουσιν, nearly the same meaning may be obtained. Cp. Book iii. 6. § 9, a passage which helps to explain this, διὸ καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ᾗ κατ' ἰσότητα τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκυῖα καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἀξιοῦσιν ἀρχεῖν, πρότερον μὲν, ᾗ πέφυκεν, ἀξιοῦντες ἐν μέρει λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖν τινα πάλιν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἀρχῶν ἐσκόπει τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον.

2. 7. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἀρχόντων ἕτεροι ἑτέρας ἀρχοῦσιν ἀρχάς.

1) The equalisation of rulers and ruled is attained in two ways: a) by succession; b) by the variety of offices which the same person may hold,—that is to say, instead of going

out of office, he may pass from one office to another, from higher to lower and conversely; the alderman may become a common councillor or the common councillor an alderman. Or, 2) the words are a passing thought suggested by ἄλλοι γενόμενοι, confirmatory of the view that the State consists of dissimilars. 'There is a further variety; not only do they come into and go out of office, as if they were no longer the same persons, but they have different offices.'

3. 2. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς ἕκαστος, τάχ' ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ὃ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὁ Σωκράτης . . . νῦν δ' οὐχ οὕτω φήσουσιν κ.τ.λ.

'When each man can speak of his own wife, his own son, or his own property, the clear conviction which he entertains may tend to produce unity, but this is not the meaning of those who would have all things in common; they mean "all," not "each." '

3. 3. τὸ γὰρ πάντες καὶ ἀμφοτέρω καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια διὰ τὸ διπλὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικοὺς ποιεῖ συλλογισμούς· διὸ ἐστὶ τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὡδὶ μὲν καλόν, ἄλλ' οὐ δυνατόν, ὡδὶ δ' οὐθὲν ὁμοιοτήτων.

The absolute unity of 'all' in the sense of 'each' is not what Plato intended, and is in fact impracticable. The unity of all in the abstract, i.e. of the whole state, excluding individuals, does not tend to harmony. Such a unity is really inconceivable; a state without individuals is a μάταιον εἶδος. (Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 10.) The term 'all,' like the term 'one,' is ambiguous, and has a different meaning when applied to the state and to the individuals of whom the state is composed.

πάντες καὶ ἀμφοτέρω. The fallacy is that these words may mean 'all' or 'both,' either in a collective or individual sense.

περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια. The fallacy consists in assuming that odd and even are the same because two odd numbers when added together are even: e. g. the odd numbers, 5 + 7 = 12, which is an even number; or that five is both odd and even, because it is composed of three which is an odd and two which is an even number. See Arist. Sophist. Elench. c. 4. 162 a. 33. Cp. infra c. 5. § 27, οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὧν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιον, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κ.τ.λ. 'For the word πάντες is fallacious, and indeed the use of this and other analogous terms is a source of contentious syllogisms in arguments.' καί, 'not only in this instance, but in arguments generally.'

The fallacy referred to is that of σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις, cp. Soph. Elench. c. 20. 177 a. 33 ff.

3. 4. ἢ ὅσον ἕκαστῳ ἐπιβάλλει.

Either, 'only so far as comes in the way of,' or, 'is the business of each,' or, with a slight difference of meaning, 'only so far as it touches or affects each.' Cp. i. 13. § 8, διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τῆν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς.

3. 5. καὶ οὗτοι οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστου.

'Every man will have a thousand sons, and these do not properly belong to him individually, but equally to all.'

3. 5. ἔτι οὕτως ἕκαστος ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εἶν' πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ κακῶς, ὁπόσος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὧν, οἷον ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δεῖνος, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγων καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν χιλίων.

οὕτως*, 'on this principle'; ἐμὸς = ἐμὸς ἔστι. 'Further, on this principle [of common parentage], each one says of the citizen who fares ill or well, "he is mine," whatever fraction he himself may be of the whole number; I mean that (οἷον) he will say, "he is mine," or, "his," and this will be his way of speaking about each of Plato's thousand citizens.' The words have a reference to Plat. Rep. v. 463 E, μάλιστα συμφωνήσουσιν ἑνὸς τινος ἢ εἶν' ἢ κακῶς πράττοντος . . . ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν εἶν' πράττει ἢ τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς. The citizen speaks as one in a thousand of all the rest: he gives a thousandth part of his affection to each and all of the thousand persons who are the objects of it. Or, to put the matter in another way: we may suppose the citizens to be conversing with each other: they say, 'my son is doing well,' or, 'is not doing well,' being each of them a thousandth part of the whole, and those of whom they speak being likewise each of them a thousandth part.

A different view of this passage has been taken in the Text. More stress is laid on the words τὸν εἶν' ἢ κακῶς πράττοντα: the parent is supposed to appropriate the youth who is doing well, and to disown the one who is doing badly: ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εἶν' ἢ κακῶς πράττοντα = ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εἶν' πράττοντα, οὐκ ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν κακῶς πράττοντα. It must be remembered that, according to Aristotle, the true children are liable to be discovered by their likeness to their parents.

τῶν χιλίων, as if Plato had made his state to consist of a thousand citizens; cp. infra c. 6. § 5. This is only an inference from Rep. iv. 423 A, in which Plato says that the ideal state, even if consisting of no more than a thousand soldiers, would be invincible.

3. 7. ὁ μὲν γὰρ υἱὸν κ.τ.λ.

'In Plato's state they are all "mine": in ordinary states there are many sorts of relationship, and the same person may be a father or a brother or a cousin of some one or other; there are likewise remoter degrees of affinity, and remoter still the tie of fellow wardman or fellow tribesman. Even a distant cousinship is preferable to that shadow of a relationship which supersedes them all.'

3. 7. ὁ δ' ἀνεπιόν, ἢ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ συγγένειαν.

The variety of human relations as ordinarily conceived is contrasted with the monotony of Plato's society in which the state and the family are identified.

3. 7. κρεῖττον γὰρ ἴδιον ἀνεπιόν εἶναι ἢ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον υἱόν.

A resumption of πότερον οὕτω κρεῖττον; 'Is not the present practice better? for it is better to have a cousin of your own than to have a son after Plato's fashion.'

3. 9. Φασί τινες . . . τῶν τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων εἶναι τισι τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα τέκνα διαίρεσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας.

Cp. Herod. iv. 180, τῷ ἄν οἴκῳ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὸ παιδίον, τούτου παῖς νομίζεται, who is speaking, however, not of Upper, but of Lower Libya.

4. 1. τῶν οὐδὲν ὄσιόν ἐστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοὺς μὴ πόρρω τῆς συγγενείας ὄντας, ὡςπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἕλωθεν.

'Crimes of violence are worse in the republic of Plato because they are attended with impiety, and they are more likely to be committed because natural relationships are undiscoverable.' Aristotle here mixes up Plato's point of view and his own. He does not remark that Plato having abolished family relations is not really chargeable with the occurrence of offences which arise out of them. Perhaps he would have retorted that the natural relationship could not be thus abolished.

4. 1. καὶ γενομένων, τῶν μὲν γνωριζόντων ἐνδέχεται τὰς νομιζόμενας γίνεσθαι λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μηδεμίαν.

τῶν δὲ is opposed to τῶν μὲν, though not parallel with it = 'but in the other case,' as if τῶν μὲν without γνωριζόντων had preceded. Or a comma may be placed after τῶν μὲν, and γνωριζόντων may be separated from it. 'And when offences take place, in the one case men having knowledge of them, the customary expiations may be made, in the other case they cannot.'

4. 2. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ κοινὸς ποιήσαντα τοὺς υἱοὺς τὸ συνεῖναι μόνον ἀφελεῖν τῶν ἐρώωντων, τὸ δ' ἐρᾶν μὴ κωλύσαι, μηδὲ τὰς χρήσεις τὰς ἄλλας, αἷς πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν εἶναι πάντων ἐστὶν ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ ἀδελοφῶ πρὸς ἀδελοφόν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν μόνον.

The instance quoted, πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν, shews that the reference is to Rep. iii. 403, but Aristotle has been hasty or forgetful in his citation. Plato does not say that he will allow the practice of lovers to prevail between father and son, or brother and brother, but that the endearments of lovers shall be only such as might be practised without offence between members of the same family. τὸ ἐρᾶν evidently in the lover's sense of the word.

4. 4. ἔοικε δὲ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.

'If the legislator desire to keep the inferior classes in a state of weakness, and communism is a source, not of strength, but of weakness, then it is better adapted to them than to the guardians'— that is, according to Aristotle's view of communism, not Plato's. Cp. vii. 9. § 8; c. 10. § 13 where he argues that the legislator should destroy as far as possible any tie of race among the slave population. And the traditional policy of slave-holding countries has been to deprive the slave of education and of family rights.

4. 4. τοιούτους.

Sc. ἦπτον φιλικοὺς gathered from ἦπτον Φιλία.

4. 5. καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης οὕτως οἴεται δεῖν τάπειν τὰ περὶ τὰ τέκνα.

Supply τοῦναντιον (from the preceding) τῆς αἰτίας δι' ἣν, viz. unity. Cp. supra c. 2. § 1, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετῆσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὁ Σωκράτης οὐ

φαίνεται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων.

4. 6, 7. δ καὶ δοκεῖ κάκεινος εἶναι φησι τῆς φιλίας ἔργον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἴσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην ὡς τῶν ἐρώωντων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμούντων συμφύνασι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρους ἓνα. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθάρθαι ἢ τὸν ἓνα· ἐν δὲ τῇ πόλει τὴν φιλίαν ἀναγκαῖον ὑδαρῆν γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ἥκιστα λέγειν τὸν ἓμὸν ἢ υἱὸν πατέρα ἢ πατέρα υἱόν.

Socrates wishes to have the city entirely one: now such a unity is either attained or not attained: if attained like that of the lovers in the Symposium (called here ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις), p. 192, it would be suicidal. But it is not attained, for he only succeeds in creating a very loose tie between his citizens.

ὡς τῶν ἐρώωντων, a rare construction after λέγειν. Cp. Plat. Men o 95 E, ὡς διδακτοῦ οὕσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει.

ἢ τὸν ἓνα. 'If they are to be absorbed in one another, both individualities cannot subsist, though one may.'

4. 8. οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων διαφροντίζειν ἥκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ὅν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ τοιαύτῃ, ἢ πατέρα ὡς υἱῶν ἢ υἱὸν ὡς πατρός, ἢ ὡς ἀδελφοὺς ἀλλήλων.

ἀναγκαῖον ὅν is to be taken with συμβαίνει, ἥκιστα with διαφροντίζειν. The latter word has two constructions, 1) with τινὰ for subject, and οἰκειότητα as object; 2) with πατέρα, υἱόν for subjects, and the genitives υἱῶν, πατρός following, e. g. ἢ πατέρα διαφροντίζειν ὡς υἱῶν.

4. 9. τὸ τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν.

ἀγαπητόν, 'that which is to be cherished or valued,' like ἀγαπητός in Plat. (?) Alcibiades I. 131 E, οὕτ' ἐγένετο, ὡς εἰοικεν, Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ Κλεινίου ἐραστῆς οὕτ' ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ εἷς μόνος, καὶ οὕτος ἀγαπητός, Σωκράτης ὁ Σωφρονίσκου καὶ Φαιναρέτης; and Rhet. i. 7, 1365 b. 19, οὐκ ἴση ζημία, ἂν τις τὸν ἑτερόφθαλμον τυφλώσῃ καὶ τὸν δὴ ἔχοντα ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἀφίηται: also Homer (Odyssey ii. 365) μοῦνος ἔων ἀγαπητός. Compare the English 'dear.' Or, more simply, ἀγαπητόν may also be taken as answering to φιλεῖν: 'men love an object which is naturally to be loved.'

4. 10. καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξιν [εἷς] τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας.

Aristotle is referring to the case of the citizens who pass from one rank to another. Those who are raised to the condition of the guardians and those who are degraded from it have both lost the natural relationships of brothers and sisters, parents and children. But the natural relations still exist although the names of them have disappeared; and therefore they are now less likely to be respected. Here again Aristotle is confusing his own point of view with that of Plato.

παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξιν must be explained as a confusion of rest and motion, lit. 'those who [having been transferred from the other citizens] are now among the guardians.' The words εἷς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας have been explained as a pleonasm = 'in relation to the other citizens' (οὐ προσαγορεύουσιν ἀδελφοὺς, κ.τ.λ.), 'they do not call them brothers.' But the use of εἷς in a different sense in two successive lines is objectionable. It is possible that the words εἷς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας are an error of the copyist, who may

have repeated the words of the previous line. The omission of εἷς (which is wanting in Moerbeke and in two good MSS., M^S. P¹, but inserted as a correction in one of them, and found in all the rest) is the best way of amending the passage.

5. 2. καὶν ἢ ἐκεῖνα χωρίς,

sc. τὰ περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας.

5. 2. πότερον . . τὰς τε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις.

These words are a statement of the general question which is afterwards subdivided into three cases, though the carelessness of the language might at first sight lead to the inference that Aristotle is putting the third case only. Hence Bernays has been led, unnecessarily, to alter the reading. The change made by him of τε into γε and of καὶ into κατὰ impairs the parallelism of κτήσεις and χρήσεις (τὰς γε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον κατὰ τὰς χρήσεις). The three cases are: 1) the soil divided, produce common: 2) soil common, produce divided: 3) soil and produce alike common.

5. 2. ὅπερ ἕνια ποιεῖ τῶν ἔθνῶν.

ἔθνη as in i. 2. § 6, a vague expression for βάρβαροι and generally opposed to πόλεις or Ἕλληνες: also any loosely organised people, ii. 2. § 3; applied to the more general divisions of Hellas, vii. 7. § 4. The cases of Sparta, infra § 7, and of Tarentum, vi. 5. § 10, are not in point, even if their practice could be regarded as communism.

5. 3. ἑτέρων μὲν οἷον ὄντων τῶν γεωργούντων ἄλλος ἂν εἴη τρόπος καὶ ἑῶν.

If the land were cultivated by serfs there would be no disputes among the cultivators, for having no property, they would have nothing to quarrel about.

5. 4. τῶν συναποδήμων κοινωνία· σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλειῖστοι διαφερόμενοι κ.τ.λ.

Either* 'fellow-travellers' or 'fellow-settlers in a foreign city.' Whether the κοινωνία were formed for the purposes of business or only of companionship is not determined. With the words σχεδὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. supply προσκρούουσι.

5. 5. καὶ ἐπικοσμηθὲν . . διενέγκαι.

A condensed expression put for ὅν δὲ νῦν τρόπον ἔχει, διαφέρει, καὶ ἐπικοσμηθὲν ('when it has been improved'), οὗ μικρὸν ἂν διενέγκαι.

5. 6. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλεια διττηρῆναι τὰ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὗ ποιήσουσιν.

Either 1), 'for the division of labour will give rise to no complaints,' i. e. will prevent complaints, ἐπιμέλεια being taken as the nominative to οὗ ποιήσουσιν: or 2) regarding (as the words πρὸς ἀλλήλους and the following clause μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιδώσουσιν seem to indicate) αἱ μὲν ἐπιμέλεια as nom. absolute, or the construction of the sentence as changing, we may translate, 'Every one having a distinct occupation, men will not complain of one another.'

5. 6. δι' ἀρετῆν δέ.

'But where there is virtue there will be in practice community of goods among friends.'

5. 6. ὑπογεγραμμένον.

'Sketched out or faintly indicated.' For ὑπογράφειν, cp. De Gen. Anim. ii. 6, 743 b. 24, οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράφαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῆλον.

5. 7. οἶον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι τοῖς τε δούλοις χρῶνται τοῖς ἀλλήλων ὥς εἰπεῖν ἰδίοις, ἔτι δ' ἵπποις καὶ κυσίν, καὶ δαθηθῶσιν ἐφοδίων ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τῆν χώραν.

χώρα as opposed to πόλις:—'When on a journey in the country, they take the produce in the fields.' The apodosis (i. e. some such words as χρῶνται ἐφοδίοις) is omitted. Cp. Xen. Respub. Lac. 6, §§ 1, 3, 4, Ἐναντία γε μῆν ἔγνω καὶ τάδε τοῖς πλείστοις. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἀλλαῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος καὶ παίδων καὶ οἰκετῶν καὶ χρημάτων ἄρχουσιν· ὁ δὲ Λυκοῦργος, κατασκευάσαι βουλόμενος ὥς ἂν μηδὲν βλάπτοντες ἀπολαύοιεν τι οἱ πολῖται ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν, ἐποίησε παίδων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως τῶν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἄρχειν. . . . ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ οἰκέταις, εἴ τις δεηθῆι, χρῆσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις. Καὶ κυνῶν δὲ θηρευτικῶν συνῆψε κοινωνίαν· ὥστε οἱ μὲν δεόμενοι παρακαλοῦσιν ἐπὶ θήραν, ὁ δὲ μῆ αὐτὸς σχολάζων ἠδέως ἐκπέμπει. Καὶ ἵπποις δὲ ὡσαύτως χρῶνται· ὁ γὰρ ἀσθενήσας ἢ δεηθεὶς ὀχήματος ἢ ταχύ ποι βουληθεὶς ἀφικέσθαι, ἦν που ἴδῃ ἵππον ὄντα, λαβὼν καὶ χρησάμενος καλῶς ἀποκαθίστησιν, κ.τ.λ. Also Plat. Laws, viii. 845 A, ἐὰν δὲ ξένος ἐπιδημήσας ὀπώρας ἐπιθυμῇ φαγεῖν διαπορευόμενος τὰς ὁδοῦς, τῆς μὲν γενναίας ἀπτέσθω, ἐὰν βούληται, μεῖλι; ἐνὸς ἀκολούθου χωρὶς τιμῆς, ξένια δεχόμενος, τῆς δὲ ἀγροῖκου λεγομένης καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὁ νόμος εἰργέτω μῆ κοινωνεῖν ἡμῖν τοῦς ξένους.

5. 8. ὅπως δὲ γίνωνται τοιοῦτοι.

'Of such an unselfish character as to place their property at the service of others.'

5. 9. τὸ δὲ φίλαυτον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως, κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 8; Rhet. i. 11. § 26; Plato's Laws, v. 731 E.

5. 9. τῶν τοιούτων.

'Not only money, but anything towards which there can be an excess of love.' Cp. note on i. 1. § 2.

5. 10. ἀναιροῦσιν ἔργα . . σωφροσύνης περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας.

Yet Plato in his Republic aimed really at an impossible strictness in the relation of the sexes, and is very far from allowing his guardians to indulge in sensuality.

5. 11. Εὐπρόσωπος μὲν οἶν ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλόανθρωπος ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρώμενος ἄσμενος ἀποδέχεται, νομίζων ἔσσεσθαι φιλίαν τινὰ θαυμαστὴν πᾶσι πρὸς ἅπαντας, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορῆ τις τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὥς γινομένων διὰ τὸ μῆ κοινῆν εἶναι τῆν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκας τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυριῶν κρίσεις καὶ πλουσιῶν κολακείας.

The flow and regularity of this sentence remind us of the opening of Book vii, noticed by Bernays. Cp. for a similar regularity supra c. 1.

Mankind quickly become enamoured of socialistic theories, especially when they are interspersed with attacks on existing institutions. Cp. Plat. Rep. v. 464, 465; iv. 425.

5. 12. ὧν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τῆν ἀκοινωνησίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆν μοχθηρίαν.

A similar unwillingness to ascribe to institutions what is due to human nature may be remarked elsewhere: e.g. c. 7. § 8, ἔτι δ' εἴ τις καὶ τῆν μετρίαν τάξιεν οὐσίαν πᾶσιν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὀμαλίζειν ἢ τὰς οὐσίας κ.τ.λ.

The emphatic negative ὧν οὐδὲν γίνεται for ἃ οὐ γίνεται is curious.

5. 12. ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν ὀλίγους τους ἐκ τῶν κοινωνιῶν διαφερομένους πρὸς πολλοὺς συμβάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτημένους ἰδίᾳ τὰς κτήσεις.

To what Aristotle may be alluding is not very clear. He may have remarked that there were more quarrels among Pythagorean sects, as well as among friends who had become fellow-travellers, than among other men. A similar reflection has often been made on the religious communities of later times. Or he may be referring to disputes arising in 'guilds' or 'clubs,' or partnerships in business. διαφερομένους is to be repeated with κεκτημένους. The meaning is that the owners of common property are comparatively few, and that therefore their quarrels, though relatively more frequent, do not so often come under our notice.

5. 15. ἀλλὰ δεῖ πλήθος ὄν, ὥσπερ εὔρηται πρότερον, διὰ τῆν παιδείαν κοινήν καὶ μίαν ποιεῖν.

Aristotle takes up a position half way between the communism of Plato and the existing practice of states. He would have men lend or give to their neighbours more than they do, but he would not enforce by law a community of goods; he would unite them by education, but would not destroy family life.

5. 15. ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συσσιτίοις ὁ νομοθέτης ἐκοίνωσεν.

This remark more truly applies to Crete, where the common tables were provided at the public expense (c. 10. § 7), than to Sparta, where he who could not afford to contribute to his mess lost the rights of citizenship (c. 9. §§ 30-32). Still in both there was a common mode of life; and an element of communism was introduced by the legislator. Compare also the remarkable description of the effect of Lacedaemonian training (iv. 9. §§ 6-9) in producing the same simple habits of life both among rich and poor; and Xen. De Rep. Laced. 6. §§ 1, 3, 4.

5. 16. πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν εὔρηται μὲν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήικται, τοῖς δ' οὐ χρῶνται γινώσκοντες.

οὐ συνήικται, lit. 'they have not been put together,' implying that no comparison has been made of them, nor inference drawn from them. In other cases the inference has been drawn, but not applied to a practical use. As in Pol. vii. 10. § 7, and Metaph. xi. 8, 1074 b. 8 (ὧν εἴ τις χωρίσας αὐτὸ λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι θεοὺς ἄντο τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας εἶναι, θείως ἄν εἰρησθαι νομίσειεν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶκος πολλάκις ε

ὑρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἑκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ἑκείνων οἷον λείψανα περισσεῶσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν), and several other passages, Aristotle supposes the inventions of arts and laws to have been made many times over. Compare Plat. Laws iii. 677 A foll.

5. 17. μάλιστα δ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν, εἴ τις τοῖς ἔργοις ἴδοι τῆν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην.

'In the actual process of creation.'

Cp. Plat. Tim. 19 B, προσέεικε δὲ δὴ τινί μοι τοιῦδε τὸ πάθος, οἷον εἴ τις ζῆα καλά που θεασάμενος, εἴτε ὑπὸ γραφῆς εἰργασμένα εἴτε καὶ ζῶντα ἀληθινῶς, ἧσυχίαν δὲ ἄγοντα, εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἀφίκοιτο θεάσασθαι κινούμενά τε αὐτὰ καὶ τι τῶν τοῖς σώμασι δοκούντων προσήκειν κατὰ τῆν ἀγωνίαν ἀθλοῦντα. ταῦτόν καὶ ἐγὼ πέπονθα πρὸς τῆν πόλιν ἣν διήλθομεν.

5. 17. μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων.

αὐτὰ refers to some general subject gathered from τῆν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. The neuter is supported by τὰ μὲν and τὰ δέ, which follow.

5. 17. ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν.

1)* 'Which already,' i.e. as a matter of fact, without having recourse to Plato's ideal, the Lacedaemonians are actually carrying out; or 2), 'which at this very time the Lacedaemonians are trying to carry out [as though they had fallen into desuetude]' (Schneider). For the use of νῦν compare ii. 8. 6.

ἐπιχειροῦσιν according to 1), (as often in Plato. See Ast's Lexicon) is used pleonastically = 'do carry out.' So τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν (v. 7. § 13) = τῶν νεωτερισάντων. And Plato's Phaedrus, 265 E, μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδέν.

5. 20. ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἷον φρουρούς, τοὺς δὲ γεωργούς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας.

1)* The emphasis is on τοὺς μὲν and τοὺς δέ. 'He makes one class to consist of the guardians, who are a sort of garrison, and he makes husbandmen, [or, 'to these he opposes the husbandmen'] and the artisans and the rest of the citizens.' 2) Bernays translates, 'For he makes the guardians a sort of garrison and the husbandmen and the artisans and the others, citizens [held in check by the garrison], making a pause at τοὺς ἄλλους. Cp. Rep. iv. 419. But the opposition between φρουρούς and πολίτας is harsh. For the φρουροὶ or φύλακες had a special right to the name citizens, whereas the husbandmen, as is implied in §§ 23, 28, are hardly to be reckoned in the State at all. Cp. c. 6. §§ 2, 3. Yet it may be argued on the other hand, that Aristotle has only an imperfect recollection of Plato; that he 'snatches' at the word φρουροῦντας, and puts into the mouth of Socrates an objection which really proceeds from Adeimantus, though afterwards paradoxically admitted by Socrates himself. Nor is it possible to set any limits to the misinterpretations of Plato passing under the name of Aristotle. The first way of taking the passage is confirmed by c. 8. § 2 infra: ἐποίει γὰρ ἓν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἓν δὲ γεωργούς, τρίτον δὲ τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ τὰ ὄπλα ἔχον.

5. 23. ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἴτ' ἀναγκαῖα ταῦθ' ὁμοίως εἴτε μὴ, νῦν γ' οὐδὲν διώρισται.

Here, again, the antecedent to ταῦτα is to be gathered generally from the context, = 'whether these communistic institutions are equally necessary for the inferior and for the superior classes,' &c. Cp. note on i. 2. § 2.

5. 23. νῦν γε.

'As far, at least, as his book shows.' Cp. supra c. 2. § 1.

5. 23. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων.

Sc. οὐδὲν διώρισται from the previous sentence. 'And as to matters connected with these, what is to be their government, what their education, what their laws, nothing has been determined.' A repetition of § 18. The emendation ἀρχομένων (Congreve) is unnecessary and out of place; for Aristotle has already disposed of the subject class in § 22, and at § 24 he returns to speak of the members of the state generally.

5. 24. καὶ εἰ κοινὰ αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναῖκες.

Sc. τίς οἰκονομήσει; or more generally, 'What then?' Two cases are supposed: 1) what if wives are common and possessions private; and 2) what if possessions and wives are both common.

5. 24. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολήν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰς γυναῖκας τοῖς ἀνδράσιν οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.

The language is not exact; ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολήν = to argue from the comparison of the animals. οἷς: sc. τοῖς θηρίοις.

5. 26. 'The rulers must always be the same; for they cannot change the metal or quality which is infused into their souls by nature.' But then Plato supposes the whole ruling class to be guardians, divided only as young and old into warriors and counsellors (as in the state described in vii. 9. § 5); and he provides for exceptional merit by the transfer from one class to another. The actual governing class are men advanced in years (Rep. vii. 536 ff.), and Aristotle himself acknowledges (vii. 14. § 5) that the division of functions between young and old is natural, and that the young wait their turn and do not rebel against such an arrangement.

5. 27. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενος τῶν φυλάκων, ὅλην φησὶ δεῖν εὐδαιμονα ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν τὸν νομοθέτην. ἀδύνατον δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅλην, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ μὴ τῶν πάντων μερῶν ἢ τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.

This passage, like many others in the Politics, involves a misconception of Plato's meaning. The literalism of Aristotle prevents him from seeing that Plato does not really take away the happiness of individuals in affirming that the happiness of the state must be considered first. He takes it away that he may afterwards restore a larger measure of it. He is only insisting that the doctrine of the priority of the whole to the part, which Aristotle holds in common with him (cp. Pol. i. 2. § 13), should be carried out in practice. Compare also Rep. iv. 420 B, C, and Politics vii. 9. § 7, (τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαιμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς ἀλλ' εἰς πάντα τοὺς πολίτας) where Aristotle appears to coincide with Plato in the doctrine which he here repudiates.

5. 27. ὧν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιον, κ.τ.λ.
- Aristotle means to say that the even number may exist in the whole though not always in the parts (cp. note on c. 3. § 3 supra); but happiness must always exist in both.
6. 1-4. Socrates is here spoken of by implication (ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν, § 4) as if he were the chief speaker in the Laws, though he is not introduced at all. The Laws are quoted as Plato's in c. 7. § 4.
6. 1. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ περὶ ὀλίγων πάντων διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης.
- The list which follows is a very inadequate summary of the subjects contained in the Republic. Probably the metaphysical and imaginative portions of the work appeared to Aristotle ποιητικαὶ μεταφοραὶ (Met. c. 9. 991 a. 22) and alien from politics.
6. 2. τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ προπολεμοῦν μέρος· τρίτον δ' ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ κύριον τῆς πόλεως.
- 'And a third class taken from the warriors,' (τῶν προπολεμούντων).
6. 3. περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν, πότερον οὐδεμιᾶς ἢ μετέχουσι τινος ἀρχῆς . . . οἰκίῃ; δὲν διώρικεν.
- Yet Plato has expressly foretold, emphasizing his words by the declaration of an oracle, 'that when a man of brass or iron guards the State it will then be destroyed' (Rep. iii. 415, and supra c. 5. § 26), by which he clearly means that the third and fourth classes are to be excluded from office. Nor would he have thought for a moment of a shoemaker, or agricultural labourer, exercising political rights. On the other hand, it is true to say that Plato has nowhere defined the position of the lower classes: he has thus evaded the question of slavery to which Aristotle was keenly alive. He acknowledges the difficulty of this question in the Laws v. 776 ff.
6. 3. τοῖς ἔξωθεν λόγοις.
- I. e. with digressions, such as the attack upon the poets (Books ii and iii), the theory of knowledge (v, vi, vii), the doctrine of immortality (x). To Aristotle these appear irrelevant, though naturally entering into Plato's conception of the state, which includes philosophy and religion as well as politics.
6. 4. τῶν δὲ νόμων τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν.
- This statement is far from accurate. The truth is that in the Laws of Plato a nearly equal space is given to the constitution and to legislation; the latter half of the fifth book, the sixth, seventh, eighth, and a portion of the twelfth book being devoted to the constitution; the ninth, tenth, eleventh and the remainder of the twelfth to legislation.
6. 4. καὶ ταύτην βουλόμενος κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι κατὰ μικρὸν περιάλει πάλιν πρὸς τῆν ἑτέραν πολιτείαν.

For a similar use of the word κοινοτέραν cp. c. 6. § 16, εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκευάζει ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείαν, κ.τ.λ.

ἑτέραν πολιτείαν, sc. the Republic. The idea of good, the rule of philosophers, the second education in dialectic, the doctrine of another life, are the chief speculative elements, as the community of property, and of women and children, are the chief social or practical elements, of the Republic which vanish in the Laws (Laws v. 739). The spirit of the Republic is more ideal and poetical, of the Laws more ethical and religious. Plato may be said to 'bring round the Laws to the Republic' in the assimilation of male and female education, in the *syssitia* for women, in the assertion of the priority of the soul to the body and of her fellowship with the gods; in the final revelation of the unity of knowledge to which he introduces his guardians at the end of the work (Laws xii. 965 ff.).

6. 5. τῆν μὲν χιλίων.

Cp. note on c. 3. § 5, *supra*.

6. 6. τὸ μὲν οὖν περιπτόν κ.τ.λ.

This and the noble passage in the Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 1 (προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη. Δόξειε δ' ἄν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίῳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τῆν ἀλήθειαν·) are a sufficient confutation of the idle calumnies spread abroad in later times respecting the quarrels of Plato and Aristotle, which only reflect the *odium philosophicum* of their respective schools. Cp. note, i. 13. § 10.

6. 6. χώρας δεήσει τοῖς τοσοῦτοις Βαβυλωνίας κ.τ.λ.

A strange remark: Aristotle himself mentions, apparently without surprise, that according to the ancient tradition the Spartan citizens had once numbered ten thousand, and he has himself testified that the country could support thirty thousand hoplites and fifteen hundred cavalry (c. 9. §§ 16, 17). Nor were the 5000 or rather 5040 citizens to be maintained in idleness, for each of them had to cultivate his lot.

6. 7. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι κατ' εὐχὴν, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον.

Even the best state, according to Aristotle, is limited by the number of citizens who can readily act together and by other conditions. These conditions he accuses Plato of having disregarded. Cp. vii. 4. § 2, and 4. § 11.

Plato would not have admitted the impracticability of his ideal state. It might be hard to realise, but was not impossible, Rep. v. 471-474. In the Laws he resigns his ideal, though with reluctance, and acknowledging the conditions of actual life, he allows that there must be a second-best and even a third-best sample of states; Laws v. 739.

6. 7. ἔτι δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προσθεῖναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γεινιῶντας τόπους, εἰ δεῖ τῆν πόλιν ζῆν βίον πολιτικόν.

Compare vii. 6. § 7, εἰ γὰρ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζήσεται βίον κ.τ.λ. [sc. ἡ πόλις]. The two passages mutually confirm each other and the comparison of them shows that neither here, with Muretus, nor in vii. 6. § 7, with Bekker (2nd edition), do we need to substitute πολεμικὸν for πολιτικὸν which in both passages is used to express International Relations. The addition of μὴ μονωτικὸν or μὴ μονώτερον in some MSS. after πολιτικὸν appears to be a gloss, probably suggested by vii. 2. § 16.

The same criticism—that a state must have a foreign as well as a domestic policy, is made once more on Phaleas in c. 7. § 14. Nations and cities can no more get rid of other nations and cities than man (except by going into the wilderness) can tear himself from the society of his fellows. Cp. Mazzini's forcible saying, 'Non-interference is political suicide.'

6. 8. εἰ δὲ τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βίον, μήτε τὸν ἴδιον μήτε τὸν κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως . . ἀπελθοῦσιν.

'But if a person does not accept the life of action either for individuals or for states, still the country must be protected against her enemies.' In modern language, 'however much we may dislike war and the use of arms, there are cases in which the resistance to an enemy becomes a duty.'

ἀπελθοῦσιν, i.e. 'lest they renew the attempt.'

6. 8. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὁρᾶν δεῖ, μήποτε βέλτιον ἑτέρως διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον.

Literally, 'Would it not be better to define the amount of property differently by defining it more clearly?'

6. 8. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἶπεν ὥστε ζῆν εἶ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι καθόλου μᾶλλον.

It is doubtful whether these words are to be taken 1) as an illustration of the want of clearness in Plato's definition, or 2) as a correction of it; e.g. 1) 'this is only saying, "enough to enable a man to live well." ' But this explanation seems to require that the following words τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι καθόλου μᾶλλον should be translated 'this however is too general' (Bernays), giving a sense to μᾶλλον (= μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ) which is doubtful unless suggested by the context, as in Rep. iii. 410 E, Phaedo 63 D. 2)* 'By the confused expression "Enough to live upon with temperance," he means only "enough to live upon well or virtuously; for this is the more general idea." '

6. 9. ἕξεις αἰρεταί.

The MSS. give ἄρεται, corrected by Bekker from a marginal note in a copy of the Aldine edition into αἰρεταί. But the words ἕξεις αἰρεταί are unmeaning. It is possible that ἕξεις may be the true reading and ἄρεταί the gloss or vice versâ. See note on text.

6. 10. ἀφεῖναι τῆν τεκνοποιίαν.

Another inaccurate criticism. For Plato expressly provides that the overplus of population should be sent to colonies (Laws v. 740).

6. 11. δεῖ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις τότε καὶ νῦν.
 'But this matter ought not to be regulated with the same strictness then and now,' i.e. it ought to be regulated with greater strictness in the imaginary state of the Laws than in existing states.
6. 11. παράζυγας.
 'For whom there is no place at the banquet of life.'—Malthus.
6. 12. τοῦτο δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἂν συμβαίνοι τελευτῶν τινῶν τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τῆν τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν.
 τῶν ἄλλων, 'the sterility of others,' i.e. of others than those who have children, implied in the word γεννηθέντων,—'the death of some of the children and the sterility of some of the married couples.'
6. 13. Φεῖδων μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὃν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς οἴκους ἴσους φήθη δεῖν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον τοὺς κλήρους ἀνίσους εἶχον πάντες κατὰ μέγεθος.
 ἴσους and ἀνίσους are here used in slightly different senses, ἴσους referring to the numbers of the families, ἀνίσους to the size of the lot. 'He thought that the number of the families should be the same, even although the original size of the lot was different.' That is to say he accepted the existing distribution of property among families, however disproportioned, and did not allow it to be afterwards altered.
 Of Pheidon the Corinthian nothing is known; he has been identified with Pheidon the tyrant of Argos on the ground that Corinth lay in the Argive dominions (Müller, Dorians i. 7. § 15). But no evidence is adduced of this assertion. The word Κορίνθιος may have been a slip: (cp. for a similar or worse error, infra c. 11. §§ 2, 15; v. 12. §§ 12, 14); but such a slip would be remarkable in a writer who has elsewhere called Pheidon tyrant of Argos, v. 10. § 6.
6. 14. περὶ μὲν τούτων . . λεκτέον ὕστερον.
 There is no adequate fulfilment of this promise to resume the question hereafter. But cp. vii. 5. § 1; 10. § 11; 16. § 15.
6. 14. Φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν κ.τ.λ.
 Aristotle is finding fault with Plato's vagueness:—'He says nothing but that the governors and governed should be made of a different wool.'
6. 15. τῆν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἐφήσι γίνεσθαι μείζονα μέχρι πενταπλασίας.
 Cp. Laws, v. 744 E, where the proprietor is allowed to acquire (κτῆσθαι) four times the value of his original inheritance. If we add in the original inheritance which was not acquired, the limit of property will be fivefold. There is no reason for supposing any mistake in this statement (Susemihl) or in c. 7. § 4.

6. 15. καὶ τῆν τῶν οἰκοπέδων δὲ διαίρεσιν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, μὴ ποτ' οὐ συμφέρῃ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν.
- One of the homesteads is to be in the city, another on the border (v. 745 E), the first to be the dwelling of the elders, the second of the son of the house (vi. 776 A). A plan similar to the one which he condemns is adopted by Aristotle in vii. 10. § 11: cp. note on text, in which the inconsistency of the two passages is pointed out.
6. 16. ἔκ γὰρ τῶν ὀπλιτευόντων ἐστίν.
- The normal idea of a πολιτεία is that it consists of the free citizens who carry arms and are its natural defenders. Cp. iii. 7. §§ 3, 4, ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία· συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως· ἕνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ' ἄρετῆν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλεπὸν ἠκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἄρετῆν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τῆν πολεμικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλῆθει γίγνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τῆν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὄπλα, and see also Ib. c. 17. § 4; iv. 13. § 7; and Nic. Eth. viii. 10. 6.
6. 16. τῆν γὰρ πρώτην πολιτείαν.
- The same as the ἑτέρα πολιτεία (§ 4), i. e. the Republic of Plato.
6. 17. Here the Spartan is spoken of as a mixed constitution; in iv. c. 9. § 7, as a combination of aristocracy and democracy. So uncritical writers of the last century extol the English constitution as comprehending the elements of every other. It was thought by other nations as well as by ourselves to be an ideal which Europe should copy. But so far from being the fulfilment of a perfect design, it was really the growth of accident; the merit lay not in any wisdom of our ancestors, but in the willingness of the people to conform to circumstances which was so wanting among the Spartans...; With the criticisms of Aristotle on the Lacedaemonian constitution it is interesting to compare the very similar criticism of Plato in the Laws, iv. 712 D, E, καὶ μὴν ξυννοῶν γε, ὃ ξένη, τῆν ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ πολιτείαν οὐκ ἔχω σοὶ φράζειν οὕτως, ἦντινα προσαγορεύειν αὐτῆν δεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τυραννίδι δοκεῖ μοι προσοικέειν· τὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐφόρων θαυμαστὸν ὡς τυραννικὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γέγονε· καὶ τις ἐνίοτε μοι φαίνεται πασῶν τῶν πόλεων δημοκρατουμένην μάλιστ' εἰκέναι. τὸ δ' αἶψα μὴ φάναι ἀριστοκρατίαν αὐτῆν εἶναι παντάπασιν ἄτοπον. καὶ μὴν δὴ βασιλεία γε διὰ βίου τ' ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν καὶ πρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν λεγομένη. ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτω νῦν ἐξαιφνης ἂν ἐρωτηθεὶς ὄντως, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐκ ἔχω διωρισάμενος εἰπεῖν τίς τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. Cp. Cic. de Rep. ii. 23.
6. 18. ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις εἴρηται τούτοις ὡς δεόν συγκεῖσθαι τῆν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος.
- This is not really said, though in Laws (iv. 710 ff.) Plato sketches an imaginary tyrant who is to mould the state to virtue.
6. 19. Φέρειν ἄρχοντας.
- Φέρειν = 'to vote for,' used here as in Plato and Demosthenes with the accusative of the person.

6. 20. αἰροῦνται μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τιμήματος, εἶτα πάλιν ἴσους ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἶτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων. πλὴν οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες ἦν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις.

The general meaning is that the higher the qualification of the elected, the lower may be the qualification of the electors, or, vice versâ, the lower the qualification of the elected, the higher must be the qualification of the electors; they should balance one another.

There remain, however, some difficulties in reconciling the text of the Politics with the statements of Plato.

What Plato says in the Laws (756) may be shortly stated as follows: 'For those who are to be elected out of the 1st and 2nd classes, all are compelled to vote and are liable to penalties if they abstain from voting: for those who are to be elected out of the 3rd class, only the three first classes are compelled to vote and are liable to penalties; for those who are to be elected out of the 4th class only the two first classes.

The text of the Politics as given by Bekker (which is that of all the MSS.) does not agree with the corresponding passage of Plato and in one place at least is corrupt.

1) The words ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων can hardly be right if we are to get any sense out of the passage at all. Either τοῦ τετάρτου or τῶν τετάρτων must be omitted. Probably we should omit the latter, for τοῦ τετάρτου agrees best with τοῦ πρώτου τιμήματος and τοῦ δευτέρου antea, and τῶν τετάρτων may have crept into the text from the preceding τετάρτων. Either alternative is simpler than reading τετάρτων (for τετάρτων) as in 2nd Ald. edition.

But 2) if we are to make the passage agree with Plato, we should further omit τρίτων ἢ before τετάρτων. Cp. Laws, 756 D, where nothing is said about the third class.

Finally, we must allow that Aristotle may not have remembered or may have misunderstood the words of Plato. Such a supposition cannot be thought far-fetched, when we consider the numerous passages in which he has done unintentional injustice to his master, Pol. i. 13. § 10; ii. 4. § 2; ii. 5. § 27; ii. 6. § 5, etc. The words οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες, sc. αἰρεῖσθαι, do not imply that some of the class were compelled to vote. They are used as they are in Anal. Pr. ii. 15, 63, b 26 for the particular negative proposition, which is called by Aristotle indifferently τὸ οὐ παντὶ and τὸ οὐ τινί, from which of course we can logically infer nothing as to the particular affirmative.

6. 22. ὥς μὲν οἶν οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνιστάναι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν καὶ τῶν ὑστερον ἐθησομένων, ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ἢ σκέψις.

ἐκ τούτων. Whether the inference be true or false, it is difficult to elicit from the words which have preceded the grounds for maintaining that a polity should not be made up of democracy and monarchy. Strictly speaking they are only a more detailed statement of this proposition, not an argument in support of it.

In the passage which follows (ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ), Aristotle is looking forward to the

discussion of what he calls πολιτεία, or 'constitutional government,' which like the constitution of the Laws, falls short of the ideal state, but is in advance of most existing forms.

τοιούτης, 'a state similar to that in the Laws.'

6. 22. τῶν ὕστερον ἐξηθροσμένων.

Mixed constitutions are treated of in iv. cc. 7-9, but the promise seems hardly to be fulfilled in that place.

6. 22. ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων τὸ ἕξ αἵρετῶν αἵρετοὺς ἐπικίνδυνον· εἰ γάρ τινες συστήναι θέλουσι καὶ μέτριοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀεὶ κατὰ τῆν τούτων αἵρεθήσονται βούλησιν.

Cp. Mill's Representative Government, chap. ix (Should there be two stages of election?), 'The comparatively small number of persons in whose hands, at last, the election of a member of parliament would reside, could not but afford additional facilities to intrigue.' The double election of representatives is thought to be a safeguard against democracy ; it is really a source of danger and suspicion, and weakens the national interest in politics. It seems often to supersede itself. Thus the election of the President of the United States by Electoral Colleges has passed into a mere form of universal suffrage. The only case in which such elections succeed is where the electors have other important functions (like the American State Legislatures, to which the election of the Senate is entrusted), and therefore cannot be appointed under a pledge to vote for an individual.

For the indefinite use of ἐπικίνδυνον cp. Thuc. i. 137, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ μὲν ἐμοί, ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἐν ἐπικινδύνῳ πάλιν ἢ ἀποκομιδῇ ἐγένετο.

7. 1. αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν.

ἰδιώτης is opposed both to philosophers and statesmen, as in Plato to δημιουργός (Laws 921 B) and to ποιητής (Phaedr. 258 D), and in Thucydides (ii. 48) to ἰατρός. 'ἰδιῶται' such as Phaleas and Hippodamus; 'philosophers' such as Pittacus or perhaps Pythagoras; 'statesmen' such as Solon or Lycurgus (cp. infra, c. 12. § 1).

7. 2. διὸ Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τοῦτ' εἰσήνεγκε πρῶτος.

A sentence apparently inconsequential but really a condensation of two propositions. 'Therefore Phaleas the Chalcedonian introduced this, sc. the regulation of property, he being the first to do it.'

Nothing is known of Phaleas from other sources. The manner in which Aristotle speaks of him in this passage (§ 2 φησὶ γάρ, § 8 εἰποὶ ἄν ὁ Φαλέας, οἴεται γὰρ) would lead us to the inference that he was not a legislator but the writer of a book; and this inference is further confirmed by c. 12. § 1, in which Aristotle (?) places first, and in a class by themselves, the private individuals who had treated of laws, apparently meaning Phaleas and Hippodamus. Whether Phaleas was earlier than Hippodamus is uncertain. It

is true that Hippodamus is described as the first of those not statesmen who treated of 'the best state,' c. 8. § 1. But the stress may be laid on the words *περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης*, 'Hippodamus was the first, not of political writers, but the first who treated of the perfect state' which would be consistent with the claim of Phaleas to be an earlier writer on the subject of politics in general.

We cannot argue with Grote (Pt. II. c. 6, vol. ii. p. 523) that because Phaleas was the first who wrote or speculated about the equal division of land, therefore the legislation of Lycurgus or the ancient Dorian institutions may not have anticipated him in fact.

7. 3. *κατοικιζομέναις*, sc. *ταῖς πόλεσι* or *πολιτείαις*, an emphatic present, 'when in process of settlement.'

7. 3. *τῷ τὰς προίκας τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μή κ.τ.λ.*

Cp. the Babylonian 'marriage-market' in Hdt. i. 196.

7. 5. *ἔργον γὰρ μὴ νεωτεροποιῶντας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους.*

With this passage compare v. 12. § 17 where Aristotle criticizes rather captiously the remark of Plato 'that loss of fortune is a source of revolutions,' to which he replies that 'it is only dangerous when it affects the leaders of the state.'

7. 6. *οἶον καὶ Σόλων ἐνομοθέτησεν κ.τ.λ.*

Mr. Grote (iii. pt. ii. chap. 11, p. 179) thinks that these words refer only to the annulment of mortgages. But they clearly imply that Solon restricted or attempted to restrict the amount of land which might be held by individuals. Although there is no other evidence of this fact, the silence of antiquity cannot be taken as decisive against the statement of Aristotle, and is certainly no reason for explaining away the plain meaning of his words, whether he was correctly informed or not.

7. 7. *ἔτι δὲ τοὺς παλαιοὺς κλήρους διασώζειν.*

Dependent on *νόμοι εἰσὶ*, gathered from the preceding sentence. The preservation of the lot tended to maintain the equality of property; hence the transition from the one subject to the other.

7. 7. *οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συνέβαινεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρισμένων τιμημάτων εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν.*

The meaning is as follows:—Originally the Leucadian citizens had a lot which was their qualification for office. They were afterwards allowed to sell this lot, and still retained the right of holding office, when they had lost their qualification.

7. 9. *ἀλλὰ τὴν τε παιδείαν ἥτις ἔσται δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲν ὄφελος.*

So in modern times reflections are often made on the evils of education unless based on moral and religious principles. Yet it was a noble thought of an early thinker like Phaleas that there should be equal education for all.

καὶ τὸ μίαν κ.τ.λ. 'Moreover there is no point in saying that it is one and the same, for it may be bad.'

7. 10. τοῦναντίον δὲ περὶ ἐκάτερον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἄνισον, οἱ δὲ ἐχαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὼν ἴσαι.

The opposition here intended is between the inequality of property by which the many are offended, and the equality of honour which offends the higher classes.

περὶ ἐκάτερον, sc. τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τὰς τιμάς.

7. 12. οὐ τοίνυν διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄν ἐπιθυμοῖεν, ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἄνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς. Τί οὖν ἄρκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων;

The words καὶ ἄν ἐπιθυμοῖεν, though rather weak, are found in all MSS. and are therefore probably genuine. They are omitted however by Bernays, and have been variously corrected, καὶ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμιῶν (Bojesen), sc. ἀδικήσουσιν, an ingenious conjecture; ἄν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν (Schneider), too great a departure from the MSS.; ἀνεπιθύμητοι (also Bojesen), too rare a word.

The general meaning is plain: 'And therefore, i.e. not only to still pain, but also to gain pleasure, they will desire pleasures to which no pains are annexed.' The three motives are, 1) necessity, 2) desire of things not necessary, 3) desire of painless pleasures.

7. 12. οὐκ ἄν ἐπιζητοῖεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ φιλοσοφίας ἄρκος.

'They will look for a cure from philosophy and go no further.'

7. 13. οἷον τυραννοῦσιν οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ἐίγῳσιν. Διὸ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαι.

Cp. the Story of Jason, who said πεινῆν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, iii. 4. § 9 and note. So Daniel Manin (quoted by Stahr) used to say of himself that 'he knew nothing except how to govern.' 'And as is the greatness of the crime, so is the honour given to the tyrannicide.'

7. 14. δεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γεινιῶντας κ.τ.λ.

A favourite idea of Aristotle. Cp. supra c. 6. § 7.

7. 16. ἀλλ' οὕτως ὥς ἄν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν.

= ἀλλ' οὕτως ποιεῖν ὥς ἄν ποιοῖεν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν, the more general word ποιεῖν being understood from πολεμεῖν.

'That your enemies should act as they would do if you had not so great an amount of property,' i.e. that your wealth should be no temptation. Cp. Plat. Rep. iv. 422, where he argues that trained warriors will be always too much for wealthy citizens.

7. 17. Eubulus, by birth a Bithynian, was the tyrant of Atarneus in Mysia, and was succeeded by Hermias his slave, whose niece or adopted daughter Aristotle is said to have married; Eubulus revolted from Persia, and was besieged by Autophradates, the Satrap

of Lydia. See Strabo, xiii. 610, Suidas s. v. Ἀριστοτέλης.

7. 19. διωβελία.

The diobelia was the ordinary payment of two obols for attendance on the assembly and the courts, and also for theatrical entertainments. These payments seem in the later days of Athens, and even during the Peloponnesian war, to have amounted to three obols, and some of them to have been as high as a drachma. They were also made much more frequently than in 'the good old times.' Cp. Schol. in Aristoph. Vesp. 684, where it is said on the authority of Aristotle in [the] Politics that the sum given was originally three obols, but afterwards varied at different times: also cp. Lucian Dem. Encom. 36; Prooem. Dem. 1459, 27, a remarkable place; and other passages quoted by Boeckh, 'Public Economy,' Eng. Tr. vol. i. ed. 1, pp. 296 ff.

7. 20. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχή κ.τ.λ.

If ἀρχή be retained, τῶν τοιούτων refers to some idea of reform vaguely implied in the previous sentences. ἄκη conj. Scaliger, ἀρκεί Coraes.

7. 23. ἄλλ' εἴπερ δεῖ δημοσίους εἶναι, τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους δεῖ καθάπερ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ τε, καὶ ὡς Διοφάντος ποτε κατεσκευάζεν Ἀθήνησι, τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον.

Bernays places a comma after εἴπερ, and omits the second δεῖ, placing a καὶ before καθάπερ. 'But if this is so (i. e. if artisans are to be public slaves), those who are to be engaged in public works should be slaves.' Nearly the same meaning may be got from the text, *if we place a comma after εἶναι and remove the comma after ἐργαζομένους: 'But if artisans are to be public slaves, those who are engaged in public works should form this class.'

τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον, sc. δημοσίους εἶναι. This Diophantus, or 'some one else of the same name, about whom nothing is known, was Archon at Athens in the year 395.

8. 1. Stobaeus has preserved some fragments of a work περὶ πολιτείας, which bear the name of 'Hippodamus the Pythagorean' (Florileg. xliiii. pp. 248-251, xcvi. p. 534, Mullach. Fragm. Philos. Graec. vol. ii. p. 11). But there can be little doubt that they are, as Schneider says, the pious fraud of some later writer. The portions cited by Stobaeus will be enough to show the character of such performances. These fragments disagree in several points with the statements of Aristotle; such as the threefold division of the citizens into councillors, auxiliaries, and artisans (cp. the Republic of Plato), and the subdivision of each class into three other classes; the three principles of honesty, justice, utility, and the three instruments by which civil society is knit together, reason, habit, law. Of all this and of a good deal else, there is no trace in Aristotle, although the triplets are also found in Stobaeus. Considerable differences are not however inconsistent with the genuineness of the fragments. A more suspicious circumstance is the character of the philosophical distinctions, such as the opposition of καλόν, δίκαιον, and συμφέρον, which could hardly have existed before the time of Socrates, and a certain later tone of thought.

HIPPODAMUS Περὶ Πολιτείας.

'In my opinion the whole state is divided into three parts: one the "Good"—that is, those who govern the commonwealth by mind; another, those who rule by force; a third part, those who supply and furnish necessaries. The first class I call councillors; the second, "allies" or warriors; the third, artisans. To the two former classes belong those who lead a freeman's life: to the latter those who work for their living. The councillors are the best, the artisans the worst, the warriors are in a mean. The councillors must rule, the artisans must be ruled, while the warriors must rule and be ruled in turn. For the councillors settle beforehand what is to be done: the warriors rule over the artisans, because they fight for the state, but in so far as they must be guided, they have to submit to rule.

'Each of these parts again has three divisions: of the councillors there are 1) the supreme council; 2) the magistrates; 3) the common councillors. The first has the presidency, and deliberates about all matters before they are carried to the assembly. The second comprises all those who are or have been magistrates. The third, the common councillors, are the mass of senators who receive the measures which the upper council have prepared, and vote upon and determine matters which come before them for decision. In a word, the upper council refers matters to the common council, and the common council, through the general, to the assembly. In like manner there are three divisions of the warrior or military class: the officers, the fighters in the front ranks, and lastly the common herd of soldiers, who are the larger number. The officers are the class which furnishes generals and colonels and captains and the front rank of soldiers, and generally all those who have authority. The soldiers of the front rank are the whole class of the bravest, most spirited, and most courageous men; the common herd of soldiers are the remaining multitude. Again, of the class who work for their living, some are husbandmen and tillers of the ground; others mechanics, who supply tools and instruments for the needs of life; others traders and merchants, who export superfluous productions to foreign countries, and import necessaries into their own. The framework of the political community then is composed of such and so many parts; we will therefore proceed to speak of the harmony and unison of them.

'Now every political community exactly resembles a stringed instrument, in that it needs arrangement and harmony and touch and frequent practice. Of the character and number of the elements which form the arrangement of the state I have already spoken. The state is harmonized by these three things — reason (λόγος), moral habit, law, and by these three man is educated and becomes better. Reason gives instruction and implants impulses towards virtue. The law partly deters men from crime by the restraint of fear, partly attracts and invites them by rewards and gifts. Habits and pursuits form and mould the soul, and produce a character by constant action. All these three must have regard to the honourable and the expedient and the just; and each of the three must aim at them all if possible, or, if this is not possible, at one or two. So will reason and habit and law all be honourable and just and expedient; but the honourable must always be first esteemed; secondly, the just; thirdly, the expedient. And generally our aim should be to render the city by these qualities as far as possible harmonious, and deliver it from the love of quarrelling and strife, and make it at unity with itself. This will come to pass if the passions of the youthful soul are trained by endurance in pleasures and pains and conformed to moderation;—if the amount of

wealth is small, and the revenue derived from the cultivation of the soil; — if the virtuous fill the offices in which virtue is needed, the skilful those in which skill is needed, the rich those in which lavish expenditure and profusion are needed; and to all these, when they have filled in due manner their proper offices, due honour be assigned. Now the causes of virtue are three: fear, desire, shame. The law creates fear, moral habits, shame (for those who have been trained in right habits are ashamed to do wrong); reason implants desire. For it is a motive power, at once giving the reason and attracting the soul, especially when it is combined with exhortation. Wherefore also we must prepare for the souls of the young guilds and common meals, and places of living and meeting together, military as well as civil, and the elders must be harmonized with them, since the young want prudence and training, the old, cheerfulness and quiet enjoyment.'

Aristotle's account of the character and attainments of Hippodamus may be compared with the passage in the Lesser Hippias of Plato(?) (368 A foll.), in which Hippias is described as acquainted with every conceivable art and science. The personal description of Hippodamus also bears an odd resemblance to the statement of Diogenes Laertius about Aristotle himself—τραυλὸς τῆν φωνῆν . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰσχυροσκελῆς . . . ἦν, καὶ μικρόμματος, ἐσθ' ἥτι τε ἐπισήμῳ χρώμενος καὶ δακτυλίοις καὶ κουρῶν (v. 1. § 2 init.).

The quantity of the name Hippodamus, though unimportant, is a somewhat difficult question. In Aristophanes (Knights 327) the *a* is long, yet if the name be a compound of δῆμος, it is hard to give any meaning to it. It has been thought that Aristophanes has altered the quantity for the sake of the joke.

Mention occurs of the Ἴπποδάμειος ἀγορὰ at the Piraeus in Andoc. de Myst. § 45, p. 7, Xen. Hell. ii. 4. § 11, and Dem.(?) adv. Timoth. § 22, p. 1190. A tradition is preserved by Strabo (xiv. 653, ὡς φασίν), that the architect of the Piraeus was the architect of the magnificent city of Rhodes. The scholiast on Knights 327 who supposes the Hippodamus of Aristophanes to be the person here mentioned, supposes him also to have designed the Piraeus at the time of the Persian War (κατὰ τὰ Μηδικά); but he had probably no special means of information and only 'combined' the two facts that Hippodamus was the architect of the Piraeus and that Themistocles was the original author of the proposal to improve the harbour. Hippodamus is also called 'the Thurian' in Hesychius. The city of Thurii was founded in 445 B.C. and Rhodes was built in 406 B.C. If therefore Hippodamus was a Thurian and also the builder of Rhodes he must have designed not the original works of the Piraeus, but the improvements made at a later date, such as was the middle wall in the age of Pericles, B.C. 444. This latter date is more in accordance with the half Sophist, half Pythagorean character which is attributed to Hippodamus. It is also more in accordance with the words of Aristotle in vii. 11. § 6, ἥ δ' ἐ τῶν ἰδίων οἰκίσεων διάθεσις ἡδίων μὲν νομίζεται . . . ἂν εὐτομος ἦ καὶ κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἴπποδάμειον τρόπον, where it is implied that the Hippodamean plan of arranging cities in straight streets was comparatively recent. Cp. for the whole subject C. F. Hermann de Hippodamo Milesio.

8. 1. καὶ κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ, ἔτι δὲ ἐσθ' ἥτος εὐτελοῦς κ.τ.λ.

There is no reason for suspecting corruption. The eccentricity of Hippodamus consisted

in combining expensiveness and simplicity: ἐσθητός is dependent on some such word as χρήσει to be supplied from κόσμος.

8. 3. διίτριει δ' εἰς τρία μέρη τῆν χώραν, τῆν μὲν ἱεράν, τῆν δὲ δημοσίαν, τῆν δ' ἰδίαν.

The division of the land proposed in the Seventh Book (c. 10. § 11) is nearly similar to that of Hippodamus.

8. 4. δικαστήριον ἔν τῷ κύριον.

Plato in the Laws also establishes an appeal, vi. 767 C. 'The final judgment shall rest with that court, which has been established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of the neighbours or of the tribes.'

8. 5. τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις κ.τ.λ.

See infra note on §§ 14, 15. Though the principle of Hippodamus is condemned by Aristotle as unsuited to the Athenian popular courts of law, it prevailed in the more advanced jurisprudence of the Romans in which the judges were allowed to give a sentence of *n. l.* or *non liquet*, whence the Scotch verdict of 'not proven.' The ideas of Hippodamus certainly show great legislative ingenuity in an age when such a quality was extremely rare.

8. 6. ὥς οὕτω τοῦτο παρ' ἄλλοις νενομοθετημένον· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις οὗτος ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις τῶν πόλεων.

Aristotle intends to say that Hippodamus proposed this law as a novelty of which he claimed the credit, whereas it already existed at Athens and elsewhere. The meaning is clear, though the form of the sentence is not perfectly logical: '*But this law actually exists in Athens at the present day,' and this is considered as sufficient proof that it existed at the time of Hippodamus. Or 2) without any opposition but with less point: 'And this law now exists at Athens.' Cp. Thuc. ii. 46.

8. 7. τοὺς δ' αἰρεθέντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὀρφανικῶν.

I. e. 'They were to watch over the public interests and over the interests of persons who had no legal status.'

8. 10, 11. Aristotle, after his rather onesided manner of attacking an opponent, raises several ὑποψίαι respecting the three classes of Hippodamus. 'How can the two inferior classes, who have no arms, maintain their independence? For many offices they are obviously unfitted: and if they have no share in the state how can they be loyal citizens? Granting that the artisans have a *raison d'être*, what place in the state can be claimed by the husbandmen and why should they have land of their own? If the soldiers cultivate their own lands, there will be no distinction between them and the husbandmen; this, however, is not the intention of the legislator: if there are separate cultivators of the public lands, then there are not three, but four classes. The husbandmen are practically slaves who will be at the mercy of the warriors; and if so, why should they elect the magistrates? They will have no attachment to the state and must be kept down by

force.'

To these ἀπορίαί he finds no answer. He adds one or two more: 'How can the husbandmen produce enough for themselves and the warriors? And why, if they can, should there be any distinction between their lots and those of the soldiers?'

8. 12. γεωργήσει δύο οἰκίας.

Either οἰκία is here used like οἶκος in the sense of 'property' or 'inheritance'; or γεωργήσει must be taken to mean 'maintains by agriculture.' (Cp. for a similar use of οἰκία Dem. de Falsâ Leg. καρπούμενη τὰς τῶν χρωμένων οἰκίας; and for another singular use of γεωργέω, i. 8. § 6, ὡσπερ γεωργίαν ζῶσαν γεωργοῦντες.) If neither of these explanations is deemed satisfactory, we must suppose a corruption of the text, which may be corrected by reading εἰς δύο οἰκίας (Bernays), or δύοσιν οἰκίαις. The old Latin translation 'ministrabit' has suggested the emendation ὑπουργήσει. This is no better, or rather worse, Greek than γεωργήσει in the sense given above.

8. 13. τοῦτο δ' ἐν μὲν τῷ διαίτῳ καὶ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεται.

'This is an arbitration is possible, even although the judges are many.'

8. 14. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἴκοσι μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστῆς κρίνει δέκα μνᾶς, ἢ ὁ μὲν πλέον, ὁ δ' ἔλασσον, ἄλλος δὲ πέντε, ὁ δὲ τέτταρας.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ clearly refers to the litigant, sc. ὀφείλεσθαι οἶεται. But in what follows, the words ἢ ὁ μὲν πλέον ὁ δὲ ἔλασσον may refer either 1) to the difference between the judges and the litigant or 2*) to the differences of the judges among themselves. In the first case ἢ ὁ μὲν πλέον ὁ δὲ ἔλασσον is a generalised statement of the words which have preceded, ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἴκοσι μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστῆς κρίνει δέκα μνᾶς. But in the second case the words are restricted to ὁ δὲ δικαστῆς κρίνει δέκα μνᾶς, ἄλλος δὲ πέντε, ὁ δὲ τέτταρας. Anyhow there is a colloquial irregularity, the words ἄλλος δὲ πέντε κ.τ.λ. having crept in out of place, as an illustration of the general principle ὁ μὲν πλέον κ.τ.λ. already stated.

8. 16. εὐνόφθαλμον ἀκοῦσαι μόνον.

A confusion of language: cp. εὐπρόσωπος (c. 5. § 11).

8. 16. ἔχει γὰρ συκοφαντίας.

That Hippodamus was speaking of political discoveries and not of inventions in the arts, is clear from the context. Hippodamus' error was derived from the analogy of the arts, § 18. We can easily understand the danger of rewarding discoveries such as were made in the conspiracy of the Hermae at Athens or in the days of the Popish Plot in England. Aristotle admits that there have been and will be changes in government, but he advocates caution and insists that law should be based on custom.

8. 18. αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις.

Every art and science is also a power to make or become; hence the word δύναμις being the more general term is constantly associated with both τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη.

8. 21. ζητοῦσι δ' ὅλως οὐ τὸ πάτριον ἀλλὰ τὰ γαθὸν πάντες.

This statement goes beyond the truth. For the traditions of families or clans are very slow in giving way, as e.g. in the constitution of Lycurgus or Solon, to a sense of the common good. It is rarely and for a brief space that nations wake up to the feeling of their own nationality, or are touched by the enthusiasm of humanity.

8. 21. ὁμοίους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους, ὥσπερ καὶ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν γηγενῶν.

ὁμοίους has been altered by Bernays into ὀλίγους but without reason. It may be taken 1) as = ὁμοίους τοῖς γηγενέσι, or, 2)* ὁμοίους may be joined with καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας = 'no better than simple or common persons.' Cp. Hdt. vii. 50, γνώμῃσι ἐχρέοντο ὁμοίῃσι καὶ οὐ. Plat. Theaet. 154 A, ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπων ἄρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὁτιοῦν.

8. 22. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν ἀδύνατον ἀκριβῶς πάντα γραφῆναι.

1)* If we take πάντα as subject, τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν may be the remote object of γραφῆναι, or the words may be governed by περὶ of which the force is continued from περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας. Or 2) τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν may be the subject of γραφῆναι, in which case πάντα is to be taken adverbially.

8. 23. οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὠφελήσεται κινήσας, ὅσον βλαβήσεται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἀπειθεῖν ἔθισθεις.

Cp. Thuc. iii. 37, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα, ὅτι χεῖροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις.

κινήσας, sc. ὁ πολίτης gathered from the previous sentence.

8. 24, 25. ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἰσχύον οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πειθεσθαι πλὴν παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, τοῦτο δ' οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος, ὥστε τὸ ἔθ' ἰδίως μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἑτέρους νόμους καινοὺς ἀσθενεῖ ποιεῖν ἐστὶ τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν . . ἔχει μεγάλην διαφορὰν.

Cp. Plat. Laws i. 634 D, εἰς τῶν καλλίστων ἂν εἴη νόμων μὴ ζητεῖν τῶν νέων μηδένα ἐᾶν, ποῖα καλῶς αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει and Arist. Met. ii. 3, 995 a. 3, ἡλικίην δὲ ἰσχύον ἔχει τὸ σύνηθες οἱ νόμοι δηλοῦσιν, ἐν οἷς τὰ μυθώδη καὶ παιδαριώδη μεῖζον ἰσχύει τοῦ γινώσκειν περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ ἔθος.

ἔχει μεγάλην διαφορὰν, lit. 'makes a great difference.'

9. 1. In this chapter Aristotle tacitly assumes or perhaps acquiesces in the popular belief that Lycurgus is the author of all Spartan institutions. He was supposed to be the founder of the Spartan constitution, as Solon of the Athenian, or as King Alfred of the ancient English laws. The Ephoralty is apparently attributed to him; yet elsewhere (v. 11. §§ 2, 3) Theopompus, a later king of Sparta, is said to have introduced this new power into the state.

9. 1. εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας.

εἴ τι, sc. νενομοθέτηται: καὶ τὸν τρόπον following πρὸς τῆν ὑπόθεσιν. προκειμένης α ὑποίς, i.e. 1)* 'which is proposed to the citizens,' πολίταις understood from πολιτειῶν supra; or 2) 'which legislators set before themselves' referring to νομοθέται implied in νενομοθέτηται: cp. ἡ ὑπόθεσις τοῦ νομοθέτου at the end of this chapter (§ 33).

9. 2. τῆν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν.

'Leisure or relief from the necessary cares of life.' The construction is singular and rare in prose, yet not really different from ἔν τινι σχολῇ κακοῦ of Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1286. So Plat. Rep. ii. 370 C ὅταν εἷς ἔν, σχολῆν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ.

9. 2. ἡ τε γὰρ Θετταλῶν πενεστεία πολλάκις ἐπέθετο τοῖς Θετταλοῖς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς Λάκωσιν οἱ Εἰλωτες· ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐφεδρεύοντες τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διατελοῦσιν.

Cp. Laws vi. 776 C, D: 'I am not surprised, Megillus, for the state of Helots among the Lacedaemonians is of all Hellenic forms of slavery the most controverted and disputed about, some approving and some condemning it; there is less dispute about the slavery which exists among the Heracleots, who have subjugated the Mariandynians, and about the Thessalian Penestae.' Yet in this passage of Aristotle the Penestae are spoken of as constantly revolting from their masters.

9. 3. περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρήτας οὐδὲν πω τοιοῦτον συμβέβηκεν· αἴτιον δ' ἴσως τὸ πᾶς γεινιώσας πόλεις, καίπερ πολεμούσας ἀλλήλαις, μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμμαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν καὶ αὐταῖς κεκτημέναις περιοίκους· τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν οἱ γεινιωῦντες ἐχθροὶ πάντες ἦσαν, Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μεσσηνιοὶ καὶ Ἀρκάδες.

The argument is that in Crete, where all the states had their Perioeci or subject class, no attempt was ever made to raise a servile insurrection when they went to war, because such a measure would have been contrary to the interests of both parties. The Cretans were the inhabitants of an island and there were no out-siders to encourage revolt among the slaves (cp. c. 10. § 15, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ εἴρηται σώζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον). Probably also a sort of international custom prevailed among them, arising from their common necessity, of not raising the slaves in their wars with one another. The Argives and the other Peloponnesian states, when at war, were always receiving the insurgent Helots. But the Argive subject population, like the Cretan, were not equally ready to rise, and indeed were at times admitted to the governing body (cp. v. 3. § 7, καὶ ἐν Ἀργεῖ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐβδόμῃ ἀπολομένων ὑπὸ Κλεομένους τοῦ Λάκωνος ἠναγκάσθησαν παραδέξασθαι τῶν περιοίκων τινάς). We may also remark that in c. 5. § 19 supra, Aristotle incidentally observes that the Cretan slaves were comparatively well treated, although forbidden gymnastics and the use of arms.

The word 'perioeci' appears to have been used in Crete to denote generally an inferior class, who were not, as at Sparta, distinguished from Helots or slaves. This is confirmed by c. 10. § 5, γεωργοῦσι τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν (sc. Λακεδαιμονίοις) Εἰλωτες, τοῖς δὲ Κρήσιν οἱ περιοίκοι. But compare also Sosicrates [B.C. 200-128] preserved in Athenaeus (vi. c. 84. fin., p. 263), τῆν μὲν κοινὴν δουλείαν οἱ Κρήτες καλοῦσι μνοίαν, τῆν δὲ ἰδίαν ἀφαιμῶτας, τοὺς δὲ περιοίκους ὑπηκόους. The use of the term μνοία in Sosicrates is confirmed by the celebrated Scolium of Hybrias the Cretan (Bergk 27), τοῦτ' ἔστι φει) δεσπότας μνωίας κέκλημαι. Cp. also Athen. vi. 267, where the term μνώτης is said by Hermon to be applied to 'well-born' serfs: εὐγενεῖς οἰκέται.

καὶ αὐτὰίς κεκτημέναις περιοίκους. 'Since they too have perioeci.'

9. 4. With these criticisms we may compare Aristotle's proposal (vii. 9. § 8 and 10. §§ 13, 14) in the description of his own state, that the husbandmen should be either slaves or foreign perioeci.

9. 5. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἰκίας μέρος ἀνήρ καὶ γυνή.

The singular μέρος is used by attraction with the singular ἀνήρ.

For the general subject, cp. Laws vi. 780 E ff.: 'For in your country, Cleinias and Megillus, the common tables of men are a heaven-born and admirable institution, but you are mistaken in leaving the women unregulated by law. They have no similar institution of public tables in the light of day, and just that part of the human race which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their weakness—I mean the female sex — has been left without regulation by the legislator, which is a great mistake. And, in consequence of this neglect, many things have grown lax among you, which might have been far better if they had been only regulated by law; for the neglect of regulations about women may not only be regarded as a neglect of half the entire matter, but in proportion as woman's nature is inferior to that of men in capacity of virtue, in that proportion is she more important than the two halves put together.

Cp. also Rhet. i. 5, 1361 a. 10, ὅσοις γὰρ τὰ κατὰ γυναίκα φάτλα ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμονίους, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ ἥμισυ οὐκ εὐδαιμονοῦσι: and supra i. 13. § 16; also Eur. Andr. 595,

οὐδ' ἄν, εἰ βούλοιτό τις,
σώφρων γένοιτο Σπαρτιατίδων κόρη.

9. 8. ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν.

Translated in the text, as by interpreters generally*, 'in the days of their greatness,' i. e. in the fourth century B. C. after the taking of Athens when Sparta had the hegemony of Hellas. But is not the passage rather to be explained 'many things in their government were ordered by women'? (Schlosser). For why should women be more powerful in the days of their greatness than in their degeneracy? To which it may be replied that the very greatness of the empire made the evil more conspicuous. According to the latter of the two explanations ἀρχῆς corresponds to ἄρχειν in what follows.

This use of the genitive is not uncommon: cp. ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς Arist. Wasps 557; τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, sc. ὄντας, Dem. 309. 10.

9. 10. For the conduct of the Spartan women in the invasion of Epaminondas: compare Xenophon, himself the eulogist of Sparta, Hell. vi. 5. § 28, τῶν δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αἱ μὲν ἐν γυναίκες οὐδὲ τὸν καπνὸν ὀρώσαι ἴνειχοντο, ἕτε οὐδέποτε ἰδοῦσαι πολεμίους, and Plutarch, Ages. 31, who has preserved a similar tradition, οὐχ ἴππον δὲ τούτων ἐλύπουν τὸν Ἀγησίλαον οἱ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν θόρυβοι καὶ κραυγαὶ καὶ διαδρομαὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων δυσανασχετούντων τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν οὐ δυναμένων ἴσυχάζειν, ἀλλὰ παντάπασιν ἐκφρόνων οὐσῶν πρὸς τε τὴν κραυγὴν καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῶν

πολεμίων.

9. 10. χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἴσαν, ὡσπερ ἐν ἑτέροις πόλεσιν, θόρυβον δὲ παρείχον πλείω τῶν πολεμίων.

Either 1)* 'For, unlike the women in other cities, they were utterly useless'; or 2) 'For, like the women of other cities, they were utterly useless; and they caused more confusion than the enemy.'

9. 11. The employment of the men on military service, which rendered it more easy for Lycurgus to bring them under his institutions, is supposed to have caused the disorder of the women which made it more difficult to control them. Yet we may fairly doubt whether this notion is anything more than a speculation of Aristotle or some of his predecessors (Φασὶ μὲν), striving to account for a seemingly contradictory phenomenon. For there could have been no trustworthy tradition of the time before Lycurgus. It is observable that Aristotle, if his words are construed strictly, supposes Lycurgus to have lived after the time of the Messenian and Argive wars. Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*, vol. i., p. 143 note w, considers the words καὶ Μεσσηνίων in § 11 to be an interpolation. But this assumption of interpolation is only due to the exigencies of chronology. The testimony of Aristotle may be summed up as follows: on the one hand he favours the traditional date; for he connects the name of Charillus an ancient king with that of Lycurgus c. 10. § 2: and on the other hand it is very possible that he may not have known, or may not have remembered the date of the Messenian Wars.

Grote (p. 2. c. 6, p. 516, n. 3) defends the Spartan women against the charges of Aristotle and Plato (the Φιλολάκων) *Laws* vii. p. 806, reiterated by Plutarch (*Ages*. c. 31), and even supposes that 'their demonstration on that trying occasion (i.e. the invasion of Laconia) may have arisen quite as much from the agony of wounded honour as from fear.' Yet surely Aristotle writing not forty years afterwards, who is to a certain extent supported by the contemporary Xenophon (vi. 5, 28 see above), could hardly have been mistaken about a matter which was likely to have been notorious in Hellas.

9. 12. αἰτίαι μὲν οὗν εἰσὶν αὗται τῶν γενομένων.

Sc. the women:* or 'these are the causes' (αὗται by attraction for ταῦτα). The first way of taking the words gives more point to the clause which follows.

9. 12. τίνι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν.

'We have not to consider whether we are to blame Lycurgus, or to blame the women; but whether such a state of things is right.'

9. 13. οὐ μόνον ἀπρέπειάν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆν καθ' αὐτήν.

αὐτῆν καθ' αὐτήν must agree with πολιτείαν understood in ἀπρέπειάν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας, these words being equivalent to ἀπρεπῆ ποιεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν: or αὐτῆς, which appears to have been the reading of the old translator (ipsius), may be adopted instead of αὐτήν.

9. 13. μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν ἐληθέντα τοῖς περὶ τῆν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς κτήσεως ἐπιτιμήσειεν ἄν τις.

1)* The mention of avarice, or 2) the mention of women naturally leads Aristotle to speak of the inequality of property. The connexion is either 1) that avarice tends to inequality or 2) that inequality is produced by the great number of heiresses.

9. 14. Plutarch (Agis, c. 5) apparently ascribes to the Ephor Epitadeus the law which enabled a Spartan to give or bequeath his property as he pleased. Either Aristotle has followed a different tradition. or the legislator is only a figure of speech for the institution (cp. supra, note at beginning of chapter).

9. 15. τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων.

Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 5, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπικληροὶ οὔσαι.

9. 15. ἢ καὶ μετρίαν.

'Or even a moderate one.' καὶ is here qualifying. 'Better have no dowries or small ones, or you may even go so far as to have moderate ones.'

9. 15. νῦν δὲ ἕξεσσι δοῦναι τῆν ἐπικληρον ὅτι μὲν βούληται.

νῦν, not 'now,' as opposed to some former time, but 'as the law stands.' See note on c. 5. § 23 supra. δοῦναι, sc. τινά.

'A man may give his heiress to any one whom he pleases': i.e. heiresses may be married by their relatives to rich men, and the evil of accumulating property in a few hands will thus be increased. Herodotus, vi. 57, says that the giving away of an heiress whom her father had not betrothed was a privilege of the kings of Sparta. There may have been a difference in the custom before and after the days of Epitadeus (cp. note on § 14), though this is not expressed by the particle νῦν.

9. 16. οὐδὲ χίλιοι τὸ πλῆθος ἦσαν, sc. ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς, §§ 10, 16.

9. 16. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν δῆλον ὅτι Φαύλως αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ τῆν τάξιν ταύτην.

τὰ περὶ τῆν τάξιν ταύτην, sc. their arrangements respecting property described in the previous sentence. For the use of ταύτην with a vague antecedent, cp. below ταύτην τῆν διόρθωσιν: also i. 2. § 2.

9. 16. μίαν πληγὴν.

The battle of Leuctra (B.C. 371) at which, according to Xenophon, Hellen, vi. 4. § 15, one thousand Lacedaemonians and four hundred out of seven hundred Spartans perished. The population of Sparta was gradually diminishing. In the time of Agis IV. reg. 240-248 B.C. according to Plutarch (Agis, c. 5), the Spartans were but 700, and only about 100 retained their lots.

9. 17. ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέρων βασιλέων μετεδίδοσαν τῆς πολιτείας.

Yet Herodotus (ix. 35) affirms that Tisamenus of Elis, the prophet, and Hegias, were the

only foreigners admitted to the rights of citizenship at Sparta. According to Plutarch, Dion was also made a Spartan citizen (Dio, c. 17).

9. 17. καὶ φασιν εἶναι ποτε τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καὶ μυρίου.

The ancient number of Spartan citizens is variously given: here at 10,000; in Herod. vii. 234, at 8,000; according to a tradition preserved by Plutarch (Lycurg. c. 8), there were 9,000 lots which are said to have been distributed partly by Lycurgus, partly by Polydorus, the colleague of the king Theopompus.

9. 18. ὑπεναντίος δὲ καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς τεκνοποιίας νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν.

At Sparta the accumulation of property in a few hands tended to disturb the equality of the lots. The encouragement of large families, though acting in an opposite way, had a similar effect. According to Aristotle, depopulation and overpopulation alike conspired to defeat the intention of Lycurgus. Yet it does not seem that the great inducements to have families were practically successful; perhaps because the Spartans intermarried too much.

Like Plato and Phaleas, the Spartan legislator is accused of neglecting population. (Cp. supra c. 6. §§ 12, 13, and c. 7. §§ 4-8.) It is clearly implied in the tone of the whole argument (against Mr. Grote, vol. ii. c. 6) that there was an original equality of property, but that it could not be maintained; cp. τὰς κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα, 6. § 10; τῆς χώρας οὕτω διττημένης, 9. § 19; and so Plato, Laws 684 D.

9. 19. διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὧνιοι ᾔσαν.

Cp. Thuc. i. 131, etc. where we are told that Pausanias trusted to escape by bribery, πιστεύων χρήμασιν διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολήν. Also Rhet. iii. 18. § 6, 1419 a. 31, Καὶ ὡς ὁ Λάκων εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας, ἐρωτώμενος εἰ δοκοῦσιν αὐτῷ δικαίως ἀπολωλέναι ἄτεροι, ἔφη. Ὁ δέ, ὀυκοῦν σὺ τούτοις ταῦτα ἔθου; Καὶ ὅς ἔφη. ὀυκοῦν δικαίως ἄν, ἔφη καὶ σὺ ἀπόλοιο; ὀυ δ᾽ ἴτα, ἔφη, οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα λαβόντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ, ἀλλὰ γνῶμι.

9. 20. καὶ νῦν δ' ἐν τοῖς Ἄνδριοις.

Ἄνδριοι is a proper name, probably referring to some matter in which the Andrians were concerned. It is unlikely that Aristotle would have used the archaic word ἄνδρια for φιδία or συσσία. For this use of the word ἄνδρια cp. c. 10. § 5, καὶ τὸ γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ Λάκωνες οὐ φιδία ἀλλ' ἄνδρια, καθάπερ οἱ Κρηῖτες, ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθεν.

The event to which Aristotle refers is wholly unknown to us, though the strange expression which he uses indicates the great importance of it (ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὄλην τὴν πόλιν ἀπώλεσαν).

9. 20. ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ συνεπιβλάπτεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν.

'So that in this way, as well as by the venality of the Ephors, together with the royal office the whole constitution was injured.'

9. 22. δεῖ γὰρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μέλλουσαν σώζεσθαι πάντα βούλεσθαι τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ταῦτά.

The nominatives which occur in the next sentence, οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς, οἱ δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοί, κ.τ.λ. show that the corresponding words τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως are the subject of βούλεσθαι = δεῖ πάντα τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως βούλεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν σώζεσθαι καὶ διαμένειν ταῦτά.

ταῦτά is to be taken adverbially with διαμένειν = κατὰ ταῦτά.

9. 22. ἄθλον γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν.

Nearly the same words occur in Demosthenes, c. Lept. § 119, p. 489, where speaking of the γερουσία, he says, ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλον τῆς πολιτείας κυρίῳ γενέσθαι μετὰ τῶν ὁμοίων.

9. 23. παιδαριώδης γὰρ ἐστὶ λιβαν.

It is not known how the Ephors were elected. Possibly in the same way as the γέροντες (vide note on § 27 infra), which Aristotle likewise calls παιδαριώδης. Plato, Laws iii. 692 A, says that the Ephoralty is ἐγγύς τῆς κληρωτῆς δυνάμεως, by which he seems to mean that the election to the Ephoralty was almost as indiscriminate as if it had been by lot.

9. 24. As in the funeral oration of Pericles, the Spartan discipline is everywhere described as one of unnatural constraint. There was no public opinion about right and wrong which regulated the lives of men. Hence, when the constraint of law was removed and they were no longer ἀρχόμενοι but ἄρχοντες, the citizens of Sparta seem to have lost their character and to have fallen into every sort of corruption and immorality. The love of money and the propensity to secret luxury were kindred elements in the Spartan nature.

9. 25. τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον πεπαιδευμένων ὥστε καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην αὐτὸν ἀπιστεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οὐκ ἀσφαλές.

'But when men are so educated that the legislator himself cannot trust them, and implies that they are not good men, there is a danger.' The remark is resumed and justified in § 30 (ὅτι δ' ὁ νομοθέτης, κ.τ.λ.), by the general suspicion of their citizens which the Spartan government always showed, and also (§ 26) by the circumstance that the Gerontes were placed under the control of the Ephors.

οὐκ ἀσφαλές, sc. τὸ κυρίου αὐτοῦ εἶναι μεγάλων.

9. 26. δόξειε δ' ἔν κ.τ.λ.

The discussion about the Ephors and Gerontes is a sort of dialogue, in which objections are stated and answers given, but the two sides of the argument are not distinctly opposed.

9. 27. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν αἴρεσιν ἣν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερόντων, κατὰ τε τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης κ.τ.λ.

For the mode of the election cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 26: 'The election took place after this fashion: When the assembly had met, certain persons selected for the purpose were shut up in a building near at hand, so that they could not see or be seen, but could only hear the shouting of the assembly. For, as with other matters (cp. Thuc. i. 87, κρινουσι γὰρ βοῆϊ καὶ οὐ ψήφῳ), the Lacedaemonians decided by acclamation between the competitors. One by one the candidates were brought in, according to an order fixed by lot, and walked, without speaking, through the assembly. The persons who were shut up marked on tablets the greatness of the shout given in each case, not knowing for whom it was being given, but only that this was the first or the second or the third in order of the candidates. He was elected who was received with the loudest and longest acclamations.'

9. 27. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς.

Cp. Plat. Rep. 345 E ff., 347 D.

9. 28. νῦν δ' ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τῆν ἄλλην πολιτείαν ὁ νομοθέτης φαίνεται ποιῶν· φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολίτας τοῦτοις κέχρηται πρὸς τῆν ἀ&illegible;ρεσιν τῶν γερόντων.

According to the view of Aristotle and of Plato nobody should seek to rule, but everybody if he is wanted should be compelled to rule. Yet this is rather a counsel of perfection than a principle of practical politics. And it seems hardly fair to condemn the work of Lycurgus, because like every other Greek state, Sparta had elections and candidatures.

9. 30. διόπερ ἐξέεμπον συμπρεσβευτᾶς τοὺς ἐχθρούς.

συμπρεσβευτᾶς does not refer to the kings, but is an illustration of the same jealousy which made the Spartans consider the dissensions of the kings to be the salvation of their state. διόπερ = 'by reason of a like suspicion.'

It has been argued that Aristotle in this section is criticising the kings only. And we might translate (with Bernays and others) 'they sent enemies as colleagues of the king,' e.g. in such cases as that of Agis (Thuc. v. 63). But these could hardly be described as συμπρεσβευταί, any more than the Ephors who, according to Xenophon (de Rep. Lac. c. 13. § 5), were the companions of the king—not his active counsellors, but spectators or controllers of his actions.

Ancient historians are apt to invent causes for the facts which tradition has handed down. Cp. note on c. 9. § 11 supra; also v. 11. § 2; Herod. v. 69; Thuc. i. 11, &c. It may be easily believed that there were frequent παραπρεσβεῖναι among Spartans, but that these were the result of a deeply-laid policy is the fancy of later writers. Still less can we suppose the double royalty which clearly originated in the ancient history of Sparta to be the work of the legislator. Compare the Laws (iii. 691 D) of Plato (who probably first suggested the notion of a special design), 'A god who watched over Sparta gave you two families of kings instead of one and thus brought you within the limits of moderation.'

9. 31. τῆν σύνοδον.

Either 1) the gathering for meals; or 2) the contribution, as in Hdt. i. 64.

9. 32. βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρατικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκευάσμα τῶν συσσιτίων.

It may be admitted that the common meals had a sort of leveling or equalizing tendency; but this could hardly have been the original intention of them, whether they were first instituted at Sparta by Lycurgus or not (cp. vii. 10. § 2 ff.). They are more naturally connected with the life of a camp (§ 11) and the brotherhood of arms. They may also be the survival of a patriarchal life.

9. 33. The remark that the office of admiral was a second royalty appears to be justified chiefly by the personal greatness of Lysander. Teleutias the brother of Agesilaus was also a distinguished man. It cannot be supposed that Eurybiades or Cnemus or Alcidas or Astyochus were formidable rivals to the king.

9. 35. τούτου δὲ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον· νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τὰ γαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα δι' ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ κακίας· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι τὰῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς.

'The Spartans were right in thinking that the goods of life are to be acquired by virtue, but not right in thinking that they are better than virtue' (cp. vii. c. 2. and c. 14). The 'not less error' is that they degrade the end into a means; they not only prefer military virtue to every other, but the goods for which they are striving to the virtue by which they are obtained.

9. 37. τῆν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς δ' ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους.

It is quite true that many Spartans, Pausanias, Pleistoanax, Astyochus, Cleandridas, Gylippus and others were guilty of taking bribes. But it is hard to see how their crime is attributable to the legislator. Not the institutions of Lycurgus, but the failure of them was the real source of the evil.

The love of money to whatever cause attributable was held to be characteristic of Sparta in antiquity. The saying χρήματα χρήματ' ἄν' ἦρ is placed by Alcaeus (Fr. 50) in the mouth of a Spartan, and the oracle ἃ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν ὀλεῖ ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν is quoted in the Aristotelian Πολιτεῖαι fr. Rei. Lac. 1559 b. 28.

10. 1. πάρεγγυς μὲν ἔστι ταύτης.

Polyb. vi. 45 denies the resemblance between Crete and Lacedaemon, Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆν τῶν Κρητῶν μεταβάντες (πολιτείαν) ἄξιον ἐπιστήσαι κατὰ δύο τρόπους πῶς οἱ λογιώτατοι τῶν ἀρχαίων συγγραφέων Ἐφορος, Ξενοφῶν, Καλλισθένης, Πλάτων, πρῶτον μὲν ὁμοίαν εἶναι φασὶ καὶ τῆν αὐτῆν τῆν Λακεδαιμονίων, δεύτερον δ' ἐπαινετῆν ὑπάρχουσαν ἀποφαίνουσιν. ὧν οὐδέτερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ. He contrasts the two states in several particulars; 1) the equal distribution of land in Sparta did not exist in Crete; 2) the greed of wealth which existed in Crete is said, strangely enough, to have been unknown at Sparta; 3) the hereditary monarchy of Sparta is contrasted with the life tenure of the γέροντες; 4) the harmony which prevailed at Sparta is contrasted with the rebellions and civil wars of Crete.

10. 1. τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἤπτον γλαφυρώς.

Compare what is said of Charondas in c. 12. § 11, τῆ ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρώτερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν.

10. 2. According to this view the Spartan institutions are not Dorian but Pre-Dorian, having been established originally by Minos; received from him by the Lacedaemonian colony of Lyctus in Crete, and borrowed from the Lyctians by Lycurgus.

10. 3. διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον χρῶνται αὐτοῖς, ὧς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω πρῶτου τῆν τάξιν τῶν νόμων.

The connexion is as follows:—The Lacedaemonian Laws are borrowed from the Cretan. Among the Lyctians, a colony of the Lacedaemonians who settled in Crete and whom Lycurgus is said to have visited, these laws were already in existence, and he adopted them. And even at this day, the laws of Minos are still in force among the subject population or aborigines of Crete. διὸ is unemphatic; the logical form outruns the meaning.

Either the laws of Minos had ceased to be enforced among the freemen of Crete or the freemen of Crete had themselves changed (Bernays); and therefore any vestiges of the original law were only to be found among the ancient population. Thus communistic usages may be observed among the peasants of India and Russia, which have disappeared in the higher classes. Yet Aristotle also speaks of the common meals in Crete as still continuing. Does he refer only to the survival of them among the Perioeci? By Dosiades (B.C.?) the Cretan Syssitia are described as still existing (see the passage quoted in note on § 6). Aristotle supposes that Lycurgus went to Crete before he gave laws to Sparta. According to other accounts his travels, like those of Solon, were subsequent to his legislation.

Ephorus, the contemporary of Aristotle [see fragment quoted in Strabo x. 480], argues at length that the Spartan Institutions originally existed in Crete but that they were perfected in Sparta, and that they deteriorated in Cnossus and other Cretan cities; both writers agree in the general view that the Cretan institutions are older than the Spartan and in several other particulars, e.g. that the Lyctians were a Lacedaemonian colony, that the common meals were called Ἄνδρια or Ἄνδρεῖα, that the Cretan institutions had decayed in their great towns but survived among the Perioeci; and also in the similarity of offices at Lacedaemon and Crete. The great resemblance between this account and that of Aristotle seems to indicate a common unknown source.

The existence of the same institutions in Sparta and Crete and the greater antiquity of the Cretan Minos may have led to the belief in their Cretan origin. Others deemed such an opinion unworthy of Sparta and argued plausibly that the greater could not have been derived from the less; Strabo l.c.

10. 3. Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ νῆσος καὶ πρὸς τῆν ἀρχὴν τῆν Ἑλληνικὴν πεφυκέναι καὶ κεῖσθαι καλῶς.

Aristotle, like Herodotus, Thucydides, Aeschylus, is not indisposed to a geographical digression; cp. vii. 10. §§ 3-5.

It may be observed that the remark is not perfectly consistent with §§ 15, 16. The 'silver streak' and 'the empire of the sea' are the symbols of two different policies.

10. 4. Διὸ καὶ τῆν τῆς θαλάσσης ἀρχὴν κατέσχευε ὁ Μίνως.

Cp. Herod. iii. 122, Thuc. i. 4.

10. 5. γεωργοῦσι τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἰλωτες τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶν οἱ περίοικοι.

But if Sosicrates, a writer of the second century B.C., quoted by Athenaeus vi. 84 is to be trusted, Aristotle is here at fault in his use of terms; τῆν μὲν κοινὴν δουλείαν οἱ Κρηῖτες καλοῦσι μνοίαν, τῆν δὲ ἰδίαν ἀφαιμιώτας, τοὺς δὲ περιόικους ὑπηκόους: see c. 9. § 3.

10. 5. ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθεν.

These words may be compared with the passage in Book vii. 10. § 2, ἀρχαία δ' ἔοικεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων ἢ τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα περὶ τῆν Μίνω βασιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆν Ἰταλίαν πολλῶν παλαιότερα τούτων. In both passages Aristotle says that the common meals came from Crete to Sparta.

10. 6. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι τῆν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλουμένοις κόσμοις.

The office of the Cosmi is identified by Aristotle with that of the Ephors. But the resemblance between them is very slight. The fact that at Sparta there were kings, while in Crete the kingly power, if it ever existed at all, had long been abolished, makes an essential difference. The Ephors were democratic, the Cosmi were oligarchical officers. And although both the Ephors and the Cosmi were an executive body, yet the Ephors, unlike the Cosmi, never acquired the military command, which was retained by the Spartan kings. Aristotle observes that the Cosmi were chosen out of certain families, the Ephors out of all the Spartans, a circumstance to which he ascribes the popularity of the latter institution.

10. 6. οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ Κρηῖτες βουλήν.

Yet we are told that the term βουλῆ was generally used to signify 'the council in a democracy.' Cp. iv. 15. § 11 and vi. 8. § 17, also v. 1. § 10, [at Epidamnus] ἀντὶ τῶν φυλάρχων βουλῆν ἐποίησεν. In the Cretan use of the term βουλῆ there may be a survival of the Homeric meaning of the word.

10. 6. βασιλεία δὲ πρότερον μὲν ἦν.

Probably an inference from the legendary fame of Minos. No other king of Crete is mentioned.

Dosiades, quoted by Ath. iv. c. 22. p. 143, gives the following account of the Cretan Syssitia: 'The Lyctians collect the materials for their common meals in the following manner: Every one brings a tenth of the produce of the soil into the guild (ἐταίρια) to which he belongs, and to this [are added] the revenues of the city, which the municipal authorities distribute to the several households. Further, each of the slaves contributes

a poll-tax of an Aeginetan stater. All the citizens are divided among these guilds which they call *andreaia*. A woman takes care of the *syssitia* with three or four of the common people to help in waiting; and each of these has two attendants, called *καλοφόροι*, to carry wood for him. Everywhere in Crete there are two buildings for the *syssitia*, one called the *andreion*, the other, which is used for the reception of strangers, the dormitory (*κοιμητήριον*). And first of all they set out two tables in the room for the *syssitia*, called "strangers' tables," at which any strangers who are present take their place. Next to these come the tables for the rest. An equal portion is set before every man: the children receive a half portion of meat, but touch nothing else. On every table a large vessel is set full of diluted wine: from this all who sit at that table drink in common; and when the meal is finished another cup is put on. The children too drink in common from another bowl. The elders may, if they like, drink more. The best of the viands are taken by the woman who superintends the *syssitia* in the sight of all, and placed before those who have distinguished themselves in war or council. After dinner their habit is first of all to consult about state affairs, and then to recount their deeds in battle and tell the praise of their heroes. Thus they teach the youth to be valiant.'

10. 8. ὅστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφεσθαι πάντας, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἄνδρας.

ἐκ κοινοῦ, 'out of a common stock'; not necessarily at common tables. The *syssitia* or common meals of women are said by Aristotle in chap. 12 to be an invention of Plato in the *Laws*, and if so they could hardly have existed at Crete. Nor is there any allusion to them in the fragment of *Dosiades* (*supra*). The name ἄνδρια or ἄνδρεῖα also affords a presumption against the admission of women to the public tables. But if the words ἐκ κοινοῦ are interpreted as above, there is no reason that with *Oncken* (*Staatslehre der Arist.* ii. 386) we should suppose the words γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας on this ground to be spurious; nor is such a mode of textual criticism legitimate.

10. 9. πρὸς δὲ τῆν ὀλιγοσιτίαν.

The connexion appears to be as follows: 'And as there were so many mouths to feed,' the legislator had many devices for encouraging moderation in food, which he thought a good thing, as well as for keeping down population.

10. 9. τῆν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας ποιήσας ὁμιλίαν, περὶ ἧς εἰ φαύλως ἢ μὴ φαύλως ἕτερος ἔσται τοῦ διασκέπασθαι καιρός.

If these words refer to this work, the promise contained in them is unfulfilled. Nothing is said on the subject in *Book vii. c. 16*, when the question of population is discussed. The promise, however, is somewhat generally expressed; like the end of *c. 8. § 25 supra*, Διὸ νῦν μὲν ἀφῴμεν ταύτην τῆν σκέψιν, ἄλλων γὰρ ἔστι καιρῶν.

10. 10-12. ἐνταῦθα δ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάντων αἵρονται τοὺς κόσμους ἀλλ' ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν, καὶ τοὺς γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων. περὶ ὧν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄν τις εἴπειε λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι γινομένων. τὸ γὰρ ἀνυπεύθυνον, καὶ τὸ διὰ βίου μεῖζον ἔστι γέρας τῆς ἀξίας αὐτοῖς. . . τὸ δ' ἴσυχάζειν, κ.τ.λ.

περὶ ὧν. Do these words refer to* the γέροντες (*Susemihl, Bernays*) or to the κόσμοι (*Stahr*)? The connexion would lead us to suppose the latter; for what precedes and what follows can only be explained on this supposition. Yet the *Cosmi* appear not to have held office for life (*cp. γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων*), perhaps only for a year

(Polyb. vi. 46), though nothing short of a revolution could get rid of them; see *infra*, § 14. It is better to suppose that Aristotle has 'gone off upon a word' as at c. 9. § 30, and is here speaking of the γέροντες, but returns to his original subject at τὸ δ' ἴσχυάζειν. περὶ ὧν and γινομένων have also been taken as neuters: 'about which things,' i. e. the mode of electing: but this explanation does not agree with the next words, which relate, not to the mode of election, but to the irresponsibility of the office.

10. 11. καὶ τὸ μῆ κατὰ γράμματα ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' αὐτογνώμονας ἐπισφαλές.

Cp. c. 9. § 23 where similar words are applied not, as here, to the Cosmi and elders, but to the Ephors. Another more general censure is passed on the γέροντες, § 25.

10. 12. οὐδὲ γὰρ λήμματός τι τοῖς κόσμοις ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις, πόρρω γ' ἀποικοῦσιν ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθερούντων.

Yet to say that the Cosmi could not be bribed because they lived in an island appears to be rather far-fetched. Probably Aristotle is thinking of the bribery of Hellenes by foreign powers, and for this there was little opportunity because the Cretans were isolated from the world.

10. 13. οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλῆς ὁ κανὼν.

The expression is not quite accurate, for the caprice of an individual cannot be called a κανὼν. He means that to make the caprice of man a rule is unsafe.

10. 14. πάντων δὲ φαυλότατον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν, ἣν καθιστᾶσι πολλάκις ὅταν μῆ δίκας βούλωνται δοῦναι.

The words ἣν καθιστᾶσι πολλάκις which follow and the preceding ἐκβάλλουσι συστάντες τινὲς show that the expression τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν means not the insubordination of the notables, but the temporary abrogation of the office of Cosmi by their violence, or, possibly, their defiance of its authority.

10. 15. ἔστι δ' ἐπικίνδυνος οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλις τῶν βουλομένων ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένων.

Translated in the English text: 'A city is in a dangerous condition, when those who are willing are also able to attack her.' More correctly, 'A city which may at any time fall into anarchy (οὕτως ἔχουσα) is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to attack her.'

10. 16. Διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοίκων μένει.

'And this is also a reason why the condition of the Perioeci remains unchanged.'

10. 16. οὔτε γὰρ ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς κοινωνοῦσι.

Either 1*) have no foreign domains; or 2) have no relation to any foreign power. The language is not quite clear or accurate; for although a nation may possess foreign dominions it cannot 'share' in them. The Cretans were not members either of the Delian or of the Lacedaemonian confederacy.

10. 16. νεωστί τε πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον.

The date of this event is said to be B. C. 343 when Phalaecus, the Phocian leader, accompanied by his mercenaries, crossed into Crete and took service with the inhabitants of Cnossus against those of Lyctus over whom he gained a victory, but shortly afterwards perished (Diod. xvi. 62, 63). This however is rather a civil than a 'foreign war.' Others refer the words to the war in the time of Agis II. (B.C. 330), or to the Cretan rising against Alexander.

νεωστί τε refers to σώζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον, 'Quite lately [her isolation did not save her,] foreign mercenaries brought war into the island.'

11. 1. καὶ πολλὰ περιπτῶς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους.

'And in many respects their government is remarkable when compared with those of other nations' or 'with the others of whom I have been speaking.' For the use of περιπτός, cp. c. 6. § 6.

11. 1. αὐταὶ γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τρεῖς ἀλλήλαις τε σύνεγγύς πῶς εἶσι.

Yet the differences are far more striking than the resemblances, which seem to be only 'the common tables,' the analogous office of kings at Sparta and Carthage, and the council of Elders. The real similarity to one another of any of these institutions may be doubted (see note on § 3 infra): while the entire difference in spirit is not noticed by Aristotle. The Semitic trading aristocracy has little in common with the Hellenic military aristocracy; the prosperity of Carthage with the poverty and backwardness of Crete. But in the beginnings of reflection mankind saw resemblances more readily than differences. Hence they were led to identify religions, philosophies, political institutions which were really unlike though they bore the impress of a common human nature.

11. 2. σημεῖον δὲ πολιτείας συντεταγμένης.

'And the proof that they were an organized state' or 'that they had a regular constitution.' The insertion of εἶ before συντεταγμένης (Schneider) is unnecessary. Cp. supra ii. 9. § 22.

11. 2. τὸν δῆμον ἔχουσιν agrees with some word such as πόλιν understood from πολιτεῖαν = 'the city with its democracy.' There is no need to change ἔχουσιν into ἐκόντα (Bernays) or ἐκούσιον (Spengel).

11. 2. μήτε στάσιν γεγενῆσθαι.

For the inconsistency of these words with another statement of Aristotle (v. 12. § 12) that 'the Carthaginians changed from a tyranny into an aristocracy,' which is also irreconcilable with the further statement in v. 12. § 14, that they never had a revolution, see note in loco.

11. 3. ἔχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῆι Λακωνικῆι πολιτείῳ τὰ μὲν συσσίτια τῶν ἐταιριῶν τοῖς Φειδιππίοις, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἑκατῶν καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχὴν τοῖς ἐφόροις . . . τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ βασιλεῦσι καὶ γέρουσιν.

Yet there could hardly have been much resemblance between the common tables of guilds or societies in the great commercial city of Carthage, and the 'camp life' of the Spartan *syssitia*; or between the five ephors of Sparta and the hundred and four councillors of Carthage: or between kings who were generals and elected for life at Sparta and the so called kings or *suffetes* who seem to have been elected annually and were not military officers at Carthage, but are distinguished from them, *infra* § 9.

11. 3. οὐ χεῖρον.

Is to be taken as an adverb agreeing with the sentence, 'and this is an improvement.'

11. 4. καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τοὺς βασιλεῖς μήτε κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος, μηδὲ τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν, εἴ τε διαφέρον ἐκ τούτων αἰρετοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ καθ' ἡλικίαν.

The true meaning of this rather perplexed passage is probably that given in the English text which may be gathered from the words as they stand. With *διαφέρον* supply τὸ γένος ἔστι. The correction of Bernays, *τυχόν, εἰς δὲ γερουσίαν ἐκ πλουσιῶν αἰρετοὺς* is too great a departure from the MSS. Lesser corrections, *εἰ δὲ, ἄλλ' εἴ τι, εἴ τι* have some foundation in the Latin Version, but are unnecessary. *εἴ τε* is to be read as two words and answers to *μήτε*, as *διαφέρον* does to *μηδὲ τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν*. 'It is a great advantage that the kings are not all of the same family and that their family is no ordinary one, and if there be an extraordinary family, that the kings are elected out of it and not appointed by seniority.'

11. 4. μεγάλων γὰρ κύριοι καθεστώτες, ὧν εὐτελεῖς ᾧσι, μεγάλα βλάπτουσι καὶ ἔβλαψαν ἤδη τῆν πόλιν τῆν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

He elsewhere speaks of the Spartan monarchy in a somewhat different spirit (iii. 14. § 3, 15. § 1 ff.). The praise here given to the elective Monarchy or Consulate of the Carthaginians at the expense of the Spartan kingship is considerably modified by the fact mentioned in § 10, that they not unfrequently sold the highest offices for money.

11. 5. τῶν δὲ πρὸς τῆν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας,

sc. ἐπιτιμηθέντων ὧν κ.τ.λ. Lit. 'But of the things which would be censured when compared with the ideal of aristocracy and constitutional government, etc.'

11. 5. The constitution of Carthage was an aristocracy in the lower sense, and like Aristotle's own *πολιτεία*, a combination of oligarchy and democracy (iv. 8. § 9, v. 7. §§ 5-7). While acknowledging that wealth should be an element in the constitution, because it is the condition of leisure, Aristotle objects to the sale of places and the other abuses which arose out of it at Carthage. The Carthaginian constitution is expressly called an 'aristocracy' in iv. 7. § 4, because it has regard to virtue as well as to wealth and numbers; and once more (in v. 12. § 14) a democracy in which, as in other democracies, trade was not prohibited. According to Aristotle the people had the power 1) of debating questions laid before them; 2) of deciding between the kings and nobles when they disagreed about the introduction of measures, but 3) they had not the power of initiation.

11. 6. ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις πολιτείαις.

Sc. Crete and Sparta. Cp. supra § 5, ταῖς εἰρημέναις πολιτείαις.

11. 7. τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κ.τ.λ.

Of these pentarchies, or of the manner in which they held office before and after the regular term of their magistracy had expired, nothing is known. We may conjecture that they were divisions or committees of the γερουσία. Their position may be illustrated by that of the Cretan Cosmi, who became members of the γερουσία when their term of office had expired (cp. c. 10. § 10).

11. 7. τῆν τῶν ἑκατόν.

Possibly the same which he had previously (§ 3) called the magistracy of 104. The magistracy here spoken of is termed *μεγίστη ἀρχή*, the other is said to consist of great officers who are compared with the Ephors. If the two institutions are assumed to be the same, we might adduce for an example of a like inaccuracy in number, a passage, c. 6. § 5, where the citizens in Plato's Laws who number 5040 are called the 5000. But it is not certain that they can be identified. According to Livy and Justin the *ordo iudicum* consisted of 100. 'Centum ex numero senatorum iudices deliguntur.' Justin xix. 2. (Cp. Livy xxxiii. 46.) They were appointed about the year B.C. 450, to counteract the house of Mago, and are spoken of as a new institution. These facts rather lead to the inference that the 100 are not the same with the magistracy of 104, which was probably more ancient. But in our almost entire ignorance of early Carthaginian history the question becomes unimportant.

11. 7. καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχείων δικάζεσθαι πάσας [ἀριστοκρατικόν], καὶ μῆ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι.

Either 1)* καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι refers to the immediately preceding clause, μῆ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων:—or 2), to the words δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχείων δικάζεσθαι πάσας, in which case καὶ . . . ἄλλων must be taken as an explanatory parenthesis.

According to the first view, Aristotle is opposing Carthage and Lacedaemon. In Carthage all cases are tried by the same board or college of magistrates (or by the magistrates collectively), whereas in Lacedaemon some magistrates try one case and some another. The former is the more aristocratical, the second the more oligarchical mode of proceeding: the regular skilled tribunal at Carthage is contrasted with the casual judgments of individuals at Lacedaemon. The difficulty in this way of taking the passage is that we should expect ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχείων, unless the words καὶ μῆ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων be regarded as suggesting αὐτῶν by antithesis.

According to the second view, Aristotle, as in iii. 1. § 10, is comparing the general points of resemblance in Carthage and Lacedaemon. 'Both at Carthage and Lacedaemon cases are tried by regular boards of magistrates, and not by different persons, some by one and some by another.' The difference between the professional judges of the Carthaginians and the casual magistrates of the Spartans is noted in iii. 1. § 10, but here passed over in silence. The Carthaginian and Lacedaemonian arrangements may thus be considered as both aristocratic and oligarchic,—aristocratic because limiting judicial functions to regular magistrates; oligarchic, because confining them to a few. They are both contrasted with the judicial institutions of a democracy. The difficulty in

this way of construing the passage is not the parenthesis, which is common in Aristotle, but the use of ἄλλων vaguely for 'different persons,' and not, as the preceding words ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων would lead us to expect, for 'different magistracies,' or 'boards of magistrates.'

In neither way of taking the passage is there any real contradiction to the statement of iii. 1. § 10. The words of the latter are as follows: 'For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly; but only extraordinary ones; suits are distributed in turn among the magistrates; at Lacedaemon, for instance, suits about contracts are decided, some by one Ephor and some by another; while the elders are judges of homicide, and other causes probably fall to some other magistracy. A similar principle prevails at Carthage; there certain magistrates decide all causes.'

11. 9. For the sale of great offices at Carthage, see Polyb. vi. 56. § 4, παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίους δῶρα φανερώς διδόντες λαμβάνουσι τὰς ἀρχάς· παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις θάνατός ἐστι περὶ τοῦτο πρόστιμον.

11. 10. δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτου τῆν παρέκβασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτην κ.τ.λ.

The error consists in making wealth a qualification for office; the legislator should from the first have given a competency to the governing class, and then there would have been no need to appoint men magistrates who were qualified by wealth only. Even if the better classes generally are not to be protected against poverty, such a provision must be made for the rulers as will ensure them leisure. See infra § 12, βέλτιον δ' εἰ καὶ ἰ προεῖτο τῆν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ὁ νομοθέτης κ.τ.λ.

11. 10. εἰ δὲ δεῖ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχολῆς, φαῦλον τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ὠνητὰς εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, τὴν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τῆν στρατηγίαν.

Of this, as of many other passages in the Politics, the meaning can only be inferred from the context. In the Carthaginian constitution the element of wealth superseded merit. But whether there was a regular traffic in offices, as the words τὰς μεγίστας ὠνητὰς εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν would seem to imply, or merely a common practice of corruption, as in England in the last century, Aristotle does not clearly inform us. Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 544 D, ἥ τινα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἥ τις καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινὶ κεῖται; δυναστεῖαι γὰρ καὶ ὠνηταὶ βασιλείαι καὶ τοιαῦτα τινες πολιτεῖαι μεταξύ τι τούτων πού εἰσιν, εὐροὶ δ' ἔν τις αὐτὰς οὐκ ἐλάττους περὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἢ τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

11. 12. βέλτιον δ' εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τῆν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ὁ νομοθέτης.

The MSS. vary between ἀπορίαν and εὐπορίαν without much difference of meaning: 'Even if the legislator were to give up the question of the poverty' [or 'wealth] of the better class.' A similar confusion of ἀπορος and εὐπορος occurs elsewhere: iii. 17. § 4, ἀπόροις and εὐπόροις: v. 1. § 14, ἀποροι and εὐποροι: v. 3. § 8, ἀπόρων and εὐπόρων: vi. 2. § 9, ἀπόροις and εὐπόροις.

11. 14. κοινότερόν τε γάρ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ κάλλιον ἕκαστον ἀποτελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θῦπτον.

κοινότερον, 'more popular,' because more persons hold office.

καθάπερ εἴπομεν, cp. § 13.

ἕκαστον τῶν αὐτῶν, i.e. because each thing remains the same. The insertion of ὑπὸ before τῶν, suggested by the Old Translation *ab eisdem*, is unnecessary. τῶν αὐτῶν, 'where the duties are the same.'

κάλλιον ἂν ποτελεῖται, i.e. if many share in the government each individual can be confined to the same duties, a division of labour to which frequent reference is made in Aristotle. (Cp. ii. 2. §§ 5, 6; iv. 15. §§ 7, 8; vi. 2. § 8, and Plat. Rep. ii. 374 A, iii. 397 E.) And there is more political intelligence where everybody is both ruler and subject.

11. 15. ἐκφεύγουσι τῷ πλουτεῖν. See note on text.

So England has been often said to have escaped a revolution during this century by the help of colonization: nor is there 'any more profitable affair of business in which an old country can be engaged' (Mill). That Aristotle was not averse to assisting the poor out of the revenues of the state when any political advantage could be gained, or any permanent good effected for them, we infer from vi. 5. §§ 8, 9.

11. 15. ἄλλὰ τουτί ἐστι τύχης ἔργον.

Though the government of the Carthaginians is in good repute (§ 1), Aristotle regards this reputation as not wholly deserved, their stability being due to the power of sending out colonies which their wealth gave them; but this is only a happy accident. In a similar spirit he has remarked that the permanency of the Cretan government is due to their insular position (c. 10. § 15).

11. 16. ἂν ἄτυχία γένηται τις.

The later reflection on the accidental character of the stability which he attributes to Carthage is not quite in harmony with the statement of § 2, in which he cites the lastingness of the government as a proof of the goodness of the constitution.

12. 2-6. Grote in his eleventh chapter (vol. iii. p. 167, ed. 1847) says that, according to Aristotle, Solon only gave the people the power to elect their magistrates and hold them to accountability. What is said in §§ 2 and 3 he considers not to be the opinion of Aristotle himself, but of those upon whom he is commenting. This is true of § 2: but not of § 3, which contains Aristotle's criticism on the opinion expressed in § 2. Thus we have the authority of Aristotle (at least of the writer of this chapter) for attributing the institution of the δικαστήρια to Solon (cp. Schömann's Athenian Constitution, transl. by Bosanquet, pp. 36 ff.). The popular juries are said to be a democratic institution (τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστήσαι, τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων); but it is obvious that, so long as the jurors were unpaid, the mass of the people could make no great use of their privileges. The character of the democracy was therefore far from being of an extreme kind; cp. iv. 6. §§ 5, 6 and 13. §§ 5, 6, vi. 2. §§ 6, 7.

The sum of Aristotle's (?) judgment upon Solon (§ 3) is that he did create the democracy by founding the dicasteries, but that he was not responsible for the extreme form of it which was afterwards established by Ephialtes, Pericles, and their followers.

12. 4. ἕκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν.

The writer of this passage clearly intended to class Pericles among the demagogues. He judges him in the same depreciatory spirit as Plato in the *Gorgias*, pp. 515, 516.

12. 5. ἐπεὶ Σόλων γε ἔοικε τῆν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν.

Cp. Solon, *Fragm.* 4 in Bergk *Poet. Lyr. Graeci*, Δήμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον κράτος, ὅσον ἐπαρκεῖ, | Τιμῆς οὐτ' ἀφελῶν οὐτ' ἐπορεξάμενος.

12. 6. τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων κατέστησε πάσας, ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιομεδίμων καὶ ζευγιῶν καὶ τρίτου τέλους τῆς καλουμένης ἱππάδος· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς μετῆν.

The arrangement of the classes here is somewhat disorderly, the second class or Knights being placed third in the series. That Aristotle should have supposed the Hippeis to have formed the third class is incredible; but it is difficult to say what amount of error is possible in a later writer. See an absurd mistake in *Suidas* and *Photius* about ἱππεῖς and ἱππῶς (*Boeckh*, P. E. ii. 260) under ἱππᾶς, which in *Photius* s. v. is called a fifth class; while in the next entry four Athenian classes are cited in the usual order with a reference to Aristotle (?) de *Rep. Atheniensium*, and an addition 'that ἱππᾶδες belong to ἱππεῖς' (?).

12. 6. νομοθεταὶ δ' ἐγένοντο Ζάλευκός τε Λοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπιζεφυριοῖς, καὶ Χαρώνδας ὁ Καταναῖος τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολίταις.

Strabo (vi. 260), quoting *Ephorus*, says that Zaleucus made one great innovation, in taking away from the dicasts, and inserting in the law, the power of fixing the penalty after sentence was given.

Aristotle attributes greater precision to Charondas than to modern legislators. But early laws have a greater appearance of precision because society is simpler, and there are fewer of them.

12. 7. Θάλητα.

Thales, called also Thaletas, probably the Cretan poet who is said by *Ephorus* apud *Strabonem*, x. p. 481, to have been the friend of *Lycurgus*; and also to have introduced the Cretan rhythm into vocal music. Mentioned in *Plut. de Musica*, pp. 1135, 1146. *Clinton* supposes him to have flourished from 690 to 660 B.C. But chronology cannot be framed out of disjointed statements of *Plutarch* and *Pausanias*.

12. 7. Λυκοῦργον καὶ Ζάλευκον.

A greater anachronism respecting *Lycurgus* is found in the fragments of *Ephorus* (*Strabo* x. 482, ἐντυχόντα δ', ὡς Φασί τινες, καὶ Ὀμηροῦ διατριβόντι ἐν Χίῳ, quoted by *Oncken*, *Staatslehre des Aristoteles*, ii. p. 346).

12. 8. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορίνθιος.

The δὲ is not opposed to μὲν at the end of the last sentence, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγουσιν

κ.τ.λ., but is a resumption of the δὲ at the beginning of the previous sentence, πειρῶνται δέ. The story, if any reason is required for the introduction of it, may be intended to explain how Philolaus a Corinthian gave laws for Thebes.

12. 11. Of Onomacritus, Philolaus, Androdamas, nothing more is known: of Zaleucus not much more. A good saying attributed to him has been preserved in Stobaeus xlv. p. 304, Ζάλευκος, ὁ τῶν Λοκρῶν νομοθέτης, τοὺς νόμους ἔφησε τοῖς ἀραχνίοις ὁμοίους εἶναι· ὡσπερ γὰρ εἰς ἐκεῖνα ἐὼν μὲν ἐμπέσῃ μυῖα ἢ κώνωψ, κατέχεται, ἐὼν δὲ σφήξ ἢ μέλιττα, διαῖρήξασα ἀφίπταται, οὕτω καὶ εἰς τοὺς νόμους ἐὼν μὲν ἐμπέσῃ πένης, συνεχεται· ἐὼν δὲ πλούσιος ἢ δυνατὸς λέγειν, διαῖρήξας ἀποτρέχει, an apophthegm which in Aristotle's phraseology (i. 11. § 10) may be truly said 'to be of general application.' Stobaeus has also preserved (xlv. p. 289) numerous laws which are attributed to Charondas and Zaleucus. They are full of excellent religious sentiments, but are evidently of a late Neo-Pythagorean origin. The same remark applies still more strongly to the citations in Diodorus xii. c. 12 ff.

12. 12. Πλάτωνος δ' ἢ τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν, ἔτι δ' ὁ περὶ τῆν μέθην νόμος, τὸ τοὺς νήφοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τῆν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἄσκησιν ὅπως ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνωνται κατὰ τῆν μελέτην, ὡς δεόν μὴ τῆν μὲν χρήσιμον εἶναι τοῖν χεροῖν τῆν δὲ ἄχρηστον.

The reference to Plato's communism in contrast with Phaleas' proposal of equality is not unnatural; but the allusion to three unconnected, two of them very trivial, points in the 'Laws,' is strange, and looks like the addition of a later hand. This whole chapter has been often suspected. It consists of miscellaneous jottings not worked up, some of them on matters already discussed. But mere irregularity and feebleness are no sufficient ground for doubting the genuineness of any passage in the sense in which genuineness may be ascribed to the greater part of the Politics. The chapter may be regarded either as an imperfect recapitulation or as notes for the continuation of the subject. The story of Philolaus, and the discussion respecting Solon, are characteristic of Aristotle.

καὶ τῆν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἄσκησιν. The change of construction arises from the insertion of the clause ὁ περὶ τῆν μέθην νόμος. The accusative may be explained as the accusative of the remote object after ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνωνται, or may be taken with περὶ.

It may be remarked that Aristotle looks on the ἀμφιδέξιος as an exception to nature (cp. Nic. Eth. v. 7. § 4, φύσει γὰρ ἢ δεξιὰ κρείπτων καίτοι ἐνδέχεται τινὰς ἀμφιδέξιους γενέσθαι), whereas in Plato (Laws 794 D, E) the ordinary use of the right hand only is regarded as a limitation of nature.

12. 13. Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι.

Cp. Plut. Solon 17. Another reference to Draco occurs in Rhet. ii. 23, 1400 b. 21, καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος· χαλεποὶ γάρ.

BOOK III.

1. 1. τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι.

The particle δὲ after τῷ was probably omitted when the treatise was divided into books.

1. 1.

τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου

are a resumption of the opening words τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι. 'The legislator or statesman is wholly engaged in enquiries about the state. But the state is made up of citizens, and therefore he must begin by asking who is a citizen.' The clause τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ . . . περὶ πόλιν is a repetition and confirmation of the previous sentence, τῷ περὶ πολιτείας . . . ἢ πόλις, the enquirer being more definitely described as the legislator or statesman.

1. 4.

οὐδ' οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὥστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι.

καὶ is closely connected with οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες. 'Nor those who share in legal rights, so that as a part of their legal rights they are sued and sue, as plaintiffs and defendants.'

1. 4.

καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει.

These words are omitted in the old translation and in several Greek MSS. and are bracketed by Susemihl (1st ed.). If retained, they either 1) refer to the remote antecedent μέτοικοι above, 'for the metics have these rights, and yet are not citizens,' whereupon follows the correction, 'although in many places metics do not possess even these rights in a perfect form.' Or 2*) they are only a formal restatement of the words immediately preceding (for a similar restatement, which is bracketed by Bekker, see iv. 6. § 3), and are therefore omitted in the translation. Other instances of such pleonastic repetitions occur elsewhere, e. g. infra c. 6. § 4, where τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν αὐτοῦ is repeated in κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον: also iv. 1. § 1, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἐστίν, and v. 1. § 1.

Aristotle argues that the right of suing and being sued does not make a citizen, for a) such a right is conferred by treaty on citizens of other states: (cp. Thuc. i. 77, καὶ ἐλασσούμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς συμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους δίκαις καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν). b) The metics have this right, which, as he proceeds to remark, in many places is only granted them at second-hand through the medium of a patron.

1. 5.

οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ λίαν.

λίαν qualifies and at the same time emphasises ἀπλῶς: 'But not quite absolutely.'

1. 5.

ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων κ.τ.λ.

I. e. doubts may be raised about the rights to citizenship of exiles and deprived citizens, but they may also be solved by the expedient of adding some qualifying epithet.

1. 7.

ἄνωνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ.

'This is a merely verbal dispute arising out of the want of a word; for had there been a common name comprehending both dicast and ecclesiast it would have implied an office.' Cp. Laws, vi. 767 A: 'Now the establishment of courts of justice may be

regarded as a choice of magistrates; for every magistrate must also be a judge of something, and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, is a very important magistrate when he is determining a suit.'

1. 8. δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα διαφέρει τῷ εἶδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρῶτον τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τὸ δ' ἐχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν ἐστίν, ἢ τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, ἢ γλίσχρως.

τὰ ὑποκείμενα. 1*) 'the underlying notions' or 'the notions to which the things in question are referred,' i. e. in this passage, as the connexion shows, 'the forms of the constitution on which the idea of the citizen depends' (see Bonitz s. v.). 2) ὑποκείμενα is taken by Bernays to mean the individuals contained under a class, and he translates 'where things which fall under one conception are different in kind.' But it is hard to see how things which are different in kind can fall under one class or conception, and the meaning, even if possible, is at variance with the immediate context which treats not of citizens but of constitutions.

1. 9. τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν εἶδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας τὰς δὲ προτέρας οὔσας.

The logical distinction of prior and posterior is applied by Aristotle to states, and so leads to the erroneous inference that the perfect form of the state has little or nothing in common with the imperfect. So in Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 2, 'there are no common ideas of things prior and posterior.' The logical conceptions of prior and posterior have almost ceased to exist in modern metaphysics; they are faintly represented to us by the expressions 'a priori' and 'a posteriori,' or 'prior in the order of thought,' which are a feeble echo of them; from being differences in kind, they are becoming differences of degree, owing to the increasing sense of the continuity or development of all things.

1. 10. διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίῳ μάλιστ' ἐστὶ πολίτης.

Yet not so truly as in Aristotle's own polity hereafter to be described, in which all the citizens are equal (cp. infra, c. 13. § 12). Democracy is elsewhere called a perversion (infra, c. 7. § 5), but he here uses the term carelessly, and in a better sense, for that sort of democracy which is akin to the μέση πολιτεία.

1. 10. κατὰ μέρος.

Generally 'in turn,' but the examples show that the phrase must here mean 'by sections' or 'by different bodies or magistracies.'

1. 11. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα· πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας.

τὸν αὐτόν, i. e. because in both these cases the administration of justice is taken out of the hands of the people and entrusted to the magistrates, either the same or different magistrates.

The oligarchies or aristocracies of Carthage and Sparta are here contrasted, not with each other, but with democracy. A minor difference between them is also hinted at: at Carthage there were regular magistrates to whom all causes were referred; at

Lacedaemon causes were distributed among different magistrates. See note on ii. 11. § 7.

1. 11. ἀλλ' ἔχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός.

The particle γὰρ implies an objection which is not expressed. 'But how, if our definition is correct, can the Lacedaemonians, Carthaginians, and others like them be citizens; for they have no judicial or deliberative assemblies.' To which Aristotle answers, 'But I will correct the definition so as to include them.' Finding ἀόριστος ἀρχῆ to be a definition of citizenship inapplicable to any state but a democracy, he substitutes a new one, 'admissibility to office, either deliberative or judicial.'

1. 12. ταύτης τῆς πόλεως.

Namely, of that state in which the assembly or law-court exists.

2. 1. πολιτικῶς.

'Popularly' or 'enough for the purposes of politics.' Cp. Plat. Rep. 430 C. So νομικῶς (viii. 7. § 3), 'enough for the purposes of law.'

For ταχέως Camerarius and Bernays needlessly read παχέως.

2. 2. Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντίνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ' εἰρωνευόμενος, ἔφη, καθάπερ ὄλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισσαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιημένους· εἶναι γὰρ τινὰς λαρισσοποιούς.

ἀπορῶν. 'In doubt about the question who is a citizen?'

δημιουργῶν. Properly the name of a magistrate in some Dorian states. The word is used here with a double pun, as meaning not only 'magistrates,' but 1) 'makers of the people,' 2) 'artisans.' The magistrates, like artisans, are said to make or manufacture the citizens because they admit them to the rights of citizenship.

There is also a further pun upon the word Λαρισσαίους, which probably meant kettles, or was used as a characteristic epithet of kettles derived from their place of manufacture:—

'Artisans make kettles.

Magistrates make citizens.'

The sentence may be translated as follows:—'Gorgias, very likely because he was in a difficulty, but partly out of irony, said that, as mortars are made by the mortar-makers, so are the Larisseans manufactured by their 'artisan-magistrates; for some of them were makers of kettles' (Λάρισσαι or Λαρισσαῖοι).

For the term εἰρωνευόμενος, applied to Gorgias, compare Rhet. iii. 7, 1408 b. 20, ἢ μετ' ἃ εἰρωνείας, ὅπερ Γοργίας ἔποιει: and for Λάρισσαι compare Τάναγρα Ταναγρίς, a kettle, (Hesych., Pollux); also an epigram of Leonides of Tarentum (Anth. vi. 305):—

Λαβροσύνῃ τάδε δῶρα, Φιλευλείχῳ τε Λαφυγμῳ

θήκατο δεισόζου* Δωριέως κεφαλά,

τῶς Λαρισσαίως βουγάστορας ἐψητῆρας,

καὶ χύτρως καὶ τῶν εὐρυχασδῆ κύλικα,

καὶ τῶν εὐχάλκωτον εὐγναμπτόν τε κρεάγραν,

καὶ κνήστιν, καὶ τῶν ἐτνοδόνον τορύναν.

Λαβροσύνα, σὺ δὲ τὰντα κακοῦ κακὰ δωρητῆρος

δεξαμένα, νεύσαις μὴ ποκα σωφροσύναν.

2. 3. ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους. (See note on text.)

Mr. Grote, c. 31. vol. iv. 170. n., would keep the words as they stand, taking μετοίκους with both ξένους and δούλους. He quotes Aristoph. Knights 347 (εἷ που δικίδιον εἶπας εἶ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου), and infers from the juxtaposition of the words δούλους μετοίκους, that they mean, 'slaves who, like metics, were allowed to live by themselves, though belonging to a master.' That is to say μέτοικοι are spoken of in a general as well as in a technical sense. According to Xen. de Vect. 2. § 3, all kinds of barbarians were metics. Cp. for the general subject, Polit. vi. 4. § 18, where measures, like those which Cleisthenes the Athenian passed when he wanted to extend the power of the democracy, are said to have been adopted at Cyrene. Such a reconstruction of classes also took place at Sicyon under Cleisthenes the tyrant, who gave insulting names to the old Dorian tribes (Herod. v. 68).

2. 4. τὸ δ' ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς τούτους ἐστὶν οὐ τις πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἀδίκως ἢ δικαίως. καίτοι καὶ τὸντο τις ἔτι προσαπορήσειεν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle means to say that what is true in fact may be false in principle. These two senses of the words 'true' and 'false' were confused by sophistical thinkers. See Plat. Euthyd. 284, ff.

2. 5. τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς refers to τινί, sc. ἀορίστῳ, supra 1. § 7, 'an office such as we spoke of.'

3. 1. δῆλον ὅτι πολίτας μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ἢ μὴ δικαίως συνάπτει πρὸς τῆν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν.

A doubt is raised whether the ἀδίκως πολιτεύων is truly a πολίτης. The answer is that the ἀδίκως ἄρχων is truly an ἄρχων. But the πολίτης is by definition an ἄρχων, and therefore the ἀδίκως πολίτης may be rightly called a πολίτης.

καὶ τούτους, sc. τοὺς ἀμφισβητούμενους (§ 4), 'these as well as the legitimate citizens.'

πρὸς τῆν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν is the question touched upon in c. 1. § 1,

and resumed in the words which follow. The controversy concerning the *de jure* citizen runs up into the controversy respecting the *de jure* state, which is now to be discussed.

3. 1, 2. ὅταν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία. τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἕνιοι βούλονται διαλύειν.

A question which has often arisen both in ancient and modern times, and in many forms. Shall the new government accept the debts and other liabilities of its predecessor, e.g. after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants, or the English or French Revolution or Restoration? Shall the Northern States of America honour the paper of the Southern? Shall the offerings of the Cypselids at Delphi bear the name of Cypselus or of the Corinthian state? Or a street in Paris be called after Louis Philippe, Napoleon III, or the French nation?

3. 2. εἴπερ οἶνον καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται τινες κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ὁμοίως τῆς πόλεως φάτεον εἶναι ταύτης τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.

The mere fact that a government is based on violence does not necessarily render invalid the obligations contracted by it; at any rate the argument would apply to democracy as well as to any other form of government. Cp. Demosth. πρὸς Λεπτίνην, p. 460, where it is mentioned that the thirty tyrants borrowed money of the Lacedaemonians, which, after a discussion, was repaid by the democracy out of the public funds, and not by confiscation of the property of the oligarchs. Cp. also Isocr. Areopag. vii. 153, where the same story is repeated.

3. 3. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διαζευχθῆναι τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἄνθρωπους.

E.g. the case of the Athenian κληροῦχοι, who, while possessing land in other places, remained citizens of Athens; or of migrations in which a whole state was transferred; or possibly a dispersion like that of the Arcadian cities which were afterwards reunited by Epaminondas. Yet, ii. 1. § 2, ὁ τόπος εἶς ὁ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως.

3. 4. πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως λεγομένης ἐστὶ πως εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως.

'When difficulties are raised about the identity of the state, you may solve many of them quite easily by saying that the word "state" is used in different senses.'

3. 4. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον κατοικούντων,

sc. ἡ ἀπορία ἐστίν, supplied from τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης.

3. 5. τοιαύτη δ' ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλῶν.

'Such as Peloponnesus would be, if included within a wall,'—further illustrated by τῆς γ' ἑαλωκυίας κ.τ.λ.

3. 5. ἦς γέ φασιν ἑαλωκυίας τρίτην ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθέσθαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως.

Cp. Herod. i. 191: 'The Babylonians say that, when the further parts of the city had

been taken by Cyrus, those in the centre knew nothing of the capture, but were holding a festival.' Also Jeremiah li. 31: 'One post shall run to meet another, and one messenger to meet another to show the king of Babylon that his city is taken at one end.'

3. 6. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν χρήσιμος ἢ σκέψις· περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τό τε πόσον καὶ πότερον ἔθνος ἐν ἧ πλείω συμφέρει, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τὸν πολιτικόν.

The subject is resumed in Book vii. 4. § 4, ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτον τό τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δεῖ φύσει, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ὡσαύτως, ὅσην τε εἶναι καὶ ποίαν τινὰ ταύτην, and § 11. In the words τὸν πολιτικὸν Aristotle identifies himself with the statesman or politician of whom he is speaking.

πότερον ἔθνος ἐν ἧ πλείω, cp. vii. 9. § 8 and 10. § 13.

3. 6, 7. ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, πότερον ἕως ἄν ᾗ τὸ γένος ταῦτό τῶν κατοικούντων, τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ ἄει τῶν μὲν φθειρομένων τῶν δὲ γινομένων, ὡσπερ καὶ ποταμοὺς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτάς, καίπερ ἄει τοῦ μὲν ἐπιγινομένου νάματος, τοῦ δ' ὑπεξιόντος, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους φατέον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἑτέραν; εἴπερ γὰρ ἔστι κοινωνία τις ἢ πόλις κ.τ.λ.

From the digression into which he has fallen respecting the size of the state, Aristotle returns to the original question, What makes the identity of the state? He answers in an alternative: Shall we say that the identity of the state depends upon the race, although the individuals of the race die and are born—like a river which remains the same although the waters come and go? Or is not the truer view that the form or idea of the state makes the state the same or different, whether the race remain or not? This latter alternative he accepts, illustrating his meaning by the simile of a chorus (§ 7), which may be Tragic or Comic, although the members of it are the same; and of musical harmony (§ 8) in which the same notes are combined in different modes.

This is the conclusion which Aristotle intends to draw from the words εἴπερ γὰρ ἔστι κοινωνία τις ἢ πόλις κ.τ.λ., and is clearly the general drift of the passage. But the alternatives ἀλλὰ τῶν . . . ἑτέραν create an obscurity, because Aristotle begins by opposing the continuance of the race to the transitoriness of the individuals who are always going and coming, when he is really intending to oppose the idea of the state to both of them, §§ 7, 9.

διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν. 'For the same reason as the rivers;' i.e. because there is an unbroken succession of citizens as of waters.

The argument is neither clearly expressed nor altogether satisfactory. For 1) the identity of a state consists in many things, such as race, religion, language, as well as government, and therefore cannot be precisely defined; 2) it is always changing for better or for worse; 3) whether the identity is preserved or not is a question of degree; a state may be more or less the same, like the English constitution, and yet be continuous in the course of ages. Aristotle would have done better to have solved this

question by having recourse once more to the different senses of the word πόλις (§ 4).
Cp. iv. 5. § 3; v. 1. § 8.

3. 7. εἴπερ γὰρ ἔστι κοινωνία τις ἢ πόλις, ἔστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γινομένης ἑτέρας τῆς εἶδει καὶ διαφορῆς τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτήν.

'For a state being a community, and a community of citizens being a community in a constitution, ἔστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν κοινωνία πολιτείας, when the form of this community changes, the state also changes': or, if this construction is deemed harsh πολιτείας, may be thought to have crept in from the next line, and may be omitted as in the English text.

The particle γὰρ implies assent to the second alternative (supra).

4. 1, 2. 'The sailor besides his special duties has a general duty, which is the safety of the ship; the citizen has also a general duty, which is the salvation of the state—the nature of this duty will vary according to the character of the state. And besides the general duty citizens, like sailors, will have special duties and functions in the state, as in the ship.'

4. 4. οὐ μὴν ἄλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἔστι διαποροῦντας ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας.

The last words are an explanation of κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον.

Two conceptions of the state are continually recurring in the Politics of Aristotle, first the ideal state, in which the best has a right to rule and all the citizens are good men: secondly, the constitutional state, which approaches more nearly to actual fact (ii. 2. § 6; vii. 14. §§ 2-5). In the first, the good man and the good citizen, or rather the good ruler, are said to coincide; in the second, they have a good deal in common, but still the virtue of the citizen is relative to the government under which he lives, and the occupation in which he is engaged.

These two points of view are apt to cross (ἐπαλλάττειν in Aristotle's own language), and they appear to be here confused.

4. 5. εἰ γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἔξ ἀπάντων σπουδαιῶν ὄντων εἶναι πόλιν, δεῖ δ' ἕκαστον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ἔργον εἶναι ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δ' ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ἐπεὶ δ' ἀδύνατον ὁμοίους εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐκ ἂν εἴη μία ἀρετὴ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου δεῖ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τῇ σπουδαίῳ πόλει πολίτας.

The argument is that the perfect state is not composed only of perfectly good men; for such absolute goodness is incompatible with the different occupations or natural qualities of different citizens, or their duties toward the government under which they live. All the citizens are not the same, and therefore the one perfect virtue of the good man cannot be attained equally by all of them. But they may all have a common interest in the salvation of society, which is the virtue of a good citizen. The Pythagorean doctrine of the unity of virtue still lingers in the philosophy of Aristotle.

(Compare Ethics ii. 5. § 14, ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.)

4. 6. καὶ οἰκία ἐξ ἀνδρῶς καὶ γυναικῶς καὶ κτήσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου.

κτήσις is here omitted by Bernays, because the slave is a part of the οἰκία: but it may be observed that in i. 4. § 1, κτήσις is a subdivision of the οἰκία under which the slave is included.

4. 7. Φαμέν δ' ἵ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 5. § 5, where Pericles is spoken of as a type of the φρόνιμος; and vi. 8. § 1, where πολιτικῆ is described as a species of φρόνησις.

4. 7, 8. ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτῆ ἀρετῆ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρῶς σπουδαίου; Φαμέν δ' ἵ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τῆν παιδείαν δ' ἐπιθυμῶν εἶναι λέγουσιν τινες τοῦ ἄρχοντος, ὡς περ καὶ φαίνονται οἱ τῶν βασιλέων υἱεῖς ἵππικῆν καὶ πολεμικῆν παιδευόμενοι.

Aristotle having determined that the good citizen is not always a good man, now proceeds to ask the question whether some good citizens are not good men? Yes, the ruler must be a good and wise man; and the difference between him and other citizens is partly proved by the fact that he has a different education.

καὶ τῆν παιδείαν δ' ἐπιθυμῶν κ.τ.λ. 'Some persons say that, if we go no further than education, even this should be different.' So in § 6 above, ἐπιθυμῶν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος. Cp. i. 5. § 2; Met. iii. 2, 1004 a. 5, ὑπάρχει γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶν γένη ἔχοντα τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ ὄν.

4. 8. μὴ μοι τὰ κόμψ'.

The whole fragment, which appears to contain a piece of advice addressed to young princes, is given by Nauck, Eurip. Aeol. Fr. 16:—

*λαμπροὶ δ' ἕν σίχμαῖς ἄρεος ἕν τε συλλόγοις,
μὴ μοι τὰ κόμψ' ἀποκίλοι γενοῖσθε,
ἀλλ' ὡν πόλει δεῖ, μεγάλα βουλευέσθ' ἄει.*

Two points strike us about quotations from the poets which occur in Aristotle: 1) The familiarity with the words which they imply in the reader; for they are often cited in half lines only, which would be unintelligible unless the context was present to the mind. We are reminded that the Greek like some of our English youth were in the habit of committing to memory entire poems (Plat. Laws vii. 810 E). 2) The remoteness and ingenuity of the application. For a similar far fetched quotation, cp. infra c. 5. § 9.

4. 9. εἰ δὲ ἡ αὐτῆ ἀρετῆ ἄρχοντος τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρῶς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δ' ἔστι καὶ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτῆ ἀπλῶς ἕν εἶη πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρῶς, τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου.

'If the good man and the good ruler are to be identified, and the subject is also a citizen, then the virtue of the good man is not coextensive with the virtue of all good

citizens, but only with that of a certain citizen,' i.e. the citizen of a perfect state who is also a ruler, and therefore has a sphere for the employment of his energies, cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 8. § 4.

4. 9. οὐ γὰρ ἢ αὐτῆ ἄρχοντος καὶ πολίτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως Ἰάσων ἔφη πεινῆν, ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, ὡς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης εἶναι.

Another illustration of the difference in the nature of the ruler and of the citizen is contained in the saying of Jason, 1) 'that he had no choice between starvation and tyranny, for he had never learned how to live in a private station'; or 2)* 'that he felt a sensation like hunger when not a tyrant; for he was too proud to live in a private station.' The two interpretations differ according to the shade of meaning given to πεινῆν and ἐπιστάμενος.

The Jason here referred to is Jason of Pherae, the Tagus of Thessaly.

Another saying of Jason is quoted in Rhet. i. 12, 1373 a. 26, 'δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἔνια, ὅπως δύνηται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν.'

4. 10. εἰ οἶν τῆν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικὴν, τῆν δὲ τοῦ πολίτου ἀμφω, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως.

1) Aristotle here lights upon a paradox, which he cannot resist mentioning, but does not pursue further. 'If the virtue of the good man is of a ruling character, but the virtue of the citizen includes ruling and being ruled, their virtues cannot [from this point of view] be equally praiseworthy, [for the good man has one virtue only, the citizen two].'

2) Or the meaning may be, 'that the virtue of the good man being the virtue of ruling is higher than that of the citizen who only rules at times, or who obeys as well as rules.'

The words οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως according to the first way = 'the citizen is more to be praised than the good man': according to the second, 'the virtue of the two, i.e. of ruler and citizen, are not equally praiseworthy'; in other words, the virtue of the good man is the higher of the two.

The whole passage is perplexed, not from any corruption of the text, but from the love of casuistry and a want of clearness in distinguishing the two sides of the argument.

4. 11. ἐπεὶ οἶν ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἀμφοτέρα, καὶ οὐ ταύτῃ δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα μανθάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφοτέρ' ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν, τοῦντεῦθεν ἂν κατίδοι τις.

Aristotle seems to mean that the citizen acquires a knowledge of the duties of both ruler and ruled, which are different. Since the ruler and the ruled must learn both, and the two things are distinct, and the citizen must know both and have a part in both, the inference is obvious. But what is this obvious inference we are uncertain:—either, 1)* that some kind of previous subjection is an advantage to the ruler; or 2) that the citizen who knows both at once is to be preferred to the ἄρχων and ἀρχόμενος, taken separately.

The sentence is awkwardly expressed and is perhaps corrupt. The change of ἀμφοτέρα into ἀμφω ἕτερα (Bernays) would give much the same meaning with rather less difficulty, ('since the two must learn different things, and the ruler and the ruled are not required to learn the same things'), because τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον have not then to be taken in two senses, collective and distributive. It might be argued in favour of Bernays' emendation that ἀμφοτέρα may have crept in from the ἀμφοτέρα in the next line; and against it that the two words ἀμφω ἕτερα, the one having a collective, the other a distributive sense, are not happily combined.

§ 11 seems to be intended as a summing up of §§ 8-10. The thread of the argument is resumed at the words ταύτην γὰρ λέγομεν in § 14.

4. 11. ἔστι γὰρ ἄρχῆ δέσποτική κ.τ.λ.

is a digression introduced for the sake of distinguishing the ἄρχῆ δέσποτικῆ to which the preceding remarks do not apply, from the ἄρχῆ πολιτικῆ to which they do.

ἔστι γὰρ refers back to τὸν ἄρχοντα, 'We are speaking of the ruler who is also a subject; for we must remember that there is a rule of the master over his slave with which we are not here concerned.'

4. 12. διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις οὐ μετεῖχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν δ' ἦμιον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον.

διὸ, referring to ἀνδραποδῶδες and the various kinds of menial duties in which the artisan class were employed, 'Because of their servile and degraded character.'

4. 13. τῶν ἀρχομένων οὕτως.

I. e. those who (like household servants) are subject to the rule of a master.

4. 13. εἰ μὴ ποτε χρεῖας χάριν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν, οὐ γὰρ ἔτι κ.τ.λ.

*'For if men practise menial duties, not only for the supply of their own occasional wants, but habitually' (indicated by ποτέ), 'there is no longer any difference between master and slave,' i. e. the natural distinction of classes is effaced. It has been proposed to read τότε μὲν, τότε δέ, instead of τὸν μὲν, τὸν δέ, 'for then the case no longer occurs of a man being at one time master and at another time servant'—an arbitrary emendation (Riese, Susemihl) which gives a poor sense.

4. 14. οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἄρξαι μὴ ἀρχθέντα.

An ancient proverb naturally attributed by tradition (Diog. Laert. i. 60; Stobaeus xlvi. p. 308) to Solon. Cp. Plut. Apophth. Lac. 215 D, who assigns the saying to Agis, ἐρωτηθεὶς τί μάθημα μάλιστα ἐν Σπάρτῃ ἀσκεῖται, τὸ γινώσκειν, εἶπεν, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι.

4. 16. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δ' ἡ ἀγαθοῦ ἀμφω.

At first Aristotle appeared to draw an artificial line between the good citizen and the good man; but he now shifts his point of view. The good man may be supposed to have all virtue; he must therefore have the virtues both of the ruler and subject, although

the virtue of the ruler is of a peculiar character, and the virtue of the subject, if he be a freeman, takes many forms. So the virtue of a man and of a woman differ in degree and even in kind, yet both are included in the idea of virtue.

4. 17. καὶ γυνὴ λάλος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμία εἶη ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγαθός.

Compare for the ideal of womanly virtue, Thuc. ii. 45, τῆς τε γὰρ ὑπαρχούσης φύσεως μὴ χείροσι γενέσθαι ὑμῖν μεγάλη ἢ δόξα, καὶ ἥς ἂν ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον ἀρετῆς πέρι ἢ ψόγου ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι κλέος ἦ.

4. 18. ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετῆς φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθῆς· ὥσπερ ἀύλοποιός γ' ἄρ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δ' ἄρχων ἀύλητῆς ὁ χρώμενος.

Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 601 D, E, where the distinction is drawn between the ποιητής who has only πίστις ὀρθῆ and the χρώμενος who has ἐπιστήμη, and where there is the same illustration from the difference between the ἀύλοποιός and the ἀύλητῆς, and Cratylus 388 ff. also Nic. Eth. vi. 10. § 2, 'ἢ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἔστιν . . . ἢ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον.'

5. The discussion which follows is not unconnected with the preceding. For if, as has been assumed, a freeman or citizen is one who commands as well as obeys, then it would seem that the artisan or mean person, even though not a slave, must be excluded.

5. 1. οὗτος γὰρ πολίτης.

Sc. ὁ ἔχων τῆν τοιαύτην ἀρετήν. See note on English text.

5. 2. ἢ διὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον; οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδὲν, οὐδ' οἱ ἀπελεύθεροι.

'But if the artisan is not included in the number of citizens where is he to be placed? He is not a metic, nor a stranger. Yet no real difficulty is involved in his exclusion any more than in that of slaves or freedmen.'

διὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον = so far as this objection goes, viz. the implied objection that he has no place in the state.

τῶν εἰρημένων refers to οὐδὲ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος.

5. 2. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.

'On the supposition that they grow up to be men.'

5. 4. τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων.

'But in respect to servile occupations'; either an anacoluthon resumed in τὰ τοιαῦτα, or governed by the idea of ἔργον contained in λειτουργοῦντες.

The point is how to determine the position of the artisan or mean person. There is no difficulty in seeing that some who live in states are not citizens, but how is the mechanic to be distinguished from the slave? The answer is that the slave ministers to a

single master, artisans and serfs belong to the state.

5. 4. Φανερόν δ' ἐντείνθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένοις πῶς ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶν· αὐτὸ γὰρ Φανέν τὸ λεχθὲν ποιεῖ ἄλλο. ἔπει γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

'What has been said at once (Φανέν) makes the matter clear.' It has been *said* that the best form of state will not admit the artisan class to citizenship (§ 3), and that the citizen will vary with the state (supra c. 1. § 9), a remark which he repeats in what follows. 'For there are many forms of states; virtue is the characteristic of aristocracy, wealth of oligarchy. Now although the mechanic or skilled artisan cannot have virtue, he may have wealth, and therefore he may be a citizen of some states, but not of others.'

περὶ αὐτῶν, sc. about the lower class.

5. 7. ἐν Θήβαις δὲ νόμος τῖν τὸν δέκα ἔτων μὴ ἀπεσχημένον τῆς ἀγορᾶς μὴ μετέχειν ἀρχῆς.

Cp. infra vi. 7. § 4, where the fact respecting Thebes is repeated.

It is clearly for the common interest and for the security of the state, that the passage from one class to another should be as easy as possible under all forms of government. Such a power of extending, and including other classes is necessary to the very existence of an oligarchy or of an aristocracy, or even of a constitutional government. And the avenue by which the lower naturally pass into the higher is personal merit or fitness which ought to overcome circumstances and not beat helplessly against the bars of a prison. The gold which the god has implanted in a person of an inferior class should be allowed to find its place (Plat. Rep. iii. 415), even if we cannot degrade the brass or lead in the higher. The higher class too have governing qualities which pass into the lower, and they themselves receive new life and new ideas from the association.

5. 7, 8. προσφέλεκται καὶ τῶν ξένων ὁ νόμος . . οὐ μῆν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.

ξένων is partitive: 'The law goes so far as in addition to include some of the stranger class. Nevertheless, when there are citizens more than enough the law which extended, again contracts, the right.' For restrictions of population see Plat. Laws v. 740.

5. 8. τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν.

I. e. whose mothers were free women and their fathers not slaves (for this case has been already provided for in the words ἐκδούλου), but strangers or resident aliens.

5. 8. τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν αὐτῶν.

The MSS. read αὐτῶν: Schneider, following Perizonius, has changed αὐτῶν into ἀστῶν, and the emendation is adopted by Bekker in both editions: but 1) the word ἀστὸς is of very rare occurrence in Aristotle; 2) it would be in awkward proximity to πολίτης; and 3) the change is unnecessary. Lit. 'they make only those of them (αὐτῶν) citizens, who are children of citizens both on the father's and mother's side.' αὐτῶν, though not exactly needed, is idiomatic.

5. 9. ὥς εἴ τιν' ἄτιμητον μετανάστην.

Quoted also in Rhet. ii. 2, 1378 b. 33. Compare for a similar application of Homer bk. i. 2. § 9. Aristotle has given a new turn to the meaning of ἄτιμητος = τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. But there is nothing singular in this; for quotations are constantly cited in new senses.

5. 9. ἄλλ' ὅπου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνοικούντων ἐστίν.

τὸ τοιοῦτον = τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τῶν τιμῶν, i.e. the exclusion from office of certain classes is concealed in order to deceive the excluded persons. The reference is not to such cases as that of the 5000 at Athens, whose names were concealed for a political purpose (Thuc. viii. 92); but more probably to such deceptions as those of which Aristotle speaks in iv. 12. § 6 and c. 13 whereby the poor, though nominally citizens, were really deprived of their privileges because they had no leisure to exercise them. The intention was to trick them, but they were not dissatisfied; for they did not find out the trick. The English translation is defective, and should have run, 'the object is that the privileged class may deceive their fellow-citizens.'

Another way of explaining the passage is to place an emphasis on τῶν συνοικούντων, which is taken in the sense of 'fellow-colonists': 'the intention is to attract settlers by deceiving them into the belief that they will become citizens, when the rights of citizenship are really withheld from them.' (For examples of fraud practised by colonists on strangers or fellow settlers, see v. 3. §§ 11-13.) But the words refer to states generally and not merely to colonies.

5. 10. καὶ κεῖνος.

Sc. ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ πολίτης σπουδαῖος ὢν. In his later edition Bekker reads καὶ κεῖνης, a correction of one MS. All the rest, and the old translator, read καὶ κεῖνος. With either reading the meaning of the passage is much the same. 'Even where the virtues of the good man and the good citizen coincide (i. e. in the perfect state), it is not the virtue of every citizen which is the same as that of the good man, but only that of the statesman and ruler.' καὶ κεῖνος = καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς κ.τ.λ.: καὶ κεῖνης = ἐν τῷ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς κ.τ.λ.

6. 1, 2. ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία . . πολιτείαν ἑτέραν εἶναι τούτων.

Lit. 'The state [πολιτεία] is the ordering of the powers of a state, and especially of the supreme power. The government [πολίτευμα] is this supreme power, and the state or constitution (ἡ πολιτεία subj.) is what the government is. In democracies, for example, the people are the ruling power, in oligarchies the few. Accordingly we say that they differ in their constitutions.' The three words πολίτευμα, πολιτεία, πόλις have three primary gradations of meaning: 1) πολίτευμα = the government, i. e. the persons through whom the government acts; πολιτεία = the government administering and being administered, i. e. the state or constitution; πόλις = the whole state including the government. But these senses pass into one another.

6. 3. καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς.

μέρος is to be taken with καθ' ὅσον, the genitive τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς is partitive. ἐπιβάλλει,

sc. ἐκάστῳ τὸ ζῆν καλῶς or impersonally. For the meaning of this word cp. note on ii. 3. § 4.

6. 4. συνέχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ (ἴσως γὰρ ἕνεστί τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον), καὶ συνέχουσι τῆν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον, ἄν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλῃ λιαν.

Cp. Plat. Polit. 301 E, 302 A: 'And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, Socrates, at the miseries that there are, and always will be, in States? Any other art, built on such a foundation, would be utterly undermined,—there can be no doubt of that. Ought we not rather to wonder at the strength of the political bond? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them, like ships foundering at sea, are perishing and have perished and will hereafter perish, through the incapacity of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths,—I mean to say, that they are wholly unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge.'

6. 5. ὡς ἐνούσης τινὸς εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς: cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 9. § 7, τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων κ.τ.λ.

6. 8. ὅταν δὲ τούτων εἷς γένηται καὶ αὐτός.

αὐτός refers inaccurately either to the trainer or to the pilot.

6. 9. τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν.

The reflexive refers to the principal subject ἀξιόφροντες: but is changed into the singular by the introduction of τινά. Translated into the first person the sentence would run, 'Some one should now look after my interest as I looked after his when in office.' For the 'disinterestedness' of traders cp. Plat. Rep. i. pp. 345, 346.

6. 10. νῦν δέ.

Answering to πρότερον μὲν above. 'The natural principle that men should rule and be ruled in turn was once the practice; but now from corrupt motives, they insist on ruling perpetually.'

7. 2. ἢ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φαστέον εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἢ δεῖ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος.

The meaning of γὰρ is as follows: 'Since there are perverted, as well as true states, there are states of which the members are not to be called citizens; or, if they were, they would partake of the common good.' For, as has been said at the beginning of the treatise, πᾶσαν πόλιν ὀρώμεν κοινωνίαν τινά οἴσαν καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθῶν τινὸς ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν. And the true forms of government are those which regard the good of the governed.

7. 3. ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον.

Of course in reality the first of the two etymologies is the true one, but Aristotle, like

Plato in the Cratylus, regards the relation which the component parts of words bear to one another as variable. He is fond of etymological meanings and sometimes forces the etymology to suit the meaning, e.g. σωφροσύνη, ὧς σώζουσα τῆν φρόνησιν, Nic. Eth. vi. 5. § 5; ἠθικῆ from ἔθος, Nic. Eth. ii. 1. § 1; δίκαιον ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, Nic. Eth. v. 4. § 9; μακάριον ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν, Nic. Eth. vii. 11. § 2; τιμοκρατία . . ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτεία, Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 1.

The first of the two explanations of ἄριστοκρατία is more in accordance not only with the principles of etymology but with the facts of history, if we take ἄριστοι in the sense in which the word would have been understood by Alcaeus or Theognis: the second answers best to Aristotle's ideal state.

7. 3. πολιτεία.

In Ethics viii. 10. § 1 this is identified with τιμοκρατία = ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτεία, a government based upon a property qualification (ἣν τιμοκρατικῆν λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ' αὐτῆν εἰώθασιν οἱ πλείστοι καλεῖν). No example of the word τιμοκρατία occurs in the Politics. It is used by Plato in another sense = the government of honour (ἡ φιλότιμος πολιτεία, Rep. viii. 545 B).

πολιτεία originally meaning, as in Thucydides, any form of government, a sense which is continued in Aristotle, has also like our own word 'constitution' a second and specific sense, apparently coming into use in the age of Aristotle, though not invented by him. Cp. iv. 7. § 1, πέμπτη δ' ἐστίν ἡ προσαγορεύεται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν (πολιτείαν γὰρ καλοῦσιν), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλάκις γίνεσθαι λανθάνει τοὺς πειρωμένους ἀριθμεῖν τὰ τῶν πολιτειῶν εἴδη, καὶ χροῶνται ταῖς τέτταρσι μόνον, ὥσπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις; also ii. 6. § 16.

8. The subject of this chapter is again referred to in iv. c. 4. The discussion which follows affords a curious example of the manner in which Aristotle after passing through a maze of casuistry at length arrives at the conclusions of common sense.

8. 6. διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει τὰς ἐηθείσας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορᾶς.

The MSS. have διαφορὰς ('That the already mentioned differences are the true causes,' a reading which gives a somewhat unusual sense to αἰτίας). The old translator has 'differentiae' in the genitive. Better to take διαφορᾶς as a genitive, making αἰτίας the predicate, and repeating the word with ἐηθείσας. 'And thus the so-called causes of difference are not real causes.' Bernays inserts πολιτείας after ἐηθείσας without authority, and appears to translate the passage rather freely: 'And they cannot therefore create any form of constitution which can be specifically named.'

The argument is intended to show that the essential differences between oligarchy and democracy are not made by the governing body being few or many (τὰς ἐηθείσας αἰτίας), but by poverty and wealth. It is an accident that the rich are few, and the poor many.

9. 1. καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις.

'And so it is; not however for all, but only for the equal.' Cp. Cic. de Rep. i. c. 34, 'Cum par habetur honos summis et infimis . . ipsa aequitas iniquissima est.' Burke, French

Revol. (vol. v. p. 106. ed. 1815), 'Everything ought to be open, but not indifferently to every man.'

9. 2. τὸ δ' αἴτιον ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις.

Men think themselves to be as good or better than others, and therefore claim equal or greater political rights; e.g. they claim to exercise the franchise without considering whether they are fit or not. They can never see that they are inferior, and that therefore it may be just for them to have less than others: cp. below § 3.

9. 3. ἐπεὶ . . . διίρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς.

Lit. 'Since justice is distributed in the same manner (i.e. equally) over things and over persons.' τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον is to be taken not with διίρηται, but with the words which follow = ὁμοίως.

9. 3. τῆν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι.

τῆν δέ, sc. ἰσότητα is accusative after ἀμφισβητοῦσι.

οἷς as above τὸ οἷς, the technical word for persons, lit. 'in relation to the whom.' Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 3. § 6, 7.

9. 5. οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον μετέχειν τῶν ἑκατὸν μνῶν τὸν εἰσενέγκαντα μίαν μνῶν τῶν δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγινομένων.

Either 1)* τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς is in apposition with τῶν ἑκατὸν μνῶν or with some more general word, such as χρημάτων, understood; or 2) the words may = τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰσενεγκάντων τινά i.e. either any of those who originally contributed, or any subsequent generation of contributors. Cp. Burkē, Ref. on F. R. (vol. v. p. 121, ed. 1815), 'In these partnerships all men have equal rights, but not to equal things. He that has but five shillings in the partnership has as good a right to it as he that has five hundred pounds has to his larger proportion. But he has not a right to an equal dividend in the product of the joint stock.'

9. 6. εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἔνεκεν κ.τ.λ.

εἰ δὲ introduces the opposite side of the question. 'If a good life is the object, then the oligarch is wrong' (cp. above, § 5, ὡσθ' ὁ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγος δόξειεν ἂν ἰσχύειν), but the apodosis is lost in what follows. For a similar anacoluthon cp. infra c. 12. § 1.

9. 6. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῶν τῆν πόλις.

Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 8, εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου.

9. 6. οἷς ἐστὶ σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

9. 8. Cp. above, c. 1. § 4, τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν. μὴ λόγου χάριν

is either 1)* taken with περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι, or 2) is an explanation of ὧς ἀληθῶς, which it pleonastically emphasizes.

9. 8. γίνεται γὰρ ἢ κοινωνία.

'For otherwise the state becomes' or 'would be.'

9. 8. συμμαχία τῶν ἄλλων τόπῳ διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἄποθεν συμμάχων.

The construction is unsymmetrical, passing, as elsewhere, from the abstract to the concrete. 'A city is an alliance differing from any other allies [= alliances], who are at a distance, in place only.' Or τῶν ἄλλων may be taken with συμμαχιῶν, τῶν ἄποθεν συμμάχων being epexegetic = other alliances of which the members live apart.

9. 8. Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής.

An obscure rhetorician who is censured in the Rhetoric (iii. c. 3. §§ 1-3) for frigidity of style. It is also said that when set to make an encomium on the lyre he attacked some other thesis (Soph. Elench. c. 15, 174 b. 32), or, according to Alexander Aphrodisiensis, he began with the earthly lyre, and went on to speak of the constellation Lyra.

Lycophron seems to have held the doctrine that 'the state is only a machine for the protection of life and property.' Cp. Rhet. i. 15, 1376 b. 10, αὐτὸς ὁ νόμος συνθήκη τις ἐστίν.

The opposite view is maintained in Burke, French Revolution (vol. v. ed. 1815, p. 184): 'The state ought not to be considered nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the partners. It is to be looked upon with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature.'

9. 11. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνέλθοιεν οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες, ἕκαστος μέντοι χρῆτο τῆ ἰδίῃ οἰκίῃ ὥσπερ πόλει καὶ σφίσι αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπιμαχίας οὕσης βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μόνον, οὗδ' οὕτως ἔν εἶναι δοξείε πόλις τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἴπερ ὁμοίως ὁμιλοῖεν συνέλθόντες καὶ χωρὶς.

'As a confederacy is not a city, so a number of individuals uniting in the same manner in which cities form a confederacy, would not be a city, unless they changed their manner of life after the union.' The main distinction which Aristotle draws between the confederacy, in which many cities are united by a treaty, and the single city is that the object of the one is negative, of the other positive,—the one regards the citizens in some particular aspect, e. g. with a view to the prevention of piracy or the encouragement of commerce; the other takes in their whole life and education.

χρῆτο τῆ ἰδίῃ οἰκίῃ ὥσπερ πόλει. I. e. 'If every man were lord in his own house or castle, and only made a treaty with his neighbours like the cities in a federation;' in other words, if the inhabitants of the common city had no social relations.

βοηθοῦντες is parallel with κοινωνοῦντες, and in apposition with the nominative to συνέλθοιεν.

9. 13. καὶ διαγωγὰι τοῦ συζῆν.

Nearly = τρόποι τοῦ συζῆσθαι, 'pleasant modes of common life,' or more freely 'enjoyments of society,' not 'relaxations for the sake of society,' a construction not admissible in prose.

10. 1. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ.

The argument of this chapter consists of a series of ἀπορίαι which may be raised against the claims of any one person or class to have the supreme power. The ἀπορίαι are restated somewhat less sharply in the next chapter. They are indirectly, but not distinctly or completely, answered in the latter part of c. 13.

10. 1. ἔδοξε γὰρ νῆ Δία τῷ κυρίῳ δικαίως.

It is difficult to account for this sudden outburst of vivacity. Compare infra c. 11. § 5, ἴσως δὲ νῆ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον: cp. Xen. Mem. v. 1. 4, ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὲ Δία τόδε ἄξιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι: Dem. de Chersones. §§ 9, 17; Polyb. vi. 3. § 6, πότερον ὡς μόνας ταύτας ἢ καὶ νῆ Δί' ὡς ἀρίστας ἡμῖν εἰσηγοῦνται πολιτειῶν; and the use of Hercule in Tacit. Ann. i. 3.

The whole passage is a kind of suppressed dialogue in which two opposite opinions are abruptly brought face to face. No conclusion is drawn; the only inference being really the impossible one that all forms of government are equally baseless, because they are not based on justice, and therefore in all of them abuse of power is possible.

10. 2. πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων κ.τ.λ.

ληφθέντων has been explained, either 1) as neut. or 2) masc. Either 1)* 'when everything, i.e. when all the property of the rich has been exhausted;' for this meaning of the word cp. iv. 4. § 8; or 2) 'when all the citizens are taken together,' but this is a doubtful use of ληφθέντων and does not give a good sense.

The passage is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the previous argument: 'When the many poor have taken all the property of the few rich, and the majority go on subdividing among themselves, the property of the minority will become smaller and smaller, and the state will be ruined.'

Or, expressing the same idea in numbers, let us suppose a state of 1000 citizens. If a mere numerical majority constitutes rightful sovereignty, 600 citizens may resolve,—and rightly, according to the hypothesis,—to confiscate the goods of the remaining 400, and divide them among themselves. Thus 400 will cease to be citizens. Of the remaining 600, 400 may go on to divide the property of the others, and thus the state becomes reduced to 400 and so on, till it disappears altogether.

It may be remarked that in all schemes for the division of property, the wealth which has been created under a system of accumulation is supposed to continue when the motives for accumulation have ceased. The poor are not fitted to govern the rich. But neither are the rich fitted to govern the poor. The truth is that no class in the state can be trusted with the interests of any other.

10. 2. ἀλλὰ μὲν οὐχ ἢ γ' ἀρετῇ φθείρει τὸ ἔχον αὐτήν.

For the virtue of anything is that quality by which it fulfils its own proper ἔργον. Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 608 E.

10. 5. ἄν οὖν τίς νόμος μὲν ὀλιγαρχικός δὲ ἢ δημοκρατικός, τί διοίσει περὶ τῶν ἵπορημένων;

'Even if we assume the law to rule and not the few or many, where is the difference? For the law may only represent the prejudices or interests of oligarchy or democracy.' Compare infra c. 11. §§ 20, 21.

11. 1. δόξειεν ἄν λύεσθαι καὶ τιν' ἔχειν ἄπορίαν, τάχα δὲ κἄν ἀλήθειαν.

This passage has been thought corrupt. Two conjectures have been proposed, 1) εὔπορίαν for ἄπορίαν (but the sense which would be given to εὔπορία is not natural or idiomatic), and 2) the omission of λύεσθαι or λύεσθαι καί, the latter words being thought to be suggested by the mention of ἄπορίαν, or to be a corruption of ἀλήθειαν. There is a want of order in the thought, but the same disorder occurs in a parallel expression (c. 12. § 2), ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτ' ἄπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν. The text may therefore be accepted.

11. 4. ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μῆτι καλῶν τοὺς καλοὺς (διαφέρειν) φασὶ καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῷ συνῆχθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρὶς εἰς ἓν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε κάλλιον ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τουδὲ μὲν τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἑτέρου δὲ τινος ἕτερον μόριον.

The combination of qualities in the multitude is compared to the combination of qualities in the individual: e. g. in a statue or picture of which the features taken separately may be far excelled by others, but when combined make a better portrait, because they are adapted to one another. (Cp. Plat. Rep. iv. 420 C, D, ff.) Thus the multitude may be supposed to have a generalized excellence, and to be superior as a whole. This rather doubtful principle is not of universal application [§ 5]. We must presuppose the many to be good citizens and good men (infra c. 15. § 9).

Contrast the opposite view of Plato (Rep. vi. 493 A, B), in which he describes the multitude under the figure of a great beast, a view which is modified by his apology for them in Rep. vi. 498-500.

Compare the saying of Goethe: 'Nothing can be more certain than that this great Public, which is so honoured and so despised, is almost always in a state of self-delusion about details, but never or hardly ever about the broad truth (*das Ganze*).'

Yet we may also make the opposite reflection, that a few wise men when they meet and act together are apt to fall short of the average intelligence of mankind: a Ministry of All the Talents may have less sense than any man in it—a coalition may never coalesce—individuality may be too much for unity; or unity may only be enforced by the strong will of a single person.

11. 5. ἴσως δὲ νῆ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον. ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κἄν ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἄρμόσειε λόγος. καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν ἔνιοι τῶν θηρίων;

'Assuredly,' retorts the opponent, or Aristotle himself, struck by an objection which had not previously occurred to him, 'this principle cannot be true of all men. For it would be a *reductio ad absurdum* to say that it was true of beasts, and some men are no better than beasts.'

Admitting the objection Aristotle still maintains that his doctrine of 'collective wisdom' is true of some men, though not of all. He proceeds to argue that deliberative and judicial functions may be safely granted to the many, and cannot be safely denied to them; but that it would be dangerous to entrust them with high office.

11. 7. διοί τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δι' ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἔν τὰ δ' ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτούς.

The sentence is an anacoluthon; it has been forgotten that no words such as εἰκός ἐστίν or ἀνάγκη have preceded, and that they cannot be easily gathered from the context.

11. 9. ἔχουσι συνελθόντες ἱκανῆν αἴσθησιν.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 10. § 2, where the distinction is drawn between σύνεσις (= αἴσθησις in this passage), which is κριτικῆ μόνον, and φρόνησις, which is ἐπιτακτικῆ. And with both places, cp. Thuc. ii. 40, where Pericles, speaking in the name of the Athenian democracy, says, ἥτοι κρινομέν γε ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα.

11. 10, 11. Aristotle is now stating the other side of the argument:—'The physician is a better judge than he who is not a physician. And it must be remarked that under the term "physician" is included 1) the higher sort of physician, 2) the apothecary, and 3) the intelligent amateur whether he practises medicine or not. In all of these there exists a knowledge which is not to be found in the many. Apply this principle to the art of politics. Even in the choice of magistrates the well-informed man, whether he be a statesman or not, is better able to judge than the multitude.' This argument is then refuted in what follows, § 14.

The context is rendered difficult by the correction of the word 'artist,' for which Aristotle substitutes 'one who has knowledge' (§§ 11, 12). For the distinction between the δημιουργός and the ἀρχιτεκτονικός ἱατρός cp. Plat. Laws iv. 720, where the doctor, who attends the slaves, is humorously distinguished from the doctor who attends freemen. And for the notion of the ἰδιώτης ἱατρός (ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τῆν τέχνην) cp. Politicus 259 A, 'εἰ τὸ τις τῶν δημοσιευόντων ἱατρῶν ἱκανὸς συμβουλεύειν ἰδιωτεύων αὐτότος, ἀρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ προσαγορεύεσθαι τοῦνομα τῆς τέχνης ταῦτόν ὅπερ ἔσθ' συμβουλεύει;'

11. 14-17. Aristotle proceeds to argue that there is a judgment of common sense equal, if not superior to that of the artist himself, which is possessed by the many.

Without pretending that the voice of the people is the voice of God, it may be truly said of them, 1) that they are free from the hypercriticism which besets the individual; 2) that they form conclusions on simple grounds; 3) that their moral principles are generally sound; 4) that they are often animated by noble impulses, and are capable of great sacrifices; 5) that they retain their human and national feeling. The intelligent populace at Athens, though changeable as the wind (Thuc. ii. 65; Demosth. 383, ὃ μὲν

δῆμος ὡς περ ἐν θαλάτῃ πνεῦμα ἀκατάστατον.) and subject to fits of panic and fanatical fury (Thuc. vi. 27), were also capable of entertaining generous thoughts (Id. iii. 49), and of showing a wise moderation (Id. viii. 97), and in nearly every respect were superior to their oligarchical contemporaries, far less cunning and cruel (Id. iv. 80), and far more willing to make sacrifices (Id. i. 74) for the public interest.

The more general question which is here suggested by Aristotle, § 11, 'whether the amateur or the artist is the better judge of a work of art or literature' is also worthy of attention. It is probable that either is a better judge than the other, but of different merits or excellences. The artist e.g. may be expected to be the best judge of points in which a minute knowledge of detail is required; the amateur has the truer sense of proportion because he compares many works of art and is not under the dominion of a single style. He judges by a wider range and is therefore less likely to fall into eccentricity or exclusiveness.

See infra at the beginning of c. 12.

11. 18. καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ πλεῖον τὸ πάντων τούτων ἢ τὸ τῶν καθ' ἓνα καὶ κατ' ὀλίγους μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων.

Aristotle seems here to have fallen into the error of confounding the collective wealth of the state with the wealth of individuals. The former is the wealth of a great number of persons which may be unequally distributed and in infinitesimally small portions among the masses, thus affording no presumption of respectability or education; whereas the wealth of the individual is the guarantee of some at least of the qualities which are required in the good citizen. Cp. infra c. 13. §§ 4, 10.

11. 19. ἥ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία κ.τ.λ.

That is to say the certainty that any single individual or class, if dominant, will infringe upon the rights of others renders it indispensable that the law should be above them all. Cp. c. 10. § 1.

12. According to Bernays (Transl. of Pol. I-III. p. 172) c. 12 and 13 are a second sketch of the same discussion which has been commenced in c. 9-11 and is continued in c. 16 and 17. But though in what follows there is some repetition of what has preceded, e.g. c. 12. §§ 1, 2 and c. 13. § 2 compared with c. 9. §§ 1, 2. c. 13. § 1 and c. 9. §§ 14, 15, and c. 13. § 10 with c. 11. § 2 ff., the resemblances are not sufficient to justify this statement. In c. 13 new elements are introduced, e.g. the discussion on ostracism; and the end of c. 11 in which the supremacy of law is asserted (§ 20) has no immediate connexion with c. 14 in which the forms of monarchy are considered; while the transition from the end of c. 13, in which the claim of the one best man to be a monarch is discussed, is not unnatural.

12. 1. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις κ.τ.λ.

Again, as in c. 9. § 6, the apodosis appears to be lost in the length of the sentence. It is also possible to gather it from the words νοίων δ' ἰσότης κ.τ.λ. (§ 2). The process of reasoning will then be as follows: 'Seeing that the end of the state is "justice" which is

the common good, etc., and is also equality between equals, of whom or what is this equality or inequality?’

12. 1. δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν . . τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις.

Compare Topics i. 14, 105 b. 30, πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτέον, διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν.

12. 6. εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τί μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως ἄν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμιλλον εἴη καὶ πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν. ὥστ’ εἰ πλεῖον ὀδὶ διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ ὀδὶ κατ’ ἀρετήν, καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει ὅλως ἀρετῆς μέγεθος, εἴη ἄν συμβλητὰ πάντα· τοσόνδε γὰρ μέγεθος εἰ κρεῖττον τοσοῦδε, τοσόνδε δ’ ἄλλον ὡς ἴσον.

That is to say, If different qualities can be compared in the concrete, they can be compared in the abstract, and degrees of difference can be compared even when two things differ in kind. If a tall man can be compared with a virtuous, then virtue can be compared with height, and all degrees of height and virtue can be compared. But this is impossible, for they have no common measure. Qualities can only be compared when they have a common relation, such as virtue and wealth have to the state.

εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον, ‘for if we begin by saying that size in the concrete can be compared with wealth and freedom then we cannot avoid saying the same of size in the abstract: which is absurd.’

The bearing of this argument on the general discussion is as follows: Aristotle is explaining the nature of political equality which can only exist between similar or commensurable qualities and therefore between persons who possess such qualities: in the case of the state for example only between qualities or persons which are essential to the state, not between such as are indifferent, not between flute-playing and virtue, but between virtue and wealth.

12. 9. ἄνευ τῶν προτέρων . . ἄνευ δὲ τούτων.

1) freedom and wealth . . 2) justice and valour.

13. 1. ἀνάγκη πάσας εἶναι τὰς τοιαύτας πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις.

In a certain sense even the government of virtue is a perversion, if we could suppose the virtuous to govern for their own interests and to disregard those of others (cp. infra §§ 10, 20). At any rate virtue is not the only element required in a state.

13. 2. ἡ δὲ χώρα κοινόν.

‘The common or inclusive element of the state,’ ‘an element in which all are concerned’; or, if the phrase be modernized, ‘the land is a great public interest.’

The word is here used nearly as in τὸ κοινόν = ‘public’ or ‘common’: elsewhere in the sense of ‘comprehensive,’ ‘general,’ (Nic. Eth. ii. 2. § 2); applicable to the larger or more inclusive class, the more popular constitution (supra ii. 6. § 4), the more generally useful branch of knowledge (Rhet. i. 1, 1354 b. 29).

13. 5. καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀναμφισβήτητος ἡ κρίσις τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ. τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἢ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἢ δὲ τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. ἀλλ' ὅμως σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχῃ χρόνον, πῶς διοριστέον.

'There is no difficulty in determining who are to be the governing body in an oligarchy or aristocracy or democracy; for the nature of these is really implied in the name. The difficulty arises only when the few and the many and the virtuous are living together in the same city: how are their respective claims to be determined? For any of them, carried out consistently, involves an absurdity.'

13. 6. εἰ δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶεν ὀλίγοι πάμπαν οἱ τῆν ἀρετῆν ἔχοντες, τίνα δεῖ διελεῖν τὸν τρόπον;

'How are we to decide between them; or how are we to arrange the state having regard both to virtues and number?' For διελεῖν see ii. 2. § 1: also τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται, iv. 1. § 10.

13. 6. ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τῆν πόλιν &illegible; τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὥστ' εἶναι πόλιν ἕξ αὐτῶν;

'Must we consider their fewness relatively to their duties, and whether they are able to govern a state, or numerous enough to form a state of themselves?'

τὸ ὀλίγοι = 'the idea of the few,' like τὸ οἷς supra c. 9. § 2.

πρὸς τὸ ἔργον may be taken either with δεῖ σκοπεῖν, or with τὸ ὀλίγοι.

τοσοῦτοι is dependent on εἰ, understood from εἰ δυνατοὶ = ἢ δεῖ σκοπεῖν εἰ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος εἰσί.

- 13.11, 12. διὸ καὶ πρὸς τῆν ἀπορίαν, ἣν ζητοῦσι καὶ προβάλλουσι τινες, ἐνδέλεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν. ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινες πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετητέον, βουλομένῳ τίθεσθαι τοὺς ὀρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιόνων συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων, ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν. τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν.

Aristotle here raises the question whether the laws shall be enacted for the good of all or of a privileged class when several classes exist together in a state. He answers that the laws must be equal, and this equal right, or law, means the principle which conduces to the good of the whole state.

1)* ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν refers immediately to § 10, which suggests the co-existence of classes in a state, and to § 4, which contains a more formal statement to the same effect.

2) Bernays alters the punctuation by enclosing ἀποροῦσι . . . πλειόνων in a parenthesis explanatory of τῆν ἀπορίαν. This gives a sufficient sense; but a short clause at the end of a sentence following a long parenthesis is not in the manner of Aristotle. He also refers ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν to the words τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι βέλτιον κ.τ.λ., not 'when all the elements co-exist,' but 'when the whole people is better and richer than the few.'

13. 13. ὥστε μὴ συμβλητῆν εἶναι τῆν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῆν πάντων μηδὲ τῆν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τῆν πολιτικῆν πρὸς τῆν ἑκείνων.

The virtue here spoken of seems to be the virtue of the kind attributed by Thucydides viii. 68 to Antiphon, viz. political ability, and the characters who are 'out of all proportion to other men' are the master spirits of the world, who make events rather than are made by them, and win, whether with many or with few, such as Themistocles, Pericles, Alexander the great, Caesar, and in modern times a Marlborough, Mirabeau, Napoleon I, Bismarck.

13. 16. οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄγειν τῆν Ἄργω.

The legend is preserved by Apollodorus (i. 9. § 19). According to him the ship Argo, speaking with a human voice, refused to take on board Hercules, φθεγξαμένη μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸ τοῦτου βάρος. This agrees with the text of the Politics if the word ἄγειν is taken to mean 'convey,' 'take on board,' as in Soph. Phil. 901, ὥστε μὴ μ' ἄγειν ναύτην ἔπι. Stahr translates wrongly: 'Hercules would not row with his comrades, because he was so far superior to them in strength.'

13. 16. τῆν Περιάνδρου Θρασυβούλου συμβουλίαν κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Herod. v. 92, who reverses the characters, the advice being given not by Periander to Thrasybulus, but by Thrasybulus to Periander; and Livy i. 54: also Shakes. Rich. II. act iii. sc. 4:—

*'Go thou, and, like an executioner,
Cut off the heads of too fast-growing sprays
That look too lofty in our commonwealth.'*

13. 16. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας τῆν τυραννίδα καὶ τῆν Περιάνδρου Θρασυβούλου συμβουλίαν οὐχ ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμᾶν.

Because all governments rest on the principle of self-preservation, and at times extreme measures must be allowed.

13. 18. ὁ ὄστρακισμὸς τῆν αὐτῆν ἔχει δύναμιν . . τῷ κολουεῖν.

In this passage there is a doubt about the reading, and also about the construction. Several MSS. read τὸ κωλύειν = 'have the same effect in respect of putting down the chief citizens.'

If we retain the reading of Bekker's text, it is doubtful whether τῷ κολουεῖν 1) is to be taken after τῆν αὐτῆν (Bernays), or 2)* is the dative of the instrument. To the first way of explaining the words it may be objected that τῷ κολουεῖν must then be referred to the particular instance of the counsel of Periander, whereas ostracism has been just asserted to be general, and to represent the policy of oligarchy and democracy as well as of tyranny. 'It has the same effect with the "lopping off" the chief citizens.'

- 13.18-23. It can hardly be supposed that the legislator who instituted ostracism had any definite idea of banishing the one 'best man' who was too much for the state. The practice

seems to have arisen out of the necessities of party warfare, and may be regarded as an attempt to give stability to the ever-changing politics of a Greek state. It certainly existed as early as the time of Cleisthenes, and is said to have been employed against the adherents of Peisistratus. Every year on a fixed day the people were asked if they would have recourse to it or not. If they approved, a day was appointed on which the vote was taken. To ostracise any citizen not less than 6000 citizens must vote against him. We may readily believe, as Aristotle tells us (§ 23), that 'instead of looking to the public good, they used ostracism for factious purposes.' Aristides, according to the well-known legend, was banished because the people were tired of his virtues. Themistocles, the saviour of Hellas, was also ostracised (Thuc. i. 137). The last occasion on which the power was exercised at Athens was against Hyperbolus, who was ostracised by the combined influence of Nicias and Alcibiades. Other states in which the practice prevailed were Argos (v. 3. § 3), Megara, Syracuse, Miletus, Ephesus.

13. 19. οἶον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίου καὶ Χίου καὶ Λεσβίου.

For the Samians, cp. Thuc. i. 116; for the Chians, Thuc. iv. 51; for the Lesbians, Thuc. iii. 10.

13. 22. ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει τοὺς μονάρχους συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ἀφελίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν οὔσης τοῦτο δρῶσιν.

1)*, 'as far as the application of this principle of compulsion is concerned, there is nothing to prevent agreement between kings and their subjects, for all governments must have recourse to a similar policy' (cp. note on § 16). τοῦτο δρῶσιν refers to the whole passage: sc. if they use compulsion for the benefit of the whole state.

Or 2), 'there is nothing to make the policy of kings differ from that of free states.' It is an objection, though not a fatal one, to this way of taking the passage that ταῖς πόλεσιν then occurs in two successive lines in different senses.

13. 22. κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογουμένας ὑπεροχάς.

The meaning is that where the superiority of a king or government is acknowledged, there is a political justification for getting a rival out of the way.

13. 25. ἀλλὰ μῆν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου· παραπλήσιον γὰρ κἄν εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῖεν, μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς.

See note on text. 'Nay, more; a man superior to others is like a god, and to claim rule over him would be like claiming to rule over Zeus.' The words μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς may refer either 1)* to the Gods or 2) to men; either 1)* 'as if in making a division of the empire of the Gods' according to the old legend, they, i.e. the gods, should claim to rule over Zeus; or 2) more generally, 'as if when persons were distributing offices they should give Zeus an inferior place.' Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 607 C, ὃ τῶν Δία σοφῶν ὄχλος κρατῶν, Nic. Eth. vi. 13. § 8, ὅμοιον κἄν εἴ τις τῆν πολιτικὴν φαιη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, and Herod. v. 49, τῷ Διὶ πλοῦτου πέρη ἐρίζετε: also Plat. Polit. 301 D, 303 B.

Bernays translates μερίζοντες 'upon the principle of rotation of offices,' but no such use of μερίζειν occurs.

14. 4. κτείναι γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἴ μὴ ἔν τινι βασιλείῳ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ.

οὐ κύριος, sc. ὁ βασιλεύς, supplied from τῆ βασιλεία. We have a choice of difficulties in the interpretation of the words which follow. Either 1) ἔν τινι βασιλείῳ must be explained 'in a certain exercise of the royal office,' i.e. when the king is in command of the army. This way of taking the passage gives a good sense and the fact is correct; but such a meaning cannot be extracted from the Greek. Or 2), 'for a king has no power to inflict death, unless under a certain form of monarchy'; Aristotle, writing in a fragmentary manner, has reverted from the kings of Sparta to monarchy in general. Or 3)*, possibly the words ἔν τινι βασιλείῳ, bracketed by Bekker, are a clumsy gloss which has crept into the text, intended to show that the remark did not apply to every monarchy, but only to the Spartan. The conjecture of Mr. Bywater, who substitutes ἔνεκα δειλίας for ἔν τινι βασιλείῳ, though supported by the citation from Homer, is too far removed from the letters of the MSS; and there is no proof that the Spartan kings had the power of putting a soldier to death for cowardice.

ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ is often translated 'by martial law.' But the comparison of passages in Herodotus (e.g. ix. 48) and Polybius (iv. 58. § 9, etc.) shows that the word νόμος is only pleonastic, and that ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ = ἐν χερσίν, 'hand to hand,' or 'by a sudden blow.'

14. 5. οὐν δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης κ.τ.λ.

Il. ii. 391-393. These lines which are rightly assigned here to Agamemnon are put into the mouth of Hector in Nic. Eth. iii. 8. § 4.

14. 5. πᾶρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος.

These words are not found either in this or any other passage of our Homer, though there is something like them in Iliad, xv. 348: —

οὐν δ' οὐν ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε νεῶν ἐτέρωθι νοήσω,
αὐτοῦ οἱ θάνατον μητίσομαι κ.τ.λ.

The error is probably due, as in Nic. Eth. ii. 9. § 3 and iii. 8. § 4, to a confused recollection of two or more verses. For a similar confusion of two lines of Homer cp. Plat. Rep. 389 E.

14. 6. ἔχουσι δ' αὐταὶ τῆν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπλησίαν τυραννικῆ· εἰσὶ δ' ὅμως κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαί.

The MSS. vary greatly: The Milan MS. reads τυραννίσι καὶ κατὰ, instead of τυραννικῆ· εἰσὶ δ' ὅμως. So Paris 1, 2, but omitting καί: other MSS. preserve traces of the same reading. Others read παραπλησίως τυραννικῆν. Out of these Bekker has extracted the Text, in which however ὅμως seems to be unnecessary and to rest on insufficient authority. Susemihl reads τυραννίσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.

14. 6. For the distinguishing characteristics of nations, see Book vii. 7. §§ 1-4.

14. 7. καὶ τῆ φυλακῆ δὲ βασιλικῆ καὶ οὐ τυραννικῆ διὰ τῆν αὐτῆν αἰτίαν· οἱ γὰρ πολῖται φυλάττουσιν ὄπλοις τοὺς βασιλείς, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ξενικόν.

διὰ τὴν αὐτῆν αἰτίαν. 'Because the form of government is legal.'

The omission of the article before ξενικὸν emphasizes the opposition between οἱ πολῖται and ξενικὸν—'their own citizens' are contrasted with 'any mercenary body.'

14. 10.

τὸν κακοπάτριδα.

Either on analogy of εὐπάτρις,* 'the base born,' or possibly 'the injurer of his country,' like κακόδουλος, 'the maltreater of his slaves.'

14. 12.

διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλήθους εὐεργέτας κατὰ τέχνας ἢ πόλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσαι χώραν, ἐγίνοντο βασιλεῖς ἐκόντων καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριοι.

Cp. v. 10. §§ 7-9, where royalty is said to be based on merit; and i. 2. § 6, where it is assumed to have arisen from the Patriarchal relation: and for what follows vi. 8. § 20, where the ministers of Public Sacrifices are called Kings or Archons.

14. 13.

ὅπου δ' ἄξιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι βασιλείαν κ.τ.λ.

The kings who became priests retained only the shadow of royalty; but where they held military command beyond the borders, the name might be applied with greater propriety.

15. 2.

ὥστε τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν περὶ δυοῖν ἐστίν, ἓν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσι στρατηγὸν ἄϊδιον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ μέρος, ἢ οὐ συμφέρει· ἓν δὲ πότερον ἔνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ἢ οὐ συμφέρει.

κατὰ μέρος, not 'by rotation in a fixed order,' (as in iv. 14. § 4) but more simply, 'by a succession of one citizen to another.' It is implied, though not expressed, that they are chosen by vote: cp. supra c. 14. § 5, ἓν μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' εἶδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ βίου· τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ' αἰρεταί.

Three MSS. read καθ' αἵρεσιν instead of κατὰ μέρος. It is more likely that καθ' αἵρεσιν is a gloss on κατὰ μέρος, than the reverse.

15. 2.

τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ πολιτείας.

'Is a legal, rather than a constitutional question,' 'is to be regarded as a matter of administration.' εἶδος νόμων μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτείας is an abridgment of εἶδος τοῦ ἐπισκοπεῖν περὶ τῶν νόμων μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτείας.

εἶδος (like φύσις i. 8. § 10, νόμος iii. 14. § 4) is pleonastic as in i. 4. § 2, ὁ γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνου εἶδει ἐστίν, 'has the form or character of an instrument.'

15. 2.

ὥστ' ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην.

After reducing the different forms of a monarchy to two, he now rejects one of them,—namely, the Lacedaemonian, because the Lacedaemonian kings were only generals for life, and such an office as this might equally exist under any form of government. This

is a strange notion; for although the kings of Sparta were not generally distinguished, it can hardly be said with truth that Archidamus or Agesilaus were no more than military commanders.

ἀφείσθω, sc. τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος.

τῆν πρώτην is to be taken adverbially in the sense of 'to begin with' or 'at once': so τῆν ταχίστην, (Dem.). The phrase also occurs in Xenophon Mem. iii. 6. § 10, περὶ πολέμου συμβουλεύειν τῆν γε πρώτην ἐπισχῆσομεν: and in Arist. Met. ζ. 12, 1038 a. 35, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω τῆν πρώτην. Aristotle refers to the Lacedaemonian kings again in v. 11. § 2, and to the life generalship, c. 16. § 1, infra.

15. 3 ff. This passage is closely connected with a similar discussion in Plato's Politicus 293-295, where the comparative advantages of the wise man and the law are similarly discussed, and the illustration from the physician's art is also introduced. Cp. also Rhet. i. 1354 a. 28, where Aristotle argues, besides other reasons, that the law is superior to the judge, because the judge decides on the spur of the moment.

15. 4. μετὰ τῆν τετρήμερον,

sc. ἡμέραν = μετὰ τῆν τετάρτην ἡμέραν. The MSS. vary between τριήμερον and τετρήμερον.

15. 5, 6. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βουλευέσεται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα κάλλιον. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀνάγκη νομοθέτην αὐτόν εἶναι, δῆλον, καὶ κείσθαι νόμους, ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίου ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γ' ἄλλων εἶναι δεῖ κυρίου.

αὐτόν, sc. τὸν βουλευόμενον, incorrectly translated in the text 'a king:' better, 'whether you call him king or not' there must be a legislator who will advise for the best about particulars.

ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίου ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν is a qualification of what has preceded:—'although they have no authority when they err,' i. e. there must be laws and there must be cases which the laws do not touch, or do not rightly determine. This is one of the many passages in Aristotle's Politics in which two sides of a question are introduced without being distinguished. The argument would have been clearer if the words ἀλλὰ μὴ . . . δεῖ κυρίου had been omitted. Aristotle concedes to the opponent that there must be a correction of the law by the judgment of individuals. In fact both parties agree 1) that there must be laws made by the legislator; 2) that there must be exceptional cases. But there arises a further question: Are these exceptional cases to be judged of by one or by all?

The supposition contained in the words ἀλλ' ἴσως . . . κάλλιον is repeated in a more qualified form in the sentence following, ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν . . . κυρίου.

15. 7. ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἐστίασις συμφορητὸς καλλίων μιᾶς καὶ ἀπλήρης. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον ὄχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἷς ὁπισσοῦν.

Compare the saying 'that the House of Commons has more good sense or good taste than any one man in it;' and again, Burke, 'Besides the characters of the individuals

that compose it, this house has a collective character of its own.'

15. 8. ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον ἅμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἄμαρτεῖν.

It is true no doubt that the passions of the multitude may sometimes balance one another. But it is also true that a whole multitude may be inflamed by sympathy with each other, and carried away by a groundless suspicion, as in the panic after the mutilation of the Hermae, or the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae, or the English Popish Plot, or the witch hunting mania at Salem in Massachusetts, or the French reign of Terror; and commonly in religious persecutions.

15. 10. αἰρετώτερον ὢν εἴη ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρὶς δυνάμεως οὐσίας τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὢν ἢ λαβεῖν πλείους ὁμοίους.

That is to say aristocracy, or the rule of several good men, is better than the rule of one—we may leave out the question of power, if only it be possible to find the many equals who will constitute this 'aristocracy of virtue.' In other words, the superiority of the aristocracy, who are many, to the king, who is one, does not simply consist in greater strength.

ὁμοίους, 'equal in virtue to one another,' an idea which is to be gathered from the mention of ἀριστοκρατία in the preceding clause, and explained in the words which follow, πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετήν, § 11.

15. 12. ἐντεῖθεν ποθεν εὐλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας.

Yet in v. 12. § 14 he repudiates the notion of Plato that the state changes into oligarchy, because the ruling class are lovers of money. Royalty, aristocracy, oligarchy, tyranny, democracy—the order of succession in this passage—may be compared with that of Plato (Rep. viii. and ix)—the perfect state, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny. The order in which constitutions succeed to one another is discussed in Nic. Eth. viii. 10.

15. 13. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μείζους εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πόλεις, ἴσως οὐδὲ ἑἴδειον ἔτι γίγνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἑτέραν παρὰ δημοκρατίαν.

Here as elsewhere iv. 6. § 5, he accepts democracy not as a good but as a necessity, which arises as soon as wealth begins to flow and tradesmen 'circulate' in the agora, vi. 4. § 13; and the numbers of the people become disproportioned to the numbers of the governing class.

15. 15. ὁμως ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δυνάμιν, ἢ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους.

Compare what was said above c. 13. § 22, ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. that 'there need be no disagreement between a king and his subjects, because he is sometimes obliged to use force to them.' Or, according to the other mode of interpreting the passage, 'there is no difference between a king and a free state because' &c.

15. 16. διδόναι τοσοῦτους.

Either 1)* with emphasis 'so many and no more'; or better 2) with reference to the previous words εἶναι δὲ τοσαύτην τῆν ἰσχὺν ὥστε ἐκάστου μὲν καὶ ἐνὸς συμπλειόνων κρείττω, τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἥπτω, 'so many as would not make him dangerous.'

16. Nearly the whole of this chapter is a series of ἀπορίαι; as in c. 15, Aristotle states, without clearly distinguishing, them.

16. 1. Yet the στρατηγὸς ἀίδιος, who in time of peace is deprived of functions, and on the battle-field has arbitrary power, is not really the same with ὁ κατὰ νόμον βασιλεύς.

16. 1. περὶ Ὡποῦντα δὲ κατὰ τι μέρος (sc. τῆς διοικήσεως) ἔλαττον (sc. τῆς Ἐπιδάμνου).

'With a somewhat more limited power than at Epidamnus.'

16. 2. δοκεῖ δὲ τισιν.

Either the construction may be an anacoluthon, or δὲ after δοκεῖ may mark the apodosis.

16. 3. διόπερ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἢ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον. καὶ τὸ ἄνῃ μέρος τοῖνυν ὡσαύτως. τοῦτο δ' ἦδη νόμος.

καὶ τὸ ἄνῃ μέρος = καὶ τὸ ἄνῃ μέρος ἄρχειν ὡσαύτως δίκαιον.

Aristotle, taking the view of an opponent of the παμβασιλεία, asserts that equals are entitled to an equal share in the government; there is justice in their ruling and justice in their being ruled: and therefore in their all equally ruling by turns. 'And here law steps in; for the order of their rule is determined by law.'

16. 4, 5. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος ἄν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῆ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἔτι δ' ἐπανορθοῦσθαι διδωσιν, ὅτι ἄν δόξῃ πειρωμένοις ἄμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. 'But surely if there are cases which the law cannot determine, then neither can an individual judge of them.'

τὰ λοιπὰ, what remains over and above law.

The connexion of the whole passage is as follows: Instead of one man ruling with absolute power, the law should rule, and there should be ministers and interpreters of the law. To this it is answered that the interpreter of the law is no more able to decide causes than the law itself. To this again the retort is made, that the law trains up persons who supply what is wanting in the law itself, to the best of their judgment.

16. 5. ὁ μὲν οἶν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον.

This is a reflection on the παμβασιλεύς. The rule of law is the rule of God and Reason: in the rule of the absolute king an element of the beast is included.

The reading of τὸν νοῦν (instead of τὸν νόμον), which has the greater MS. authority, gives no satisfactory sense because it transposes the natural order of ideas. It has been therefore rejected. Schneider and Bekker, 2nd Edit., who are followed in the text, retain τὸν νόμον in the beginning of the clause and read τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, a very ingenious and probable emendation, partly derived from a correction νοῦν which is found in the margin of two or three MSS. instead of θεόν.

16. 8. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ νόμος τὸ μέσον.

'And so, because men cannot judge in their own case, but are impelled this way and that, they have recourse to the mean, which is the law.'

16. 9. ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη εἰσίν, ὥστε τῶν κατὰ γράμματα ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος.

The defects of written law are supplied not only by the judgments of individuals but by tradition and precedent. In any comparison of the judgments of law and of individuals, these have to be reckoned to the credit of law. And in early times this unwritten law is more sacred and important than written. Hence arises an additional argument against the superiority of the individual to the law. For the importance of unwritten law cp. Thuc. ii. 37, τῶν τε ἀεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ' ἀφελίῳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κείνται καὶ ὅσοι ἀγραφοὶ ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσιν, and Rhet. i. 10, 1368 b. 7, λέγω δὲ ἴδιον μὲν καθ' ὃν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται, κοινὸν δὲ ὅσα ἀγραφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ.

16. 9. τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

Referring to the words which have preceded—κατὰ τὸ πλείονας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας.

16. 9-13. In the whole of this passage Aristotle is pleading the cause of the law against absolute monarchy. He shows that the law is not liable to corruption, that its deficiencies are supplied by individuals, that it trains up judges who decide not arbitrarily but according to a rule, that many good men are better than one. But the monarch too must have his ministers; he will surround himself by his friends, and they will have ideas like his own. Thus the two approximate to a certain extent. In either case the rulers must be many and not one. But if so it is better to have the trained subordinates of the law than the favorites of a despot.

16. 13. εἰ τούτους οὔεται δεῖν ἄρχειν τοὺς ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχειν οὔεται δεῖν ὁμοίως.

Even in the παμβασιλεία there is an element of equality. ὁμοίως either 1) 'equally with himself'; or 2) with a slight play of words 'after the manner of equals.'

17. 2. εἰ μᾶλλον τρόπον τινά.

To be taken after ἀμείνων 'better in a certain manner, i.e. the imaginary and rather absurd case, to which he returns in § 5, of the virtue of the individual being more than equal to the collective virtue of the community.

17. 4. ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε [καὶ ἔν] ἐγγίνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικόν.
The reading of Bekker, καὶ ἔν, which is wanting in the best MSS. and is omitted by Bernays, may have arisen out of the termination of πέφυκεν. If they are retained the meaning will be 'in which there is likewise a single' or 'compact body, defined by their all carrying arms' (ii. 6. § 16, etc.) as other forms of government by virtue, wealth, etc.
17. 4. κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἄξιαν διανεμόντα τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς.
The citizens of a polity are here called εὐπόροι, 'respectable' or 'upper class,' though a comparatively low qualification is required of them (iv. 3. § 1; 9. § 3). They are 'the hoplites' (ii. 6. § 16) who are also elsewhere called εὐπόροι (vi. 7. § 1). τοῖς εὐπόροις is found in the better MSS.: *al.* ἀπόροις.
17. 6. οὐ μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν.
'He has a right to rule not only on the general ground which is put forward by all governments, but also upon the principle which we maintain, that he is superior in virtue.'
17. 7. ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν.
'This miraculous being cannot be asked to be a subject in turn or in part, for he is a whole, and the whole cannot be ruled by the part.' The double meaning of μέρος is lost in English. The idealization of the whole or the identification of the perfect man with a whole of virtue is strange. Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 2. τοῦτο = τὸ εἶναι πᾶν.
18. 1. ἄρχεσθαι δυναμένων.
Bekker's insertion of καὶ ἄρχειν after ἄρχεσθαι (ed. sec.) is unnecessary. The idea is already implied in the previous words. Under any of the three forms of government, the virtue of obedience is required in some, of command in others.
18. 1. ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἐδείχθη λόγοις ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ πολίτου τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης.
The views of Aristotle respecting the relation of the good citizen to the good man may be drawn out as follows:—
1) The good citizen is not the same with the good man in an ordinary state, because his virtue is relative to the constitution (c. 4. § 3).
2) But in the perfect state he is the same: and this appears to be upon the whole the principal conclusion (c. 18. § 1, and iv. 7. § 2).
3) Yet even in the perfect state the citizens cannot all conform to a single type of perfection; for they have special duties to perform and special virtues by which they perform them (c. 4. §§ 5, 6).

4) It is therefore the good ruler who is really to be identified with the good man (§ 7; also i. 13. § 8, where the subject is introduced for the first time).

5) And still a 'grain of a scruple may be made'; for if the good ruler be merely a ruler, the private citizen who knows both how to rule and how to obey will have more complete virtue.

6) And therefore in the perfect state the citizens should rule and be ruled by turns (§ 11), cp. vii. c. 9.

This seems to be the result of many scattered and rather indistinct observations made from different points of view and not arranged in a clear logical order.

18. 2. ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τῆν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν.

These words are removed from the end of this book by Bekker, who in his Second Edition adopts the altered arrangement of the books. See Essay on the Structure of Aristotle's Writings.

BOOK IV.

1. 2-6. The statesman has four problems to consider,

- 1) What is the best or ideal state?
- 2) What state is best suited to a particular people?
- 3) How any given state, even though inferior to what it might be, may be created or preserved?
- 4) What is the best state for average men?

1) is the best possible; 2) the best relatively to circumstances; 3) neither the best possible nor the best under the circumstances, but any constitution in which men are willing to acquiesce, even though ill-provided and ill-administered—such are to be found in the world and must therefore enter into the consideration of the statesman; 4) the best for mankind in general.

1. 2. ταύτην ἔστι τῆν δύναμιν.

The MSS. vary between ἔστι and ἔστι: ἔστι has rather the greater MSS. authority, but ἔστ ἰ is required for the construction, and the recurrence of ἔστι which was the first word of the sentence at the end of it is displeasing.

ἀχωρήγητόν τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων.

Explained in the text, with Susemihl, *‘not possessing the outward means necessary for the best state,’ but the words ‘for the best state,’ are not found in the Greek. Better ‘not possessing the common necessities or simple requisites of life,’ a hard but not impossible condition, e.g. in a remote colony. Cp. c. 11. § 21, πολλάκις οὕσης ἄλλης πολιτείας αἰρετωτέρας ἐνίοις οὐθὲν κωλύσει συμφέρον ἐτέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν, which is similar but not the same with this passage. For ἀχορήγητον, cp. κεχορηγημένον in § 1, and δεομένην πολλῆς χορηγίας in § 6.

1. 6. τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ἀναιροῦντες πολιτείας τῆν Λακωνικὴν . . . ἐπαινοῦσιν.

Although the language is inaccurate (for the Lacedaemonian is an ‘existing’ constitution), the meaning is plain. ‘They put aside their own constitution and praise the Lacedaemonian or some other.’

1. 7. χρῆ δὲ τοιαύτην εἰσηγεῖσθαι τάξιν ἣν εὐδιδως ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν καὶ πεισθήσονται καὶ δυνήσονται κοινωνεῖν, ὧς ἔστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον τὸ ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μεταμανθάνειν τοῦ μανθάνειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

‘The legislator should introduce an order of government into which the citizens will readily fall, and in which they will be able to co-operate; for the reformation of a state is as difficult as the original establishment of one and cannot be effected by the legislator alone, or without the assistance of the people.’

ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν (sc. πολιτειῶν) may be taken either with τάξιν or with κοινωνεῖν, either we ought to introduce 1) ‘from among existing constitutions’; or 2) ‘in passing out of existing constitutions that form,’ &c.; cp. in next sentence ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις βοηθεῖν.

κοινωνεῖν is the reading of the majority of MSS. Some have κινεῖν. The emendation κινεῖν [Susemihl], taken from ‘consequi’ in the old Latin translation, is an unnecessary conjecture; nor does the word occur commonly, if at all, in Aristotle; καινοῦν is open to the objection of introducing a special when a general word is required. But no change is really needed.

ὧς ἔστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον κ.τ.λ. The connexion of these words is difficult: Aristotle seems to mean that the legislator should select a constitution suited to the wants of the people: for however good in itself, if unsuited to them, they will not work it, and he will have as great or greater difficulty in adapting it than he would originally have had in making one for which they were fitted.

1. 7. Διὸ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις δεῖ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν.

We may paraphrase as follows: Therefore, i. e. because it is difficult to introduce anything new in addition to what has been said [about the highest and other forms of government by the unsatisfactory political writers mentioned in § 5], we ought also to be able to maintain existing constitutions, [which they would get rid of].

1. 7. καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον.

There is nothing in what has preceded, which precisely answers to this formal reference. § 4 may perhaps be meant.

1. 8. *νῦν δὲ μίαν δημοκρατίαν οὔονται τινες εἶναι καὶ μίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν.*
- This is true of Plato, who is probably intended under this general form. For the anonymous reference to him cp. i. 1. § 2, ὅσοι μὲν οὔονται κ.τ.λ., and c. 2. § 3 infra.
1. 8. *συντίθενται ποσαχῶς.*
- That is to say, either 1) the different ways in which the judicial and other elements of states are combined; or 2) the different ways in which the spirit of one constitution may be tempered by that of another: for the latter cp. infra c. 5. §§ 3, 4; c. 9. §§ 4-9.
1. 10. *καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν.*
- ‘And what is the end of each individual form of society?’ i. e. whether or not the good of the governed (cp. iii. c. 6).
- ἐκάστης, with the article following, is emphatic.
- κοινωνία is the state under a more general aspect.
1. 10. *νόμοι δὲ κεχωρισμένοι τῶν δηλούντων τῆν πολιτείαν.*
- Either 1)* the words τῶν δηλούντων are governed by κεχωρισμένοι, ‘are separated from those things which show the nature of the constitution’; i. e. they are rules of administration and may be the same under different constitutions; but see infra § 11. Or 2), the genitive is partitive: ‘Laws are distinct and belong to that class of things which show the nature of the constitution.’
1. 11. *τὰς διαφορὰς ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχειν τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν νόμων θέσεις.*
- Either 1), ‘we must know the differences of states (sc. πολιτειῶν) and the number of differences in each state, with a view to legislation; or 2)*, referring τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης only to διαφορὰς, and supplying πολιτειῶν with ἀριθμὸν, ‘the difference of each state and the number of states;’ or 3), τὸν ἀριθμὸν means ‘the order of classification’ (Susemihl; cp. iii. 1. § 9, where the defective (corrupt) states are said to be ‘posterior’ to the good states). This gives a good sense, but is with difficulty elicited from the words.
2. 1. *ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ.*
- Cp. infra c. 8. § 1, where the words ἐν τοῖς κατ’ ἀρχῆν refer to iii. c. 7. See Essay on the Structure of Aristotle’s Writings.
2. 1. *περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας εἴρηται (τὸ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας θεωρηῖσαι ταῦτ’ οὐ καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν τῶν ὀνομάτων).*
- He seems to mean that in discussing the ideal state he has already discussed Aristocracy and Royalty. But the discussion on the ideal state has either been lost, or was never written, unless, as some think, it is the account of the state preserved in Book vii.

Other allusions to the same discussion occur in what follows: c. 3. § 4, ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοραῖς ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἢ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν, κἄν εἴ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἕτερον εἴρηται πόλεως εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀριστοκρατίαν, a passage which is supposed to refer to vii. i. e. iv. c. 8 and 9, by those who change the order of the books (Susemihl, &c.). But in this latter passage the allusion to the perfect state is very slight, and the point of view appears to be different; for no hint is given that it is to be identified with royalty or aristocracy. Whether the words of the text have a reference, as Schlosser supposes, to the end of Book iii. c. 14-18, where Aristotle discusses the relation of the one best man to the many good, is equally doubtful. A reference to the discussion of aristocracy in some former part of the work also occurs infra c. 7. § 2, ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ τῆς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις.

2. 1. βούλεται γὰρ ἑκατέρω κατ' ἀρετῶν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην.

'For royalty and aristocracy, like the best state, rest on a principle of virtue, provided with external means.'

2. 1. πότε δεῖ βασιλείαν νομίζειν.

Not 'when we are to consider a constitution to be a royalty,' for there is no question about this, but νομίζειν is taken in the other sense of 'having,' 'using,' 'having as an institution,' like *utor* in Latin. For this use of the word cp. νομίζειν ἐκκλησίαν, iii. 1. § 10; and for the matter cp. iii. 17. §§ 4-8.

2. 2. τῶν δὲ βασιλείαν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τοῦνομα μόνον ἔχειν οὐκ οὖσαν, ἢ διὰ πολλῶν ὑπεροχῶν εἶναι τῶν τοῦ βασιλεύοντος, ὥστε τῶν τυραννίδων χειρίστην οὖσαν πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, δεύτερον δὲ τῶν ὀλιγαρχίαν (ἢ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας).

Royalty and tyranny both depend upon the individual will of the king or tyrant: hence it is argued that if royalty is the best, tyranny must be the worst of governments, because one is the preeminence of good, the other of evil. Aristotle, who is overmastered by the idea of opposites, naturally infers that the very worst must be the opposite of the very best.

πολιτείας. We might expect ἀντιῆς, or τῆς ἀρίστης to be added; but Aristotle substitutes the more general πολιτεία here, as elsewhere, used in a good sense. Compare infra c. 8. § 2, τελευταῖον δὲ περὶ τυραννίδος εὐλόγον ἐστὶ ποιήσασθαι μνείαν διὰ τὸ πασῶν ἥκιστα ταύτην εἶναι πολιτείαν, ἥμῃν δὲ τῶν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας: also for the general meaning, Plat. Polit. 301 D, Rep. ix. 576 D, etc.

In the phrase ταύτης τῆς πολιτείας the word refers to ὀλιγαρχίαν.

2. 3. ἤδη μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφάνητο καὶ τῶν πρότερον οὕτως.

The difference between Plato (Polit. 303) and Aristotle, which is dwelt upon so emphatically, is only verbal: the latter objecting to call that good in any sense, which may also be evil, a somewhat pedantic use of language, which is not uniformly maintained by Aristotle himself. Cp. vi. 4. § 1, δημοκρατίων οὐσῶν τεττάρων βελτίστη

ἡ πρώτη τάξει.

καὶ τῶν πρότερον is a strange form of citation from Plato which would seem more appropriate to a later generation than to Aristotle. See Essay on the Criticism of Plato in Aristotle.

2. 4-6. The programme corresponds fairly, but not very accurately, with the subjects which follow. At chap. 14, before discussing the causes of ruin and preservation in states, having analysed in general outline the various types of oligarchy, democracy, polity, tyranny, Aristotle introduces a discussion respecting the powers and offices which exist in a single state: but of this new beginning which interrupts the sequence of his plan he says nothing here.

3. 1. The diversity of governments has been already discussed, but not in detail, in bk. iii. c. 6-8.

3. 4. ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοραῖς ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ δὲ κατ' ἄρετήν, κἄν εἴ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἕτερον εἴρηται πόλεως εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆν ἀριστοκρατίαν.

The parts of the state are spoken of in vii. 8. § 7. The opening sentence of book vii. itself also professes to speak of aristocracy. But the writer goes on to treat rather of the ὑποθέσεις or material conditions of the best state, than of the best state itself. These references are vague; if they were really the passages here cited, we should have to suppose that the seventh book preceded the fourth. But they are not precise enough to be adduced as an argument in favour of the changed order.

3. 5. καὶ γὰρ ταῦτ' εἶδει διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν.

'As the parts of states differ from one another (σφῶν αὐτῶν), so must states differ from one another.' Compare the curious comparison infra c. 4. §§ 8, 9.

3. 5. πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις ἐστὶ, ταύτην δὲ διανέμονται πάντες ἡ κατὰ τῆν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων ἡ κατὰ τιν' αὐτῶν ἰσότητα κοινήν, λέγω δ' οἶον τῶν ὑπόρων ἡ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ κοινήν τιν' ἄμφοῖν.

The last words, κοινήν τιν' ἄμφοῖν, which are obscure and do not cohere very well with δύναμιν, are bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. But there is no reason for doubting their genuineness. Aristotle means to say that governments subsist according to the powers of those who share in them; or according to equality, whether that equality be an equality of the rich among themselves, or of the poor among themselves, or an equality of proportion which embraces both rich and poor: cp. infra c. 4. § 2. The words οἶον τῶν ὑπόρων ἡ τῶν εὐπόρων may be an explanation of κατὰ τῆν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων, which comes in out of place, and ἡ κοινήν τιν' ἄμφοῖν, as in the English text, may be an explanation of ἰσότητα κοινήν.

κατὰ τιν' αὐτῶν ἰσότητα κοινήν, 'More power may be given to the poor as being the more numerous class, or to the rich as being the more wealthy; or power may be given upon some principle of compensation which includes both;' as e. g. in a constitutional government. In this way of explaining the passage the difficulty in the words ἡ κοινήν τιν' ἄμφοῖν, which has led Bekker to bracket them, is avoided.

3. 7. For the winds compare Meteorologica ii. 4, 361 a. 4 ff., a passage in which Aristotle argues that north and south are the chief winds because wind is produced by evaporation and the evaporation is caused by the movement of the sun to the north or south. Also for the two principal forms of government cp. Plato's Laws iii. 693 C: according to Plato they are democracy and monarchy.

3. 8. ἀληθέστερον δὲ καὶ βέλτιον ὥς ἡμεῖς διειλομεν, δυοῖν ἢ μιᾶς οὐσίας τῆς καλῶς συνεστηκυίας τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν τῆς ἐν κεκραμένης ἁρμονίας, τὰς δὲ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας.

Aristotle having compared the different forms of states with the different sorts of harmonies, now blends the two in one sentence, and corrects the opinion previously expressed by him: 'There are not two opposite kinds of harmonies and states, but one or at the most two, δυοῖν ἢ μιᾶς (the two states are royalty and aristocracy), which are not opposed but of which all the rest are perversions.' From this transcendental point of view polity or constitutional government itself becomes a perversion; but in c. 8. § 1 it is said not to be a perversion, though sometimes reckoned in that class.

4. 4. ὥσπερ ἐν Αἰθιοπίᾳ φασὶ τινες.

According to Herod. iii. 20, the Ethiopians are the tallest and most beautiful of mankind: and they elect the tallest and strongest of themselves to be their kings.

4. 5. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πλείονα μόρια καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας εἰσὶν κ.τ.λ.

It is argued that neither freedom alone, nor numbers alone are a sufficient note of democracy, nor fewness of rulers, nor wealth of oligarchy: neither a few freemen, as at Apollonia, nor many rich men, as at Colophon, constitute a democracy. But there must be many poor in a democracy and few rich in an oligarchy. A slight obscurity in the passage arises from the illustrations referring only to democracy and not to oligarchy. Cp. iii. cc. 7, 8; infra c. 8. § 7.

Aristotle would not approve a classification of states such as that of Sir G. C. Lewis and the school of Austin, who define the sovereign power according to the number of persons who exercise it (cp. G. C. Lewis' 'Political Terms,' Edit. 1877, p. 50). An opposite view is held by Maine, who argues truly 'that there is more in actual sovereignty than force' (Early Institutions, p. 358 ff.). Aristotle insists that the character of a government depends more on the *quality* than on the *quantity* of the sovereign power.

4. 5. τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λυδούς.

Possibly the war with Gyges mentioned in Herod. i. 14. The Colophonians like the other Ionians (Herod. i. 142) appear to have been the subjects of Croesus at the time of his overthrow. A testimony to their wealth and luxury is furnished by Xenophanes apud Athenaeum xii. c. 31. 526 C, who says that a thousand citizens arrayed in purple robes would meet in the agora of Colophon.

4. 7. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, εἴρηται· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν ε

ἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον· ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἔν μέρους ἀλλὰ πλείω πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν.

It is remarkable that Aristotle should revert to the parts of states which he professes to have already determined when speaking of aristocracy (cp. c. 3. § 4). His reason for returning to them is that he is going to make a new sub-division of states based upon the differences of their parts or members.

πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων. As he says, *infra* § 20, "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι πλείους καὶ διὰ τίνος αἰτίας εἴρηται πρότερον· ὅτι δ' ἔστι καὶ δημοκρατίας εἴδη πλείω καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας λέγωμεν. Compare Book vii. 8. § 9.

4. 8. The illustration from animals may be worked out as follows. Suppose the different kinds of teeth were *a, a', a'', a'''*, etc., the different kinds of claws, feet, etc. were *b, b', b'', b'''*, *c, c', c'', c'''*, and so on with the other organs which are important in determining the character of an animal. Then, according to Aristotle, the different combinations of these will give the different species. Thus:—

*a', b, c'', will be one species,
a, b', c'', another and so on.*

So with constitutions:—

If we combine γεωργοί, having some political power and coming occasionally to the assembly, with disfranchised βάνουσοι, and a politically active wealthy class, the result will be an oligarchy or very moderate democracy: or if we combine politically active γεωργοί, βάνουσοι, θῆτες with a feeble or declining oligarchy, the result will be an extreme democracy: and so on.

It is hardly necessary to remark that the illustration taken from the animals is the reverse of the fact. The differences in animals are not made by the combination of different types, but by the adaptation of one type to different circumstances. Nor is there in the constitution of states any such infinite variety of combinations as the illustration from the animals would lead us to suppose; (one kind of husbandmen with another of serfs and so on). Nor does Aristotle attempt to follow out in detail the idea which this image suggests.

4. 9-17. The eight or more classes cannot be clearly discriminated. The sixth class is wanting, but seems to be represented by the judicial and deliberative classes in § 14, yet both reappear as a ninth class in § 17. Aristotle is arguing that Plato's enumeration of the elements of a state is imperfect—there must be soldiers to protect the citizens, there must be judges to decide their disputes, there must be statesmen to guide them (although it is possible that the same persons may belong to more than one class). 'Then at any rate there must be soldiers' (§ 15). This rather lame conclusion seems to be only a repetition of a part of the premisses. At this point the writer looses the thread of his discourse and, omitting the sixth, passes on from the fifth class τὸ προπολεμῆσον in § 10 to a seventh class of rich men (§ 15), and to an eighth class of magistrates (§ 16). A somewhat different enumeration of the classes, consisting in all of six, is made in vii. 8. §§ 7-9.

4. 11-14. διόπερ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείῳ κ.τ.λ.

The criticism of Aristotle on Plato (Rep. ii. 369) in this passage, to use an expression of his own, is παιδαριώδης λιβαν. Plato, who was a poet as well as a philosopher, in a fanciful manner builds up the state; Aristotle, taking the pleasant fiction literally and detaching a few words from their context, accuses Plato of making necessity, and not the good, the first principle of the state, as if the entire aim of the work were not the search after justice. There is also an ambiguity in the word ἀναγκαία of which Aristotle here takes advantage. Plato means by the ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις, 'the barest idea of a state' or 'the state in its lowest terms.' But when Aristotle says judges are 'more necessary' than the providers of the means of life, he means 'contribute more to the end or highest realization of the state.' The remarks on Plato are worthless, yet they afford a curious example of the weakness of ancient criticism, arising, as in many other places, from want of imagination. But apart from the criticism the distinction here drawn between the higher and lower parts, the 'soul' and 'body' of the state, is important. Cp. vii. 9. § 10, where Aristotle introduces a similar distinction between the μέρη of the πόλις and the mere conditions (ὧν οὐκ ἔνευ) of it. 'Husbandmen, craftsmen, and labourers of all kinds are necessary to the existence of states, but the parts of the state are the warriors and counsellors.'

4. 11. ἐν τῇ Πολιτείῳ.

Here evidently the title of the book.

4. 12. ἴσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν.

Equally with τὸ καλόν.

4. 14. ὅπερ ἐστὶ συνέσεως πολιτικῆς ἔργον.

ὅπερ grammatically refers to τὸ βουλευέσθαι, suggested by τὸ βουλευόμενον.

4. 15. ὥστ' εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκεῖνα.

ταῦτα = τὰ περὶ τῆν ψυχὴν, gathered from τὰ τοιαῦτα in § 14.

ἐκεῖνα = τὰ εἰς τῆν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν συντείνοντα. If the higher and the lower elements of a state are both necessary parts of it, then the warriors (who may in some cases also be husbandmen) are necessary parts: Aristotle is answering Plato, § 13, who in the first enumeration of the citizens had omitted the warriors.

4. 16. ταύτην τῆν λειτουργίαν,

sc. τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

4. 18. πολλοῖς.

1) 'To many' or 'in many cases' opposed to πάντες in what follows; or 2*) πολλοῖς may be taken with δοκεῖ, the meaning being 'many (differing from Plato) think, etc.:' the appeal is to the common sense which Plato is supposed to contradict.

4. 18. ἀντιποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς πάντες.

The connexion is as follows:—‘Different qualifications often coexist or are thought to coexist in the same persons; and indeed virtue is a qualification for office to which all men lay claim. But no man can be rich and poor at the same time.’

4. 20. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνος αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον is a repetition with a slight verbal alteration (διὰ τίνος αἰτίας for δι’ ἧν αἰτίαν) of the first words of § 7.

4. 20. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

I. e. from what has been said respecting differences in the parts of states (supra §§ 7, 8). Yet the curious argument from the parts of animals is an illustration only; the actual differences of states have not been worked out in detail.

4. 21. κἄν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑτέρου πλήθους εἶδος.

Susemihl (note 1199) objects that there are no others and so the freedmen must be meant. But surely in this phrase Aristotle is merely adding a saving clause = ‘and the like.’ Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 7. § 21, τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῆ θεωροῦνται αἱ δ’ αἰσθήσει αἱ δ’ ἔθισμῳ τινὶ καὶ ἄλλαι δ’ ἄλλως, where the last words only generalize the preceding.

4. 22. τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων.

Sc. εἶδη, here used inaccurately for differences or different kinds of εἶδη.

4. 22. τὰ τούτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τῆν αὐτῆν διαφοράν.

τούτοις, dative after τῆν αὐτήν, and refers to πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια, κ.τ.λ. Lit. ‘the things which are spoken of according to the same principle of difference with these,’ or ‘similar differences having a relation to these,’ e. g. the habits and occupations of the notables.

4. 22. τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοῦς ἀπόρους ἢ τοῦς εὐπόρους.

If the reading ὑπάρχειν is retained, the emphasis is on the words μηδὲν μᾶλλον which must be taken closely with it, ‘that the poor shall be no more’—which is a feeble way of saying, shall have no more power—‘than the rich’; or ‘shall have no priority,’ which gives a rather curious sense to ὑπάρχειν. A doubt about the propriety of the expression has led to two changes in the text. 1) ὑπερέχειν (Susemihl) for which there is slight MS. authority, P¹, P⁴; and Aretino’s transl. 2) ἄρχειν an emendation of Victorius adopted by Coraes, Schneider, Stahr, and supposed to be confirmed by a parallel passage in vi. 2. § 9; see note on English Text. 3) The Old Translation ‘nihil magis existere egenis vel divitibus’ seems to favour ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἀπόροις ἢ τοῖς εὐπόροις.

4. 23. δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην.

ταύτην is slightly inaccurate = ‘the state in which this occurs.’

4. 24. ἔν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κ.τ.λ.

Five forms of democracy are reckoned: but the first of these is really a description of democracy in general, not of any particular form. The words in § 24 ἄλλο δὲ seem to have been introduced by mistake. The five forms are thus reduced to four, as in c. 6 the five forms of oligarchy given in c. 5 appear as four.

4. 24. ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας ὅσοι ἀνυπεύθυνοι, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον. ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον ᾖ πολίτης, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον.

The words ὅσοι ἀνυπεύθυνοι agree with τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνους κατὰ τὸ γένος, as the ἐὰν ᾖ πολίτης does with the ὅσοι ἂν ἐλεύθεροι ᾖσι in the recapitulation of the passage which follows (c. 6. § 4). In both cases all citizens are eligible and the law is supreme: but in the first of the two the rights of citizenship have been scrutinized; in the second, all reputed freemen are admitted to them without enquiry. The latter case may be illustrated by the state of Athenian citizenship before the investigation made by Pericles; the former by the stricter citizenship required after the change. The meaning of the word ἀνυπεύθυνοι is shown by the parallel passage (c. 6. § 3, ἀνυπευθύνους κατὰ τὸ γένος) to be, 'not proved to be disqualified by birth.'

4. 27. Ὅμηρος δὲ ποίαν λέγει οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πολυκοιρανίην, πότερον ταύτην ἢ ὅταν πλείους ᾖσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ὥς ἕκαστος, ἄδηλον.

It would be a poetical or historical anachronism to suppose that Homer in the words cited intended one of the senses which Aristotle seems to think possible. The collective action of states as distinguished from that of individuals is the conception, not of a poet, but of a philosopher. No modern reader would imagine that Homer is seeking to enforce any other lesson than the necessity of having one and not many leaders, especially on the field of battle. This anti-popular text is adapted to the argument.

4. 31. τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τῆν πολιτείαν κρίνειν.

For use of gen. after κρίνειν cp. Plat. Rep. 576 D, Laws i. 646 D. τῆν πολιτείαν (πολιτεία here = πολιτεύμα) is contrasted as 'the collective government' with αἱ ἀρχαί, 'the individual magistrates.' Yet in the context, both preceding and following, the word has the more general meaning of a 'form of government' or 'constitution.'

5. 1. ἅν μὲν οἷν ἐκ πάντων τούτων.

τούτων, 'out of all the qualified persons,' all those referred to in the two previous sentences τῶν ἐχόντων τιμήματα τηλικαῖντα ὥστε κ.τ.λ. or τῶν ἐχόντων μακρὰ τιμήματα.

In what follows the *dynastia* is the exclusive hereditary oligarchy, ruling without law.

5. 2. For the forms of these hereditary oligarchies and the dangers to which they are exposed, cp. v. 6. § 3. We may remark that, though the most common, they are not included in Aristotle's definition of oligarchy (iii. c. 8).

5. 4. τὰ πρῶτα μικρὰ πλεονεκτοῦντες παρ' ἀλλήλων.

Not accurate, for the meaning is, not that the two encroach on one another, but that the dominant party encroaches on the other.

The form of a constitution is here supposed to be at variance with its spirit and practice. Thus England might be said to be a monarchy once aristocratically, now democratically administered; France a republic in which some of the methods of imperialism survive (cp. note on c. 1. § 8); while in Prussia the spirit of absolute monarchy carries on a not unequal contest with representative government.

6. 3. διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτωμένοις ἕξεσσι μετέχειν.

Omitted by Π² (i. e. the MSS. of the second family except P⁵) and Aretino's translation, bracketed by Bekker in both editions, is a repetition or pleonasm of the previous thought, though not on that account necessarily to be reckoned spurious. Cp. iii. 1. § 4 and note.

6. 3. διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην αἴρεσιν.

'The principle of election which follows next in order' (cp. c. 4. § 24, ἕτερον εἶδος). This use of the word ἐχομένη is supported by iii. 11. § 15, ἄλλη δ' ἐστὶν (ἀπορία) ἐχομένη ταύτης, and vi. 8. § 4, ἕτερα δὲ ἐπιμέλεια ταύτης ἐχομένη καὶ σύνεγγυς, and several other passages. The other interpretation of ἐχομένη, given in a note to the English text, 'proper to it' is scarcely defensible by examples and is probably wrong. The first form of democracy required a small property qualification, the second admitted all citizens who could prove their birth. The third admitted reputed citizens without proof of birth; though in both the latter cases the exercise of the right was limited by the opportunities of leisure. For the laxity of states in this matter, cp. iii. 5. §§ 7, 8.

6. 4. διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόσοδον.

The public revenues could not be distributed, for there were none to distribute, cp. infra § 8. The want of pay prevented the people from attending the assembly.

6. 5. διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλήθους.

Either 1*) 'on account of the preponderance of their numbers,' or 2) more definitely 'on account of the preponderance of the multitude'; (cp. c. 12. § 1 and iii. 15. § 13). The numbers of the people give the power and the revenues of the state provide pay.

6. 8. καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἀνάγκη μὴ τοῦς ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον εἶναι κύριον.

The more numerous the members of the oligarchy, and the greater the difficulty of finding the means of living, the less possibility is there of the government of a few and therefore the greater need of law; cp. infra § 9.

6. 8. μὴθ' οὕτως ὀλίγην ὥστε τρέφεσθαι ἀνεπιμέλεια; τῆς πόλεως, ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξιοῦν αὐτοῖς ἀρχεῖν.

'When numerous, and of a middle condition, neither living in careless leisure nor

supported by the state, they are driven to maintain in their case (αὐτοῖς) the rule of law.'

6. 9. πλείω δέ,

sc. οὐσίαν ἔχοντες.

6. 9. τὸν νόμον τίθενται τοιοῦτον.

Sc. they make the law oligarchical.

6. 10. ἔὰν δ' ἐπιτείνωσι.

'But when they stretch (the oligarchical principle) further.'

7. 1. ὥσπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις.

Either 1)* in his works on Politics, meaning especially the Republic (as in v. 12. § 7, ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ) and Politicus; or 2) in his treatment of the various forms of government, i.e. in Books viii. and ix. of the Republic. The latter explanation is less idiomatic. Without referring to the Republic or the Politicus, the statement is inaccurate; for if the perfect state be included, the number of constitutions is in the Republic five, in the Politicus (302) seven.

7. 2. ἄριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ τῆς διήλομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις· τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἄριστοκρατίαν.

The discussion is apparently the same to which he has already referred in iv. 2. § 1: the particle γὰρ seems to imply that he had in that discussion spoken of aristocracy as the government of the truly good. The passage most nearly corresponding to the allusion is iii. 4. § 4 ff., in which Aristotle treats of the relation of the good ruler to the good man.

7. καλοῦνται ἄριστοκραταί.

According to a strict use of terms aristocracy is only the government of the best; in popular language it is applied to the union of wealth and merit, but is not the same either with oligarchy or with constitutional government.

7. 4. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμέναις κοινῆν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς εἰσὶν ὅμως τινὲς οἱ ἐὺδοκιμοῦντες καὶ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐπιεικεῖς.

Cp. Plat. Laws xii. 951: 'There are always in the world a few inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond price, and who spring up quite as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered cities.'

7. 4. οἶον ἐν Καρχηδόνι . . οἶον τῇ Λακεδαιμονίῳ.

Elsewhere (ii. 11. § 9) the constitution of Carthage is spoken of as a perversion of aristocracy because combining wealth and virtue; here it is called in a laxer sense an

aristocracy because it combines wealth, virtue and numbers. That Sparta with all its secrecy (τῆς πολιτείας τὸ κρυπτόν, Thuc. v. 68) might be termed a democracy and, with all its corruption and infamy, had a sort of virtue (τὸ πιστόν τῆς πολιτείας, Id. i. 68) is the view, not wholly indefensible, of Aristotle, who regards the Spartan constitution under many aspects, cp. ii. 9. §§ 20, 22, and infra c. 9. § 5, but chiefly as consisting of two elements, numbers and virtue.

7. 4. καὶ ἐν αἷς εἰς τὰ δύο μόνον, οἷον ἢ Λακεδαιμονίων εἰς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ δῆμον, καὶ ἔστι μίξις τῶν δύο τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς.

The want of symmetry in the expression εἰς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ δῆμον, followed by δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς, instead of δήμου τε καὶ ἀρετῆς, probably arises out of a desire to avoid tautology.

7. 5. ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ταῦτα δύο εἶδη· καὶ τρίτον ὅσαι τῆς καλουμένης πολιτείας εἴησιν πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον.

There are three imperfect kinds of aristocracy beside the perfect state (ἡ πρώτη, ἡ ἀρίστη πολιτεία): 1) the governments, such as that of Carthage, in which regard is paid to virtue as well as to numbers and wealth; 2) those in which, as at Sparta, the constitution is based on virtue and numbers; 3) the forms of constitutional government (πολιτεία) which incline to oligarchy, i.e. in which the governing body is small.

8. 1. ἐτάξαμεν δ' οὕτως οὐκ οἴσαν οὔτε ταύτην παρέκβασιν οὔτε τὰς ἄρτι εἰρηθείας ἀριστοκρατίας, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς πᾶσαι διημαρτήκασιν τῆς ὀρθοτάτης πολιτείας, ἔπειτα καταριθμοῦνται μετὰ τούτων, εἰσι τ' αὐτῶν αὐταὶ παρεκβάσεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχῆν εἴπομεν.

αὐταὶ refers to τούτων, sc. τῶν παρεκβεβηκυῖων or διημαρτηκυῖων πολιτειῶν, and this to the singular παρέκβασιν.

ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχῆν εἴπομεν. Sc. iii. 7. § 5.

8. 2. Φανερωτέρα γὰρ ἢ δύναμις αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ.

'Now that we understand what democracy and oligarchy are, it is easier to see what the combination of them will be.'

8. 3. διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς εὐπορωτέροις.

Men tend to identify nobility with wealth (cp. infra § 8), not unreasonably, for wealth gives leisure, and in the second generation commonly education. For εὐγένεια, see Rhet. i. 5, 1360 b. 31.

8. 5. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ μῆ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν ἀριστοκρατουμένην πόλιν, ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατουμένην.

The words ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατουμένην (omitted in the translation) are read by all the MSS. (and supported by W. de Moerbeke), and therefore though pleonastic are unlikely to be a gloss. If retained we must 1) supply εὐνομεῖσθαι from τὸ μῆ εὐνομεῖσθαι, 'A state cannot be ill governed by good men, or well governed by evil men.' 2) We may

alter the order of words by placing μή before ἀριστοκρατουμένην, instead of before εὐνομεῖσθαι (Thurot, Susem.). Or 3), with Bekker (2nd ed.), we may insert μή before πονηροκρατουμένην. Or 4) alter πονηροκρατουμένην into πονηροκρατεῖσθαι, answering to εὐνομεῖσθαι.

8. 6. διὸ μίαν μὲν εὐνομίαν . . τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις.

Cp. Thuc. iii. 37, where Cleon says, πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ βέβαιον ἤμῃν μηδὲν καθεστήξει ὧν ἂν δόξῃ περὶ, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι χεῖροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις.

8. 6. τοῦτο δ' ἐνδέχεται διχῶς κ.τ.λ.

Refers back to the words τὸ καλῶς κειῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους οἷς ἐμμένουσιν, the clause ἔστι γὰρ . . . κειμένοις being a parenthesis.

8. 6. ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἀρίστοις κ.τ.λ.

Sc. ἔστι πείθεσθαι.

8. 8. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος καλεῖται.

Sc. πολιτεία. Preserving the play of words and supplying πολιτεία with καλεῖται from τῆς πολιτείας, we may translate, 'in most cities the form of the constitution is called constitutional.' But are there 'many' such governments? Cp. supra c. 7. § 1; infra c. 11. § 19. For the answer to this question see Essay on the μέση πολιτεία, &c.

8. 8. μόνον γὰρ ἢ μίξις.

'It is called by a neutral name, e.g. a constitution or commonwealth, for it is a mixture which aims only at uniting the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich; ἐλευθερίας answering to ἀπόρων as πλούτου to εὐπόρων.

9. 1-4. As in some other summaries of Aristotle the first division seems to be a general description of those which follow. (Cp. supra note on c. 4. § 24.) We cannot distinguish between 1 and 3, unless in one of them we suppose Aristotle to have in his mind a syncretism of two general principles of government (see § 6), in the other an eclectic union of elements taken from different governments.

9. 1. σύμβολον.

Something cut in two and capable of being put together, so that the parts fitted into one another; a die or coin or ring thus divided, which friends used as a token when desirous of renewing hospitality on behalf of themselves or others, and which was also used in buying or selling. See Schol. on Eur. Med. 613, οἱ ἐπιξενούμενοι, ἀσπράγαλον κατατέμνοντες, θάτερον μὲν αὐτοῖ κατεῖχον μέρος, θάτερον δὲ κατελίμπανον τοῖς ὑποδεξαμένοις· ἵνα εἰ δεοὶ πάλιν αὐτοὺς ἢ τοὺς ἐκείνων ἐπιξενούσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐπαγόμενοι τὸ ἥμισυ ἀσπράγαλιον, ἀνενοῦντο τῆν ξενίαν: and cp. Plat. Symp. 191 D, ἀνθρώπου ζύμβολον ἅτε τετμημένος . . ἕξ ἐνὸς δύο.

9. 2. ἢ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα ληπτέον ὧν ἑκάτεραι νομοθετοῦσιν κ.τ.λ.

'For either they must take the legislation of both.' These words are resumed in εἷς μὲν οὖν οὗτος τοῦ συνδυασμοῦ τρόπος and followed by ἕτερος δὲ instead of repeating ἢ.

The first case is a union of extremes, the second a mean taken between them; the third seems to be only another example of the first.

9. 6. ἐμφαίνεται γὰρ ἐκότερον ἐν αὐτῷ τῶν ἄκρων.

From the democratical aspect a polity or timocracy has the appearance of an oligarchy or aristocracy; from the oligarchical aspect, of a democracy. Aristotle cites as an example of this many-sidedness the constitution of Lacedaemon, which he himself elsewhere (c. 7. § 4) calls an aristocracy, but which in this passage he acknowledges to have many features both of a democracy and of an oligarchy. Cp. Nic. Eth. ii. 7. § 8, ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας.

9. 9. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ γέροντας αἰροῦνται, τῆς δ' ἐφορείας μετέχουσιν.

I.e. 'The people choose the elders, but are not eligible themselves; and they share in the Ephorality.' Whether they elected the Ephors is nowhere expressly said. We are only told that the mode of election was extremely childish (ii. 9. § 23).

10. 1. ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τίθεμεν τῶν πολιτειῶν τι μέρος.

Tyranny is and is not a form of polity, in the sense in which the word 'polity' is used by Aristotle. Cp. c. 8. § 2, τελευταῖον δὲ περὶ τυραννίδος εὐλογόν ἐστι ποιήσασθαι μνείαν διὰ τὸ πασῶν ἥκιστα ταύτην εἶναι πολιτείαν, ἡμῖν δὲ τῆν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας.

10. 1. περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας διωρίσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, ἐν οἷς περὶ τῆς μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας ἐποιούμεθα τῆν σκέψιν.

Either 'royalty* commonly so called,' or 'the most truly called royalty,' which would seem to be the παμβασιλεία. Cp. iii. c. 16.

10. 1. τίνα καὶ πόθεν δεῖ καθιστάναι, καὶ πῶς.

Two slightly different senses are here combined in δεῖ, 1) 'what we ought to establish,' and 2), incorrectly, 'how or by what means we may or must establish it.'

10. 2. τυραννίδος δ' εἶδη δύο μὲν δειλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν.

Sc. iii. 14. §§ 6-10. The two forms of tyranny there mentioned are the hereditary monarchy of barbarians, and the Aesymnetia of ancient Hellas. The barbarian monarchs are here called elected sovereigns, though before spoken of as hereditary (iii. 14. § 6), and contrasted with the elected Aesymnetes of ancient Hellas, with whom they are here compared.

10. 2. διὰ τὸ τῆν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τῆν βασιλείαν.

Not 'because their powers in a manner change into one another, and pass into royalty;'

for the words 'change into one another' would not be a reason why they should be spoken of in connexion with royalty, but 'because the power of either of these forms of tyranny easily passes likewise into royalty;' likewise i.e. besides being forms of tyranny. For the use of ἐπαλλάττειν, cp. vi. 1. § 3, and i. 6. § 3.

10. 4. τοσαῦτα διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας.

εἰρημένας, sc. in the previous sentences. 'There is more than one kind of tyranny, because the tyrant may rule either with or without law, and over voluntary or involuntary subjects.'

11. Aristotle now proceeds to speak of the best average constitution to which he alluded in c. 1. § 5.

11. 3. τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον, τῆς ἐκάστοις ἐνδεχομένης τυχεῖν μεσότητος.

The gen. μεσότητος is a resumption of μέσον, and depends on βίον. Here, as in Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 7, the mean is admitted to be relative.

11. 5. ταῦτα δ' ἀμφοτέρα βλαβερά ταῖς πόλεσιν.

ἀμφοτέρα, sc. either 1) *'their rogueries and their unwillingness to perform public duties, whether military or civil,' or 2) simply 'their dislike both of civil and military duties.' It is possible also that ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρα may refer to the μεγαλοπρόνηροι and μικροπρόνηροι, in which case the words ἔτι . . . ἔρχουσι are either inserted or misplaced.

The φύλαρχοι at Athens were the cavalry officers under the ἵππαρχοι. See Liddell and Scott. The term is also sometimes used to denote civil magistrates, as in v. 1. § 11 to describe the oligarchical rulers of Epidamnus. βουλαρχεῖν literally = 'to be a chief of the senate.' The word very rarely occurs, and can here only have a generalized meaning. William de Moerbeke, apparently finding in some Greek MS. Φιλαρχοῦσι, translates by an obvious mistake, 'minime amant principes et volunt esse principes.' For the association of political inactivity with the idea of crime, cp. Solon's law forbidding neutrality in a sedition (Plut. Solon 20), τῶν δ' ἄλλων αὐτοῦ νόμων ἴδιος μὲν μάλιστα καὶ παράδοξος ὁ κελεύων ἄτιμον εἶναι τὸν ἐν στάσει μηδετέρας μερίδος γενόμενον: and Pericles in Thuc. ii. 40, μόνοι γὰρ τὸν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα ἀλλ' ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν.

11. 6. οἱ δὲ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν ἐνδειῶ τούτων ταπεινοὶ λίαν.

τούτων, sc. τῶν εὐτυχημάτων κ.τ.λ. supra.

11. 7. ἄρχεσθαι μὲν οὐδεμιᾷ ἄρχῆι.

Dative of the manner; 'to be ruled in any fashion.'

11. 8. ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον ἄριστα πολιτεύεσθαι ταύτην τῆν πόλιν ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν φημὲν φύσει τῆν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς πόλεως.

'So that a city having [like and equal] citizens, who in our view are the natural

components of it, will of necessity be best administered.' ταύτην, sc. τὴν ἐξ ἴσων καὶ ὁμοίων . . . ἐξ ὧν κ.τ.λ.

11. 9. πολλὰ μέσοισιν ἄριστα.

'Many things are best to those who are in the mean;' or as we might say in modern phraseology, 'The middle class have many advantages.' Cp. Eur. Suppl. 238-245:—

τρεῖς γὰρ πολιτῶν μερίδες· οἱ μὲν ὀλβιοὶ
ἀνωφελεῖς τε πλειόνων τ' ἐρώσ' ἀεὶ·
οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔχοντες καὶ σπανίζοντες βίου,
δεινοί, νέμοντες τῷ φθόνῳ πλεῖον μέρος,
εἰς τοὺς ἔχοντας κέντρ' ἀφίᾳσιν κακά,
γλώσσαις πονηρῶν προστατῶν φηλούμενοι·
τριῶν δὲ μοιρῶν ἢ ἓν μέσῳ σώζει πόλεις,
κόσμον φυλάσσοις ὄντιν' ἔν τάξει πόλις.

(Quoted by Oncken, ii. 225, note 1.)

11. 15. Σόλων τε γὰρ ἦν τούτων (δηλοῖ δ' ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως).

The passage referred to may be that quoted by Plutarch v. Solonis, c. 3,

πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτεῖσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται,
ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς οὐ διαμειψόμεθα
τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλοῦτον.

In classing Solon with the middle rank Aristotle appears to be thinking only of the tradition of his poverty and of the moderation inculcated in his poems. He has ignored or forgotten the tradition of his descent from Codrus.

11. 15. οὐ γὰρ ἦν βασιλεύς.

The feebleness of the argument is striking; because Lycurgus, who was the guardian and is said also to have been the uncle of the king, was not a king, he is here assumed to be of the middle class! Cp. Plut. Cleom. 10, perhaps following this passage, νῦν δὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἔχειν συγγνώμονα τὸν Λυκοῦργον, ὃς οὔτε βασιλεὺς ὦν, οὔτ' ἄρχων, ἰδιώτης δὲ βασιλεύειν ἐπιχειρῶν ἐν τοῖς ὄπλοις προῆλθεν εἰς ἀγορὰν· ὥστε δεῖσαντα τὸν βασιλέα Χαρίλαον ἐπὶ βωμὸν καταφυγεῖν. Yet Plutarch is inconsistent with himself; for he also says (Lyc. 3) that Lycurgus reigned for eight months, and resigned the royal office when the infant Charilaus was born.

11. 18, 19. Ἐπι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς τὴν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐκάτεροι πολιτείαν ἀποβλέποντες οἱ μὲν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίστασαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίας, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πόλεων συμφέρον σκοποῦντες ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν. ὥστε διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἢ μηδέποτε τὴν μέσην γίνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἢ ὀλιγάκις καὶ παρ' ὀλίγοις.

Cp. Thuc. i. 19, 76, 99, 144, iii. 82 and elsewhere.

τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων. Either of the leading states, opposed to ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι the states of Hellas generally.

11. 19. εἷς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος συνεπίσθη μόνος τῶν πρότερον [ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων] ταύτην ἀποδοῦναι τῆν τάξιν.

The variety of opinions entertained by commentators respecting the person here alluded to, who has been supposed to be Lycurgus (Zeller), Theopompus (Sepulveda), Solon (Schlosser), Pittacus (Goettling), Phaleas (St. Hilaire), Gelo (Camerarius), the king Pausanias II (Congreve), Epaminondas (Eaton), Alexander the Great (Zeller formerly), seems to prove that we know nothing for certain about him. Of the various claimants Solon is the most probable. He is regarded by Aristotle (ii. 12. §§ 1-6) as a sort of conservative democrat, the founder of a balanced polity, whom he contrasts with Pericles and the later Athenian demagogues (cp. Solon Frag. 5, δῆμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον κράτος ὅσον ἐπαρκεῖ). The omission of the name, and the words τῶν πρότερον, tend to show that a well known and traditional legislator is meant. Yet it might be argued also that the phrase τῶν ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων seems to describe some one holding the position of Lysander or Philip of Macedon in Hellas, rather than the legislator of any single city.

If 'one man' only gave this form of constitution to Hellas it must have been rare indeed or rather imaginary, cp. supra c. 7. § 1, διὰ τὸ μῆ πολλὰκις γίνεσθαι λανθάνει. But how is this to be reconciled with c. 8. § 8?

ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων, 'the leading men.' For ἐπὶ cp. οἱ ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν. (Dem.) But are not the words a copyist's repetition of τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων above?

ταύτην ἀποδοῦναι τῆν τάξιν. Not necessarily 'to restore' or 'give back' but more simply 'to give what is suitable, assign,' like [οἱ εἰκονογράφοι] ἀποδιδόντες τῆν ἰδίαν μορφήν, Poet. 15, 1454 b. 10.

11. 20. τις μὲν οὖν ἀρίστη πολιτεία, καὶ διὰ τιν' αἰτίαν.

Here, as limited in § 1, ἀρίστη ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι.

διὰ τιν' αἰτίαν, i. e. the moderation and stability of the state. Cp. v. 1. § 16 where it is implied that the safety of democracy is due to its approximation to the μέση πολιτεία.

11. 21. λέγω δὲ τὸ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν, ὅτι πολλάκις οὕσης ἄλλης πολιτείας αἰρετωτέρας ἐνίοις οὐθὲν ἐν κωλύσει συμφέρειν ἑτέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν.

'It may often happen that some constitution may be preferable [in itself] and some other better suited to the peculiar circumstances of some state.'

πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν here (as in c. 1. § 4) means any supposed or given constitution, which may not be the best possible under the circumstances, but is the one to be preferred, in some states of society.

12. 2. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιὸν ὑπάρχειν ἑτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις.

'Namely to one of those parts which make up the state'; the clause ἐξ ὧν κ.τ.λ. is explanatory of ἑτέρῳ μέρει = ἑτέρῳ τῶν μερῶν.

12. 3. ὅπου ὑπερέχει τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος τῆν εἰρημένην ἀναλογίαν.

'When the poor exceed in number the [due] proportion implied in the last words.'

12. 3. καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἕκαστον εἶδος κατὰ τῆν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλήθους.

'And in like manner (not only oligarchy in general, but) each sort of oligarchy varies according to the predominance of each sort of oligarchical population (sc. ὃ ὑπάρχει αὐτῆ).

12. 5. πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ δαιτητής, δαιτητῆς δ' ὁ μέσος.

The middle class are the arbiters between the extremes of oligarchy and democracy. When Aristotle calls the arbiter **illegible**; μέσος, this is probably meant in the same sense in which δικαιοσύνη is said to be a mean because it fixes a mean. Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 17, ἥ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἐστὶν οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς πρότερον ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν, and v. 4. § 7, Διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστῆν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστῆν ἰέναι ἰέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστῆς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἔμψυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστῆν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς, ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχῃσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευξόμενοι.

12. 6. ἀνάγκη γὰρ χρόνῳ ποτὲ ἐκ τῶν ψευδῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀληθῆς συμβῆναι κακόν· αἱ γὰρ πλεονεξίαι τῶν πλουσίων ἀπολλύουσι μᾶλλον τῆν πολιτείαν ἢ αἱ τοῦ δήμου.

Aristotle gives no reason for this statement. He may have thought that the designs of an oligarchy are more deeply laid and corrupting, while the fickleness of the multitude is in some degree a corrective to itself. The oligarchies of Hellas were certainly worse than the democracies: the greatest dishonesty of which the Athenians were guilty in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. iv. 23) is far less hateful than the perfidy of the Spartans narrated Id. iv. 80. The cruelty of the four hundred or of the thirty tyrants strikingly contrasts on both occasions with the moderation of the democracy which overthrew them.

13. It is a curious question, which we have not the means of answering, whether all these artifices (σοφίσματα) are historical facts or only inventions of Aristotle, by which he imagines that the democracy or oligarchy might weaken the opposite party. Some of them, such as the pay to the people, we know to have been used at Athens: but there is no historical proof, except what may be gathered from this passage, that the richer members of an oligarchical community were ever compelled under a penalty to take part in the assembly, or in the law courts. Cp. infra p. 178 note: also c. 15. § 14-18.

13. 2. τοῖς μὲν μεγάλην, τοῖς δὲ μικράν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Χαρώνδου νόμοις.

Yet the penalty must have been relatively as well as absolutely greater or smaller, or the rich would have had no more reason for going than the poor for abstaining. The meaning is not that Charondas inflicted a larger fine on the rich and a proportionally

small one on the poor for absence from the assembly; but generally that he adapted his fines to the circumstances of offenders.

13. 8. ἐθέλουσι γὰρ οἱ πένητες καὶ μὴ μετέχοντες τῶν τιμῶν ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν, ἐὰν μὴ ὑβρίζῃ τις αὐτοὺς μήτε ἀφαιρῆται μηθὲν τῆς οὐσίας.

The connexion is as follows: 'The qualification must be such as will place the government in the hands of a majority [and then there will be no danger]: for the poor, even though they are not admitted to office, will be quiet enough if they are not outraged.'

13. 9. ἐν Μαλιεῦσι δὲ ἡ μὲν πολιτεία ἦν ἐκ τούτων κ.τ.λ.

'Among the Malians the governing or larger body was elected from those who were past service, the magistrates from those on actual service'; the past tense (ἦν) has been thought to imply that the government had changed possibly in consequence of Philip and Alexander's conquests: compare a similar use of the past, v. 1. § 11 respecting the government of Epidamnus, and note.

13. 10. ὥστ' ἐν τοῖς ἵππεύουσιν εἶναι τῆν ἰσχύιν.

Yet the tendency of some of the Greek states to the use of cavalry was as much due to the suitability of large regions, such as Thessaly, for the breeding and support of horses, as to the form of government. Nor can the remark be true of Greek oligarchies in general, considering how ill suited the greater part of Hellas was to the training or use of horses. Cp. supra c. 3. § 3, a passage in which Aristotle has made a similar observation.

13. 11. ὅς νῦν καλοῦμεν πολιτείας, οἱ πρότερον ἐκάλουν δημοκρατίας.

I.e. what appeared to the older Greeks to be a large governing class was to the later Greeks a small or moderate one.

13. 11. κατὰ τῆν σύνταξιν μᾶλλον ὑπέμενον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι.

1*) Some word like ἀσθενεῖς has to be supplied from ὀλίγοι ὄντες τὸ πλῆθος before κατὰ τῆν σύνταξιν; or 2) κατὰ τῆν σύνταξιν may be taken after ὑπέμενον, 'and also through a (want of) organization, they were more willing to endure the dominion of others.'

14. 1. Πάλιν δὲ καὶ κοινῆ καὶ χωρὶς περὶ ἐκάστης λέγωμεν περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς, λαβόντες ἀρχὴν τῆν προσηκούσαν αὐτῶν.

From a consideration of the differences between states, and the causes of them, Aristotle in his accustomed manner, proceeding from the whole to the parts, passes on to consider the mode in which different powers are constituted in states, cc. 14-16. He will hereafter show how the wholes are affected by the parts.

A somewhat similar discussion occurs in bk. vi. c. 8. See note on vi. 1. § 1.

14. 2. ἔστι δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων (sc. μορίων) ἕν μὲν τι τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς (τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἃς δεῖ καὶ τίνων εἶναι κυρίας, καὶ ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι τῆν ἀίρεσιν αὐτῶν), τρίτον δὲ τι τὸ δικάζον.

Aristotle divides the state, much as we should do, into three parts, 1) the legislative, (which has in certain cases power over individuals; see infra § 3): 2) the administrative or executive: 3) the judicial. The words τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν seem to refer back to δεῖ θεωρεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην. But if so there is a verbal irregularity. For the duties and modes of appointment to offices are not a part of the state, but questions relating to a part of the state.

τι not interrogative, to be taken closely with ἕν and with τρίτον.

14. 4. Nothing more is known about Telecles. From the manner in which he is spoken of he appears to have been an author rather than a legislator. ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ Τηλεκλέους is said like ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ii. 1. § 3, iv. 4. § 11.

14. 4. ἕως ἂν διέλθῃ.

Some word implying the right of succession to office has to be supplied, e. g. ἡ ἀρχὴ from τὰς ἀρχάς. The same phrase occurs infra c. 15. § 17.

14. 4. συνιέναι δὲ μόνον

is governed by εἶς μὲν τρόπος above.

14. 6. ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος κ.τ.λ.

A reduplication of the preceding, although there may also be a shade of distinction in the greater stress which is laid upon voting and scrutinies. Here, as in other places (c. 4. §§ 22-24; c. 6. §§ 3, 4), we have a difficulty in discriminating Aristotle's differences. There is only an incomplete order in the catalogue of democracies. First of all comes the most moderate, in which the assembly plays a very subordinate part, then two more which are almost indistinguishable, lastly the most extreme.

14. 6. τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰς ἀρχάς διοικεῖν αἰρετάς οὐσας, ὅσας ἐνδέχεται· τοιαῦτα δ' εἰσὶν ὅσας ἀρχεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τούς ἐπισταμένους.

The words ὅσας ἐνδέχεται can only mean 'as many elective offices as can be allowed to exist in a democracy consistently with the democratic principle of electing the magistrates by lot.' The excepted magistracies will be those in which special skill or knowledge is required. Cp. vi. 2. § 5, τὸ κληρωτάς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς ἢ πάσας ἢ ὅσαι μὴ ἐμπειρίας δεόνται καὶ τέχνης. Susemihl has introduced κληρωτάς οὐκ before ἐνδέχεται = ὅσας οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κληρωτάς εἶναι· τοιαῦτα δ' εἰσὶν referring to αἰρετάς. But the change has no MS. authority, and though ingenious is unnecessary.

14. 8. fin. ὅταν δὲ μὴ πάντες τοῦ βουλευέσθαι μετέχωσιν ἀλλ' αἰρετοί, κατὰ νόμον δ' ἀρχωσιν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ὀλιγαρχικόν.

Opposed to the milder πολιτικῇ ὀλιγαρχία in the previous sentence, and repeated with greater emphasis in the words which follow ὀλιγαρχικὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῆν τάξιν ταύτην (§ 9). μὴ πάντες, i. e. 'not all [who possess the required qualification].' Yet

these latter words, which are necessary to the sense, are wanting in the text.

14. 8-10. Compare for several verbal resemblances, *supra* c. 5.

14. 10. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὗτοι αἰρετοὶ ἢ κληρωτοί.

For in an aristocracy or oligarchy, as in a democracy, a magistrate might be elected by lot, but only out of a select class.

14. 10. ἀριστοκρατία μὲν ἢ πολιτεία.

Aristocracy is elsewhere said to include numbers, wealth, and virtue; here the aristocratical element seems to reside in the magistrates who have superior merit, and control the whole administration of the state except war, peace, and the taking of scrutinies.

Compare c. 7. § 3; c. 8. §§ 3, 9, in which the near connexion between aristocracy and polity is pointed out.

14. 11. διτίρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, καὶ διοικεῖ ἕκαστη πολιτεία κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν.

κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν, i. e. each constitution will be variously administered according to some one of the principles on which the governing body is elected, e.g. out of some, or out of all; and as acting either according to law, or without law, etc.

διοικεῖ has been changed into διοίσει and διοικεῖται, for which latter there is perhaps the authority of Moerbeke, who reads *disponitur*. But no change is needed. For use of διοικεῖν, cp. v. 10. § 36.

14. 12. συμφέρει δὲ δημοκρατίῳ τῆι μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκοῦσθι δημοκρατίῳ νῶν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle remembering the short life of the extreme democracy which is above law, proposes various ways of strengthening or moderating it; he would have the notables take part in the assembly; and he would enforce their attendance by the imposition of penalties analogous to the fines which the oligarchy inflict on judges for neglect of their duties. (Cp. v. cc. 8, 9 on the preserving principles of state.)

Of the advantage of combining the few with the many there can be no question: but will the upper classes ever be induced to take an active part in a democracy? They have not done so in France or America; may we hope that they will in England?

14. 13. ἀποκληροῦν τοὺς πλείους.

I. e. he on whom the lot fell was not included, but excluded until the numbers were sufficiently reduced.

15. 3. αἰροῦνται δὲ καὶ πρεσβευταί.

'Even ambassadors, whom we might be more inclined to call magistrates, and who are elected by lot, are ἕτερον τι παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς.'

15. 3. οἶον στρατηγὸς στρατευομένων,

sc. ἐπιμελεῖται implied in ἐπιμελειῶν.

15. 4. ἀλλὰ τὰῦτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις οὐθὲν ὡς εἶπειν· οὐ γάρ πω κρίσις γέγονεν ἀμφισβητούντων περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος. ἔχει δὲ τιν' ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν.

'Verbal questions, such as the definition of an office, are of no practical importance, although some intellectual interest may attach to them.' ἄλλην is redundant.

15. 5. μᾶλλον ἄν τις ἀπορήσειε.

I. e. rather than dispute about the name.

15. 6. βέλτιον ἕκαστον ἔργον τυγχάνει τῆς ἐπιμελείας μονοπραματούσης ἢ πολυπραματούσης.

Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 370 B ff.

15. 9. καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὸ πρῶγμα δεῖ διαιρεῖν ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, λέγω δ' οἶον ἕνα τῆς εὐκοσμίας, ἢ παίδων ἄλλον καὶ γυναικῶν.

Two offices are mentioned in the latter part of the sentence: cp. infra § 13, παιδονόμος καὶ γυναικονόμος; and vi. 8. § 22, ἰδίῳ δὲ ταῖς σχολαστικωτέραις καὶ μᾶλλον ἐϋημερούσαις πόλεσιν . . . γυναικονομία . . . παιδονομία κ.τ.λ.

15. 10. ἕτεραι ἐν ἑτέραις, οἶον ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων.

'Differing,' i. e. in the character of those from whom the election is made. Though the word ἕτεραι is inaccurate, the meaning is the same as that of ἑτέρων, which Susemihl, on very slight authority, has introduced into the text.

15. 10. πότερον διαφέρει . . . ἢ τυγχάνουσι μὲν τινες οἷσαι καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔστι δ' ὅπου συμφέρουσιν αἱ αὐταί.

The alternative πότερον διαφέρει κ.τ.λ. is repeated and expanded. 'Are offices the same in different states, or not the same? Are they the same, but elected out of different classes in aristocracy, monarchy, oligarchy, democracy? Or do the offices differ naturally according to the actual differences in forms of government, the same offices being sometimes found to agree and sometimes to disagree with different forms of government, and having a lesser power in some states and a greater in others? For example, has the president of the assembly, in whatever way appointed, the same functions at Sparta and at Athens? Are not probuli suited to an oligarchy, a censor of boys and women to an aristocracy, a council to a democracy? And will they be equally suited to other forms, or may not their powers require to be extended or narrowed?'

According to this explanation the natural order of the words is somewhat inverted, for τ

ἔκ τινων ἀρχῶν is taken with τινές: and with κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς διαφορὰς has to be supplied τῶν πολιτειῶν from κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας supra. We may also supply πολιτεῖαι with τινές, and translate 'may not some states essentially derive their character from offices.' But the abrupt transition to a new subject (ἀρχαί) in the next clause shows this way of taking the passage to be inadmissible.

Bekker (2nd Edit.) after Victorius reads διαφοραί for τὰς διαφορὰς.

15. 11. οἷον ἢ τῶν προβούλων· αὕτη γὰρ οὐ δημοκρατική.

πρόβουλοι, as he says vi. 8. § 17, are oligarchical officers, because they alone have the initiative, and, therefore, the people cannot of themselves make any change in the constitution; supra c. 14. § 14.

15. 14-18. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ διαφοραὶ κ.τ.λ.

The meaning of the text may be illustrated by the following scheme:—

i. τίνες οἱ καθιστάντες τὰς ἀρχάς.	ii. ἔκ τινων.	iii. τίνα τρόπον.
a) ἢ πάντες.	a) ἢ ἔκ πάντων.	a) ἢ ἀ ἰρέσει.
b) ἢ τινές.	b) ἢ ἔκ τινων ὠφωρισμένων.	b) ἢ κλήρ φ.
c) ἢ τὰς μὲν πάντες, τὰς δὲ τινές.	c) ἢ τὰς μὲν ἔκ πάντων, τὰς δ' ἔκ τινων.	c) ἢ τὰς μὲν ἀ ἰρέσει, τὰς δὲ κλήρ φ.
αἱ τρεῖς διαφοραί.	αἱ τρεῖς διαφοραί.	αἱ τρεῖς διαφοραί.
οἱ τέσσαρες τρόποι	οἱ τέσσαρες τρόποι	οἱ τέσσαρες τρόποι
1. πάντες ἔκ πάντων ἀ ἰρέσει.	A. τινες ἔκ πάντων ἀ ἰρέσει.	α. τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς πάντες, τὰς δὲ τινες ἔκ πάντων ἀ ἰρέσει.
2. πάντες ἔκ πάντων κλήρ φ.	B. τινες ἔκ πάντων κλήρ φ.	β. τὰς μὲν πάντες, τὰς δὲ τινες ἔκ πάντων κλήρ φ.
3. πάντες ἔκ τινων ἀ ἰρέσει.	C. τινες ἔκ τινων ὠφωρισμένων ἀ ἰρέσει.	γ. τὰς μὲν πάντες, τὰς δὲ τινες ἔκ τινων ὠφωρισμένων ἀ ἰρέσει.

4. πάντες ἐκ D. τιν ἐς δ. τ ἄς μ ἐν πάντες,
 τιν ὅν ἐκ τιν ὅν τ ἄς δ ἐ τιν ἐς
 κλήρ φ. κλήρ φ. ἐκ τιν ὅν κλήρ φ.
 τ ἄ μ ἐν κλήρ φ. τ ἄ δ ἐ α ἱρέσει.
 τ ἄ μ ἐν ἐκ πάντων. τ ἄ δ ἐ ἐκ τιν ὅν.

All, or some, or all and some, elect out of all, or some, or out of all and some, by vote or by lot; or by vote and by lot.

The three modes give rise to twelve possible varieties:

All elect	by vote out of all, by lot out of all, by vote out of some, by lot out of some;
Some elect	by vote out of all, by lot out of all, by vote out of some, by lot out of some;
All and some elect	by vote out of all, by lot out of all, by vote out of some, by lot out of some;

and to the two further combinations (οἱ δύο συνδυασμοί): partly by vote and partly by lot, partly out of all and partly out of some.

It is not to be supposed that, even in such a 'bazaar of constitutions' (Plat. Rep. viii. 557 D) as Hellas furnished, all these different forms of government were really to be found. Aristotle derives them not from his experience of history, but out of the abundance of his logic.

15. 15. ὥσπερ ἐν Μεγάροις.

Cp. v. 3. § 5 and 5. § 4, where the overthrow of the Megarian democracy is attributed to the corruption and oppression practised by demagogues; also Thuc. iv. 74 (though it is not certain whether Aristotle is speaking of the return of the exiles there mentioned or of some earlier or later one); and Arist. Poet. c. 3. § 5, 1448 a. 32, where he refers to an ancient democracy existing in Megara, of which the recent establishment is deplored by Theognis, line 53 ff., Bergk. There was an alliance between Athens and Megara in 458 (Thuc. i. 103, 114), which terminated at the battle of Coronea 447; probably during the alliance, but not afterwards, Megara was governed by a democracy. In the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War the oligarchs were in exile, but were

restored by the influence of Brasidas. In the year B.C. 375 the democracy had been re-established: Diod. xv. 40.

15. 19. τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν δύο κ.τ.λ.

The vote is considered less democratical than the lot: both are admissible in a democracy, but it is essential to its very nature that all should elect. If any limitation takes place the government becomes an aristocracy or a polity, which alike tend to oligarchy in so far as they reduce the number of electors or of persons who are eligible, though differing in other respects. When some only appoint, in whatever manner, out of all, or all out of some, and the elections do not take place all at once (ἄμα, i.e. when the governing body retire by rotation), we have a constitutional government, which inclines to an aristocracy when the two opposite principles of 'some out of some' and 'some out of all' are combined. The high oligarchical doctrine is 'some out of some, by vote or by lot or by both,' the lot being employed in an oligarchy, as in a democracy, to exclude favour or merit. Cp. v. 3. § 9.

15. 19. γίνεσθαι.

If genuine, is used in a pregnant sense = καθίστασθαι, the construction being changed from the active, which is resumed in the clause which follows, to the neuter or passive. Though the word appears to disturb the sentence, it is found in all the MSS.

15. 20. ὀλιγαρχικώτερον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἁμφοῖν.

ἐξ ἁμφοῖν seems naturally to mean τὰς μὲν ἕκ πάντων, τὰς δὲ ἕκ τινῶν, cp. § 19 fin. But if so the same words which here describe the oligarchical government, are applied in the next sentence to the polity or constitutional government which inclines to aristocracy. Nor can any reason be given why the election 'out of all and out of some' should be 'more oligarchical' than the election out of some. Another way of taking the words is to explain ἐξ ἁμφοῖν as a double election. But in this passage ἐξ is always used to introduce the persons out of whom the election is made; and therefore ἐξ ἁμφοῖν could not = ἁμφοῖν. Some corruption of the text is probable; the numerous repetitions are likely to have confused the eye of the copyist. τὸ ἕκ τινῶν ἁμφοῖν is the ingenious and probably true emendation of Mr. Evelyn Abbott. If the principle of 'some out of some' is maintained, the election in both ways, i. e. by vote out of persons elected by lot, or by lot out of persons elected by vote, would clearly be more oligarchical than the simple election by vote or by lot.

15. 21. μᾶλλον γινόμενον δ' ὁμοίως,

sc. ὀλιγαρχικόν. These words which are translated in the text 'though not equally oligarchical if taken by lot' would be better rendered 'and equally oligarchical if not appointed by lot' (Stahr): that is to say, whether appointed by vote or by lot they would equally retain their oligarchical character, if some were chosen out of some. μᾶλλον must be taken with γινόμενον.

15. 21. τινὰς ἕκ τινῶν ἁμφοῖν.

'In both ways,' sc. κλήρω καὶ αἰρέσει.

15. 22. τίνα δὲ τίσι συμφέροι καὶ πῶς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὰς καταστάσεις ἅμα ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῶν ἄρχῶν τίνες εἰσίν, ἔσται φανερόν.

Neither the reading nor the meaning of this passage is quite certain. Some MSS. and the old translation omit* καὶ before τίνες, thus referring τίνες εἰσίν to δυνάμεσι. If with Bekker and several MSS. we retain καὶ before τίνες εἰσίν, the words may receive different interpretations. Either 1), 'how to establish them and what their powers and their nature are will be manifest,' i. e. need no explanation; or 2), 'we shall know how to establish them and their nature when we know their powers.'

16. 3. τὸ ἐν Φρεαττοῖ δικαστήριον.

Nothing certain is known about this court; it is here spoken of only as a matter of tradition. The cases of which it took cognizance were rare, and therefore it is not strange that the court which tried them should have become obsolete. According to Pausanias (i. 28. § 12) Phreattys was a spot in the Piraeus near the sea, whither banished persons, against whom some fresh accusation was brought after their banishment, went to defend themselves out of a ship before judges who were on the land. This explanation is repeated by several of the scholiasts; but Aristotle, with much greater probability, supposes the banished man to offer himself for trial of the original offence. So in Plat. Laws ix. 866 D, a law is proposed, probably founded on some ancient custom, that the banished homicide, if wrecked upon his native shore, should sit with his feet in the sea, until he found an opportunity of sailing.

16. 5. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀφείσθω καὶ τῶν Φονικῶν καὶ τῶν ζενικῶν, περὶ δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν λέγωμεν, περὶ ὧν μᾶλλον γινομένων καλῶς διαστάσεις γίνονται καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν αἱ κινήσεις.

This sentence appears to be out of place; for no special mention occurs of political causes in what follows; but the writer at once returns to his former subject, and treats the appointment of judges on the same principles which he has applied to the appointment of other magistrates. It is possible that they connect with the beginning of Book v, and that the rest of the chapter is only a repetition in an altered form of c. 15. §§ 17-22.

16. 5, 6. οἱ τρόποι τέτταρες.

The scheme on which judges are appointed, though abridged, is the same as that on which magistrates are appointed; and the various modes correspond in like manner to different forms of government.

The judicial institutions of a country reflect the political, but with a difference. The legislature is active, the courts of law are passive; they do not move until they are set in motion, they deal with particular cases which are brought before them by others; and through these only do they rise to general principles. They do not make laws, but interpret them; nor can they set aside a law unless by appealing to a higher law. They are the conservative element of the state, rooted in habit and precedent and tradition.

But there is also a certain analogy between the political and judicial institutions of a

country. In a free state the law must be supreme, and the courts of law must exercise an independent authority; they must be open and public, and they must include a popular element. They represent the better mind of the nation, speaking through certain fixed forms; and they exercise indirectly a considerable influence upon legislation. They have their place also in the education of the people: for they, above all other instructors, teach the lesson of justice and impartiality and truth. As good actions produce good habits in the individual, so the laws of a state grow and strengthen and attain consistency by the decisions of courts.

That Aristotle was not ignorant of the connexion between the judicial and political institutions of a people is shown by his remark that 'Solon established the democracy when he constituted the dicasteries out of the whole people' (ii. 12. § 2).

BOOK V.

1. 1. The first sentence implies that we are approaching the end of the treatise; but see Essay on the Structure of the Aristotelian Writings.

1. 1. ἔτι δὲ σωτηρίαί τινες καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστης εἰσὶν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τίνων ὅν μάλιστα σώζοιτο τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστη.

The latter of these two clauses is bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition as being a mere repetition of the preceding. If spurious it is probably a duplicate incorporated from some other ancient form of the text, not a gloss. But Aristotle often draws oversubtle logical distinctions, and in striving after completeness he may easily have written σωτηρίαί τινες and διὰ τίνων ὅν σώζοιτο, with little or no difference of meaning between them.

1. 2. δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τῆν ἀρχήν.

The last words may be either 1) taken adverbially; or 2)* may be the accusative after ὑπολαβεῖν, 1) 'We must in the first place begin by conceiving' or 2)* 'we must in the first place conceive our starting point to be.'

1. 2. τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον.

In Bekker's 2nd edition καὶ is altered to εἶναι without MSS. authority. The sense thus obtained would coincide with the conception of justice in the Nic. Eth. v. 3. § 8.

But the same thought is less accurately expressed by the text. The καὶ here, as elsewhere in Aristotle, may be taken in the sense of *id est*. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 2, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῆ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι: Metaph. iv. 14, 1020 b. 3, τὰ ἄκίνητα καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά where τὰ ἄκίνητα = τὰ μαθηματικά. And it may be further argued that the more general form of words is better suited to this passage. For Aristotle is here expressing not his own opinion but the consensus of mankind. And although the democrat in some sense acknowledges proportional equality, he would hardly go so far as to say that justice is identical with it. The reading of the MSS. is therefore preferable.

In Book iii. cc. 9 and 12 it has been assumed that justice and proportionate equality, not mere class interests, are the principles on which the state is based and which give a right to citizenship. Aristotle proceeds to show how the neglect or misconception of these principles leads to the overthrow of states.

1. 4. οἱ δ' ὡς ἄνισοι ὄντες πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσι· τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνισον.

The last words are an explanation of πλεονεκτεῖν. Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 2. § 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἄπαν ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλεόν.

1. 5. ἡμαρτημένα δ' ἀπλῶς εἰσί.

Spengel reads ἡμαρτηκυῖαι δὲ τοῦ ἀπλῶς, though there is no trace of variation in the MSS. Nearly the same meaning may be elicited from the text as it stands: 'They are perversions, when regarded simply,' i. e. 'by an absolute standard of justice'; that is to say, their justice is relative to aristocracy, oligarchy or democracy, and hence becomes a cause of revolution.

1. 8. Διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται διχῶς.

The commentators are puzzled to find a connexion for these words, which the various reading δικαίως shows to have been an ancient difficulty. Either 1)* the particle διὸ is attributable to the superabundance of logical expression and therefore is not to be strictly construed; or to the condensation of two clauses into one, the word διχῶς referring to what follows: 'Hence arise changes; and in two ways.' Or 2) we must gather, however obscurely indicated, out of what has preceded some distinction corresponding to that between changes of forms of government and changes of persons and parties under the same form of government. Love of equality may perhaps be thought to lead to a change of the constitution; impatience of inequality to a change of persons and offices. But this connexion of ideas, if intended, is not clearly stated. It would be rash, after the manner of some editors (Conring, Susemihl, etc.), in a book like Aristotle's Politics to infer a 'lacuna' between the words στάσεων εἰσιν and ὅθεν στασιάζουσιν from the want of connexion.

1. 10. ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ φασὶ Λύσανδρον τινεὶ ἐπιχειρήσαι καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν.

Cp. Plut. Lys. 24-26 for an account (partly taken from Ephorus and wearing rather an improbable appearance) of the manner in which Lysander by the aid of oracles and religious imposture conspired to overturn the monarchy of Sparta and to throw open the office of king to the whole family of the Heraclidae, of which he was himself a member; or, according to another statement, to all the Spartans.

1. 10. Πausanίαν τὸν βασιλέα.

He was not king, though of the royal family; cp. Thuc. i. 132, ἄνδρα γένους τε τοῦ βασιλείου ὄντα καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τιμῆν ἔχοντα (Πλείσταρχον γὰρ τὸν Λεωνίδου ὄντα βασιλέα καὶ νέον ἔτι ἀνεψιὸς ὧν ἐπετρόπευεν). The same mistake is repeated in vii. 14. § 20.

1. 10, 11. καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδαμνῷ δὲ μετέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ μόριον· ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν φυλάρχων βουλὴν ἐποίησαν. εἰς δὲ τὴν Ἡλιαίαν ἐπάναγκες ἔστιν ἔτι τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι βαδίζειν τ

ὁ ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐπισηφίζηται ἀρχή τις, ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀρχῶν ὁ εἷς ἦν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ.

The revolution at Epidamnus was only partial. The change of φύλαρχοι into a βουλή made the state less oligarchical. Cp. vi. 8. § 17, καλεῖται δὲ [τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας] ἔνθα μὲν πρόβουλοι . . . ὅπου δὲ πλῆθος ἐστὶ βουλή μᾶλλον. But according to an ancient custom in the governing body the magistrates (τὰς ἀρχάς = τοὺς ἄρχοντας) were required to go to the Heliaea at every election — this relic of oligarchy survived in the democracy. A like oligarchical spirit was indicated in the appointment of ‘the single magistrate’ (cp. iii. 16. § 1).

It is also possible to take the words in another way, connecting τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτεύματι with εἷς τῆν Ἡλιαίαν instead of with τὰς ἀρχάς. ‘It was compulsory that the magistrates should attend the assembly of the ruling classes, when a certain magistracy took a vote requiring it.’ Which of the two modes of translating the passage is correct, we can only guess, as we have no independent knowledge of the procedure mentioned. The latter is the mode of taking them adopted by Müller (Dorians, iii. 9. § 6); but the use of Ἡλιαία simply in the sense of an assembly, and not as a proper name, and therefore its construction with τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτεύματι is doubtful.

τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτεύματι. Either 1)* the ruling class; or better 2) the governing body. The two meanings cannot always be clearly distinguished. Cp. c. 6. § 11; iv. 6. § 9 and v. 4. § 2. Compare also iii. 7. § 2, ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ πολιτεύμα σημαίνει ταῦτόν, πολιτεύμα δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, and infra v. 8. § 5, τοῖς ἕξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ πολιτεύματι, which show that the two meanings of πολιτεύμα, as of πολιτεία, like the two senses of the English word ‘government’ or ‘state,’ pass into one another. The genitive is partitive.

ὁ ἀρχῶν ὁ εἷς ἦν. ἦν is omitted in several MSS. and is not confirmed by iii. 16. § 1, (. . . πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἕνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχή τις ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον) where Aristotle speaks of the single Archon at Epidamnus, not in the past, but in the present tense. Yet it is not impossible that he may have spoken of an office which had recently existed at Epidamnus, first, in the present, and afterwards, more correctly, in the past tense.

1. 11. πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἄνισον ἢ στάσις· οὐ μῆν τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον· αἰδιος γὰρ βασιλεία ἄνισος, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐν ἴσοις· ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἴσον ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν.

οὐ μῆν . . . ἴσοις is a parenthetical explanation of the word ἄνισον. 1) ‘Certainly to unequals there is no proportion.’ According to this way of taking the passage ἀνάλογον is the nom. to ὑπάρχει. 2) Others supply τὸ ἄνισον from the preceding sentence (sc. ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον). ‘*I mean the inequality in which there is no proportion.’ This is illustrated by an example. 3) Others again connect ἀνάλογον with τοῖς ἀνίσοις. ‘Not that real inequality exists among those who are only proportionately unequal.’ According to any explanation the connexion is harsh: and therefore there is some reason for suspecting that a marginal note has crept into the text.

1. 13. The punctuation of Bekker, who places a comma after τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν, in his 2nd Edition (see note on Text) accords with his correction of the text in § 2, ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον ε&illegible;ναι τὸ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν ἴσον instead of καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν.

1. 14. εὐγένεια γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ ἐν ὀλίγοις, ταῦτα δ’ ἐν πλείοσι.

The antecedent of ταῦτα is wealth and poverty, latent in δῆμος and ὀλιγαρχία. The conj. τᾶναντία, adopted by Bekker following Lambinus in his 2nd Edition, is unnecessary.

1. 14. ἄποροι δὲ πολλοὶ πολλαχοῦ.

'But there are in many places a large class of poor.' Some MSS. read εὐποροί, some omit πολλοί, and it has been contended by Stahr that ἄποροι δὲ καὶ εὐποροί πολλαχοῦ is the true reading. But the text, which is the reading of several Greek MSS. and is confirmed by Moerbeke, is better.

1. 14. τὸ δὲ ἀπλῶς πάντῃ καθ' ἑκατέραν τετάχθαι τῆν ἰσότητα Φαῦλον.

'Either equality of number or equality of proportion, if the only principle of a state, is vicious': cp. infra c. 9. § 13; iv. 13. § 6; vi. 5. § 2.

1. 15. ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡμαρτημένου.

ἡμαρτημένου is to be taken with τοῦ πρώτου as well as with τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ.

1. 16. ἡ πρὸς τῆν ὀλιγαρχίαν.

ὀλιγαρχία is here used for the oligarchical party, τοὺς ὀλίγους, parallel to δῆμος in the previous clause, although in the preceding sentence the same word means a form of government—an example of Aristotle's transitional and uncertain use of language.

1. 16. αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτόν, ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται τῷ δήμῳ στάσις.

This reflection is probably true of Greek democracies, but can hardly be justified by modern experience either of the Italian Republics, which swarmed with factions and conspiracies, or of France in the first French revolution, or of England under the Commonwealth, or of Switzerland in the war of the Sonderbund, or of N. America in the war of North and South, or of the S. American Republics. Differences of character, climate, religion, race, affect democracies as well as other forms of government.

1. 16. ἔτι δὲ ἡ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ δήμου ἢ ἡ τῶν ὀλίγων, ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἄσφαλεστάτη τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν.

Aristotle is giving a further reason why democracy is safer than oligarchy, because it more nearly approximates to the μέση πολιτεία, which is the safest of all *such* forms of government, [i. e. of all except the perfect one]. Cp. iv. 11. § 14.

ἥπερ refers to ἡ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία. τοιούτων = the imperfect forms.

An obscurity arises from the inversion of the subject. The sentence = δῆμος ἐγγυτέρω τῆς τῶν μέσων πολιτείας ἢ τῆς τῶν ὀλίγων ἔστι τῆς τῶν μέσων πολιτείας. The meaning would be improved if, as in some MSS., ἡ before τῶν ὀλίγων was omitted.

2. 1. The πῶς ἔχοντες, τίνων ἕνεκεν, τίνες ἀρχαὶ τῶν στάσεων are the material, final and efficient causes of revolutions.

2. 2. περὶ τῆς ἤδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες.

Sc. in what he has said about ἴσον and ἕνισον in the previous chapter.

2. 4. αἱ δ' αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων, ὅθεν αὐτοὶ τε διατίθενται τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων, ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἑπτὰ τυγχάνουσιν οἷσαι, ἔστι δ' ὡς πλείους.

The seven causes are κέρδος, τιμή, ὕβρις, φόβος, ὑπεροχή, καταφρόνησις, αὔξησις παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. Or, according to another way of reckoning (ἄλλον τρόπον), other elements, partly the same, and partly different, are added, viz. ἐριθεία, ὀλιγωρία, μικρότης, ἀνομοιότης.

As often happens both in the Politics (cp. bk. iv. c. 1) and in the Ethics (cp. vii. cc. 1-10) of Aristotle, the order in which the cases are at first enumerated is not the order in which they are afterwards discussed; the latter is as follows: ὕβρις, κέρδος, τιμή, ὑπεροχή, φόβος, καταφρόνησις: the rest retain their original place.

περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων. To be taken closely with τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, 'in the manner which I have described, and about the things which I have described,' sc. κέρδος and τιμή to which τοῖς εἰρημένοις (§ 5) also refers.

2. 5. ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως,

sc. ὡσαύτως ταῦτά. They are the same and not the same. 'The love of gain seeks gain for itself, the love of honour is jealous of honour bestowed upon others.'

2. 6. διὰ μικρότητα,

sc. τῆς κινήσεως. Cp. below, c. 3. § 10, ἔτι διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρόν· λέγω δὲ παρὰ μικρόν, ὅτι πολλάκις λανθάνει μεγάλη γινομένη μετάβασις τῶν νομίμων, ὅταν παρορῶσι τὸ μικρόν κ.τ.λ. for the explanation of the term.

3. 4. συνέστησαν οἱ γνώριμοι ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας.

This and the revolution in Rhodes mentioned below (§ 5) appear to be the same with that of which a more minute but somewhat obscure account is given in c. 5. § 2—mentioned here as illustrating fear and contempt; in c. 5, as showing that revolutions arise from the evil behaviour of demagogues in democracies; two accounts of the same event taken from different points of view, but not inconsistent with each other. Rhodes was transferred from the alliance of Athens to Sparta in 412, and remained the ally of Sparta until after the battle of Cnidus in the year 394 B.C. when the people, assisted by the Athenians, drove out the notables who were afterwards restored by the help of Teleutias the Lacedaemonian B.C. 390. Diod. Sic. xiv. 97; Xen. Hell. iv. 8. Whether this latter revolution can be identified with the ἐπανάστασις mentioned by Aristotle is uncertain.

διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας. Cp. infra c. 5. § 2, where the suits against the rich at Rhodes appear to have been brought by private individuals; also Thuc. iii. 70.

3. 5. οἶον καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετἱλλεγίβλε; τῆν ἐν Οἶνοφύτοις μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἢ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη.

Yet the destruction of the democracy seems hardly consistent with the preponderance which the Athenians retained in Boeotia during the nine years following the battle of Oenophyta (456), at the end of which time, and not until after they had won the battle of Coronea (447), all the Boeotians regained their independence. (Thuc. i. 112.) Compare as bearing on Aristotle's knowledge of Theban history, *infra* c. 6. § 15, and note.

3. 5. ἡ Μεγαρέων [δημοκρατία διεφθάρη] δι' ἄταξιν καὶ ἀναρχίαν ἡττηθέντων.

Probably the same event mentioned *infra* c. 5. § 4, but apparently not the same with the revolution in Megara, mentioned in Thuc. iv. 74, which occurred after, and in consequence of, the retirement of the Athenians (B.C. 424); possibly the same with the occasion mentioned in iv. 15. § 15, when the government was narrowed to the returned exiles and their supporters. See on iv. 15. § 15.

3. 5. ἐν Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος,

sc. ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη. According to the narrative of Herod. vii. 155, the γαμόροι were driven out by the Syracusan populace, and returned under the protection of Gelon, to whose superior force the Syracusans opened their gates. The destruction of the democracy may therefore be said to have been caused by the violent conduct of the people towards the landowners. But if so, the contradiction which Mr. Grote finds between the statements of Herodotus and Aristotle admits of a reconciliation. See note on c. 43, vol. v. 286, original edit. He thinks that for Gelo we should substitute Dionysius, and observes that the frequent confusion of the two names was noted by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Antiq. Rom.* vii. c. 1. p. 1314.

3. 7. ἐν Τάραντι ἡττηθέντων.

Called by Herodotus (vii. 170) 'the greatest slaughter of Greeks within his knowledge.' Diodorus, 'the Sicilian,' (xi. 52. § 5), apparently in ignorance of the geography of Italy, says that the Iapygian victors pursued the Rhegians into the town of Rhegium (a distance of about 200 miles), and entered with them!

3. 7. δημοκρατία ἐγένετο ἐκ πολιτείας.

Cp. vi. 5. §§ 10, 11, where the Tarentines are described in the present tense as being under a sort of πολιτεία or moderate democracy, to which they probably reverted at some time later than that referred to in the text. In the Syracusan expedition they were hostile to the Athenians (Thuc. vi. 44), and are therefore not likely at that time to have been a democracy.

3. 7. καὶ ἐν Ἄργει τῶν ἐν τῇ ἑβδόμῃ ἀπολομένων ὑπὸ Κλεομένους τοῦ Λάκωνος ἡττηθέντων παραδέξασθαι τῶν περιοίκων τινάς.

The meaning of the name Hebdomê was unknown to the Greeks themselves. The victory of Cleomenes over the Argives is mentioned in Herodotus (vi. 76-83), Pausanias (iii. 4), and in Plutarch (*De Mulierum Virtutibus*, iv. 245 D). In the narrative of the latter various plays on the number seven occur, which probably originated in the word

ἑβδόμη. The number of the dead slain by Cleomenes is said to have been 7777: the battle is said to have been fought on the seventh day of the month (ἑβδόμη ἰσταμένου μηνός, Ib.); or during a truce of seven days which Cleomenes violated by attacking the Argives during the night, he arguing that the seven days did not include the nights, or, perhaps with better reason, that vengeance on an enemy was deemed preferable to justice both by Gods and men (Arophth. Lacon. 223 B). The word may have been the name of the wood mentioned in the accounts of Herodotus and Pausanias (loc. cit.) or of some other place* called after the number seven; but more likely of a festival held on the seventh day, which gave its name to the battle.

ἄπολομένων ὑπὸ Κλεομένου κ.τ.λ. Read in the English text: 'the Argives, after their army had been cut to pieces.'

3. 7. καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἀτυχούντων πεζῶν οἱ γνώριμοι ἐλάττους ἐγένοντο διὰ τὸ ἐκ καταλόγου στρατεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τὸν Λακωνικὸν πόλεμον.

The κατάλογος ὀπλιῶν mentioned in Thuc. vi. 43, καὶ τούτων Ἀθηναίων μὲν αὐτῶν ἦσαν πεντακόσιοι μὲν καὶ χίλιοι ἐκ καταλόγου, and elsewhere, Xen. Mem. iii. 4. § 1, in which the Θῆτες, or lowest of the four classes, were not included.

ἐκ καταλόγου. Every one was obliged to take his turn in the order of the roll, and no substitutes were allowed, because the number of soldiers willing to offer themselves was not sufficient.

ὑπὸ τὸν Λακωνικὸν πόλεμον. As in the Syracusan expedition, to which the word ἀτυχούντων chiefly refers. Cp. Thuc. vii. 27.

3. 8. πλειόνων γὰρ τῶν ἀπόρων γινομένων.

Most of the extant MSS. are in favour of εὐπόρων. But ἀπόρων, which is the reading of the old translator, is not wholly indefensible. The meaning may be that power falls into the hands of the few, either when the poor become more numerous, or when properties increase; the extremes of want and of wealth coexisting in the same state. The two cases are really opposite aspects of the same phenomenon, 'when the citizens become more and more divided into rich and poor.' The argument from the more difficult reading is in favour of ἀπόρων.

3. 9. ἐν Ἡρεῖ.

A later name of Hestiaea in Euboea, or rather (Strabo x. p. 446) of an Athenian city established in the time of Pericles, on the same site, to maintain control over Euboea. After the fall of Athens it passed into the hands of Sparta and received an oligarchical constitution, reverting to Athens in the year 377. Probably at this time κατελύθη ἡ ὀλιγαρχία. For another reference to Hestiaea, which never entirely lost its old name (Pausan. vii. p. 592), see c. 4. § 4.

3. 10. τέλος δ' οὐθενὸς ἤρχον.

οὐθενὸς is taken in the text as the genitive of value. If this way of explaining the word is rejected as unidiomatic, or rather, not likely to be employed when according to the more familiar idiom οὐθενὸς would be governed by ἤρχον, we may adopt the

emendation of Bekker's 2nd Edition, ἀπ' οὐθενός.

3. 11. οἶον Τροϊζηνίους Ἀχαιοὶ συνέκκησαν Σύβαριν, εἶτα πλείους οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ γενόμενοι ἐξέβαλον τοὺς Τροϊζηνίους· ὅθεν τὸ ἄγος συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις.
- The foundation of Sybaris (B. C. 720) is recorded in Strabo vi. p. 263, but nothing is said of the joint occupation of the place by the Troezenians: nor of the curse. The fall of Sybaris is attributed to a very different cause in a gossiping story told by Athenaeus xii. p. 520, of a Sybarite having beaten his slave at the altar to which he fled for refuge. A rather fabulous account of the war between Sybaris and Croton, in which Milo the athlete figures as a sort of Heracles, is given by Diod. Sic. xii. 9.
3. 12. καὶ ἐν Θουρίοις Συβαρίται τοῖς συνοικήσασιν.
- Sc. ἔστασίασαν or some similar word gathered from the preceding sentence. For a more detailed though not very trustworthy narrative of the event referred to, see Diod. Sic. xi. 90; xii. 10, 11. Thurii being founded on the site of Sybaris, the Sybarites who joined in the colony naturally looked upon the country as their own.
3. 12. Ζαγκλαῖοι δὲ Σαμίους ὑποδεξάμενοι ἐξέπεσον καὶ αὐτοί.
- This, which is one of the blackest stories in Greek history, is narrated at length by Herodotus vi. 23. The Zancleans had invited Hippocrates tyrant of Gela to assist them against Anaxilaus tyrant of Rhegium, but were betrayed by him and delivered over to the Samians.
3. 13. Συρακούσιοι μετὰ τὸ τυραννικὸν τοὺς ξένους καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους πολίτας ποιησάμενοι ἔστασίασαν καὶ εἰς μάχην ἦλθον.
- Another instance of the danger of incorporating foreigners in a state. The foreigners in this case were the mercenaries of Hiero and Gelo. After the expulsion of Thrasybulus they were allowed to remain in the city, but deprived of political privileges. The narrative of their revolt, of their seizure of Acradina and Ortygia, and of the troubles which followed the attempt to drive them out in the ill-fated island of Sicily, is to be found in Diod. xi. 72 ff.
3. 13. καὶ Ἀμφιπολίται δεξάμενοι Χαλκιδῶν ἀποίκους ἐξέπεσον ὑπὸ τούτων οἱ πλείστοι αὐτῶν.
- αὐτῶν is to be taken with οἱ πλείστοι, which is in partitive apposition with Ἀμφιπολίται. The event referred to cannot be shown to have any connexion with the revolt of Amphipolis during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. iv. 105). Nor do we know of any other event which corresponds with the account given either here or in c. 6. § 8 where the revolution is spoken of 'as an insurrection against an oligarchy, made by the aid of Chalcidians' who had settled in the place. But an oligarchy could not have existed under the control of Athens; nor would a democracy be likely to have joined the Peloponnesian confederacy.
3. 14. στασιάζουσι δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις κ.τ.λ.

'There are other differences besides those of race which divide cities. There may be two cities in one (c. 12. § 15), both in oligarchies and democracies.' This general reflection is introduced awkwardly amid the special causes of revolutions in states. But a similar confusion of general and particular occurs in several other passages; e. g. iv. 4. § 22 ff.

3. 14. καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον.

Probably c. 1. §§ 3, 4.

3. 15. Κολοφώνιοι καὶ Νοτιεῖς.

That the Colophonians and Notians were torn by dissensions may be gathered from Thucydides iii. 34.

3. 15. μᾶλλον δημοτικοὶ οἱ τὸν Πειραιῶν οἰκοῦντες τῶν τὸ ἄστυ.

The great power of the democracy at Athens dated from the battle of Salamis; and as the sailors were the lowest class of citizens, naturally the Piraeus was its head-quarters. Liberty was saved by the fleet in the days of the Four Hundred; and when driven out of Athens by the thirty took refuge at the Piraeus, from which it returned victorious.

4. 1. γίνονται μὲν οἷον αἱ στάσεις οὐ περὶ μικρῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ μικρῶν.

Do not wars or revolutions always or almost always arise from a combination of large public and political causes with small personal and private reasons? Some spark sets fire to materials previously prepared. If Herodotus overestimates the personal and private causes of great events, does not Thucydides underestimate them, explaining everything on great principles and ignoring the trifles of politics to which Aristotle here directs attention? The course of ancient or of modern history taken as a whole appears to be the onward movement of some majestic though unseen power; when regarded in detail, it seems to depend on a series of accidents. The Greek was a lover of anecdotes; and for him this gossip about trifles had a far greater interest than the reflections of Thucydides upon the course of human events. (See Introduction, vol. i. p. xcii.)

4. 1. μετέβαλε γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ.

The same story is told with additions and embellishments by Plutarch 'Praecepta gerendae reipublicae' p. 825 C.

4. 2. ὅθεν προσλαμβάνοντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι διεσασίαν πάντας.

Here as infra c. 6. § 8 the word διεσασίαν may be causal and active, 'they took the members of the government to their respective sides and so split all the people into factions.' (Cp. κατασασιάζεσθαι v. 6. § 14). Or as in the English text (taking διασασιάζω, like σασιάζω, as a neuter) 'they then drew all the members of the ruling class into their quarrel and made a revolution.'

4. 3. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ μικρὸν ἁμάρτημα ἀνάλογόν ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν.

The argument is that the beginning is half the whole, according to the old proverb, and therefore that an error at the beginning is equivalent to half the whole amount of error. The proverb is again cited, Nic. Ethics i. 7. § 20.

4. 5. καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐκ κηδεῖας γενομένης διαφορᾶς ἀρχὴ πασῶν ἐγένετο τῶν στάσεων τῶν ὕστερον.

This narrative, like the story of the Syracusan affair, is told, but in a more romantic manner, in the passage of Plutarch quoted above (Praec. geren. reip. p. 825 B) and also by Aelian, Var. Hist. xi. 5. The narrative of Plutarch contains the names of the persons concerned, Crates and Orgilaus, and is therefore probably taken not from Aristotle but from some other source. τῶν στάσεων κ.τ.λ., the sacred war to which another origin is assigned infra in § 7. See Essay on Contributions of Aristotle to History.

4. 6. καὶ περὶ Μιτυλήνην δὲ ἐξ ἐπικλήρων στάσεως γενομένης πολλῶν ἐγένετο ἀρχὴ κακῶν καὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐν ᾧ Πάχης ἔλαβε τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν. Τιμοφάνους γὰρ τῶν εὐπόρων τινὸς καταλιπόντος δύο θυγατέρας, ὁ περιωσθεὶς καὶ οὐ λαβῶν τοῖς υἱέσιν αὐτοῦ Δόξανδρος ἦρξε τῆς στάσεως καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους παρῶξενε, πρόξενος ὢν τῆς πόλεως.

No mention of Doxander occurs nor is there any hint of this story in Thucydides (iii. 2 ff.). The revolt of Mitylene is ascribed in his narrative entirely to political causes, and was long premeditated. The only point of coincidence between the two accounts is the mention of the proxenus, who is said in Thucydides to have given information to the Athenians. They are not, however, necessarily inconsistent: for Aristotle may be speaking of the slight occasion, Thucydides of the deeper cause. Nor can any argument be drawn from the silence of the latter. He may have known the tale, but may not have thought fit to mention it, any more than he has recorded the singular episode of the suicide of Paches in the public court on his return home, recorded by Plutarch iv. 8 (Nicias 6). There is also an omission in the account of Aristotle which is supplied by Thucydides. For the proxenos who gave information to the Athenians is afterwards said to have repented, and to have gone on an embassy to Athens petitioning for peace (Thucyd. iii. 4). Such stories as this about Doxander have been common in modern as well as in ancient history; they are very likely to be invented, but may sometimes be true.

4. 7. Mnason, according to Timaeus, was the friend of Aristotle (Athenaeus vi. p. 264).

4. 8. ἥ ἐν Ἀρείῳ βουλῇ εὐδοκιμήσασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς.

According to Plut. Themistocles c. 10 Aristotle narrated that 'at the time [of the battle of Salamis] when the Athenians had no public resources the council of the Areopagus gave to each sailor a sum of eight drachmas and thus enabled the triremes to be manned.' Whether such a statement was really to be found in Aristotelian writings, perhaps in the Politics to which it is commonly ascribed, or whether Plutarch is confusing the more general statement of Aristotle contained in this passage with information which he had derived from some other source, is uncertain.

4. 8. συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν.

Ἐρ. iv. 3. § 8, ὀλιγαρχικῶς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας, τὰς δ' ἄνευμένους καὶ μαλακῶς δημοτικῶς, sc. πολιτείας. σύντονος means the more highly pitched note given by the greater tension of the string, and hence the stricter and more rigid form of government.

4. 8. ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος γενόμενος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησε.

διὰ ταύτης, sc. τῆς νίκης, 'by means of this victory.'

τῆς ἡγεμονίας, sc. αἰτίος γενόμενος. διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν follows τῆς ἡγεμονίας.

Plut. Arist. 22 says that after the battle of Salamis Aristides extended the right of voting to the fourth class. He had already mentioned in c. 13 that many of the higher classes had fallen into poverty; they would therefore have been degraded but for this extension. The merits and sufferings of all classes in the war were a natural justification of such a measure. The nobility and the common people vied with one another in their defence of Hellas against the invader. No element lay deeper in the Hellenic character than the sense of superiority which all Hellenes acquired in the struggle with Persia.

4. 9. περὶ τὴν ἐν Μαντινείῳ μάχην.

I. e. the first battle of Mantinea (419 B.C. described by Thuc. v. 70-74) in which, though the Argive army was defeated, the 1000 chosen Argives (doubtless belonging to the noble families) remained unconquered, and cut their way through the enemy. There is nothing in the account of Thucydides inconsistent with this statement, though he naturally dwells more on the influence of Lacedaemon in effecting the change of government (Ib. 81).

4. 9. ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος αἰτίος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν.

These words are not in perfect accord with the statement of Thucydides that the Athenians were unable to cope with the Syracusans because they had a form of government like their own, Thuc. vii. 55; but they agree with Diod. xiii. 34 fin., who says that the extreme form of democracy was introduced at Syracuse by Diocles after the overthrow of the Athenians. Nor is Thucydides quite consistent with himself; for the overthrow of the Athenian expedition was effected by the aristocratic leader Hermocrates and by the aid of Corinthians and Lacedaemonians. (See Essay on Contributions of Aristotle to History.)

4. 9. καὶ ἐν Ἀμβρακίῳ.

See note on English text. Ambracia is said to have been founded by Gorgus, who is described by Antonin. Liberalis (i. 4. 19 ed. Westermann) as the brother of Cypselus (cp. Neanthes apud Diog. Laert. i. 98, who says that the two Perianders were ἀνεψιοὶ ἀλλήλοις): by Scymnus (454) he is called his son. Periander is supposed by Müller (i. 8. § 3) to have been the son of Gorgus; but this is conjecture. Whether there was any real connexion, or whether the stories of relationship arise only out of an accidental

similarity of names, it is impossible to determine.

4. 10. οἱ δυνάμεως αἴτιοι.

'Who are the causes of the power of a state:' cp. supra, § 9, ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης. The elements of strength are also the elements of danger.

4. 13. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐξαπατήσαντες . . . ἄρχουσιν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.

I. e. when fraud is succeeded by force or the old fraud by a new one. To take an example from Modern History, as the presidency of Louis Napoleon was succeeded by the *coup d'état*, and ended in the *plébiscite* by which he was made Emperor of the French; or as in ancient history the tyranny of Gelo and Hiero was acquiesced in after a time by their Syracusan subjects.

4. 13. οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπάτησαν, φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξειν.

Cp. Thuc. viii. 53, where Peisander demonstrates to the Athenian assembly that their only hope lay in the alliance of the Persian king.

4. 13. ψευσάμενοι.

'Having once told the lie' which, it is inferred, was detected,

5. 2. καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ μισθοφορὰν τε γὰρ οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἐπόριζον, καὶ ἐκώλυον ἀποδιδόναι τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τοῖς τριηράρχοις· οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας ἵναγκάσθησαν συστάντες καταλύσαι τὸν δῆμον.

'The demagogues gained influence over the assembly by procuring pay for them: [probably they obtained the money for this purpose by not paying the trierarchs]. These were sued by their sailors or other creditors, and, not having been paid themselves, were unable to pay others; so in self-defence they overthrew the government.' Such appears to be the meaning of this passage, a little amplified, on which no light is thrown from other sources.

The revolution here mentioned would seem to be the same as that which has been already referred to, supra, c. 3. § 4. The words διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας occur in both passages.

5. 3. κατελύθη δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ ὁ δῆμος.

Probably the Heraclea of Pontus founded by the Megarians in B. C. 559. The poems of Theognis imply that already in the sixth century B. C. a democratical party existed in the mother-city. Nine places bear the name of Heraclea. The Heraclea in Pontus is the most important of them and may be presumed to be meant when there is no further description as here or in c. 6. §§ 2, 3.

5. 4. ἡ ἐν Μεγάροις κατελύθη δημοκρατία.

Cp. supra c. 3. § 5.

5. 5. ἢ τὰς προσόδους ταῖς λειτουργίαις.

Some word containing the idea of diminishing has to be supplied from ἀναδάστους ποιοῦντες.

5. 7. Demagogues like Cleon, Lysicles, Eucrates, Hyperbolus, Cleophon, were of a different type from Peisistratus or Periander, and equally different from Hiero and Gelo or Dionysius the First.

5. 8. Three reasons are given for the frequent attempts to establish tyrannies in early Greek history—1) there were great magistracies in ancient states; 2) the people were scattered and therefore incapable of resistance; 3) the demagogues were trusted by them, because they were supposed to be the enemies of the rich.

5. 9. Πεισίστρατος στασιάσας πρὸς τοὺς πεδιακοὺς.

According to the narrative of Herodotus, i. 59 ff., Attica was at this time divided into factions, that of the inhabitants of the plain led by Lycurgus, and of the sea coast by Megacles, to which was added a third faction of the inhabitants of the highlands whom Peisistratus used as his instruments. He was restored to the tyranny by a combination of his own adherents and those of Megacles against the inhabitants of the plain.

5. 9. Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις.

Theagenes is mentioned in Thuc. i. 126 as the father-in-law of Cylon the conspirator; and in Arist. Rhet. i. 2, 1357 b. 33, as an example of a tyrant who like Peisistratus had asked for a guard.

5. 10. Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου.

Cp. Diod. Sic. (xiii. 86, 91, 92) who narrates how Daphnaeus, having been elected general by the Syracusans, failed to relieve Agrigentum and on the motion of Dionysius was deposed from his command.

5. 10. ἐκ τῆς πατρίας δημοκρατίας.

The same phrase is used in ii. 12. § 2 where Solon is said to have established ἡ πατριος δημοκρατία, the ancient or traditional democracy, 'the good old democracy,' as opposed to the later and extreme form.

5. 11. ἄρκος δὲ τοῦ ἢ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἥπτον τὸ τὰς φυλὰς φέρειν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντα τὸν δῆμον.

τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι, sc. κύριον τὸν δῆμον τῶν νόμων = 'a remedy against the people becoming master.' That is to say, when the magistrates were elected by the tribal divisions the power of the people was not so great as when they voted all together.

When the larger units of government or representation are broken up into very small ones, local interests are likely to be preferred to the general good, and local candidates for office take the place of better men—a nation ceases to be inspired by great political ideas, and cannot effectually act against other nations. On the other hand, if England, or France, or the United States were represented in the national council only as a whole, what would be the result? Aristotle might have replied that a state is not a state in which 30,000,000 of people are united under a single government, or are represented in a single assembly, having no other connecting links; nor yet when they are subdivided into parishes: cp. vii. 4. § 11.

These are extremes by which a principle may be illustrated, but no one would think of accepting either alternative. The question which Aristotle here touches has a modern and recent interest to us, and may be put in another form: 'What should be the area of a constituency?' Some considerations which have to be kept in view are the following: 1) The facilities of locomotion and communication; 2) The habit or tradition of acting together among the natives of a country or district; 3) The question of minorities—should the aim of a constitution be to strengthen the government, or to give a perfectly fair representation of all parties, opinions, places? 4) The greater opportunity of a political career afforded by more numerous elections and smaller bodies of electors; and, on the other hand, 5) The greater independence of the representatives of large constituencies; and 6) The advantages or disadvantages of local knowledge and of local interests have to be placed in the scale. We may conclude that in so far as the political life of a country is affected by the area of representation, it should not be so extended as to interfere with the power of common action; nor so localized that the members of the national assembly cease any longer to think in the first place of great national interests.

6. 1, 2. αἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι διὰ δύο μάλιστα τρόπους τοὺς φανερωτάτους . . . ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀρχὴ στάσεως διαφορᾶς.

According to c. 1. § 16, ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἐγγίνονται δύο, ἣ τε πρὸς ἄλλήλους στάσις καὶ ἔτι ἡ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον there are two modes of revolutions in oligarchies,—1) That arising from dissensions among the oligarchs themselves; 2) that arising from dissensions between the oligarchs and the people. The order of the two is reversed in this passage. The first which is here the second is generalized into 'that arising from those outside the governing body' (ἡ ἐξ ἄλλων, § 2), under which four cases are included (see Introduction). Το ἕνα μὲν (§ 1) corresponds grammatically μάλιστα δέ, which introduces one of the cases of στάσις arising ἐξ ἄλλων although the leader comes ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας. The other mode of revolution from within is discussed at the end of § 5 κινουῦνται δὲ κ.τ.λ., with which the second main division begins.

6. 1. ἐν Νάξῳ Λύγδαμις.

For a silly story about a bargain over some fish which is said to have been the origin of the revolt led by Lygdamis at Naxos, see Athenaeus viii. 348 who derives it from the Ναξίων πολιτεία in the so-called 'Polities' of Aristotle.

6. 2. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀρχὴ στάσεως διαφορᾶς.

Goettling would interpret ἄλλων as = ἄλλων ἢ τοῦ πλήθους which is harsh. The conjectures αὐτῶν and ἀλλήλων seem, at first sight, to simplify the passage, as everything from μάλιστα δ' in § 1 onwards would then apply to the same mode of στάσις (ἢ ἐξ αὐτῶν): but Aristotle in § 2 expressly distinguishes the εὐποροὶ who are not in the government from the oligarchs, and therefore a revolution begun by them could not be described as arising ἐξ ἀλλήλων or ἐξ αὐτῶν.

6. 2. οἶον ἐν Μασσαλίῳ.

In vi. 7. § 4 Massalia is described by Aristotle, speaking probably of a later period, as having enlarged the narrow oligarchy by the admission of new citizens. The oligarchy thus became more like a πολιτεία (πολιτικωτέρα ἐγένετο ἢ ὀλιγαρχία).

6. 3. The difference was settled, not by throwing open the government to a lower class, but by the admission in greater numbers of members of the same families.

6. 5. τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείῳ.

Here the members of the governing body, see note on c. 1. § 10.

6. 6. ἐν τοῖς τριάκοντα Ἀθήνησιν οἱ περὶ Χαρικλέα ἴσχυσαν τοὺς τριάκοντα δημαγωγοὺς ὄντας, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετρακοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον.

From Xenophon's Hellenics ii. 3 we might be led to infer that Critias was the leading spirit of the thirty, but in Lysias contra Eratosthenem § 56, p. 125, we find that the name of Charicles precedes that of Critias among the leaders of the more extreme party. Charicles and Critias are also named together among the νομοθέται whom the thirty appointed in Xen. Mem. i. 2. § 31.

It is singular that the leadership of a party in the 400 should be ascribed to Phrynichus who was late in joining the attempt (Thuc. viii. 68) and was soon assassinated (c. 92). He was however a man of great ability and is said by Thucydides to have shown extraordinary energy when he once took part.

6. 6. καὶ ἐν ὅσαις ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐχ οὗτοι αἰροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄρχοντες εἰσιν.

The people will always be able to elect those members of the oligarchy who favour their interests. The representative depends upon his constituents, and must do their bidding. The remark of Aristotle is true, and admits of several applications. Yet the opposite reflection is almost equally true, that the popular representative easily catches the 'esprit de corps' of the society in which he mingles, and of the order or assembly to which he is admitted.

6. 6. ὅπερ ἐν Ἀβύδῳ συνέβαιεν.

We cannot be certain whether these words illustrate οἱ ὀπλιῖται ἢ ὁ δῆμος or ὁ δῆμος only. That the membership of a club should have been the qualification for an office of which the election was in the hands of the people is remarkable (see note on § 13 infra).

6. 7. καὶ ὅπου τὰ δικαστήρια μᾶλλον ἔκ τοῦ πολитеύματος ἔστιν· δημαγωγοῦντες γὰρ πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν.

Compare ii. 12. § 3, where Solon is said to have established the democracy by appointing the courts of law from the whole people.

6. 8. γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσῃ τὰ ἴδια ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς.

So Plat. Rep. viii. 555 D. Compare also infra c. 12. § 17.

6. 8. Hipparinus, the father of Dion, was the chief supporter of Dionysius (Plut. Dio c. 3), who married his daughter.

6. 9. Καὶ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ὁ τὴν προῶξιν τὴν πρὸς Χάρητα πράξας ἐνεχείρησε μεταβαλεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν.

Probably the well-known general Chares who flourished between 367-333 is here intended. He was a man who, in spite of his disreputable character, contrived by corruption to maintain a great influence over the Athenian people in the decline of their glory. Of the transaction here referred to nothing more is known.

6. 9. διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν,

sc. διὰ τὸ ἀναλῶσαι τὰ ἴδια τοὺς εὐπόρους ζῶντας ἀσελγῶς.

6. 9. ὅτε μὲν οὖν ἐπιχειροῦσι τι κινεῖν, ὅτε δὲ κλέπτουσι τὰ κοινά· ὅθεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς στασιάζουσιν ἢ οὗτοι ἢ οἱ πρὸς τούτους μαχόμενοι κλέπτοντας.

αὐτοὺς = 'the government, or the other oligarchs, from whom the theft is made.'

οὗτοι = 'the thieves or peculators.' The revolution arises in two ways, from the attack either of the thieves upon the government, or of the government upon the thieves.

6. 11. ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ γερόντων.

I. e. the election of the Elean elders, besides being an election out of certain families (δυναστευτικὴν), resembled that of the Lacedaemonian elders who were chosen but 'in a ridiculous fashion' by the whole people. See ii. 9. § 27.

6. 12. Timophanes was a Corinthian general, who was about to become, or for a short time became, tyrant of Corinth. He was slain either by the hand (Diod. xvi. 65), or at the instigation, of his brother Timoleon (Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4).

6. 13. τῶν περὶ Σίμων.

σάμων is found in all the Greek MSS. and in the old Latin translator. It shews at any rate the faithfulness with which they copied an unmeaning reading. Σίμων which is adopted by Bekker in both editions is an ingenious conjecture of Schlosser. Simus, if he be the person mentioned in Demosthenes (de Cor. p. 241), was a Larissaeian who betrayed Thessaly to king Philip.

6. 13. ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐταιριῶν ὧν ἦν μία ἡ Ἴφιάδου.

The name of Iphiades occurs in Demosthenes (in *Aristocratem*, p. 679), where it is said that his son was, or ought to have been, given up as a hostage to the Athenians by the town, not of Abydos but of Sestos. It will be remembered that at Abydos (supra c. 6. § 6) some of the magistrates were elected by the people from a political club. The manner in which he is spoken of would lead us to suppose that Iphiades was tyrant of Abydos, and that by the help of his club he had overthrown the oligarchy.

6. 14. Of the great Euboean cities Chalcis and Eretria, as of so many other Hellenic states which were famous in the days before the Persian War, little is known. We are told in bk. iv. 3. § 3 that the Chalcidians used cavalry against their opponents, and there is an allusion in Thuc. i. 15 to the ancient war between Chalcis and Eretria which 'divided all Hellas,' again mentioned by Herod. v. 99.

6. 15. τῶν δ' ἐν Θήβαις κατ' Ἀρχίου.

The only Archias of Thebes known to us was an oligarch, who betrayed the citadel of Thebes to the Spartans, and was afterwards himself slain by Pelopidas and his fellow conspirators. An oligarchical revolution could not therefore be said to have arisen out of his punishment. Yet the uncertainty of the details of Greek history in the age of Aristotle should make us hesitate in assuming a second person of the name. The mention of Heraclea in juxtaposition with Thebes may suggest that this is the Heraclea not in Pontus, but in Trachis. Cp. note on c. 5. § 3.

6. 15. ἐφιλονείκησαν αὐτούς.

Const. *preg.* = φιλονεικοῦντες ἐδίωκον. The infinitive δεθῆναι helps the construction of αὐτούς, 'They carried their party spirit against them so far.'

6. 16. διὰ τὸ ἄγαν δεσποτικὰς εἶναι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας . . . ἡ ἐν Χίῳ ὀλιγαρχία.

The Chians in the later years of the Peloponnesian War were governed by an oligarchy: cp. Thuc. viii. 14. The island was recovered by Athens under the Second Empire, but again revolted in the year 458. The population is said to have been largely composed of merchant-seamen, supra, iv. 4. § 21.

6. 17. πολλάκις γὰρ τὸ ταχθὲν πρῶτον τίμημα . . . τοὺς μέσους

is an *accusativus pendens*; 'Often when there has been a certain qualification fixed at first . . . the same property increases to many times the original value,' etc.

7. 1. οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταύτων ὀλιγοί.

The exclusiveness of aristocracy and oligarchy is equally the ruin of both, though arising in the one case from the fewness of men of virtue and good manners, in the other from the fewness of men of wealth and birth.

7. 2. Παρθενία (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων γὰρ ἦσαν).

According to the legend the Partheniae were the progeny of Spartan women and of certain slaves or citizens of Sparta called ἐπεύνακτοι. They had in some way incurred the reproach of illegitimacy or inferiority. The fertile imagination of ancient writers, who were clearly as ignorant as ourselves, has devised several explanations of the name: they were the children of Spartans who remained at home during the Messenian war and were made Helots (Antiochus of Syracuse, fr. 14 Müller Fr. Hist. Gr. vol. i. p. 184); or of Helots who married the widows of those who had fallen in the war (Theop. fr. 190 Müller i. p. 310); or of the youngest of the army who had not taken the oath to remain until the war was finished (Ephor. fr. 33 Müller i. p. 247), and were sent home to beget children.

7. 2. Λύσανδρος.

For the narrative of the later life of Lysander and of his attempt to open the Spartan monarchy to all the Heraclidae of whom he himself was one, and of his overthrow by Agesilaus whose claim to the kingdom he had previously supported, see Plutarch's *Life of Lysander*, 24-26.

7. 3. Κινάδων ὁ τῆν ἐπ' Ἄγησιλάῳ συστήσας ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας.

For a very curious account of the conspiracy of Cinadon, to which he was instigated by a desire to become one of the Spartan peers, see Xen. *Hell.* iii. 3. §§ 4-11.

ἐπ' Ἄγησιλάῳ if genuine must mean 'against Agesilaus' and (less directly) against the Spartans.

7. 4. δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς καλουμένης Εὐνομίας.

See Bergk *Frag.* 2-7, p. 316.

7. 4. Hanno is mentioned by Justin, xxi. 4. He is said to have lived in the time of Dionysius the younger about the year 346 and to have attempted to poison the senate and raise an insurrection among the slaves. Being detected and taken he was crucified with his family.

7. 5. ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τε πειρῶνται μινύναι καὶ αἱ πολλὰ τῶν καλουμένων ἀριστοκρατιῶν.

ταῦτα refers to τὰ δύο, democracy and oligarchy. The great difficulty is the combination of the many and the few; not of virtue with either, except from the circumstance that it so rarely exists: cp. iv. 7. §§ 3, 4, and c. 8. § 8.

7. 6. διαφέρουσι γὰρ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων πολιτειῶν αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι τούτῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰσὶν αἱ μὲν ἴπτον αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον μόνιμοι αὐτῶν. τὰς γὰρ ἀποκλινούσας μᾶλλον πρὸς τῆν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀριστοκρατίας καλοῦσιν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος πολιτείας.

τούτῳ and διὰ τοῦτο have been taken as follows: 1)* 'Aristocracies differ from what are termed polities in the number of elements which they combine (supra § 5), and the nature of the combination makes some of them more and some less stable.' The words which follow return to διαφέρουσι: 'there are such differences; for those of them which

incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, those which incline to democracy, polities.'

2) τοῦτ' and διὰ τοῦτο may be thought to refer rather to what follows than to what precedes. 'Aristocracies differ from polities in that polities include numbers, and because of this difference some of them are less and some of them more stable, some inclining more to oligarchy or the government of a few, others to polity, which is the government of a larger number.'

Susemihl takes the whole passage nearly in the same manner: 3) 'Aristocracies differ from the so-called polities in this respect (i. e. in having the three elements of δῆμος, πλοῦτος, ἀρετή instead of the first two only), and for this reason, the former of these two kinds of governments (αὐτῶν) are less stable and the latter more so. For those which incline rather to oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those which incline to democracy are called polities; and for this reason they are safer than the others: for the greater number have more influence, and because they have equality they are more content.' Polity has only two elements, while aristocracy has three. The δῆμος being one-half of the polity but only one-third of the aristocracy are better pleased with the existing government and therefore less disposed to revolution.

This way of explaining the passage gives an excellent sense. But the words αἱ μὲν ἥπτον, αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον, are partitive of αὐτῶν, which refers to αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι and cannot therefore be applied αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον μόνιμοι to timocracies αἱ δὲ ἥπτον μόνιμοι to aristocracies. The passage is ill written and inaccurately worded, though the general meaning is tolerably clear, namely, that there is often an ill mingling of constitutions, which in various degrees seek to unite numbers and wealth, and that of the two, numbers are the safer basis.

7. 9. συνέβη δὲ τὸ εἰρημένον ἐν Θουρίοις.

Sc. the tendency of the constitution towards the prevailing element spoken of in § 7, as at Thurii from aristocracy towards oligarchy, followed by a reaction to democracy.

ἐν Θουρίοις. Thurii was founded in the year 443 under the protection of Athens, and had nearly ceased to exist in 390. Yet in this short time it was subjected to at least two serious revolutions, 1) that which is mentioned here from an oligarchical aristocracy into a democracy; 2) another revolution, noted infra § 12, by which it passed from a polity into an oligarchy of a few families, whether earlier or later than the preceding, is unknown. It may be conjectured, but it is only a conjecture, that the narrowing of the aristocracy briefly alluded to in this passage is the same change with that which is afterwards mentioned more fully in § 12, and their overthrow which ensued may be further identified with the expulsion of the Sybarites soon after the foundation of the city. It may also be conjectured with considerable probability that the government of Thurii became an oligarchy at the time when the Athenian citizens were driven out, after the failure of the Syracusan expedition.

7. 9. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄπο πλείονος τιμήματος εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς ἕλαττον μετέβη καὶ εἰς ἀρχεῖα πλείω, διὰ δὲ τὸ τῆν χώραν ὅλην τοὺς γνωρίμους συγκτήσασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον.

Lit. 'For because the qualification for office was high and also because the whole country was monopolized by the notables contrary to law, the qualification was reduced and the number of offices increased.' Either the apodosis which is attached to the first member of the sentence belongs also to the second; or a clause answering to the second has been forgotten. The revolution at Thurii was a change from aristocracy or polity to democracy. The government had grown narrow and oligarchical, and the governing class had contrived to get the land into their own hands. But the people rose against the oligarchy, lowered the qualification, increased the number of offices, and got back the land. Two reasons are given for the rising of the people, 1) the increase of the qualification for office, and 2) the monopoly of land which had passed into the hands of the notables.

For εἰς ἄρχεῖα πλείω, cp. ii. 11. § 14, ὥσθ' ὅπου μὴ μικρὰ πόλις, πολιτικώτερον πλείονας μετέχειν τῶν ἄρχῶν, καὶ δημοτικώτερον· κοινότερον τε γάρ, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, καὶ κάλλιον ἕκαστον ἀποτελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θῆττον.

7. 10. ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.

Aristocracies are in fact more oligarchical than aristocratical, and 'the few' are always grasping at wealth. Cp. *infra*, c. 8. § 16.

7. 10. ἡ Λοκρῶν πόλις.

The mother of Dionysius the younger was Doris a Locrian woman, and when expelled from Syracuse he was received by the citizens of Locri in a most friendly manner, but he afterwards availed himself of their good will to impose a garrison on the town. They ultimately drove out his garrison [Diodorus xiv. 44, Justin xxi. 2 and 3].

7. 10. ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίῳ οὐκ ἔν ἐγένετο, οὐδ' ἔν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίῳ εἶμιγμένῳ.

But why not? Aristotle seems to mean that no well-governed city would have allowed one of its citizens to marry into the family of a tyrant or would have entered into relation with him in consequence: or perhaps that in a democracy or well ordered aristocracy the marriage of a single citizen could not have become a great political event.

7. 14. ὅπερ συνέβαιεν ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων.

We may paraphrase this rather singular expression, 'In the days when the Greek world was divided between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians.'

8. 3. παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ δianoia ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος.

ὑπ' αὐτῶν, sc. τῶν δαπανῶν.

σοφιστικὸς λόγος = ὁ σωρός, or 'acervus.'

8. 5. τῷ μὴ ἀδικεῖν

and the following are causal or instrumental datives after διὰ τὸ εἶναι χρῆσθαι. The article

is to be continued with the second $\mu\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$.

8. 5. $\tau\hat{\omega}\ \tau\acute{o}\nu\varsigma\ \eta\gamma\epsilon\mu\omicron\nu\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\hat{\omega}\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\acute{\alpha}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \tau\hat{\eta}\nu\ \pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$.

For the expression of a similar spirit acting in a wider field and giving a mythological origin to the traditional policy of Rome, cp. Tac. Ann. xi. 24: 'Quid aliud exitio Lacedaemoniis et Atheniensibus fuit, quamquam armis pollerent, nisi quod victos pro alienigenis arcebant? At conditor nostri Romulus tantum sapientia valuit, ut plerosque populos eodem die hostes, dein cives habuerit,' and the real speech of Claudius (given by Orelli and Nipperdey in their editions).

8. 6. $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \acute{\omega}\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho\ \delta\hat{\eta}\mu\omicron\varsigma\ \eta\acute{\iota}\delta\eta\ \omicron\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\delta}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\iota,\ \delta\iota\acute{\omicron}\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\acute{o}\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\gamma\acute{\iota}\gamma\omicron\nu\omicron\tau\alpha\iota\ \delta\eta\mu\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\omicron\acute{\iota}\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\kappa\iota\varsigma,\ \acute{\omega}\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\rho\eta\tau\alpha\iota\ \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$.

$\eta\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$, sc. $\acute{\delta}\tau\alpha\nu\ \pi\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \acute{\omega}\sigma\iota$.

$\acute{\omega}\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\rho\eta\tau\alpha\iota\ \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ refers only to the clause, $\delta\iota\acute{\omicron}\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \dots\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\kappa\iota\varsigma$ as will be seen from the comparison of c. 6. § 6 (demagogues in an oligarchy) where nothing is said about equals in an aristocracy becoming a democracy.

8. 9. $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu\ \pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\iota\lambda\eta\phi\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$.

The construction is $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \phi\iota\lambda\omicron\nu\epsilon\iota\kappa\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\iota\lambda\eta\phi\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$ (sc. $\tau\acute{o}\nu\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\xi\omega$), $\acute{\omega}\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho\ \tau\acute{o}\nu\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$.

$\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$ may be either the subject or the object of $\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\iota\lambda\eta\phi\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota$, with a slightly different meaning. Either *'before the spirit of contention has also carried away or absorbed them,' or, 'before they too have caught the spirit of contention.'

8. 10. $\tau\hat{\omega}\ \tau\iota\mu\acute{\eta}\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \kappa\omicron\iota\nu\omicron\hat{\omega}\ \tau\hat{\omicron}\ \pi\lambda\hat{\eta}\theta\omicron\varsigma$.

i. e. the amount of the whole rateable property. The object is to preserve the same number of qualified persons, when the wealth of a city has increased or diminished.

8. 10. $\sigma\upsilon\mu\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \tau\iota\mu\acute{\eta}\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\kappa\omicron\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \kappa\omicron\iota\nu\omicron\hat{\omega}\ \tau\hat{\omicron}\ \pi\lambda\hat{\eta}\theta\omicron\varsigma\ \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \tau\hat{\omicron}\ \pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\lambda\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \tau\hat{\omicron}\ \hat{\nu}\tau\omicron\nu\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \chi\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\nu,\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \acute{\delta}\sigma\alpha\iota\varsigma\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \pi\acute{\omicron}\lambda\epsilon\sigma\iota\ \tau\iota\mu\hat{\omega}\nu\tau\alpha\iota\ \kappa\alpha\tau'\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\iota\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu,\ \kappa\tau\lambda$.

The words $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \tau\hat{\omicron}\ \hat{\nu}\tau\omicron\nu\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \chi\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\nu$, though somewhat pleonastic, have a sufficiently good sense. The government is to compare the present with the past value of property at that time, i. e. with the property serving as a qualification at the time when the change is occurring ($\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\nu\omicron\pi\omicron\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma\ \nu\omicron\mu\acute{\iota}\sigma\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \gamma\iota\gamma\omicron\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\varsigma$). The words are placed after $\kappa\alpha\tau'\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\iota\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ by Susemihl following the authority of William of Moerbek, but the meaning is thus over emphasized.

With $\kappa\alpha\tau'\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\iota\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ repeat $\kappa\alpha\tau'\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\iota\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\kappa\omicron\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \kappa\tau\lambda$.

8. 12. $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \delta\hat{\eta}\mu\hat{\omega}\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\omicron}\lambda\iota\gamma\alpha\rho\chi\acute{\iota}\hat{\omega}\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \mu\omicron\nu\alpha\rho\chi\acute{\iota}\hat{\omega}\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\hat{\iota}\ \pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\hat{\omega}$.

$\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \mu\omicron\nu\alpha\rho\chi\acute{\iota}\hat{\omega}$ is omitted by Bekker in his second edition, but is found in the best MSS. The advice given is at least as applicable to kings as to other rulers of states. $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\hat{\iota}\ \pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\hat{\omega}$ = not 'every constitutional government' but in a more general sense 'every form of government.' (See note on text.)

8. 12. τὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν.
= τοὺς παραστάτας, 'their followers' or 'followings.'
8. 13. τοὺς ζῶντας ἄσυμφόρως πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν.
As an example of a life unsuited to the state of which they are citizens may be cited the case of the Spartan Ephors, ii. 9. § 24.
8. 14. τούτου δ' ἄρκος τὸ ἄει τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις μορίοις ἐγχειρίζειν τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.
In this favourite remedy of 'conservation by antagonism,' which is really only an 'unstable equilibrium,' Aristotle does not seem to see how much of the force of the state is lost.
8. 17. μοναχῶς δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν, εἰ τοῦτο κατασκευάσειέ τις.
τοῦτο, sc. τὸ μῆ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν κερδαίνειν, to be gathered from the previous sentence.
8. 19. ἀντίγραφα κατὰ φρατρίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλάς τιθέσθωσαν.
λόχοι are military divisions to which in some states civil divisions appear to have corresponded. Cp. Xen. Hier. c. 9. § 5, διτίρηνται μὲν γὰρ ἅπασαι αἱ πόλεις αἱ μὲν κατὰ φυλάς αἱ δὲ κατὰ μοίρας αἱ δὲ κατὰ λόχους· καὶ ἀρχοντες ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ μέρει ἐφειστήκασιν. The accounts apparently are to be deposited at the bureaus or centres of such divisions.
8. 20. μῆ μόνον τὰς κτήσεις μῆ ποιεῖν ἀναδάστους, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς καρπούς, ὃ ἐν ἐνιαίαις τῶν πολιτειῶν λανθάνει γιγνόμενον.
As might be done by taxes or state services exclusively imposed on the rich, or by a tax of which the rate increased in proportion to the amount assessed. Infra c. 11. § 10, Aristotle tells us how Dionysius contrived in five years to bring the whole property of his subjects into his treasury. Cp. also vi. 5. § 5.
8. 20. κἄν τις ὑβρίσῃ τῶν εὐπόρων εἰς τούτους, μείζω τὰ ἐπιτίμια εἶναι ἢ ἂν σφῶν αὐτῶν.
The construction is ἄν τις ὑβρίσῃ τινὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν; but whether σφῶν αὐτῶν refers 1) to οἱ εὐπόροι or 2)* to τούτους, i. e. τοὺς ἀπόρους, is not clear.
8. 20. μηδὲ πλειόνων ἢ μιᾶς τὸν αὐτὸν κληρονομεῖν.
Cp. Mill, Pol. Econ. Bk. v. c. 9. § 1, where he urges, much in the spirit of Aristotle and Plato, 'that no one person should be permitted to acquire by inheritance more than the amount of a moderate independence.'
9. 1. τρία δὲ τινα χρῆ ἔχειν κ.τ.λ.

In this passage, which has the appearance of a digression, Aristotle is still speaking of the preservatives of the state.

See the summing up, § 5.

Cp. Rhet. ii. 1, 1378 a. 6, τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ ἐῖναι πιστοῦς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἔστι τὰ ἀαίτια· τοσαῦτα γὰρ ἔστι δι' ἃ πιστεύομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀποδείξεων. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὐνοία: also Thuc. ii. 60, where Pericles claims εὐνοία, φρόνησις, ἀρετὴ as the proper qualities of a statesman: καίτοι ἔμοι τοιοῦτοῦ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε ὅς οὐδενὸς οἶομαι ἴσσω ἐῖναι γινῶναι τε τὰ δεόντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσω.

9. 1. δύναμιν τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς.

= 'administrative capacity,' 'power to do the duties of the office.'

9. 2. πῶς χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι τῆν διαίρεσιν.

In this passage (cp. infra πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῆν αἵρεσιν) the words αἵρεσις and διαίρεσις are used almost indifferently, the latter adding to the idea of choice or selection another shade of meaning 'discrimination or separation from others,'—'how we are to discriminate in the choice.'

9. 4. ἢ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται κ.τ.λ.

Dependent on some more general idea to be supplied from ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις. 'May not the reason be that those who have these two qualities are possibly wanting in self control?'

9. 5. ἀπλῶς δέ, ὅσα ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὡς συμφέροντα λέγομεν ταῖς πολιτείαις.

We need not suppose any allusion to a lost part of the Politics, or to a special treatise called 'οἱ νόμοι.' The meaning is that 'enactments in the laws of states which are supposed to be for their good are preservative of states.' τοῖς νόμοις = 'their laws,' the article referring to πολιτείαις which follows.

9. 7. οἱ δ' οἰόμενοι ταύτην εῖναι μίαν ἀρετήν.

ταύτην, sc. τὸ ὀλιγαρχώτατον (or δημοτικώτατον) εῖναι gathered from the preceding sentence.

Those who consider that rigid adherence to the principles of the existing constitution, whether democracy or oligarchy, is the only object worthy of a statesman, carry their theory to an extreme. They forget that 'happy inconsistencies' may be better than extremes. The *Opportunist* may do greater service to the Republic than the *Intransigent*.

9. 7. καθάπερ εἶς.

Cp. Rhet. i. 4, 1360 a. 23, λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθειρεσθαι, ὅτι ἔξω τῆς βελτίστης πολιτείας αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι καὶ ἀνιέμεναι καὶ ἐπιτεινόμεναι φθείρονται, οἷον δημοκρατία

οὐ μόνον ἀνιεμένη ἀσθενεστέρα γίνεται ὥστε τέλος ἵξει εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιτεινομένη σφόδρα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ γρυπότης καὶ ἡ σιμότης οὐ μόνον ἀνιέμενα ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφόδρα γρυπὰ γινόμενα ἡ σιμὰ οὕτω διατίθεται ὥστε μηδὲ μυκτῆρα δοκεῖν εἶναι.

9. 7. διὰ τῆν ὑπεροχῆν καὶ τῆν ἔλλειψιν τῶν ἐναντίων.

'On account of the excess (cp. above ἐὼν ἐπιτείνῃ) and of the defect of the opposite qualities.'

9. 8. συμβαίνει δὲ τὸ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας.

ἄλλας is used adverbially, as in Plato and Thucydides, in the sense of 'likewise.' Cp. Nic. Eth. ii. 4. § 3, πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν, where ἄλλας = 'which we are comparing with the virtues;' and Pol. vii. 10. § 10, διοικεῖν τῆν ἄλλην οἰκίαν.

9. 8. ὥστ' ἔχειν.

ὥστε is bracketed by Bekker (2nd edition) without reason; it is found in all the MSS. and in point of Greek is unobjectionable; cp. Περὶ Ψυχῆς ii. 1, 412 b. 25. § 11, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀποβεβληκὸς τῆν ψυχῆν τὸ δυνάμει ὄν ὥστε ζῆν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον.

9. 9. φθείροντες τοῖς καθ' ὑπεροχῆν νόμοις.

Sc. τοὺς εὐπόρους ἢ τὸ πλῆθος. 'So that when they destroy either party by laws *carried to excess [or possibly 'by laws based on superior power'] they destroy the state.'

9. 11. μέγιστον δὲ πάντων . . . τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας.

Cp. Rep. iv. 423 E, ταῦτα . . . πάντα φαῦλα, ἐὰν τὸ λεγόμενον ἔν μέγα φυλάττωσι, μ ἄλλον δ' ἀντὶ μεγάλου ἱκανόν. τί τοῦτο; ἔφη. τῆν παιδείαν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τροφῆν.

9. 11. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐνίαις ὁμνύουσι 'καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι καὶ βουλευσώ ὃ τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν.'

The habit of taking a formal oath of hostility may be illustrated by an Inscription containing an agreement between certain Cretan cities:—

ὁμνύω . . . θεοῦς πάντας καὶ πάσας, μῆ μὲν ἐγώ ποκα τοῖς Λυττίοις καλῶς φρονησεῖν μήτε τέχνῃ μήτε μαχανῃ μήτε ἐν νυκτὶ μήτε πεδ' ἀμέραν καὶ σπευσίω ὃ τι κα δύναμαι κακὸν τῷ πόλει τῷ τῶν Λυττίων.

The inscription is given in Vischer's Kleine Schriften, vol. ii. p. 106.

9. 11. χρῆ δὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ὑποκρίεσθαι τοῦναντίον.

'To have the notion and act the part of one who does no wrong,' not necessarily implying a mere profession or simulation, as c. 11. § 19 infra, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ὥσπερ ὑπόθεσιν δεῖ μένειν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν ὑποκρινόμενον τὸν βασιλικὸν καλῶς.

9. 13. νῦν δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οἱ τῶν ἀρχόντων υἱοὶ τρυφῶσιν κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 556 D, ὅταν ἰσχυρὸς ἀνὴρ πένης, ἠλιωμένος, παραταχθεὶς ἐν μάχῃ πλουσίῳ ἐσκιατροφηκότι, πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας. ἕδῃ ἄσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν κ.τ.λ.

9. 15. 'εἰς ὃ χρῆζων.'

Probably ἐστὶ is to be supplied. The words do not agree with any known passage of Euripides.

10. 3. πρὸς βοήθειαν τῆν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου.

'The assistance which arises from i. e. is necessitated by the people.' Such we must infer to be the meaning from the parallel clause ἐπὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους which follows.

10. 3. τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι.

'The good' in the party sense, i. e. the higher classes like the ἀγαθοὶ of Theognis 32 Bergk and elsewhere.

10. 3. Besides the three accounts of the origin of monarchy given in i. 2. § 6 (the patriarchal); and iii. 14. § 12 and infra §§ 7, 8 (election for merit), and iv. 13. § 11 (the weakness of the middle and lower classes), we have here a fourth in which the royal authority is said to have been introduced for the protection of the aristocracy against the people.

10. 5. Supra, c. 5. § 8, Aristotle speaks of tyrannies arising out of the need which democracies felt of a protector of the people against the rich before they became great (διὰ τὸ μὴ μεγάλας εἶναι τὰς πόλεις); here, when they were already 'increased in power,' (ἤδη τῶν πόλεων ἠύξημένων). But the discrepancy is verbal. For the terms greatness and littleness might be used of the same states at different periods of Greek history.

10. 5. οἱ δῆμοι.

Not 'the democracies,' but 'the peoples in different states.'

10. 6. Pheidon, a legitimate king of Argos, tenth or sixth in descent from Temenus, called by Herodotus (vi. 127) a tyrant, who gave the Peloponnesians weights and measures. He is said to have driven out the Elean judges, and to have usurped authority over the Olympic games. According to Ephorus fr. 15, Müller i. p. 236, he recovered the whole lot of Temenus and attempted to reduce all the cities once subject to Heracles. He was at length overthrown by the Eleans and Lacedaemonians.

10. 6. Phalaris, according to Arist. Rhet. ii. 20. § 5, 1393 b. 8 ff., was elected by his Himerian fellow citizens general and dictator of Himera. It was on this occasion that Stesichorus told the story of the Horse and his Rider. Phalaris has been generally called tyrant of Agrigentum, and it is possible that his power having begun in the one city may have extended to the other.

Panaetius is mentioned in c. 12. § 18 as having changed the government of Leontini from an oligarchy into a tyranny.

For Cypselus, who came into power as the representative of the people against the oligarchy of the Bacchiadae from which he was himself sprung, see Herod. v. 92.

10. 8. ὥσπερ Κόδρος.

In the common tradition Codrus is supposed to have saved his country in a war with the Dorians by the voluntary sacrifice of his own life; here Aristotle implies that he delivered Athens from slavery by his military services.

10. 8. ἐλευθερώσαντες ὥσπερ Κῆρος,

who delivered the Persians from the Medes. See *infra*, § 24.

10. 8. κτίσαντες χώραν.

'Who have settled a country.'

κτίζειν χώραν is said like κτίζειν πόλιν, with a slight enlargement of the meaning of the word.

10. 8. ὥσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς.

Referring, probably, not to the Lacedaemonian kings generally, who cannot be said to have added, except in the Messenian Wars, to the territory of Sparta, but to the original founders of the monarchy.

10. 8. Μακεδόνων.

Such as Perdiccas I., Alexander I. (Herod. viii. 137 ff.), Archelaus (Thuc. ii. 100), Philip the father of Alexander the Great and others.

10. 8. Μολοπτῶν.

Cp. *infra*, c. 11. § 2, where the moderation of the Molossian monarchy is eulogized.

10. 9. Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 2, διαφέρουσι δὲ πλεῖστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ ἑαυτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ· ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τῶν ἀρχομένων· οὗ γὰρ ἔστι βασιλεὺς ὁ μῆ ἀντάρκης καὶ ἰπῶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἔν σοποιῆ τοῖς δὲ ἀρχομένοις:—in which the ideal conception of royalty maintained in the Politics also appears.

10. 13. τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύβουλον συμβούλευμα.

See note on iii. 13. § 16.

10. 15. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἄρμόδιος.

Sc. ἐπέθετο, to be supplied from τῶν ἐπιθέσεων, or from ἐπιτίθενται (*supra*, § 14). Cp. Thuc. i. 20, vi. 54-58. The account of Aristotle agrees in the main with that of Thucydides, but there is no mention of the critical question raised by the latter, viz.

whether Hippias or Hipparchus was the elder son of Peisistratus. The Peisistratidae are loosely spoken of as the authors of the insult, and the punishment inflicted is assumed to be the punishment of a tyrant. But the language of Aristotle is not sufficiently precise to be adduced on either side of the question.

10. 16. ἐπεβούλευσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάνδρῳ τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίῳ τυράννῳ.

Mentioned above, c. 4. § 9, where, not inconsistently with the account here given, he is said to have been attacked by conspirators, although the conspirators failed in attaining their object, for the people took the government.

10. 16. ἢ Ἀμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ.

Probably Amyntas the Second who flourished in the generation which followed the Peloponnesian War and succeeded after a struggle to the Macedonian throne b. c. 394, from which however he was deposed but afterwards restored by the help of the Spartans.

Derdas the prince of Elymia his kinsman, and at one time his ally, is probably the conspirator here mentioned.

10. 16. ἢ δὲ Φιλίππου ὑπὸ Πausανίου.

The only direct allusion to Philip which is found in Aristotle except Rhet. ii. 23, 1397 b. 31, καὶ πάλιν πρὸς τὸ Θηβαίους διεῖναι Φίλιππον εἰς τὴν Ἀπτικήν, ὅτι εἰ πρὶν βοηθῆσαι εἰς Φωκεῖς Ἡξίου, ὑπέσχοντο ἄν· ἄτοπον οὖν εἰ διότι προεῖτο καὶ ἐπίστευσε μὴ διήσουσιν. To Alexander there is none.

The murder of Philip by Pausanias occurred at the marriage of his daughter with Alexander of Epirus b.c. 336. The mention of the circumstance shows that this passage, if not the whole of the Politics, must have been composed later than the date of this event.

The story here referred to is narrated more fully by Diodorus (xvi. 93). According to his rather incredible narrative Attalus was the uncle of Cleopatra whom Philip married in 337 b.c., and he had a friend also named Pausanias of whom the assassin Pausanias was jealous. Pausanias the friend of Attalus being abused and insulted by his namesake, sought death in battle, and Attalus, to revenge the supposed insult to his friend, invited the other Pausanias to a banquet and outraged him. When Philip could not or would not punish Attalus, Pausanias turned his anger against the king. Nearly the same story is told by Justin ix. 6. and Plutarch Alex. c. 10.

10. 16. καὶ ἢ τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρῳ τῷ Κυπρίῳ.

Sc. ἢ ἐπιθεσις. Εὐαγόρῳ is governed by the ἐπὶ in ἐπιθεσις. The story is differently told by Theopompus (Fragm. 111, Müller i. p. 295). According to his account the eunuch Thrasydæus got Evagoras and his sons into his power by inducing them to make assignations with a young maiden, who was the daughter of Nicocreon, a revolted

subject of Evagoras. According to Diodorus (xv. 47) the name of the eunuch who conspired was Nicocles; but the name is probably a confusion with the son of Evagoras who succeeded him. Isocrates in his 'Evagoras' throws a veil over the whole story. Thus our four authorities all disagree with one another.

10. 17. Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, reigned in Macedonia 413-399, and had two wives,— the name of the second was Cleopatra, the name of the first is not mentioned. He seems to have thought that he would prevent quarrels in his two families if he married a son and daughter out of each of them to one another. For Archelaus see Thuc. ii. 100 and Plat. Gorg. 470, 471; for Arrhabaeus (or Arrhibaeus) the enemy of Perdiccas, as he was afterwards the enemy of Archelaus, see Thuc. iv. 79. Of Sirra, which appears to be the name of a woman, nothing more is known. The occurrence of the name in this passage has suggested a very ingenious emendation in the words of Strabo, bk. viii. c. 7. p. 327, ἢ Φιλίππου μήτηρ τοῦ Ἀμύντου Εὐρυδικὴ Σίρρα δὲ θυγάτηρ where read Εὐρυδικὴ Σίρρα δὲ θυγάτηρ. (Dindorf.)
10. 18.

Cotys was assassinated in 358 B. C. by the brothers Heraclides and Parrhon called also Python, Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 659. According to Plut. Adv. Coloten 32 and Diog. Laert. iii. 31 they had been disciples of Plato.

10. 19.

πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰκισθῆναι πληγαῖς ὀργισθέντες οἱ μὲν διέφθειραν οἱ δ' ἐνεχείρησαν ὡς ὑβρισθέντες, καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν δυναστειῶν.

The first καὶ means that attempts were also made in consequence of personal ill-treatment of another sort, and the second καὶ that they were made not only upon tyrants, but upon magistrates and royal personages. See also note on Text.

In this passage, though speaking primarily of tyrannies, Aristotle digresses into monarchies generally and oligarchies.

ἐνεχείρησαν, sc. διαφθεῖρουν.

10. 19. Πενθαλίδας.
- It was Penthilus, the son of Orestes, who according to Strabo, bk. ix. p. 403, xiii. p. 582, and Pausanias iii. 2. p. 207 recolonized Lesbos. The Penthalidae derived their name from him.

10. 20. ὁ δ' Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπαιεν εἰπόντος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσωδίαν τοῦ στόματος.

This story, which casts a rather unfavourable light on the character of Euripides, is alluded to in Stobaeus, Serm. 39. p. 237, Εὐριπίδης ὄνειδίζοντος αὐτοῦ τινὸς ὅτι τὸ στόμα δυσῶδες ἦν, πολλὰ γὰρ, εἶπεν αὐτῷ, ἀπόρρητα ἐγκατεσάπη, i. e. Some one said to Euripides, 'Your breath smells.' 'Yes,' he replied, 'for many things which might not be spoken have been decomposed in my mouth.'

10. 21. ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰς μοναρχίας.

We must supply περὶ in thought before μοναρχίας. It is inserted in the margin of P⁵. 'As well in monarchies as in more popular forms of government.'

10. 21. οἶον Ξέρξην Ἀρταπάνης φοβούμενος τῆν διαβολήν τῆν περί Δαρεῖον, ὅτι ἐκρέασεν οὐ κελεύσαντος Ξέρξου, ἀλλ' οἰόμενος συγγνώσασθαι ὡς ἀμνημονοῦντα διὰ τὸ δειπνεῖν.

The Xerxes here referred to is Xerxes the First, cp. Ctesiae Fragmenta, Περσικὰ § 29 (edit. Didot p. 51), Ἀρτάπανος (sic) δὲ μέγα παρὰ Ξέρξῃ δυνάμενος, μετ' Ἀσπαμίτρου τοῦ εὐνούχου καὶ αὐτοῦ μέγα δυναμένου βουλευόνται ἀνελεῖν Ξέρξην, καὶ ἀναιροῦσι, καὶ πειθοῦσιν Ἀρτοξέρξην (sic) τὸν υἱὸν ὡς Δαρειαῖος (sic) αὐτὸν ὁ ἕτερος παῖς ἀνεῖλε. Καὶ παραγίνεται Δαρειαῖος ἀγόμενος ὑπὸ Ἀρταπάνου εἰς τῆν οἰκίαν Ἀρτοξέρξου πολλὰ βοῶν καὶ ἀπαρνούμενος ὡς οὐκ εἴη φονεὺς τοῦ πατρός· καὶ ἀποθνήσκει.

According to Diod. xi. 69, Artabanus an Hyrcanian, having by a false accusation got rid of one of the sons of Xerxes, shortly afterwards attacked the other son Artaxerxes who succeeded him, but he was discovered and put to death. Both these stories, which are substantially the same, are so different from the narrative of Aristotle that it is better not to try and reconcile them by such expedients as the placing οὐ before ἐκρέμασε. The purport of Aristotle's rather obscure words seems to be as follows: Artapanes had hanged Darius the son of Xerxes who was supposed to have conspired against his father; he had not been told to hang him or he had been told not to hang him (for οὐ κελεύσαντος may mean either); but he had hoped that Xerxes in his cups would forget what precisely happened.

Ctesias is several times quoted by Aristotle in the *Historia Animalium* but always with expressions of distrust, ii. 1. 501 a. 25, iii. 22. 523 a. 26, viii. 28. 606 a. 8; also *De Gen. An.* ii. 2. 736 a. 2.

10. 22. Σαρδανάπαλον.

A rather mythical person apparently the same with the Assurbanipal of the Assyrian inscriptions, a mighty hunter and great conqueror, who became to the Greeks and through them to the civilized world the type of oriental luxury. The story of his effeminacy is taken by Diodorus (ii. 23-27) from Ctesias and is again referred to by Aristotle in *Nic. Eth.* i. 5. § 3.

10. 22. εἰ δὲ μῆ ἔπ' ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ἔπ' ἄλλου γε ἄν γένοιτο ἀληθές.

For another example of a similar manner of treating old legends, see i. 11. § 8.

10. 23. Διονυσίῳ τῷ ὑστέρῳ Δίων ἐπέθετο.

See *infra* §§ 28 and 32.

10. 24. ὥσπερ οἱ στρατηγοῦντες τοῖς μονάρχοις, οἶον Κῦρος Ἀστυάγῃ.

Aristotle in this passage follows a legend, differing from that of Herodotus who selected the tradition about Cyrus' life (i. 95 ff.) and death (i. 214) which seemed to him the most probable. In Aristotle's version Cyrus, not Harpagus, was represented as the general of Astyages. Of a misconception entertained by Herodotus, Aristotle speaks with some severity in his *Historia Animalium*, iii. 22, 523 a. 17.

10. 24. Σεύθης ὁ Θρᾷξ.

A friend and acquaintance of Xenophon who recovered his small kingdom by the help of some of the ten thousand. He is mentioned in Anab. vii. 3, Hell. iii. 2. § 2, iv. 8. § 26.

10. 25. οἶον Ἀριοβαρζάνῃ Μιθριδάτης.

According to Corn. Nepos Datames, c. 11, Mithridates the son of Ariobarzanes, a revolted satrap of Pontus, attacked not Ariobarzanes but Datames the celebrated satrap of Caria. It does not therefore become less probable that he may also have attacked his own father; and the latter fact is confirmed by the allusion of Xenophon, Cyrop. viii. 8. 4, ὡσπερ Μιθριδάτης τὸν πατέρα Ἀριοβαρζάνην προδοῦς.

10. 28. οἷς ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ τῆν Δίωνος ὑπόληψιν.

'There should be ever present with them the resolution of Dion.'

10. 28. ἰκανὸν αὐτῷ.

Sc. ὄν.

10. 30. Διὸ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πλείστας κατέλυσαν τυραννίδας.

Διὸ, 'because one form of government naturally hates another.' Cp. Thuc. i. 18, ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἷ τε Ἀθηναίων τύραννοι καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ πρὶν τυραννευθείσης οἱ πλείστοι καὶ τελευταῖοι, πλὴν τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων κατελύθησαν: and Hdt. v. 92 about the Lacedaemonian hatred to tyranny.

10. 30. καὶ Συρακούσιοι.

This period of liberty and prosperity lasted for sixty years, 466-406, from the overthrow of Thrasylbulus to the usurpation of Dionysius. But more is known of Sicily in the days of the tyrants than of the time when the island was comparatively free.

10. 31. καὶ νῦν ἢ τῶν περὶ Διονύσιον.

The final expulsion of Dionysius the younger by Timoleon occurred B. C. 343; but it is the first expulsion by Dion to which Aristotle is here referring, B. C. 356, as the Politics were written not earlier than 336 (see supra note on § 16). We have thus a measure of the latitude with which Aristotle uses the expression καὶ νῦν 'quite lately' which recurs in ii. 9. § 20, καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς Ἀνδρῶσις.

10. 31. οἱ δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν.

Either 1) the same persons who are called οἰκεῖοι συστάντες, or some part of them, οἱ συστάντες being taken substantively = οἱ συσπασίῳται. Or 2) αὐτῶν may be understood of the whole people as if πολῖται had preceded; συστάντες would then refer to another band of conspirators who were not of the family. Bekker in his second edition has inserted κατ' before αὐτῶν without MS. authority. Susemihl suggests μετὰ. Neither emendation is satisfactory.

The reign of Thrasylbulus, if indeed he reigned at all except in the name of his nephew, as seems to be implied in this passage, lasted only eleven months; see infra c. 12. § 6.

According to Diodorus (xi. 67, 68), who says nothing of a son of Gelo, he immediately succeeded Hiero, but soon provoked the Syracusans by his cruelty and rapacity to expel him.

10. 32. Διονύσιον δὲ Δίων στρατεύσας, κηδεστῆς ὦν καὶ προσλαβὼν τὸν δῆμον, ἐκεῖνον ἐκβαλὼν διεφθάρη.

This is a reminiscence of § 28. The emphasis is on ἐκβαλὼν. Aristotle is speaking of cases in which tyrants were destroyed by members of their own family. He means to say that Dion drove out Dionysius who was his kinsman, although he himself perished more than twelve months afterwards when the revolution was completed. Or, 'Dion did indeed perish (as I have already implied), but not until he had driven out his kinsman Dionysius.'

10. 35. ἄλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μῖσος,

sc. χρῆται τῷ λογισμῷ which is supplied from the preceding sentence.

10. 35. ὅσας αἰτίας εἰρήκαμεν τῆς τε ὀλιγαρχίας,

sc. τῆς φθορᾶς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, understood from the general meaning of the preceding passage.

10. 37. οὐ γίνονται δ' ἔτι βασιλεῖαι νῦν.

Cp. iii. 14. § 13, a passage in which the gradual decline of royalty is described.

10. 37. ἄλλ' ἂν περ γίνωνται, μοναρχίαι [καὶ] τυραννίδες μᾶλλον.

The objection to the καὶ (which is found in all the MSS.) is that μοναρχία is elsewhere the generic word (cp. supra §§ 1, 2), including βασιλεία and τυραννίς. If we accept the reading of the MSS., some general idea, 'wherever there are such forms of government' must be supplied with γίνωνται from βασιλεῖαι. 'There are no royalties nowadays: but if there are any,' or rather 'instead of them mere monarchies and tyrannies.' Here 'monarchies' is taken in some specific bad or neutral sense opposed to βασιλεῖαι. But a variation in a technical use of language which he was endeavouring to fix, but was not always capable of himself observing, is not a serious objection to a reading found in Aristotle's Politics.

10. 38. ἔφθια γὰρ ἐγένετο ἢ κατάλυσις.

'For their overthrow was easily effected.' The imperfect graphically represents the historical fact.

11. 2. ἢ περὶ Μολοπποῦς βασιλεία.

Cp. supra, c. 10. § 8.

11. 2. Theopompus is said by Tyrtæus to have terminated the first Messenian War, Fr. 3 Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graeci:—

Ἡμετέρῳ βασιλῆϊ θεοῖσι φίλῳ Θεοπόμπῳ,
 δὲν διὰ Μεσσήνην εἵλομεν εὐρύχορον,
 Μεσσήνην ἀγαθὴν μὲν ἀροῦν, ἀγαθὴν δὲ φυτεύειν·
 ἀμφ' αὐτῆν δ' ἐμάχοντ' ἔννεακαίδεκ' ἔτη
 νωλεμέως, αἰεὶ ταλασίφρονα θυμὸν ἔχοντες
 αἰχμηταὶ πατέρων ἡμετέρων πατέρες·
 εἰκοστῷ δ' οἱ μὲν κατὰ πύονα ἔργα λιπόντες,
 Φεῦγον Ἴθωμαίων ἐκ μεγάλων ὀρέων.

According to Plutarch, Lyc. 7, he increased the power of the Ephors, but he also made the ἔήτρα more stringent which forbade the people to amend or modify proposals submitted to them.

In this passage the institution of the Ephors is attributed to Theopompus, but in ii. c. 9 it seems to be assumed that Lycurgus is the author of all the Spartan institutions: see note *in loc.*

11. 5. ἥ γὰρ γνῶσις πίστιν ποιεῖ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Cp. Thuc. viii. 66 where the difficulty of overthrowing the 400 is attributed to the uncertainty of the citizens as to who were or were not included in the conspiracy.

11. 6. καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας ἀεὶ φανεροὺς εἶναι καὶ διατρίβειν περὶ θύρας.

ἐπιδημοῦντας is translated by William de Moerbek without any authority 'praefectos populi,' apparently an etymological guess.

περὶ θύρας. Either 'at his gate' or 'at their own gates.' In whichever way the words are taken, the general meaning is the same, viz. that the people are not to hide but to show themselves.

11. 8. καὶ τὸ πένητας ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους, τυραννικόν, ὅπως ἢ τε φυλακῆ τρέφεται.

1) *Reading ἢ τε with Bekker's second edition after Victorius: 'Also he should impoverish his subjects that he may find money for the support of his guards.' Yet the mode of expression is indirect and awkward. If 2) we retain μήτε with the MSS. we must translate either 'that he may not have to keep soldiers,' for his subjects will keep them for him; or, 'so that a guard need not be kept,' because he will be in no danger on account of the depressed state of his subjects. Neither explanation is satisfactory; there is a balance of difficulties.

11. 9. ἀναθήματα τῶν Κυψελιδῶν κ.τ.λ.

See Herod. i. 14.

Florence in the fifteenth century, and Paris in the nineteenth, witness to a similar policy.

11. 9. τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτεια.

Lit. and 'among' or 'of the buildings of Samos the works of Polycrates.' Among these splendid works an artificial mountain containing a tunnel forming an aqueduct, a mole in front of the harbour, and the greatest temple known, are commemorated in Herod. iii. 60, but he does not expressly attribute them to Polycrates.

11. 10. καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν, οἷον ἐν Συρακούσαις· ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν εἰσενηνοχένοι συνέβαινον.

Compare a story equally incredible told of Cypselus in the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomics ii. 1346 a. 32: 'Cypselus the Corinthian made a vow that if he ever became lord of the city he would consecrate to Zeus the whole wealth of the citizens, so he bade them register themselves, and when they were registered he took from them a tithe of their property and told them to go on working with the remainder. Each year he did the like; the result was that at the end of ten years he got into his possession all which he had consecrated; the Corinthians meanwhile had gained other property.'

There are several similar legends respecting Dionysius himself recorded in the Oeconomics, such as the story of his collecting the women's ornaments, and after consecrating them to Demeter lending them to himself, 1349 a. 14; or of his taking the money of the orphans and using it while they were under age, ib. b. 15; or of his imposition of a new cattle-tax, after he had induced his subjects to purchase cattle by the abolition of the tax, ib. b. 6. The fertile imagination of the Greeks was a good deal occupied with inventions about the tyrants; the examples given throw a light upon the character of such narratives.

11. 10. βουλομένων μὲν πάντων, δυναμένων δὲ μάλιστα τούτων.

Cp. note on text.

11. 11. καὶ γὰρ ὁ δῆμος εἶναι βούλεται μόναρχος.

i. e. 'for they are both alike.'

11. 13. ἥλωφ γὰρ ὁ ἥλος, ὡσπερ ἡ παροιμία.

Sc. ἔκκρούεται, 'one nail is knocked out by another' = one rogue is got rid of by another. That is to say; 'The tyrant finds in rogues handy and useful instruments.' Such appears to be the application of the proverb in this passage. Yet the common meaning of it given in collections of proverbs is that 'one evil is mended by another.' Cp. Lucian, Pro Lapsu inter Salutandum, § 7, μυρία δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔκ τε ποιητῶν καὶ συγγραφέων καὶ φιλοσόφων καταδειξαί σοι ἔχων, προτιμώντων τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, τοῦτο μὲν παραιτήσομαι, ὡς μὴ εἰς ἀπειροκαλίαν τινα μειρακιώδη ἐκπέσῃ μοι τὸ σύγγραμμα καὶ κινδυνεύωμεν ἄλλω ἥλωφ ἔκκρούειν τὸν ἥλον.

11. 13. αὐτὸν γὰρ εἶναι μόνον ἀξιοῖ τοιοῦτον ὁ τύραννος.

Compare the saying attributed to the Russian Emperor Paul, 'Il n'y a pas de considérable ici que la personne à laquelle je parle, et pendant le temps que je lui parle.' Wallace's Russia, p. 280, ed. 8.

11. 14. οὐθὲν δ' ἔλλειπει μοχθηρίας.

Sc. ὁ τύραννος; or οἴθ' ἔν may be the nominative to ἔλλειπει.

11. 16. εἰς οὓς μὲν οὖν ὄρους . . . φρονῶσιν.

The end of § 16 is bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd Edition (after Schneider). It is only a repetition of what goes before, the three aims of the tyrant being stated in a different order.

The 1st in § 15 = 3rd in § 16.

The 2nd in § 15 = 1st in § 16.

The 3rd in § 15 = 2nd in § 16.

The parallel words are either a summary or a duplicate.

But there is no reason for excluding either of the two passages any more than for excluding the repetitions in Homer. Both versions can hardly be supposed to have come from the hand of Aristotle, but they belong to a text which we cannot go behind.

11. 17. ὁ δ' ἕτερος σχεδὸν ἐξ ἐναντίας ἔχει τοῖς εἰρημένοις τῆν ἐπιμέλειαν.

Literally, 'the other manner of preserving a tyranny takes pains,' i.e. works, 'from an opposite direction.'

11. 18, 19. ἔν φυλάττοντα μόνον τῆν δύναμιν . . . τοῦτο μὲν ὥσπερ ὑπόθεσιν δεῖ μένειν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν ὑποκρινόμενον τὸ βασιλικὸν καλῶς.

Compare Machiavelli, who in his 'Prince' goes much farther than Aristotle in preaching the doctrine of 'doing evil that good may come' and of 'keeping up appearances' and of 'fear to be preferred to love.' 'Let it be the Prince's chief care to maintain his authority; the means he employs, be they what they may, will for this purpose always appear honourable and meet applause; for the vulgar are ever caught by appearances and judge only by the event.' (c. 18, Bohn's Translation, p. 461.) Again 'A prince ought to be very sparing of his own or of his subjects' property.' . . . 'To support the reputation of liberality, he will often be reduced to the necessity of levying taxes on his subjects and adopting every species of fiscal resource, which cannot fail to make him odious.' (c. 16. pp. 454, 455.) And for much of what follows, infra §§ 20, 25: 'He should make it a rule above all things never to utter anything which does not breathe of kindness, justice, good faith and piety; this last quality it is most important for him to appear to possess, for men judge more from appearances than from reality.' (ib.) Again, cp. §§

22, 23 with Machiavelli c. 19. p. 462: 'Nothing in my opinion renders a prince so odious as the violation of the rights of property and disregard to the honour of married women. Subjects will live contentedly enough under a prince who neither invades their property nor their honour, and then he will only have to contend against the pretensions of a few ambitious persons whom he can easily find means to restrain. A prince whose conduct is light, inconstant, pusillanimous, irresolute and effeminate is sure to be despised—these defects he ought to shun as he would so many rocks and endeavour to display a character for courage, gravity, energy and magnificence in all his actions.' Like Aristotle he advises that princes should practise economy and not overcharge the people with taxes; they should give festivals and shows at certain periods of the year and 'should remember to support their station with becoming dignity,' p. 476. Cp. Hallam, *Med. Ages* i. 66, 'The sting of taxation is wastefulness. What high-spirited man could see without indignation the earnings of his labour yielded ungrudgingly to the public defence become the spoil of parasites and speculators?' (quoted by Congreve).

11. 19. Bekker in his 2nd edition, following a suggestion of Schneider, adds εἰς before δωρεάς, but unnecessarily.

11. 22. The moderation here described in everything but ambition was shown by the elder Dionysius as he is pictured by Cornelius Nepos *De Regibus* c. 2: 'Dionysius prior . . . et manu fortis et belli peritus fuit, et, id quod in tyranno non facile reperitur, minime libidinosus, non luxuriosus, non avarus, nullius rei denique cupidus, nisi singularis perpetuique imperii, ob eamque rem crudelis. Nam dum id studuit munire, nullius pepercit vitae, quem ejus insidiatorem putaret.'

The second Dionysius would furnish a tyrant of the opposite type (§ 23), if we may believe the writer of the Aristotelian Polity of Syracuse, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν τῇ Συρακοσίων πολιτείᾳ καὶ συνεχῶς φησὶν αὐτὸν [Διονύσιον τὸν νεώτερον] ἔσθ' ὅτε ἐπὶ ἡμέρας ἑνενήκοντα μεθύειν· διὸ καὶ ἀμβλυωπότερον γενέσθαι τὰς ὄψεις. (Arist. Berl. Ed. 1568, b. 19.)

11. 23. φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βούλονται τοῦτο ποιοῦντες.

These words curiously illustrate the love of ostentation inherent in the Greek character.

11. 24. κατασκευάζειν γὰρ δεῖ καὶ κοσμεῖν τὴν πόλιν.

Like Polycrates at Samos, Gelo at Syracuse, Cypselus and Periander at Corinth, Theron at Agrigentum, Peisistratus at Athens.

11. 28. κολάσεως.

Bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition after Schneider. Certainly the word is not appropriate if taken with ἡλικίαν, but ὑβρεως may be supplied with τῆς εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν from the preceding.

11. 30. διαφθειραντες.

Sc. τὸν τύραννον.

11. 31. χαλεπὸν θυμῷ μάχεσθαι.

Quoted in Nic. Eth. ii. 3. § 10, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον ἤδοντὶ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶ ἐν Ἡράκλειτος.

For the arts of the tyrant cp. Machiavelli's 'Prince' quoted above, especially chaps. 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23.

11. 32. μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοτέρους ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ σῶζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀρχήν.

The consciousness that no other government could hold the balance between irreconcilable parties seems to have been the main support of recent French Imperialism.

11. 34. ἔτι δ' αὐτὸν διακεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἦθος ἦτοι καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ ἡμίχρηστον ὄντα, καὶ μὴ πονηρὸν ἀλλ' ἡμιπόνηρον.

Cp. Machiavelli, Prince, c. 15. p. 453, in a still more subtle style of reflection: 'It would doubtless be happy for a prince to unite in himself every species of good quality, but as our nature does not allow of so great a perfection a prince should have prudence enough to avoid those defects and vices which may occasion his ruin.' And again: 'He should not shrink from encountering some blame on account of vices which are important to the support of his states; for there are some things having the appearance of virtues which would prove the ruin of a prince, should he put them in practice, and others upon which, though seemingly bad and vicious, his actual welfare and security entirely depend.'

12. 1. Hdt. vi. 126 gives the Sicyonian tyrants as 1) Andreas, 2) Myron, 3) Aristonymus, 4) Cleisthenes. According to Pausanias x. 7. § 3. p. 814 Cleisthenes is said to have won a victory in the Pythian games B.C. 582. Grote (vol. iii. c. 9. p. 43) says 'there is some confusion about the names of Orthagoras and Andreas. It has been supposed with some probability that the same person is designated under both names: for the two names do not seem to occur in the same author.' Orthagoras, 'speaker for the right,' may have been a surname or second name of Andreas. Infra § 12, Aristotle supposes the tyranny to have passed directly from Myron to Cleisthenes.

12. 2. Πεισίστρατον ὑπομεῖναι ποτε προσκληθέντα δίκην εἰς Ἄρειον πάγον.

According to Plutarch in the life of Solon c. 31 he is said to have gone to the Court of the Areopagus intending to defend himself against a charge of homicide, but his accuser did not appear.

12. 3. Cypselidae.

The addition in this passage appears to be incorrect.

Cypselus	30	years.
Periander	44	years.

Psammetichus 3 years.
77

From these numbers how does Aristotle get a total 73½ years?

Sylburg would change τρία καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα into ἑπτὰ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα. Giphanius would omit καὶ τέτταρα after τετταράκοντα. Susemihl would change τέτταρα into ἥμισυ, which would give exactly the sum wanted. Goettling has a very farfetched and groundless supposition that the reign of Psammetichus was omitted by Aristotle in the addition, because he was only a commander of mercenaries and not of Cypselid blood. It might also be suggested that some of the reigns overlap in consequence of a tyrant adopting his successor as colleague. But a mistake either of Aristotle or his copyists is more likely.

All the MSS. read τέτταρα or τέσσαρα.

12. 5. τριάκοντα καὶ πέντε.

Hdt. v. 65 makes the Peisistratidae rule Athens 36 years.

Peisistratus seized the sovereignty in 560 B.C. and died in 527; he reigned 17 years out of the 33. Hippias reigned 14 years before the death of Hipparchus (514), and in the year 510, four years afterwards, he was expelled. $17 + 14 + 4 = 35$.

The whole period 560-510 is 50 years, 35 of actual rule. In the calculation of Herodotus there is a year more. From Thuc. vi. 54 we learn that even at Athens not 100 years after the event, there were erroneous ideas about the expulsion of the Peisistratidae.

12. 6. Here the addition is correct. $7 + 10 + 1 = 18$, although the time assigned to Hiero's reign does not agree with the statement of Diodorus (xi. 66) that he reigned 11 years. But why does Aristotle omit Dionysius, whose tyranny lasted longer, and therefore afforded a better example? Dionysius I B.C. 405-367, Dionysius II 367-356, and again 346-344, besides the shorter reigns of Dion and others, in all about 60 years.

12. 7. ἰδίως.

i.e. in any way specially applicable to that form of government.

12. 8. We may observe that Aristotle criticises the Platonic number as if it had a serious meaning: yet he omits τρίς ἀΰξηθεις, words which are an essential part of the calculation, after δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται. (See Rep. viii. 546 C.)

12. 9. διὰ τε τοῦ χρόνου.

Sc. τί ἄν ἴδιος εἴη μεταβολῆ to be supplied from the preceding sentence. 'And in what is any special change made by time?' i.e. What has time alone to do with the changes of states?

12. 9. With τὰ μὴ ἀρχάμενα supply τι or διὰ τι from τι ἄν εἴη above; cp. διὰ τιν' αἰτίαν (infra § 10). 'And why should things which do not begin together change together?'

12. 10. διὰ τιν' αἰτίαν ἐκ ταύτης εἰς τῆν Λακωνικὴν μεταβάλλει;

Aristotle unfairly criticizes Plato's order as if it were meant to be an order in time. The same objection might be taken to his own use of the phrases μεταβάλλειν and μεταβαίνειν in Nic. Eth. viii. 10, where he talks as if states always 'passed over' into their opposites:—the 'passing over' is logical, a natural connexion of ideas, not always historical.

12. 11. ἔτι δὲ τυραννίδος οὗ λέγει οὗτ' εἰ ἔσται μεταβολή, οὗτ' εἰ μὴ ἔσται, διὰ τιν' αἰτίαν, καὶ εἰς ποίαν πολιτείαν.

1) *'He never says whether tyranny is or is not liable to revolutions, and if it is, what is the cause of them and into what form it changes'—a condensed sentence in which καὶ is omitted before διὰ τιν' εἰς ποίαν πολιτείαν, sc. ἔσται μεταβολή.

2) It is also possible and perhaps better, with Bekker in his second edition, to place a comma after the second οὗτε: οὗτ', εἰ μὴ ἔσται, διὰ τιν' αἰτίαν. (It will be remembered that tyranny is the last development of the Platonic cycle, and it is natural to ask 'Why does not the cycle continue or return into itself?') The meaning may then be paraphrased as follows: 'He never says whether (as might be expected) tyranny, like other forms of government, experiences a change, or if not, what is the explanation of this inconsistency?'

12. 12. ἧ Χαριλάου.

According to Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 2 Müller) Charillus, as the name is also spelt in ii. 10. § 2, or Charilaus, as here, made himself tyrant during the absence of Lycurgus, who on his return to Sparta restored or introduced good order. The change which he then effected in the constitution of Sparta is called by Aristotle, who appears to follow the same tradition, a change from tyranny to aristocracy.

12. 12. ἐν Καρχηδόνι.

Sc. τυραννίς μετέβαλεν εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν. Yet he says in Book ii. c. 11. § 2 — 'that Carthage has never had a sedition worth speaking of, nor been under a tyrant,' and a similar statement occurs in this chapter (§ 14). Cp. also vi. 5. § 9, τοιοῦτον δὲ τινα τρόπον Καρχηδόνιοι πολιτευόμενοι φίλον κέκτηνται τὸν δῆμον· ἀεὶ γάρ τινας ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοικίδας ποιοῦσιν εὐπόρους κ.τ.λ. To avoid this apparent contradiction St. Hilaire conjectures Χαλκηδόνι, a useless emendation of which there can be neither proof nor disproof; for we know nothing of the history of Chalcedon and not much of the history of Carthage.

It might be argued that the text as it stands may refer to a time in the history of Carthage *before* the establishment of the aristocratical constitution described in Bk. ii. c. 11, as he says in this very passage of Lacedaemon, § 12, that it passed from tyranny into aristocracy. But such a violent supposition is hardly to be assumed in order to save Aristotle's consistency. In § 14 *infra*, he calls Carthage a democracy. In ii. 11. § 5, he

talks of it as having a democratic element.

12. 15. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τῆν ὀλιγαρχικὴν, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle is really objecting to a figure of speech, Plat. Rep. iv. 422 E; viii. 551 D. It may be certainly said of a state which is governed by an oligarchy, with much more truth than of a timocracy or democracy, that it consists of two cities.

12. 17. Bekker inserts καὶ in his 2nd Edition—ἄσωτευόμενοι (καὶ) κατατοκιζόμενοι. The addition makes no change in the sense.

12. 18. μεταβάλλουσιν οὐθὲν μᾶλλον οὐδέποτε εἰς δῆμον ἢ εἰς ἄλλην πολιτείαν.

Yet in iii. 15. § 12, Aristotle says that oligarchies passed into tyrannies and these into democracies.

BOOK VI.

The greater part of Book vi. has been already anticipated in iv. There are also several repetitions of Book v. A few sentences may be paralleled out of ii. and iii. (See English Text.) The whole is only a different redaction of the same or nearly the same materials which have been already used; not much is added. The varieties of democracy and oligarchy and the causes of their preservation or destruction are treated over again, but in a shorter form. The management of the poor is worked out in greater detail: the comparison of the military and civil constitution of a state is also more precise and exact. The magistrates required in states are regarded from a different point of view: in iv. they are considered chiefly with reference to the mode of electing them and their effect on the constitution; in vi. they are enumerated and described, and the officers necessary to all states are distinguished from those which are only needed in certain states. There are several passages in which a previous treatment of the same subjects is recognized (1. § 1, § 5, § 8, § 10; 4. § 1, § 15; 5. § 2; 8. § 1). The references seem to have been inserted with a view of combining the two treatments in a single work.

1. 2. ἄμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἴ τι λοιπόν

seems to indicate the supplementary character of this part of the work. 1) 'As well as any omission of those matters (ἐκείνων) which have just been mentioned,' i. e. the offices, law-courts, etc.; or 2*) ἐκείνων may refer to the forms of constitutions [πολιτεῖων].

1. 4-6. Bekker in his 2nd edition inserts περὶ τὸ before βουλευόμενον in § 4, and ἐπεὶ before δεῖ in § 6 without any authority, both apparently in order to make the language smoother and more regular. But this is not a good reason for altering the text of Aristotle.

1. 6. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡν καλοῦσι τινες ὀλιγαρχίαν,

'which they call oligarchy,' is perhaps only an example of unmeaning pleonasm like the

expression ὁ καλούμενος ἀήρ, Meteor. i. 3, 339 b. 3; τῆν τοῦ καλουμένου γάλακτος φύσιν, Pol. i. 8. § 10. But it is also possible that Aristotle here uses the term in the wider sense in which he has previously spoken of oligarchy and democracy as the two principal forms of government under which the rest are included (iv. 3. § 6). Cp. note on iv. 8. § 1.

1. 9. τῆ δ' ἅπαντα ταῦτα.

'All the democratic elements of which he has spoken generally and is going to speak more particularly,' i. e. election by lot, elections of all out of all, no property qualification, payment of the citizens (etc., see infra c. 2. § 5), 'may exist in the same state.'

2. 1. ὡς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ μετέχοντας ἐλευθερίας.

μετέχοντας, accusative absolute, or a second accusative after λέγειν εἰώθασιν, the subject and object being nearly the same.

2. 2. τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ τέλος, καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον.

'That is also the end, and that is the just principle.'

2. 3. εἴπερ τοῦ δούλου ὄντος τὸ ζῆν.

The MSS. vary between δουλεύοντος and δούλου ὄντος. Supply ἔστι or some weaker word than ἔργον.

2. 4. συμβάλλεται ταύτῃ πρὸς τῆν ἐλευθερίαν τῆν κατὰ τὸ ἴσον.

'The impatience of control passes into the love of equality; mankind are unwilling to be ruled and therefore they rule and are ruled in turn. Thus the two characteristics of freedom meet or coincide.'

2. 5. τὸ δικάζειν πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων.

The old translator takes this as if he read ἢ ἐκ. But we may retain καὶ, regarding ἐκ πάντων as explanatory of the manner in which the whole people exercised their judicial functions by the election of smaller bodies out of their own number.

2. 5. τὸ τῆν ἐκκλησίαν κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων, ἀρχὴν δὲ μηδεμίαν μηθενὸς ἢ ὅτι ὀλιγίστων ἢ τῶν μεγίστων κυρίαν.

The passage as it stands in the MSS. [ἢ ὅτι ὀλιγίστων ἢ τῶν μεγίστων κυρίαν] gives no suitable meaning. It is possible to correct it 1*) by placing the words ἢ τῶν μεγίστων after πάντων, or 2) by inserting μῆ before τῶν μεγίστων [Lambinus].

2. 6. ἀρχῶν

is used in the generic sense to include the ἀόριστος ἀρχή of iii. 1. § 7.

2. 6. μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ ταύτης.

Sc. iv. 6. § 5 and c. 15. § 13.

2. 7. τῶν ἀρχῶν ἅς ἀνάγκη συσσιτεῖν μετ' ἀλλήλων.

i. e. the chief magistrates whom the law required to take their meals together. This, which is a regulation prescribed by Aristotle in vii. 12. § 2, may be inferred to have been the general custom.

2. 7. ἔτι ἐπειδὴ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὁρίζεται κ.τ.λ.

The term oligarchy is here used nearly in the sense of aristocracy. Education cannot be said to be characteristic of oligarchy in the strict sense of the word. Cp. iv. 8. § 3. 'The term aristocracy is applied to those forms of government which incline towards oligarchy, because birth and education are commonly the accompaniments of wealth.'

2. 8. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ μηδεμίαν ἰδίον εἶναι.

Sc. δημοτικὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι. For the general power of the ancient magistrates cp. iii. 16. § 1; v. 1. §§ 10, 11; c. 10. § 5.

2. 8. ἐξ ἀρχαῖς ἀμεταβολήσιν.

These words are translated in the text 'has survived some ancient change'; they may also mean, though the expression is somewhat inaccurate, 'have survived from the old state before the change.' For an example of such a 'survival' compare the custom at Epidamnus of the magistrates going into the assembly at elections, v. 1. § 10.

2. 9. τὰ μὲν οὖν κοινὰ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῦτ' ἔστιν.

ταῦτα, i. e. 'election out of all, all over each, each over all, some payment for services, poverty, mean birth are in various degrees characteristic of all democracies.'

2. 9. τὸ μηθὲν μᾶλλον ἄρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους

is the reading of all the MSS. except one, and is supported by Moerbek. The phrase is peculiar: 'that the poor should no more have power than the rich' — we might expect rather 'that the rich should no more have power than the poor.' But Aristotle is speaking of democracy in the previous passage. It has been suggested that we should transpose the words; for the confusion of εὐποροὶ and ἀποροὶ (ii. 11. § 12, iii. 17. § 4, and v. 3. § 8) is common, and renders such a transposition not improbable. But a sufficiently good meaning is elicited from the text as it stands.

3. 1. Τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπορεῖται πῶς ἕξουσι τὸ ἴσον, πότερον δεῖ τὰ τιμήματα διελεῖν χιλίοις τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίων καὶ τοὺς χιλίους ἴσον δύνασθαι τοῖς πεντακοσίοις, ἢ οὕτω δεῖ τιθέσθαι τὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἰσότητα, ἀλλὰ διελεῖν μὲν οὕτως, ἔπειτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἴσους λαβόντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, τούτους κυρίουσ εἶναι τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων.

The meaning of the first case (πότερον δεῖ τὰ τιμήματα κ.τ.λ.) is that the five hundred men of property should have as many votes as the thousand; of the second case that

the proportion between the rich and the poor being maintained (500 = 1000), the electors instead of voting directly should choose representatives in equal numbers and transfer to them all the electoral and judicial power.

χιλίοις is the dative after διελεῖν: 'to distribute to or among the thousand the qualification of the 500.' The clause which follows (καὶ . . . πεντακοσίοις) is explanatory and illustrates the meaning. The qualification of the 500 is to be distributed among the 1000, and so the 1000 are equal to the 500. Others take the words with ἴσον δύνασθαι, placing a comma at διελεῖν, 'and arrange the qualifications so that the votes of the 500 should be equal to those of the 1000, and the 1000 equal to the 500.' According to this way of taking the passage, τὰ τιμήματα τῶν πεντακοσίων is not parallel with χιλίοις, sc. πολίταις, for which we should have expected τοῖς τῶν χιλίων. The irregularity is not continued in the next clause.

διελεῖν μὲν οὕτως. 'We ought to distribute the qualification in this proportion, i. e. so that 1000 shall have together as much as 500 have together; and carry out the principle by electing an equal number of representatives from both.' In the previous case Aristotle supposes a direct election, in this an election through representatives.

The word διαιρέσεων in this passage is doubtful. If genuine, it probably means the distribution of the citizens in classes or courts, like διελεῖν in the previous sentence (ἄλλὰ διελεῖν μὲν οὕτως κ.τ.λ.).

3. 4. λέγουσι γὰρ ὅς ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι τῶν πολιτῶν, τοῦτ' ἐπιλείπειν; ναὶ δεῖ κύριον κ.τ.λ.

'It is commonly said that the majority must prevail, but in the majority the elements both of wealth and numbers have to be included. Suppose for example there are ten rich and twenty poor, six rich are of one opinion, fifteen poor of another. Five poor vote with the six rich, and four rich with the fifteen poor. When both are added up, then of whichever side the qualification exceeds, that is supreme.'

In the instance given, assuming the qualification of the poor to be half that of the rich then the votes of the side on which

the poor have a majority =	$4 \times 2 + 15 =$	23,
the rich have a majority =	$6 \times 2 + 5 =$	17,
Majority of poor . . .		6

The precise arithmetical expression which is given to an imaginary problem is rather curious. It is also remarkable that the formula which is used seems applicable to timocracy rather than to democracy, which is now being discussed. But here as elsewhere Aristotle is always trying to escape from democracy pure and simple.

3. 5. ὁποτέρων οὖν τὸ τίμημα ὑπερτείνει συναριθμουμένων ἀμφοτέρων ἑκατέροις, τοῦτο κύριον.

ἑκατέροις is the dative after ὑπερτείνει and a pleonastic explanation of ὁποτέρων.

4. 1. λέγω δὲ πρώτην ὡς περ ἄν τις διέλοι τοὺς δήμους· βέλτιστος γὰρ δῆμος ὁ γεωργικός

ἔστιν, ὥστε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν, ὅπου ζῆν τὸ πλῆθος ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἢ νομῆς.

ὥσπερ ἔν τις κ.τ.λ. is the explanation of πρώτην, 'I call it the first, meaning that which comes first in the classification of democracies,' because it is the best and most natural, implied in βέλτιστος γὰρ δῆμος.

ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν. The commentators require the addition of βελτίστην which may be supplied from βέλτιστος. Or Aristotle may mean, that you can have a democracy (though not commonly found to exist) among a rustic population, for that is the very best material of a democracy.

ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἢ νομῆς. Aristotle is here speaking not of nomadic tribes 'cultivating their living farm' (i. 8. § 6), who are far from being the most peaceable of mortals, not of an exclusively pastoral life at all (cp. § 11 infra), but of the tending of cattle as one of the ordinary pursuits of an agricultural population.

4. 2. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἀσχολος, ὥστε μὴ πολλάκις ἐκκλησιάζειν· διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖα πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις διατρίβουσι καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.

It may appear strange that their being poor should be a reason why people do not desire the property of others. But though a little paradoxical the meaning is clear. Aristotle is describing a population which having little or no independent means, is absorbed in labour, and can only obtain through their labour the necessaries of life; they are patient as well as industrious, and too busy to covet the property of others.

4. 4. κἄν μὴ μετέχῃσι τῆς αἰρέσεως τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀλλὰ τινες αἰρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκ πάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείῳ.

These words probably mean that a body of representatives elected the magistrates, this body consisting of persons elected in turn, or by sections out of all the citizens. A similar principle was adopted in the constitution of Telecles the Milesian (iv. 14. § 4), in which the citizens were to deliberate by turns, as here they elect by turns.

4. 5. καὶ δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι σχῆμά τι δημοκρατίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείῳ ποτ' ἦν.

So iv. 9. § 7, πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐγχειροῦσι λέγειν ὡς δημοκρατίας οὐσης [τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας] διὰ τὸ δημοκρατικῶς πολλὰ τῶν τάξιν ἔχειν. Mantinea is to be counted as a democracy 'after a fashion,' at a certain period of her history, because the electors to offices, although themselves a small body only, were elected by all, and because the whole people had the right of deliberating. Schneider thinks that the names of the magistrates mentioned in the treaty made between Athens, Argos, Mantinea and Elis, B. C. 420 (Thuc. v. 47), likewise indicate a democratic form of government. But this is fanciful. That Mantinea was at that time a democracy may be more safely inferred from the alliance which she formed with Athens and Argos. Aristotle's cautious language would lead us to suppose that the government of Mantinea, though not strictly speaking a democracy, wore the appearance of one, and was a form of government which he himself greatly admired, being in name a democracy but in reality administered by its chief citizens.

4. 5, 6. The chief magistrates are to be a select class possessing a high qualification, but they will be controlled by the whole people. Thus the democratical constitution is supposed to be happily balanced. But it may be questioned whether a democracy which has a supreme power in the assembly would be willing to elect its magistrates from a privileged class. It may equally be doubted, whether a great people like the Athenians would have submitted to the checks and artifices by which democracy is bridled. Such theories of government look well in books, but they are 'paperconstitutions' only. They may sometimes be realized in fact when events have prepared the way for them; but cannot be imposed as the behests of political philosophy on a reluctant people merely with a view to their good.

4. 5. διὸ δὴ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστὶ τῆι πρότερον ἐηθείσῃ δημοκρατίῳ.

διὸ refers to what has preceded. 'And because of the general contentment which is thereby secured, it is advantageous to this rural form of democracy to be allowed to elect officers and review and judge': a thought which is illustrated in what follows, § 6.

4. 7. ἄρχειν τοὺς ἐπεικεῖς ἀναμαρτήτους ὄντας.

Lit. 'and they are blameless,' 'do no wrong,' or taken in connexion with the preceding words, as in the translation, 'are prevented from doing wrong.' An example of a condensed sentence in which two thoughts are compressed into one.

4. 8. πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν γεωργὸν τὸν δῆμον τῶν τε νόμων τινὲς τῶν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς κειμένων τὸ ἀρχαῖον χρήσιμοι πάντες, ἢ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἐξεῖναι κεκτηῖσθαι πλείω γῆν μέτρου τινὸς ἢ ἀπὸ τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ τῆν πόλιν.

ἀπὸ τινος τόπου, 'beginning from a certain place,' reckoned in relation to the town. *If reckoning inwards, we must supply μὴ from μὴ ἐξεῖναι; if outwards, the force of μὴ is not continued.

'The law provided that no one should possess more than a certain quantity of land; or, if he did, it was not to be within a certain distance of the city; or, regarded from another point of view, it was to be beyond a certain distance from the city.' In other words he was not to monopolize the valuable portions of the land (cp. Plato's Laws, v. 739 foll.), which were to be distributed among as many of the citizens as possible.

ἄστυ the city is more precisely defined by πόλις, the Acropolis, as at Athens, cp. Thuc. ii. 15.

4. 9. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὃν λέγουσιν Ἰσχυλοῦ νόμον εἶναι τοιοῦτόν τι δυνάμενος, τὸ μὴ δανείζειν εἰς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἐκάστῳ γῆς.

That is to say, a certain portion of the land could not be pledged, and was therefore always clear of incumbrances. In ancient as well as in modern times there were agricultural troubles; and many plans were devised for securing the peasant proprietor against the money-lender.

4. 9, 10. νῦν δὲ δεῖ διορθοῦν καὶ τῶν Ἀφυταίων νόμῳ· πρὸς γὰρ ὃ λέγομεν ἐστὶ χρήσιμος. ἔκεῖνοι γάρ, καίπερ ὄντες πολλοὶ κεκτημένοι δὲ γῆν ὀλίγην, ὅμως πάντες γεωργοῦσιν· τι

ᾠνται γὰρ οὐχ ὅλας τὰς κτήσεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τηλικαῦτα μόρια διαιροῦντες ὥστ' ἔχειν ὑπερβάλλειν ταῖς τιμήσεσι καὶ τοὺς πένητας.

διορθοῦν. 'Now, when through the want of an enactment such as that which is ascribed to Oxyllus the evil has already sprung up, we should correct it by the law of the Aphytaeans.'

The object aimed at was to maintain or to preserve a large number of small proprietors who were freemen. This was effected at Aphytis by dividing the lots into small portions, each of which gave a qualification for citizenship, so that every one, however poor, was included: e.g. suppose a citizen of Aphytis to have possessed fifty acres, and that forty of these were seized by the usurer, still the remaining ten were sufficient to preserve his rights of citizenship. Or, more generally, 'though the properties were often larger, the portion of land required for a qualification was small.'

The meaning of ὑπερβάλλειν is doubtful. It has been thought to mean that 'even the small proprietors exceeded in number some other class, i.e. the rich or the inhabitants of the town,' or* better 'they exceeded the amount required.'

Aphytis was a city in Pallene, which, according to Heraclides Ponticus, fr. 39, Müller, vol. ii. p. 223, bore an excellent character for honesty among Hellenic cities. Δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως βιοῦσιν καὶ ἀλλοτρίων οὐ θιγγάνουσιν ἀνεφγμένων τῶν θυρῶν. Then follows the story of the stranger who bought wine and entrusted it to no one, but on returning after a voyage found it in the same place.

4. 11. τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις.

Not to be taken after γεγυμνασμένοι; nor is it necessary with some editors to bracket τὰ. Translate, 'and as regards military actions, their mode of life is an excellent training for them.' Compare Alexander's speech to his army, made a few months before his death, 323 B.C., recorded by Arrian, Exped. Alexandri, vii. 9, in which he contrasts the Oriental luxury of his Macedonian soldiers with their former life as mountain shepherds.

The pastoral democracies of the Swiss mountains have been among the most lasting democracies in the world, and they have also furnished some of the best soldiers.

4. 15. ἔπομένως δεῖ παρεκβαίνειν,

sc. τὰς ἄλλας. 'The other sorts must deviate in a corresponding order.'

ἔπομένως, i.e. 'in an order corresponding to their goodness or badness,' gathered from βελτίστην καὶ πρῶτην.

4. 15. χειρὸν ἀεὶ πλῆθος χωρίζειν.

'At each stage we shall exclude a population worse in kind than at the preceding stage.' Thus the first and best kind of democracy excludes the class of τεχνῖται (and *a fortiori* of course all below them). The second excludes the θῆτες, and so on till at last nobody remains to be excluded. For the analogous process in oligarchy, cp. infra c. 6. §§ 2, 3.

4. 15. ὃ δὲ φθεῖρειν συμβαίνει καὶ ταύτην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, εἴρηται πρότερον τὰ πλε

ἴστα σχεδόν.

Either the stress is to be laid upon καὶ ταύτην, to which the words καὶ τὰς ἄλλας are subordinated, for other states have not been spoken of, 'Most of the causes which are wont to destroy this like other states, have been already mentioned.' Or, if the emphasis on καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας is retained, the reference is to the causes of the destruction of states in bk. v.

ὄ δὲ . . . εἴρηται. The connexion is, 'But I need not speak of the causes which destroy states; for they have been already spoken of.' For the absolute use of μᾶλλον cp. Plat. Phaedo 63 D, Φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς διαλεγόμενους.

4. 16. ἅπαν γὰρ οἰκεῖον τοῦτο τῷ τοιούτῳ δήμῳ μᾶλλον.

The last word qualifies οἰκεῖον: 'For all this admission of citizens is rather natural than alien to a democracy of this kind.'

4. 17. ὅπερ συνέβη τῆς στάσεως αἴτιον γενέσθαι περὶ Κυρήνην.

ὅπερ = the violence of the democracy which was established after the overthrow of the royal power (Herod. iv. 161), about 460 or 450 B.C., and was extended at a somewhat later period in the history of Cyrene.

4. 18. Κλεισθένης.

Cp. Hdt. v. 69, ὥς γὰρ δὴ τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον πρότερον ἄπωσμένον τότε πάντα (al. lect. πάντων) πρὸς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ μοῖραν προσεθήκατο, τὰς φυλάς μετουνόμασε καὶ ἐποίησε πλεῖνας ἐξ ἐλασσόνων. δέκα τε δὴ φυλάρχους ἀντὶ τεσσέρων ἐποίησε, δέκα δ' ἔ καὶ τοὺς δήμους κατένεμε ἐς τὰς φυλάς.

Cp. Schömann's Antiquities of Greece, Engl. Transl., p. 336.

The breaking up old divisions in an army and a state is not a mere change of names, but of traditions, customs, personal relations—to the ancients even of gods. The division of France into departments, the reorganisation of Italy and Germany, or, to take a minor instance, the recent redistribution of the English regiments, are modern examples of the manner in which such changes affect the habits of men or offend their prejudices.

5. 1. ἔστι δ' ἔργον . . . μέγιστον ἔργον.

The repetition of ἔργον is awkward; but the general style of the Politics is not sufficiently accurate to justify us in omitting the word in either place.

5. 2. διὸ δεῖ, περὶ ὧν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, τίνες σωτηρία καὶ φθοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν.

διὸ because of the instability of states; the words περὶ ὧν τεθεώρηται πρότερον are either omitted or altered by those who change the order of the books.

The clause τίνες σωτηρία is the explanation of περὶ ὧν, and is resumed in ἐκ τούτων.

5. 3. καὶ φερόντων πρὸς τὸ κοινόν.

These words are an explanation of τῶν καταδικαζομένων, 'of those who are condemned, and so bring money into the public treasury,' not voluntarily, but by the penalties which they incur.

Cp. Cleon in Aristoph. Knights (923):

δώσεις ἐμοὶ καλῆν δίκην,
ἰπούμενος ταῖς ἐσφοραῖς.
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐς τοὺς πλουσίους
σπεύσω σ' ὅπως ἂν ἐγγραφήις.

5. 5. δεῖ ποιεῖν ὀλίγας ἐκκλησίας.

Cp. iv. 14. § 4.

5. 8. ἄθροα χρῆ διανέμειν τοῖς ἀπόροις, μάλιστα μὲν, εἴ τις δύναται τοσοῦτον ἄθροίζων ὅσον εἰς γηδίου κτήσιον.

ἄθροα, 'in lump sums,' opposed to the piecemeal method of doling out money which he had been describing above.

εἴ τις, indefinite 'if we can only collect.'

δύναται, sc. ἄθροα διανέμειν. The MSS. vary between ἄθροίζων and συναθροίζων. Bekker's emendation ἄθροίζειν is unnecessary.

5. 9. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ.

'In the meantime,' i.e. until the poor have all received their share they should be assisted by the rich, who should pay them for attending the assembly.

5. 9. ἀφιεμένους τῶν ματαίων λειτουργιῶν.

They being excused from those services which are useless. Cp. v. 8. § 20.

5. 10. For Tarentum, see Müller's Dorians (iii. 9. § 14), who suggests without any proof that the words κοινὰ ποιοῦντες τὰ κτήματα refer only to the *ager publicus*. Compare ii. 5. § 8, where Aristotle describes the Lacedaemonians as using one another's horses and dogs in common.

5. 11. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς μερίζοντας, τοὺς μὲν κληρωτοὺς τοὺς δ' ἀίρετούς.

See note on text.

ἀρχῆς is a genitive of respect, assisted by μερίζειν. 'Either there may be two sets of offices, filled up the one by lot and the other by vote, or the same office may be filled up sometimes by lot and sometimes by vote.'

τοὺς μὲν κληρωτούς, sc. ἄρχοντας. Either the accusative immediately follows ποιῆσαι, or is in apposition with τοῦτο; or some word like καθιστάντας is to be supplied from

μερίζοντας.

The people of Tarentum elected to some of their offices by vote and to some by lot; the same result might have been attained if they had divided each office, and filled up the vacancies alternately by vote and by lot.

6. 1. πῶς δεῖ φανερόν ἐκ τούτων.

With δεῖ, κατασκευάζειν from the previous sentence, or some similar word suitable to the construction, has to be supplied.

6. 1. τῆν μὲν εὐκρατον μάλιστα τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ πρώτην.

With these words have to be supplied, though not therefore to be inserted in the text (Lambinus), πρὸς τῆν βελτίστην δημοκρατίαν καὶ πρώτην from the beginning of chap. 4.

6. 2. ἢ δεῖ.

ἢ = ἐν ἢ. 'And in this.'

6. 2. μετέχειν ἐξεῖναι,

sc. δεῖ.

6. 2. τοσοῦτον εἰσαγομένου τοῦ δήμου πλῆθος,

'The people being introduced in such numbers.' An accusative of measure. (Matth. G. G. 421. § 5.)

6. 4. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν σώματα εἰ διακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῖα τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν καλῶς ἔχοντα τοῖς πλωτῆρσιν ἐπιδέχεται πλείους ἁμαρτίας.

καλῶς ἔχοντα is taken in a double construction with τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν and with πλωτῆρσι. Either (1)* 'well furnished with sailors for navigation,' or (2) 'well furnished in respect of naval equipments for their sailors.' τοῖς πλωτῆρσιν may also be construed with ἐπιδέχεται, 'allow of more errors in their sailors.' (1) is confirmed by the words which follow πλωτήρων τετυχηκότα Φαύλων.

7. 1. ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα μὲν ἔστι κ.τ.λ.

Interpreters correctly remark that the four kinds of military force have no connexion with the four classes of the people.

7. 1. ἐνταῦθα μὲν εὐφυῶς ἔχει κ.τ.λ.

'There nature favours the establishment of an oligarchy which will be strong,' or 'we may naturally expect to establish an oligarchy.'

7. 1. ὅπου δ' ὀπλίτην.

Sc. εἶναι συμβέβηκε understood from the previous words though with a slight change of meaning in the word εἶναι. It is not necessary to read 1) ὀπλίτην with Bekker (in his second edition), or 2) ὀπλιτικῆν with Susemihl (on the authority of one MS. which reads ὀπλιτικὸν and the old translator who gives 'armativam').

7. 2, 3. The oligarchy find themselves outnumbered and overmatched by the light-armed troops. The remedy for this evil is to combine a light-armed force of their own with their cavalry and heavyarmed.

7. 2. νῦν μὲν οὖν ὅπου τοιοῦτον πολὺ πλῆθος ἐστίν, ὅταν διαστώσι, πολλακίς ἀγωνίζονται χεῖρω.

The change in the nominatives is observable, 'When the two parties (πλῆθος καὶ εὐποροὶ) fall out, the rich (εὐποροὶ) are often worsted in the struggle.'

7. 2. Φάρμακον . . . στρατηγῶν.

'A remedy such as military commanders employ.'

7. 3. ταύτῃ δ' ἐπικρατοῦσιν.

The antecedent of ταύτῃ, 'in this way,' is not clear. It appears to mean (as we gather from the context) 'by their superior flexibility'—sc. διὰ τὸ ψιλῆν τῆν δύναμιν εἶναι.

7. 3. ἐκκεκριμένους δὲ ἐκ παίδων ἀθλητᾶς εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῶν ἔργων.

Lit. 'and that persons selected out of boys [thus trained] should themselves become actual light-armed warriors.' The opposition of ἐκκεκριμένους δὲ to ἔτι μὲν ὄντας νέους implies that the persons selected had passed the stage of youth. For ἀθλητᾶς τῶν ἔργων cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 543 B, ἀθλητᾶς πολέμου.

7. 4. ἐν Μασσαλίῳ.

See note on v. 6. § 2.

7. 6. κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν

should be taken generally of some permanent work, to erect some public building or monument.

7. 7. τὰ λήμματα γὰρ ζητοῦσιν οὐχ ἵπτον ἢ τῆν τιμὴν.

Cp. Eth. viii. 16. § 3, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι.

8. The plan of this book, which is for the most part a repetition of Book iv., here abruptly breaks down. For though democracy and oligarchy are fully discussed, nothing is said of other forms of government, notwithstanding the intention expressed at the beginning of the book, c. 1. § 2, of considering 'the modes of organisation proper to each form of government.'

8. 3. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἢ περὶ τῆν ἀγοράν, ἐφ' ἣ δεῖ τινα ἀρχῆν ε

ἵνα τῆν ἐφορώσαν περὶ τε τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ τῆν εὐκοσμίαν.

τῶν ἀναγκαίων, sc. 1) ἐπιμελειῶν; or *2) ἀρχῶν, cp. supra § 1, τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀρχῶν.

8. 8. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἐχομένη μὲν ἀναγκαιοτάτη δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ χαλεπωτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν καταδικασθέντων καὶ τῶν προτιθεμένων κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφάς.

πράξεις is here used generally to include execution of sentences passed on criminals, and exaction of debts from public debtors.

τῶν προτιθεμένων appears to mean those whose names, having been first entered on the register as defaulters or criminals (κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφάς), are publicly posted up. Cp. infra § 10, περὶ τὰς προθέσεις τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων: and Plato Laws 784 D where the incorrigible are to be written up (ἀναγεγραμμένοι) and deprived of citizenship.

8. 9. καὶ πράξεων μῆ γιγνομένων,

sc. κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις.

8. 10. ἔτι δ' ἔνια πράττεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς τῶν νέων μᾶλλον τὰς νέας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεστώτων ἑτέρας καταδικασάσης ἑτέραν εἶναι τῆν πραπτομένην, ὅτιον ἀστυνόμου τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγορανόμων, τὰς δὲ παρὰ τούτων ἑτέρους.

'Moreover, in some cases, the magistrates too should execute the sentence; and there should be fresh magistrates to execute the sentences on fresh offences; but in the case of old or existing offences (τῶν ἐνεστώτων opposed to τῶν νέων) one magistrate should condemn, another should exact the penalty; for example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed by the wardens of the agora.'

With τὰς τῶν νέων and τὰς τῶν ἐνεστώτων supply δίκας.

8. 11. τὸ δὲ περὶ πάντων τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους πᾶσιν.

Sc. ποιεῖ understood from ἀπέχθειαν ἔχει διπλήν.

8. 12. διὸ βέλτιον καὶ ταύτην χωρίζειν, καὶ τὸ σόφισμα ζητεῖν καὶ περὶ ταύτην.

τὸ σόφισμα, 'the suitable or appropriate device.' The correction τι σόφισμα, which is supported by the expression ἐὰν μὴ τι σοφίζονται (ii. 5. § 19), is unnecessary and feeble. Such an idiomatic use of the article is not unknown in English: e. g. 'to find out the way' or 'the proper way of making the office less unpopular.'

καὶ περὶ ταύτην, sc. τῆν φυλάττουσαν. 'About this as well as the last case,' i. e. the case of the jailor and the executioner, as well as of the judge and the executioner.

8. 14. τοιαῦται δ' εἶεν αἵ τε περὶ τῆν φυλακῆν τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ὅσαι τάπτονται πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας.

The optative here would seem to require ὤν, which is inserted by Bekker in his second edition, or εἶεν may be altered into εἴσι.

8. 15. τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἔν τι τούτων ἐστὶν εἶδος ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν.
The order of the words is τὸ δὲ πᾶν εἶδος τούτων ἐστὶν ἔν τι εἶδος ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν. Bekker, in his 2nd edition (after Lambinus), reads ἐπιμέλεια, a change which is unnecessary.
8. 16. καὶ προσευθυνοῦσαν.
'And which in addition audits them.'
8. 17. ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ πολλάκις ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν εἰσφοράν.
The connexion proves that the latter words can only mean 'the final ratification and the introduction of measures.'
8. 20. ἐχομένη δὲ ταύτης ἢ πρὸς τὰς θυσίας ἀφωρισμένη τὰς κοινὰς πάσας, ὅσας μὴ τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἐστίας ἔχουσι τὴν τιμὴν.
Either 1)* the words ἐκείνοις ὅσοι, or 2) αἱ θυσίαι must be supplied before ἔχουσι.
Aristotle is opposing the priests, who perform the ordinary sacrifices assigned to them by law, to the great officers of state, who offer sacrifice at the public hearth of the city.
8. 20. καλοῦσι δ' οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντας κ.τ.λ.
Cp. iii. 14. § 13.
8. 21. ἐπιλογισμούς.
Audits by the officers called λογισταί (cp. § 16). But it is hard to distinguish them from ἐξετάσεις since Aristotle (supra § 16) says that λογισταί and ἐξετασταί are only different names for the same officers.

BOOK VII.

Jowett1885v1_section_13. Bernays (Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 69 ff.) has drawn attention to the peculiar style of the opening chapters (1, 2, 3) of this book, which he supposes to be taken from some Aristotelian dialogue. (See Essay on Structure of Aristotelian Writings.) The passage is certainly remarkable for a flow and eloquence which are not common in Aristotle. But though rare, there are other traces of grace and elevation of style to be discovered in the Politics: e.g. in the discussion about education (viii. c. 3-5), where the writer seems to derive inspiration from his subject; in the introduction to the criticism on the forms of government ii. c. 1; parts of ii. c. 5, especially § 11, are easy and flowing; the descriptions of the middle class citizen iv. c. 11; of the tyrant v. c. 11; and of the city vii. cc. 11, 12, are graphic and striking. There are also several passages in the Nicomachean Ethics as well as many fine expressions in which beauty of style shines through the logical analysis, e. g. Eth. i. 10. § 14; c. 10. § 12, ὄμως δὲ καὶ . . . μεγαλόψυχος; ix. 4. §§ 3-6; x. 8. §§ 7, 8. If we could suppose these passages to be a

fair sample of any complete writing of Aristotle, we could better understand why his style was so highly praised by Cicero (Acad. ii. 38), and other writers.

1. 1. ἄδηλου γὰρ ὄντος τούτου καὶ τῆν ἀριστην ἀναγκαῖον ἄδηλον εἶναι πολιτεῖαν.

'For the best life may be expected to show us the best state.'

1. 1. ἀριστα γὰρ πράττειν προσήκει τοὺς ἀριστα πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς, εἰ μὴ τι γίγνηται παράλογον.

ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων is to be taken closely with πολιτευομένους. Not 'they lead the best life, as far as their conditions of life admit, who are governed in the best manner:' but 'they lead the best life who have the best form of government possible under their conditions of life.'

The qualification ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, though not mentioned in the first sentence, naturally occurs to the mind of Aristotle, who thinks of life under the conditions of life. Cp. infra § 13, νῦν δ' ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἀριστος, καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὃ μετ' ἀρετῆς κεχορηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἀρετῆν πράξεων.

Aristotle adds a further qualification εἰ μὴ τι γίγνηται παράλογον: as we might say without much meaning and almost as a *façon de parler*, 'under ordinary circumstances.'

1. 2, 3. νομίσαντας οὖν ἰκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀριστῆς ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστῆρον αὐτοῖς. ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδὲ ἰς ἀμφισβητήσειεν εἶν ὡς οὐ τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακαρίοις δεῖ.

καὶ τῶν is partitive, 'enough has been said among, or in, the things which have been said.'

ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. 'Popular writings in general,' whether those of Aristotle or of others, containing opinions or distinctions which were generally accepted. The threefold division of goods, into goods of the body, goods of the soul, and external goods, here said to be found in the ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοι, is again mentioned in Rhet. i. 5. § 4, 1360 a. 25, and would seem to have been a received notion not peculiar to Aristotle. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 8. § 2, νενεμημένων δ' ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῆ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων, τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ· τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχῆν τίθεμεν. ὥστε καλῶς εἶν λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτην τῆν δόξαν παλαιῶν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. The λόγοι ἐξωτερικοῖ are alluded to in the same manner and nearly in the same words by Aristotle, Nic. Eth. i. 13. § 9. They are opposed to λόγοι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν Eud. Eth. 1217 b. 22.

τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, sc. τῶν ἀγαθῶν, which is somewhat strangely omitted. The clause which follows τῶν τε ἐκτὸς κ.τ.λ., is either dependent on these words, or in apposition with them.

1. 4. ἀνδρίας κ.τ.λ.

The virtues here mentioned are the four cardinal virtues of Plato (Rep. iv. 428), who calls Φρόνησις by the term σοφία, making no such distinction between σοφία and

Φρόνησις as Aristotle afterwards introduced (Nic. Eth. vi.).

1. 4. τοὺς φιλτάτους φίλους.

φίλους is bracketed by Bekker in his second edition. But why object to the pleonasm in a rhetorical passage?

1. 5. ἀλλὰ τὰντα μὲν λεγόμενα ὥσπερ πάντες ἄν συγκωρήσειαν, διαφέρονται δ' ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.

ὥσπερ is bracketed* by Bekker in his second edition, but without reason. If retained it may either be construed with ἄν συγκωρήσειαν, 'as all would agree in these things the moment they are uttered, so on the other hand they differ' etc.; or ὥσπερ may be a qualification of πάντες, 'in a manner every one' (Schlosser, Bonitz s.v.).

1. 5. διαφέρονται δ' ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.

Cp. infra § 8, κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἦνπερ εἴληφε διάστασιν.

1. 5-13. 'Virtue can never be in excess, and he who has the most virtue is the best of men and the happiest; for happiness consists in virtue provided with sufficient means or instruments of good action; and this principle applies equally to individuals and to states, and is the foundation both of ethics and of politics.'

1. 6, 7. The proof that external goods are inferior to the goods of the soul is twofold:

1) διὰ τῶν ἔργων, from the fact that the former are acquired by the latter and not *vice versa*.

2) κατὰ τὸν λόγον σκοπούμενοις, from reason, i. e. the nature of things, because external goods, being an instrument, have a limit; of the goods of the soul there is no limit.

On the antithesis of facts and reason and the connexion between them in Aristotle, cp. note on i. 5. § 1.

1. 7. τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆν ἕκαστον ἀγαθῶν, ὅσῳπερ ἄν ὑπερβάλλῃ, τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον χρήσιμον εἶναι.

Yet this is only true of the goods of the soul in their most general sense; a man cannot have too much justice, or wisdom, or intelligence, but he may have too much memory or too much imagination, and perhaps even too much courage or liberality. He cannot have too much of the highest, but he may have too much of the lower intellectual and moral qualities. Cp. Ethics ii. 6. § 17 where Aristotle, after defining virtue as a μεσότης, is careful to explain that it is also an ἀκρότης.

1. 8. ὅλως τε δῆλον ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἕκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, ἦνπερ εἴληφε διάστασιν ὧν φημὲν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας.

The general meaning of this passage is simple enough. 'If one thing is superior to

another, the best state of that thing is superior to the best state of the other.' But an awkwardness is caused by the insertion of διάστασιν, after the relative ἥνπερ in apposition with ὑπεροχὴν. 'According to the excess or interval which exists between the different states of things.' The subject of εἶληψε is the antecedent of ὧν, i. e. πράγματα, supplied from ἐκάστου πράγματος.

Bekker, following the old translation 'sortita est,' reads εἶληχε for εἶληψε in his second edition. The change makes no real difference in the sense.

1. 9. ἔτι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν ταῦτα πέφυκεν αἰρετὰ καὶ δεῖ πάντας αἰρεῖσθαι τοὺς εἰς φρονοῦντας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ἕνεκεν τῆν ψυχὴν.

Cp. Matth. xvi. 26, τί γὰρ ὠφεληθήσεται ἄνθρωπος ἔάν τὸν κόσμον ὅλον κερδήσῃ τῆν δὲ ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ζημιωθῆ;

1. 10. μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 14. § 8, Διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεως ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσιος καὶ ἡδονῆ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει: also Ib. x. 8. § 7, ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικῆ ἢ ἐν εἴῃ: and Metaph. xi. c. 7, 1072 b. 26, ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωὴ, ἐκεῖνος δὲ (sc. ὁ θεός) ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀίδιος.

1. 11. ἔχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμόνα τῆν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράπτουσαν καλῶς.

The words πράπτουσαν καλῶς may be taken either with εὐδαιμόνα or with τῆν ἀρίστην. Either 1)* 'the happy state is that which is (morally) best, and which does rightly': or 2) 'the happy state and that which does rightly is the best': or 3) (and this though not the only allowable rendering of the passage probably has the most point) 'the best state and that which acts rightly is happy,' as God has been said to be happy in the previous sentence. The last words πράπτουσαν καλῶς are ambiguous, including both our own 'doing well,' and 'faring well.' The argument is that as God is happy in his own nature so the state can be happy only so far as it partakes of virtue or wisdom.

1. 12. ἄνδρῶν δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις τῆν αὐτῆν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ μορφῆν, ὧν μετασχὼν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων.

τῆν αὐτῆν δύναμιν, sc. ἐκείνοις, to be supplied before ὧν μετασχὼν, 'with that power or force which each man partakes of when he is called just and temperate and wise.' Cp. for construction supra § 8.

Bekker, in his second edition (after Coraes), inserts καὶ σωφροσύνη after φρόνησις, and ἀνδρείος καὶ before δίκαιος to make the passage symmetrical; but there is no reason to expect this exact symmetry.

1. 13. ἑτέρας γὰρ ἐστὶν ἔργον σχολῆς ταῦτα.

Lit. 'For this is the business of another time of leisure,' or 'of another time when we shall be at leisure,' or*, 'of another discussion.' Yet he returns to the subject at the beginning of the next chapter. The word σχολῆ is translated 'discussion' in this passage

by Stahr, and so explained in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon. It is found in this sense in the Laws of Plato, 820 C, and perhaps in Arist. Polit. v. 11. § 5.

1. 14. ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου.

'Enquiry,' rather than 'treatise.' No reference is made in the Politics to the whole work as a book.

2. 1. It has been already said, c. 1. § 11, not exactly that the happiness of the state is the same as that of the individual, but that they can be shown to be the same by the same kind of arguments; and again, § 13, the best life for both is declared to be the life of virtue, furnished sufficiently with the means of performing virtuous actions; and in § 14 he proposes to defer matters of controversy for the present. But at the beginning of the second chapter, as if he were dissatisfied with his conclusion, he resumes the question, which has been already in a manner briefly determined, and as if he had forgotten the intention to defer it. There appears to be a latent incongruity even in this rhetorical passage.

It has been thought by Susemihl that c. 1. § 11, ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον κ.τ.λ. is another form of what follows, and that if c. 1. §§ 11, 12 be omitted the connexion of c. 1 and c. 2 would be restored. But the similarity of §§ 11, 12 in c. 1 with c. 2 is not very close; and the difference of style in the two chapters remains as striking as ever.

The analogy of the individual and the state is drawn out at length in the Republic of Plato, iv. 435 ff.

2. 3. εἴτε πᾶσιν ὄντος αἰρετοῦ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις.

'Whether it be a democracy or a timocracy.' The remark is parenthetical, and is not further expanded.

2. 4. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον αἰρετόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προἰρήμεθα νῦν τῆν σκέψιν, ἐκεῖνο μὲν πάρεργον ἂν εἴη τοῦτο δ' ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

ταυτήν, sc. σκέψιν πολιτικῆν supplied from πολιτικῆς.

ἐκεῖνο, sc. the question, 'which is the more eligible life?'

τοῦτο, sc. the question, 'which is the best state?' Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 2. § 8.

2. 5. ἀμφισβητεῖται . . . πότερον ὃ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἰρετός ἢ μᾶλλον ὃ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, οἷον θεωρητικὸς τις.

Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 7, where the relative value of the two kinds of life is fully discussed.

2. 6. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν τε εὖ φρονούντα πρὸς τὸν βελτίω σκοπὸν συντάττεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστον καὶ κοινῇ τῆν πολιτείαν.

Yet Aristotle does not show how the two lives of action and contemplation are to be transferred to the sphere of politics, the parallel which he sets over against them in this passage being only the life of the tyrant and the life of the private individual. At § 16 he opposes the state in activity to the state in isolation; and this is perhaps the half-expressed contrast which is floating before his mind.

2. 7. νομιζουσι δ' οἱ μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γιγνόμενον μετ' ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον οὐκ ἔχειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν τῆ περι αὐτὸν εὐήμερι.

ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν, 'to contain an impediment.' The article may be supplied, if necessary from τὸ μὲν ἄδικον.

2. 9. ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντέτακται σχεδὸν ἥ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος.

Cp. Plato's *Laws*, bk. i. 630 ff., where the principle that the laws of nations should have some higher object than success in war is energetically maintained, and for the approval of these sentiments by Aristotle, *supra*, ii. 9. § 34.

2. 10. καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι Φασί τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρικῶν κόσμον λαμβάνειν.

It may be instructive and is certainly amusing to remark that William de Moerbek either reading κρινῶν from κρινόν, 'a lily,' or confusing κρινῶν and κρικῶν, translated 'lilia.'

2. 11. ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἐξῆν πίνειν ἐν ἑορτῇ τινὶ σκύφον περιφερόμενον τῷ μηθένα ὑπεκταγκότι πολέμιον.

Cp. *Hdt.* iv. 66, where it is said that once in every year the governor of each district mixes a bowl of wine from which those only may drink who have captured enemies.

The accusative σκύφον περιφερόμενον may be regarded as an accusative absolute, assisted by the verb of cognate signification, 'when the cup was brought round.'

2. 12-18. Here is a beginning of national and international morality. The question whether the contemplative or the practical life is the superior was discussed in *Nic. Eth.* x. c. 7, but entirely with reference to the individual. In this passage an analogous question is raised concerning the state. May not an individual find within himself the best kind of action?—May not the state, though isolated and self-centred, lead a true political life? These two questions to us appear distinct; but they are very closely connected in the mind of Aristotle, to whom the individual is the image of the state.

The isolated life of the state is suggested as a possibility by Aristotle. But he is quite aware that all states have relations to their neighbours which they cannot afford to neglect. Cp. ii. 6. § 7; c. 7. § 14.

2. 15. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτόν.

Cp. in i. 7. § 5, οἶον ἡ δικαία, and *infra* c. 14. § 21.

3. 3, 4. καίτοι τάχ' ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἄριστον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πλείστων καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἴη πράξεων. ὥστε οὐ δεῖ τὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχειν παριέναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παίδων μήτε παῖδας πατρὸς μήθ' ὅλως φίλον φίλου μηθένα ὑπολογεῖν μηδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φροντίζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον αἰρετώτατον.

'It is argued by some that power gives the opportunity for virtue, and if so, the attainment of power will be the attainment of virtue. But power in the higher sense implies the qualities which enable a man to make the true use of it, and these he will not gain but lose by violating the equality which nature prescribes.' Compare the notion of Thrasymachus (Plat. Rep. i.) that justice is the interest of the superior and supra, note on i. 6. § 3; also the thesis maintained by Callicles (Gorgias 484 ff.) that the tyrant is wisest and best and the refutation of this notion by Socrates.

πρὸς τοῦτο, sc. πρὸς τὸ ὑπολογεῖν παίδων, κ.τ.λ.

3. 5. μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς ἢ πατὴρ τέκνων ἢ δεσπότης δούλων.

These family relations are chosen as types of government answering to various kinds of rule, aristocratical, royal, tyrannical (cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10).

Aristotle means to say that a man is harmed by ruling over others unless he have a right to rule; but this right can be given only by a natural superiority.

3. 5. τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ μέρει.

Either 1) 'For equals to share in the honourable is just,' or 2)* 'For to equals the honourable and the just consists in all having a turn.'

3. 9. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν.

καὶ τοῦτο = οὐκ ἀπρακτεῖν; or rather some positive idea which is to be elicited from these words. 'There may be in a state internal as well as external activity.'

3. 10. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ καθ' ἑνὸς ὁποιοῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

'Like the state the individual may be isolated, yet he may have many thoughts and powers energizing within him.'

3. 10. σχολῆ γὰρ ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλῶς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος οἷς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν.

i.e. 'were happiness not possible in isolation.' Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 4. § 4, ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τὰγαθὸν ἀλλ' ὧν ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν; ib. x. 8. § 7, quoted supra, c. 1. § 10.

3. 10. καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

There is no reason for bracketing these words as Bekker has done in his second edition; = 'mankind generally.' Cp. supra c. 2. § 17, where πόλεις are joined with γένος ἀνθρώπων.

4. 1. περὶ αὐτῶν.

'About these general questions.'

4. 1. περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας κ.τ.λ.

'Other than the best.' These words seem most naturally to refer to Books iv, v, and vi, and are therefore inconsistent with the altered order of the books. It is impossible to believe with Hildenbrand and Teichmüller that Book ii., in which Aristotle treats not of different forms of government, but of certain theoretical or historical constitutions, furnishes a sufficient antecedent for these words. (See Susemihl's note, 749, vol. ii. p. 180.)

4. 1. περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχῆν συνεστάναι πόλεως.

Compare iv. 1. § 3, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πολιτείαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης τῆν ἄριστην θεωρῆσαι τίς ἐστὶ, καὶ ποία τις ἂν οὖσα μάλιστ' εἴη κατ' εὐχῆν, μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος τῶν ἑκτός, Aristotle appears to start with a consideration of the perfect state; but in attempting to describe the conditions of it he seems to forget his higher purpose. Unless it may be supposed that the Politics is an unfinished work.

4. 3. τῆν οἰκείαν ὕλην.

= τὰς ὑποθέσεις, the conditions mentioned in § 1.

4. 5. ἔστι γὰρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον, ὥστε τῆν δυναμένην τοῦτο μάλιστ' ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰκείαν εἶναι μεγίστην, οἷον Ἱπποκράτην οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἀλλ' ἰατρὸν εἶναι μείζω φήσειεν ἂν τις τοῦ διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος.

'That city is the greatest, not which is numerically largest, but which is best adapted to its end; just as Hippocrates is greater, not as a man but as a physician, than somebody else who is taller.' The great city must have the qualities suited to a city, just as the great Hippocrates must have the qualities, not of a tall man, but of a physician. It is the accident of a city that it is populous, just as it is the accident of Hippocrates that he is tall.

4. 8, 9. ὁ δὲ λιαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως· θείας γὰρ δῆ τὸ τοῦτο δυνάμει ἔργον, ἣτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν· ἐπεὶ τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι. διὸ καὶ πόλιν ἣς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς ὄρος ὑπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαῖον.

The connexion is as follows: 'The divine power which holds together the universe can alone give order to infinity. For beauty consists in number and magnitude; wherefore that city in which magnitude is combined with the principle of order is to be deemed the fairest.'

In this and similar passages we may note mingling with Pythagorean fancies, a true sense that proportion is the first principle of beauty. Cp. Metaph. xii. 8. § 26, 1074 b. 1, παραδέδοται δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παλαιῶν ἐν μύθῳ σχήματι καταλειμμένα τοῖς ὑστερον ὅτι θεοὶ τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τῆν ὄλην φύσιν· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ

μυθικῶς ἤδη προσήκται πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν.

τοῦτο refers to τάξεως, but is neuter because it is attracted by ἔργον.

ὁ λεχθεὶς ὄρος, 'the above-mentioned principle,' sc. εὐταξία.

4. 11. διὸ πρῶτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ἐκ τοσούτου πλήθους ὃ πρῶτον πλήθος ἀϋτάρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ἔστι κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν.

διὸ refers not to the clause immediately preceding but to the principal idea of the sentence, contained in the words ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις, ἣ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγων λίαν οὐκ ἀϋτάρκης κ.τ.λ. Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 10. § 3, οὐτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἄν πόλις, οὐτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἔστιν.

πρῶτην and πρῶτον. 'We then first have a state when we first have a sufficient number.' πρῶτον may be either adjective or adverb.

κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. 'A good life according to the requirements of the political community,' i. e. the life of a freeman and citizen.

4. 12. εἶναι μείζω πόλιν.

μείζω is unnecessarily bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. The point is as follows: 'There may be also a greater city than is required by the limit of self sufficiency, but this increase is not unlimited.' He has said above (§ 4) 'that the more numerous city is not necessarily the greater,' but in this case it is or may be.

4. 12. εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων, τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων.

The πράξεις, or actions of a state, are the actions of two classes which act upon each other, the governors and the governed. Cp. i. 5. § 3, ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀρχει τὸ δ' ἀρχεται ἔστι τι τούτων ἔργον.

4. 13. ἀναγκαῖον γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους.

Cp. Plat. Laws v. 738 D, E, οὐ μείζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ γνωρίμους αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς πολίτας) αὐτοῖς εἶναι. Ὅπου γὰρ μὴ φῶς ἀλλήλοις ἔστιν ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς τρόποις ἀλλὰ σκότος, οὐτ' ἄν τιμῆς τῆς ἀξίας οὐτ' ἀρχῶν οὐτε δίκης ποτέ τις ἄν τῆς προσηκούσης ὀρθῶς τυγχάνοι.

4. 14. δῆλον τοίνυν ὡς οὐτός ἐστι πόλεως ὄρος ἄριστος, ἣ μεγίστη τοῦ πλήθους ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς ἀϋτάρκειαν ζωῆς εὐσύννοπος.

This is a condensed sentence, meaning 'the largest number which can be seen at once, and at the same time suffices for the purposes of life.' Aristotle wishes to combine μέγεθος τι with εὐνομία. Cp. Poet. 7, 1451 a. 3, ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύννοπον εἶναι.

5. 2. ἔλκοντας,

like the English word 'draw,' is used neutrally, 'those who draw or pull to either

extreme.'

5. 3, 4. The paragraph—τὸ δ' εἶδος . . . εὐπαρακόμιστον—is ill arranged: it may be analysed as follows: 'The city should be difficult of access to enemies, and easy of egress to the citizens; the whole territory should be seen at a glance (for a country which is easily seen is easily protected): it should be well situated both in regard to sea and land. Herein are contained two principles: 1) the one already mentioned, about inaccessibility to enemies and convenience to friends: to which may be added 2) a second principle, that the situation should be adapted to commerce.'

The words δεῖ . . . ἀπάντων are a repetition of the words τὸ δ' εὐσύνοπτον τὸ εὐβοήθητον εἶναι τῆν χώραν ἔστιν.

5. 4. εἷς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὄρος,
sc. περὶ τοῦ εἶδους τῆς χώρας.
5. 4. ἔτι δὲ τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης, καὶν εἴ τινα ἄλλην ἐργασίαν ἢ χώρα τυγχάνοι κεκτημένη τοιαύτην, εὐπαρακόμιστον.
τῆς ὕλης dependent on εὐπαρακόμιστον = εἶχουσαν πρὸς τῆν κομιδὴν: τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης either 1) wood (ὕλη) which is used as timber, or 2) timber which is used as material (ὕλη).

6. The echo of these antimaritime prejudices is heard in Cicero, who discusses the subject at length in his De Republica, Book ii. cc. 3 and 4.

6. 1. καὶ τῆν πολυανθρωπίαν,
sc. ἀσύμφορον εἶναι φασιν.

6. 2. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, κ.τ.λ.

'That however, if we could get rid of these evils, there would be an advantage in a city being connected with the sea is obvious.'

6. 4. αὐτῆ γὰρ ἐμπορικῆν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεῖ εἶναι τῆν πόλιν.

'Like the individual (i. 9. § 14) the city may receive what she absolutely needs, but is not to import and export without limit.'

Aristotle would restrain foreign trade as much as possible, not because he aims at exclusiveness, but because he dislikes the moneymaking and commercial spirit.

6. 5. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρῶμεν πολλὰς ὑπάρχον καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφυῶς κείμενα πρὸς τῆν πόλιν, ὥστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστει μήτε πόρρω λίαν, ἀλλ' ἂν κρατεῖσθαι τείχεσι καὶ τοιοῦτοις ἄλλοις ἐρύμασι, φανερόν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τι συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῆ πόλει τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ τι βλαβερόν, φυλάξασθαι ἑἴτιον τοῖς νόμοις φράζοντας καὶ διορίζοντας τὸ ἀκατάλληλον; οὐ δεῖ καὶ τινὰς ἐπιμίσησθαι δεῖ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

In this passage ὑπάρχον the reading of the MSS. has been altered into 1) ὑπάρχειν by Schneider and by Bekker in his 2nd Edition; and also 2) into ὑπάρχοντα, in the latter case with the omission of καί. The alteration, though probable, is not necessary; for ἔμποριον may be supplied with ὑπάρχον from the preceding sentence, the plural words ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας being taken in apposition as an epxegesis. 'But now-a-days there are many cities and places in which such a mart exists, [containing] docks and harbours conveniently situated in relation to the city; and as is obvious, whatever evil there may be is avoided and the good secured, when they are placed at a moderate distance, but commanded by walls and similar fortifications.'

The inland position of the ancient Greek cities, as Thucydides (i. 7) remarks, was due to the prevalence of piracy. Their ports were added later, as the Piraeus at Athens, Nisaea at Megara, Cenchreae and Lechaemum at Corinth, Cyllene at Elis, Gythium at Sparta, Nauplia at Argos, Siphae at Thespieae, Notium at Colophon, etc.

κρατεῖσθαι = to be controlled or held in check by.

6. 7. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζήσεται βίον.

ἡγεμονικὸν, like Athens or Sparta in the days of their greatness, v. 7. § 14. The alteration of πολιτικὸν into πολεμικὸν in Bekker's 2nd edition is quite unnecessary. For πολιτικὸς βίος, applied to a city, cp. ii. 6. § 7, εἰ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν ζῆν βίον πολιτικόν.

6. 8. πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσι τριήρεις [οἱ Ἡρακλεῶται].

Cp. Xen. Anab. v. 6. § 10, πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστι πλοῖα ἐν Ἡρακλείῳ.

6. 9. καὶ πόλεων.

πόλεων, if genuine, is a difficult word. It may be taken in the sense of 'ports like the Piraeus'*; or closely connected with λιμένων of 'cities in relation to their harbours,' cp. supra, c. 5. § 3. But neither of these explanations is satisfactory. The word has been bracketed by Bekker in his second edition and is probably corrupt. The conjectural emendations ἐπινείων (Coraes), ἔμπορίων (Schmidt), περιπολίων (Broughton) are not fortunate; πλοίων might also be suggested (cp. supra, § 6). But it is more probable that some words have been accidentally transposed and that we should read περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ πόλεων [or πόλεως] καὶ λιμένων κ.τ.λ. or, περὶ μὲν οὖν πόλεων [or πόλεως] καὶ χώρας κ.τ.λ.

7. 2. τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην.

According to Aristotle it would seem that Europe includes the colder, that is, the Northern parts of Europe and excludes Hellas. The words καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην are explanatory of τὰ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη. Compare the Hymn to Apollo l. 250:

ἤμὲν ὅσοι Πελοπόννησον πίειραν ἔχουσιν,
ἤδ' ὅσοι Εὐρώπην τε καὶ ἄμφιρύτας κατὰ νήσους,

in which a similar notion of Europe is implied.

Plato too was no stranger to speculations about race. Cp. Laws v. 747 D, μηδὲ τοῦθ' ἤμ ὡς λανθανέτω περὶ τόπων, ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄλλοι τινὲς διαφέροντες ἄλλων τόπων πρὸς τ

ὁ γεννᾶν ἀνθρώπους ἀμείνους καὶ χεῖρους: and Rep. iv. 435 E, τὸ θυμοειδές . . . οἷον οἱ κατὰ τὴν Θρακίην τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ σχεδὸν τι κατὰ τὸν ἄνω τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, ὃ δὲ περὶ τὸν παρ' ἡμῶν μάλιστα ἄν τις αἰτιάσαιτο τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλοχρήματον, ὃ περὶ τοὺς τε Φοίνικας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ Αἴγυπτον φαῖ τις ἄν οὐχ ἦκιστα. Cp. also Herod. ix. 122, φιλέειν γὰρ ἕκ τῶν μαλακῶν χώρων μαλακοὺς ἄνδρας γίνεσθαι· οὐ γάρ τοι τῆς αὐτῆς γῆς εἶναι καρπὸν τε θωμαστὸν φύειν καὶ ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς τὰ πολέμια: and iii. 106, ἢ Ἑλλὰς τὰς ὥρας πολλὸν τι κάλλιστα κεκρημένας ἔχει. So Plat. Tim. 24 C, ἢ θεὸς . . . ἐκλεξαμένη τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ γεγέννησθε (viz. Hellas), τὴν εὐκрасίαν τῶν ὥρων ἐν αὐτῷ κατιδοῦσα, ὅτι φρονιμωτάτους ἄνδρας οἷοι.

7. 3. μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας.

Could Hellas have been united in a federation, she might have governed the world. But the individuality of Greek cities was too strong to allow of such a union, and the country was too much divided by natural barriers. The cities on the coast might be coerced into an Athenian Empire, but could not be fused into a political whole. Cp. Herod. ix. 2, where the Thebans say to Mardonius that the Greeks if united would be a match for the whole world,—κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν Ἑλληνας ὁμοφρονέοντας, οἷπερ καὶ πάρος ταῦτά ἐγίνωσκον, χαλεπὰ εἶναι περιγίνεσθαι καὶ ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποισι.

7. 5. Φασὶ τιμες δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικὸς μὲν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

This, like some of Aristotle's other criticisms on Plato, is chiefly interesting as shewing the difficulty which he found in understanding the play of language which is characteristic of Plato. [See Essay on Aristotle's Criticisms of Plato.] The passage referred to is Rep. ii. 375 E, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ὡς οἷόν τε πραοτάτους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώστας τὸ ὑναντίον, where we may observe that the word φιλητικὸς is not used by Plato.

7. 5. ὁ θυμός.

'Passion' = the depth or force of character which makes a good lover or a good hater. Compare Theognis, l. 1091 Bergk—

ἀργαλέως μοι θυμὸς ἔχει περὶ σῆς φιλότητος,

οὔτε γὰρ ἐχθαίρειν οὔτε φιλεῖν δύναμαι.

But in the Topics ii. 7, 113 b. 1 Aristotle raises the question whether φιλία resides in τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν and not in τὸ θυμοειδές. Like our word passion, θυμὸς has both a wider and narrower use, and is employed by Aristotle here in a more philosophical, but in the Topics in a more popular sense.

7. 5-8. Aristotle truly remarks that anger is felt, not against strangers, but against friends who have wronged or slighted us. Cp. Rhet. ii. c. 2, 1379 b. 2, καὶ [ὀργίζονται] μᾶλλον τοῖς φίλοις ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις: and Psalm xli. 9, 'Yea, even mine own familiar friend, whom I trusted, who did also eat of my bread, hath lifted up his heel against me.'

7. 6. οὐ γὰρ δὲ περὶ φίλων ἀπάγχεο.

The reading of the MSS. which is repudiated in the translation is not indefensible,

though, in the absence of context, it is impossible to interpret it with certainty: 'For were they not friends about whom thou wast plagued or grieved'? cp. again from Psalm lv. 12: 'It is not an open enemy that hath done me this dishonour, for then I could have borne it.' A *mot* attributed to a well-known statesman who had been anonymously attacked in a newspaper is to the point, 'It must have been by a friend,' he said, 'an enemy would not have been so bitter.' The verse is very probably taken from the well-known poem of Archilochus in Trochaic verse beginning $\theta\upsilon\mu\grave{\epsilon}\ \theta\upsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\eta\chi\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\iota\sigma\iota\ \kappa\acute{\eta}\delta\epsilon\sigma\iota\upsilon\ \kappa\upsilon\kappa\acute{\omega}\mu\epsilon\nu\epsilon$, of which a fragment is preserved (Bergk 60): the metre might be restored either by omitting $\delta\acute{\eta}$, which may have been added by Aristotle, or by inserting $\omicron\acute{\nu}\nu$ before $\delta\acute{\eta}$.

The translators William de Moerbek and Aretino render $\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\chi\epsilon\omicron$ 'a lanceis,' as if they had read or imagined they read $\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\nu}\ \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\chi\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu$.

7. 7. $\omicron\acute{\nu}\delta\prime\ \acute{\epsilon}\iota\sigma\iota\nu\ \omicron\iota\ \mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\lambda\omicron\psi\upsilon\chi\omicron\iota\ \tau\acute{\eta}\nu\ \Phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\gamma\iota\omicron\iota\iota\ \mu\eta\delta\epsilon\ \pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu\ \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\kappa\omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}\tau\alpha\varsigma$.

Yet the $\mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\lambda\omicron\psi\upsilon\chi\omicron\varsigma$ described in Nic. Eth. iv. 3. is rather unapproachable by his neighbours.

7. 9. $\omicron\acute{\nu}\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \tau\acute{\eta}\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\eta}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\iota\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha\nu\ \delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \zeta\eta\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\epsilon\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omega\nu\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \gamma\iota\gamma\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\nu\ \delta\iota\acute{\omicron}\ \tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma\ \alpha\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$.

Cp. below c. 12. § 9. Aristotle is opposing political theories to facts, as in the Ethics he contrasts the moral certainty of Ethics (Nic. Eth. i. 3. § 4) with the absolute certainty of mathematics, though the $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\iota\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ in the two cases is different, meaning in the one the necessity and *à priori* truth of mathematics, in the other exactness of detail.

8. 1. $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \delta\prime\ \acute{\omega}\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \Phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu\ \sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\omega}\tau\omega\nu\ \omicron\acute{\nu}\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\omicron}\rho\iota\alpha\ \tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma\ \acute{\omicron}\lambda\eta\varsigma\ \sigma\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma\ \acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\upsilon\ \tau\omicron\ \acute{\omicron}\lambda\omicron\nu\ \omicron\acute{\nu}\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\eta\ \delta\acute{\eta}\lambda\omicron\nu\ \acute{\omega}\varsigma\ \omicron\acute{\nu}\delta\grave{\epsilon}\ \pi\acute{\omicron}\lambda\epsilon\omega\varsigma\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta\ \theta\epsilon\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu\ \acute{\omicron}\sigma\alpha\ \tau\alpha\ \acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \pi\acute{\omicron}\lambda\epsilon\sigma\iota\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\gamma\kappa\acute{\alpha}\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu\ \acute{\upsilon}\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\nu\ \omicron\acute{\nu}\delta\prime\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\eta\varsigma\ \kappa\omicron\iota\nu\omega\nu\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma\ \omicron\acute{\nu}\delta\epsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\xi\ \acute{\tau}\eta\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\nu}\ \tau\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$.

In this rather complex sentence Aristotle is distinguishing between the conditions and the parts of the whole. The words $\acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\upsilon\ \tau\omicron\ \acute{\omicron}\lambda\omicron\nu\ \omicron\acute{\nu}\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\eta$ answer to $\acute{\omicron}\sigma\alpha\ \tau\alpha\ \acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \pi\acute{\omicron}\lambda\epsilon\sigma\iota\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\gamma\kappa\acute{\alpha}\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu\ \acute{\upsilon}\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ in the application to the state.

The editions vary between $\tau\alpha\acute{\nu}\tau\alpha$ and $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}$. $\tau\alpha\acute{\nu}\tau\alpha$ is confirmed by the words of § 6, $\pi\acute{\omicron}\sigma\alpha\ \tau\alpha\acute{\nu}\tau\prime\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu\ \acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\upsilon\ \pi\acute{\omicron}\lambda\iota\varsigma\ \omicron\acute{\nu}\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\eta$. If we read $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}$ it will be convenient to supply $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\iota\varsigma$ with $\acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\upsilon$, if $\tau\alpha\acute{\nu}\tau\alpha$, $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha$.

$\acute{\epsilon}\xi\ \acute{\tau}\eta\varsigma\ \acute{\acute{\epsilon}}\nu\ \tau\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$, i.e. 'out of which is formed,' or 'which forms a lower class having a unity;' 'which in its nature is a whole, and not a mere aggregate,' $\acute{\acute{\epsilon}}\nu\ \tau\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma = \acute{\acute{\epsilon}}\nu\ \tau\iota\ \acute{\acute{\epsilon}}\sigma\tau\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$.

8. 3. 'The end has nothing in common with the means; the final cause with the conditions.' Just as in iii. 1. § 9 things prior and posterior are said to have no quality in common with each other. Of course the modern philosopher makes the opposite reflection, 'that the end is inseparable from the means,' or, 'is only the sum of the means'; that causes are indistinguishable from condition; and equally indistinguishable from effects; 'that no line can be drawn between *à priori* and *à posteriori* truth.' The common understanding, like ancient philosophy, rebels against this higher view, because it can point to numberless visible instances in which the end is separable from the means, the effect

from the causes. Both lines of reflection are constantly returning upon us, and the opposition between them gives rise to many metaphysical problems. It is the old difficulty, as old as the opposition of ideas to phenomena, of finding the similarity where there is difference or contrast.

8. 3.

ὀργάνῳ τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς.

Governed by οὐθὲν κοινόν ἔστι. 'The builder and his tools have nothing in common with the work; so property has nothing in common with the State.'

8. 5-6.

The connexion of this passage in which means and ends, parts and conditions are curiously combined appears to be as follows: 'Now happiness is imparted in various degrees to states, making them to be what they are according to the degree of happiness which they attain. But we must also ascertain what are the conditions of states, for in these we shall find their parts.' He seems to mean that through what is outward only we can arrive at the true elements of the state; and that happiness, which is the end of the state, is not to be confounded with the conditions of it. The argument is interrupted by the seemingly irrelevant remark that the character of states is given to them by the degrees of happiness which they attain. Here as in other passages (cp. c. 9. § 2 infra), when speaking of the perfect state, he occasionally goes back to the imperfect forms.

8. 5.

ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις.

Cp. the more complete statement of the Nic. Eth. i. 7. §§ 14-16, ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετῆν ἀρίστην ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

8. 6.

ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὧν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

'Besides considering the highest good of the state or the idea of the state in its highest terms (gathered from the previous section) we must also consider the indispensable conditions of it, and among them we shall find its parts.' All the parts are conditions of a state, not all the conditions are parts; e.g. the θῆτες are a condition but not a part; τὸ βουλευόμενον both a condition and a part.

8. 7.

πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον.

'First,' i. e. in honour, not in necessity, for that place he assigns to the sixth class.

Spengel would omit καὶ πρῶτον. But how could the insertion of such a clause ever be explained, unless it had been put in by the piety of a Greek monk?

ἣν καλοῦσιν ἱερατεῖαν, 'which they call ritual.' The formula ἣν καλοῦσιν seems to imply some technical or uncommon use of the word, which occurs nowhere else in classical Greek, cp. ἣν καλοῦσι τινες ὀλιγαρχίαν, vi. 1. § 6.

8. 7.

ἕκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμόν.

The last words are pleonastic, 'sixth in numerical succession.'

8. 9. The conjecture of Lambinus τῶν δικαίων taken from τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων above, § 7, has been adopted in the text. But the reading of the MSS. τῶν ἀναγκαίων, 'of necessary matters of life,' is really defensible and is confirmed by the word ἀναγκαιότατον in § 7. ἀναγκαίων may also refer to punishments: see infra c. 13. § 6.

9. 1, 2. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ τοῦτο πολιτείῳ.

'This question, however, does not arise in every state, for it is already decided. In democracies all share in all, while in oligarchies only some share in some employments or functions. But we are speaking of the ideal state in which the question remains to be considered.

9. 2. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν.

This passage can hardly refer to ii. 1. § 2, for there Aristotle is speaking of the distribution of property: here of the distribution of functions in the state. The reference is rather to iv. c. 4 and c. 14; see supra c. 4. § 1.

9. 3. ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας . . . εἴρηται πρότερον.

The connexion is as follows: 'But in the best state, with which we are now concerned, all cannot participate in all, for the trader, the artisan and the husbandman have no leisure for education, neither are they capable of political functions.'

εἴρηται πρότερον in c. 8. § 5 supra. It is noticeable that Aristotle in describing the perfect state no longer, as in a democracy (cp. vi. c. 4.), regards the husbandmen as the best material out of which to form citizens.

9. 4. τοὺς μέλλοντας ἔσεσθαι,

sc. πολίτας, (ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευομένῃ πόλει § 3), 'citizens of the best state.'

9. 4. πότερον ἕτερα καὶ ταῦτα θετέον.

Bekker in his second edition inserts ἑτέροις after ἕτερα unnecessarily. Without it we may translate: 'Are these also to be distinct, or are both to be given to the same persons?'

9. 5. Compare Book ii. 5. § 26.

9. 7. ἀλλὰ μῆν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ εἶναι περὶ τούτους.

The use of περὶ is singular: the force of the preposition may be paraphrased as follows: 'they too should have a near interest in property,' an indirect way of expressing what is more distinctly said infra § 8 τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων.

9. 8. εἴπερ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους.

The necessity seems to arise from the impossibility of the husbandman having the leisure which a citizen requires for mental cultivation and the fulfilment of political duties, cp. § 4.

9. 10. καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος.

τούτων, i. e. not merely the ὀπλιτικὸν and βουλευτικὸν; to these must be added the γεωργοί, τεχνῖται, and τὸ θητικὸν, in all five. The two first interchange with each other, but never with the three last.

The division between the mere conditions of the state (viz. the γεωργοί, τεχνῖται and τὸ θητικὸν) and the parts of it (τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικὸν) is permanent. The division between τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν, τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένος and τὸ βουλευτικὸν is transitory or κατὰ μέρος, i. e. the same persons may belong in turn, or at different stages of life, to all three classes.

10. 1. ἔοικε δ' οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ὅτι δεῖ διτρωθῆσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη τῆν πόλιν.

This chapter has been regarded, and perhaps with reason, as a criticism of Plato, Aristotle being desirous of disproving by historical facts the claim of Plato to originality in instituting the system of caste and of common meals.

10. 2. τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα κ.τ.λ.

In apposition with τῶν συσσιτίων ἢ τάξις, 'the custom in Crete going back to the reign of Minos.'

10. 3-5. 'The name Italy was originally confined to the district between the Lametic and Scylletic Gulfs' (Golfo di Eufemia and Golfo di Squillace), 'and was derived from Italus, an ancient king of the Oenotrians' (called by Thucydides vi. 2 a Sicel king) 'who inhabited these regions. The people to the north-west towards Tyrrhenia were called Ausones and those to the north-east in the district called Siritis' (on the shore of the Tarentine gulf) 'Chones.'

The mention of Italy (taken in this narrower sense) leads the writer to particularise its different regions; but nothing is said about how far the custom of common meals may have extended.

ἄση τετύχηκεν ἐντὸς οὗσα, viz. that part of Italy which is bounded or enclosed at its narrowest point by the two gulfs. The reason (ἀπέχει γὰρ ταῦτα) is imperfectly expressed: 'You may call this the boundary because the distance is so small between the two gulfs.' It is in fact about 20 miles.

It has been asked, 'What does Aristotle purpose in this digression?' There is a fallacy in requiring that every part of an ancient work should have a distinct purpose. Aristotle, like Aeschylus, Herodotus, Thucydides, 'breaks out' into the favourite subject of geography, and his conceptions of it, as might be expected in the beginning of such studies, are not perfectly accurate or distinct.

It is evident that common meals played a great part in the political organisation of Hellas and the south of Italy. But, according to Susemihl, no other writer mentions their existence in Italy.

10. 5. Σύρτιν is the reading of most MSS., σύρτην of two only. The MSS. of the old translator appear all to give *syrtēn*. Σίριν is conjectured by Heyne, who compares Arist. Fragm. Πολιτεῖαι 542, καὶ οἱ τῆν Σίριν δὲ κατοικοῦντες . . . ὡς φησι Τίμαιος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, εἰς τρυφῆν ἐξώκειλαν οὐχ ἦσσον Συβαριτῶν, Athen. xii. 523 C. Hence Goëttling's conjecture Σιρίτις the district of Siris. Of any district of Italy called Syrtes or Syrtis there is no mention elsewhere.

10. 6. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων τάξις ἐντεῦθεν γέγονε πρῶτον, ὃ δὲ χωρισμός ὃ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους ἐξ Αἰγύπτου· πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει τοῖς χρόνοις τῆν Μίνω βασιλείαν ἢ Σεσώστριος,

is translated in the English text: 'From this part of the world originally came the institution of common tables; the separation into castes [which was much older] from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostris is of far greater antiquity than that of Minos.'

It is also possible to supply the ellipse differently: 'The separation into castes came [not from Italy or Crete, but] from Egypt.'

The sentence is then parallel with the other statements. Common tables existed in Crete and in Italy: the latter were the older, and therefore are called 'the origin of the institution' (§§ 2, 4); similarly, caste existed in Crete and in Egypt; in the latter country its origin dates further back than in the former, for Sesostris is older than Minos, and therefore it is said to have originated there.

10. 7. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὐρησθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ.

A favourite reflection of Aristotle's. See note on text for parallel passages.

10. 8. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα.

'All political institutions are ancient; for they are found in Egypt which is the most ancient of all countries.' Cp. Plat. Laws ii. 657. 'Their (i. e. the Egyptian) works of art are painted or moulded in the same forms which they had ten thousand years ago; this is literally true, and no exaggeration.' For further references see note on text. That this sameness was the weakness of Egypt, and that the life of Hellas was progress, seems not to have occurred either to Aristotle or Plato.

10. 8. τοῖς μὲν εἰρημένοις

is the reading of the MSS., altered in the text after Lambinus into εὐρημένοις, a change which seems to be required by the want of a suitable antecedent and by the parallelism of παραλελειμμένα. Cp. supra, σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὐρησθαι πολλάκις, and ii. 5. § 16.

10. 10. ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.

This promise is not fulfilled. In c. 12. § 1 the common meals are only mentioned in passing; no reason is given in support of the institution.

10. 11. τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας πολέμους ὁμονοητικώτερον.

A lesson learned from the experience of Athens during the Peloponnesian War. The Acharnians whose lands lay on the borders, seeing them ravaged, wished to attack the invaders rashly (Thuc. ii. 21), and afterwards when they had lost their possessions as Archidamus thought likely (Thuc. ii. 20 ἐστερημένους τῶν σφετέρων οὐχ ὁμοίως προθύμους ἕσσεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων κινδυνεύειν, στάσιν δὲ ἐνέσσεσθαι), and as Aristophanes in his 'Acharnians' seems to imply, were wanting to make peace.

10. 11. For reference to Plato and criticism on him see note on text.

10. 13. δεύτερον δὲ βαρβάρους περιοίκους.

Compare above c. 9. § 8, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους ἢ περιοίκους, a comparison which has led to the insertion of ἢ before περιοίκους in this passage, or to the omission of it in c. 9. The text of the MSS. is probably right in both passages. 'If we could have the very best thing, the husbandmen should be slaves; or if slaves cannot be had, then perioeci of alien stock.'

11. 1. αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι τῆν θέσιν εὔχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα βλέποντας.

The order of the words is as follows—δεῖ εὔχεσθαι κατατυγχάνειν [τοῦ] τῆν θέσιν εἶναι.

The four points to be attended to appear to be as follows: 1) healthy and airy situation, open to the winds (cp. § 4, infra): 2) good water: 3) convenience for administration (πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις): 4) adaptation to military requirements (πρὸς πολεμικὰς πράξεις).

Cp. Xen. Oecon. 9. 4, καὶ σύμπασαν δὲ τῆν οἰκίαν ἐπέδειξα αὐτῆι, ὅτι πρὸς μεσημβρίαν ἀναπέπταται, ὥστε εὐδελον εἶναι, ὅτι χειμῶνος μὲν εὐήλιός ἐστι, τοῦ δὲ θερούς ἐὺσκιος.

Vitruvius i. 6 tells us how the inhabitants of Mitylene suffered from the situation of their town: 'Oppidum magnificenter est aedificatum et eleganter; sed positum non prudenter. In quâ civitate auster cum flat homines aegrotant, cum eurus, tussiunt, cum septentrio, restituuntur in sanitatem, sed in angiportis et plateis non possunt consistere propter vehementiam frigoris.' (Quoted by Eaton.)

11. 2. δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν.

κατὰ βορέαν = 'facing the same way that the North wind does,' (cp. κατὰ ἔσρον) i. e. sheltered from the North wind. Cp. Plat. Crit. 118 A, B, ὃ δὲ τόπος οὗτος ὅλης τῆς νήσου πρὸς νότον ἐτέτραπτο, ἀπὸ τῶν ἄρκτων κατάβορέος.

δευτερον may either be taken as *an alternative, or as introducing a second condition of healthfulness, so that a South Eastern aspect is what is recommended; i. e. a situation which is open to the healthy East winds and affords shelter from the North wind.

11. 3. τοῦτό γ' εὔρηται

is the reading of all the MSS. The conjecture of Lambinus, εὔρησθαι, adopted by Bekker

in his second edition, is unnecessary.

τοῦτό γ' εὑρηται = 'a remedy has been found for this,' i. e. 'a remedy may be found.'
The language is not quite symmetrical, but this is no reason for altering it.

11. 3. ὑποδοχὰς ὀμβρίοις ὕδασιν.

Five MSS. read ὀμβρίους, a possible reading, 'rain cisterns for water' instead of 'cisterns for rain water.'

11. 4. ἔν τε τοιοῦτῳ καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον.

'In the situation described, and looking to the quarter described.'

11. 5. τοιοῦτων ναμάτων.

The reading of the best MSS. and the old translator, 'such streams as I have spoken of above,' that is to say, 'good streams' (ὕγεινῶν § 4).

11. 5. ἄκρόπολις ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχικόν, ἀριστοκρατικόν . . . ἰσχυροὶ τόποι πλείους.

It may be asked: 'Why should a single fortress be adapted to a monarchy, or oligarchy, several strongholds to an aristocracy?' Probably because in the former case the government is more concentrated. A small governing class, if they are to maintain their power against the people, must draw together. An aristocracy has only to defend itself against foreign enemies, and is therefore better dispersed.

11. 7. ἄν τις οὕτω κατασκευάζῃ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς γεωργοῖς ἃς καλοῦσιν τινες τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας.

The last word is explained by Hesychius (under ξυστάδες) as αἱ πυκναὶ ἀμπελοὶ, ἄμεινον δὲ τὰς εἰκῆ καὶ μῆ κατὰ στοιχὸν πεφυτευμένας ἀκούειν, i. e. 1) *vines planted thickly or in clumps, or 2) vines planted irregularly. If we adopt the first of these interpretations and take the image literally, Aristotle is suggesting that the city should be built partly in regular streets, but here and there in blocks which would have the character of strong places. If we take the second, he would seem to mean that the city should be built in part irregularly, with a view to confusing or perplexing an enemy after he had entered it.

11. 8. οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν (τείχη).

Cp. Laws vi. 778 D ff, περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, ὧς Μέγιστε, ἔγωγ' ἄν τῆ Σπάρτῃ συμφερούσην τὸ καθεύδειν ἔσθ' ἐν τῇ γῆ κατακείμενα τὰ τείχη.

The absence of walls in Sparta suggested to Plato the poetical fancy that the walls of cities should be left to slumber in the ground: it may reasonably be conjectured that the position of Sparta and the military character of her citizens rendered artificial defences unnecessary.

11. 8. ἐλεγχόμενας ἔργῳ τὰς ἐκείνως καλλωπισάμενας.

The disasters of Leuctra (B.C. 371) and of Mantinea (B.C. 362) had done a great deal to diminish the admiration for Sparta. (Cp. ii. 9. § 10 and infra c. 14. § 16). Yet the allusion is hardly to the point, for Sparta was never taken by an enemy: Epaminondas after the battle of Leuctra refrained from attacking it, Xen. Hell. vi. 5.

11. 9. ἔστι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μᾶλλον πλεονεχίᾳ πλήθει διαφέροντας οὐ καλὸν τὸ πειρᾶσθαι σώζεσθαι διὰ τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἐρυμνότητος.

A somewhat romantic notion with which may be compared the further refinement of § 11, infra; also the saying of Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, when he saw catapults brought from Sicily, which in other words and under other circumstances has no doubt often been ejaculated by the African or New Zealand savage, ἀπόλωλεν ἄνδρὸς ἀ&illegible;ετᾶ. (Plut. Apophth. Lac. 219 A.)

11. 9. πολεμικωτάτην.

Either 'the most truly warlike in character' or '*the best defence of the warrior.' Both meanings may be included.

11. 10. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς οἰκίησιν ταῖς ἰδίαις μᾶλλον περιβάλλειν τοίχους.

Private houses as well as cities, especially in the country, might in many cases need the protection of walls.

ὁμοίως δέ, sc. ἔχει.

12. 1. ἀντά,

sc. τὰ τείχη, i. e. the position of the walls; or more generally, 'the consideration of these circumstances.'

12. 2. ἀρχείων.

The MSS. vary between ἀρχῶν, ἀρχαίων, ἀρχείων.

12. 3. εἴη δ' ἂν τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος ὅστις ἐπιφάνειαν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς θέσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιῶντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρυμνοτέρως.

Lit. 'This place should be of a sort which has conspicuousness, suitable to the position of virtue, and towering aloft over the neighbouring parts of the city.'

Thomas Aquinas, who wrote a Commentary on the Politics, if we may judge from his Latin 'bene se habentem ad apparentiam virtutis,' seems to have read θέσιν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιφάνειαν. (Susemihl.) But the words are better as they are found in the Greek MSS.

The habitation of virtue is to be like that of the Gods who have their temples in the Acropolis. Cp. Vitruv. 1. 7 'Aedibus vero sacris quorum deorum maxime in tutela civitas videtur esse, unde moenium maxima pars conspiciatur areae distribuantur' (quoted by Schneider); and Burke, French Revolution, p. 107, 'The temple of honour ought to be

seated on an eminence.'

12. 4, 5. εἴη δ' ἂν εὐχάρις ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔχοι τῆν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα. πρέπει γὰρ διττῆσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεωτέροις ἄρχοντάς τινας διατρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων παρουσία μάλιστα ἐμποιεῖ τῆν ἀληθινὴν αἰδῶ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων φόβον.

The opposition of μὲν and δὲ before νεωτέροις and πρεσβυτέρους seems to imply that the youth are to perform under the eye of certain magistrates, and the elders under the eye of the magistrates as a body. The distinction appears to be in the one case, that some of the magistrates are to go to the gymnasium, in the other the exercises are to take place in or near the public buildings appropriated to the magistrates. Everywhere the presence of the authorities is required. *Some of the rulers are to be present (διατρίβειν) at the exercises of the younger men, but the elders are to perform their exercises with the rulers.' Here either another verb has to be supplied with παρὰ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν or the word διατρίβειν is to be taken in a slightly different sense. Or 2) we may translate, 'and the elders shall be placed at the side of the magistrates.' This, however, disregards μὲν and δὲ and seems not to cohere with the words διττῆσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας: for thus no mention is made of the gymnastics of the elders. 3) The most natural way of taking the Greek words (τοὺς δὲ . . ἄρχουσιν) that 'the magistrates shall perform their gymnastic exercises before the elders,' (St. Hilaire) gives a very poor sense. The clause ἢ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς κ.τ.λ., shows clearly that the principal point is the requirement of the presence of the magistrates at all gymnastic exercises.

The word κόσμον is difficult. It may be taken in the sense of 'institution,' which is in some degree supported by the use of κόσμος τῆς πολιτείας for 'the order or constitution of the state,' (Περὶ Κόσμου 6. 399 b. 18). Or* τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον may be the accusative after διττῆσθαι and may be taken with Adolph Stahr in the sense of 'this embellishment of the state:' [dieser Schmuck der Stadt]. In this case it is better to make διττῆσθαι impersonal, κόσμον being the indirect accusative following it. καὶ τοῦτον, this institution too, i. e. as well as the offices of state which in c. 9 are divided between old and young.

12. 6. τῆν δὲ τῶν ὀνίων κ.τ.λ.

Cp. supra, c. 5. § 4.

12. 6. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος διαιρεῖται τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἱερεῖς, εἰς ἄρχοντας.

The enumeration is incomplete, because Aristotle has only occasion to speak of priests and magistrates. The places assigned to their common tables, like those of the soldiers and the guardians of the country, are to be situated conveniently for their employments. The baldness of the expression suggests the possibility that something may have dropped out. The first words ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος appear to be a repetition of ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὸ μὲν πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν at the beginning of the Chapter. πλῆθος is used for the citizens generally, not as opposed to the upper classes.

12. 6. περὶ τῆν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τῆν τάξιν.

'To have their proper place.' Cp. § 8, τῆν εἰρημένην τάξιν. τῆν . . . οἰκοδομημάτων, sc. τάξιν, is to be supplied.

12. 7. τῆν καλουμένην ἀστυνομίαν.

The qualifying καλουμένην, if not a mere pleonasm, seems to indicate the more uncommon or technical expression. Cp. note on c. 8. § 7 supra, and on vi. 1. § 6.

12. 8. The MSS. vary between νενεμῆσθαι and μεμιμῆσθαι. P⁴ has compounded them into νενεμιμῆσθαι. Bekker in his second edition has adopted μεμιμῆσθαι. Cp. vi. 2. § 7, where certain magistrates are required by law to take their meals together.

13. 1. περὶ πολιτείας ἀντῆς.

Hitherto Aristotle has been speaking only of the conditions of the best state, which are its ὕλη (supra c. 4. §§ 1-3). Now he is going on to speak of the πολιτεία itself, which is the εἶδος of a πόλις (cp. iii. 3. §§ 7-9).

Chapters 13, 14, 15 form a transition to the subject of education, which is begun in c. 16, and is continued in Book viii. But it cannot be said that Aristotle fulfils the promise of discussing the 'constitution' of the best state. He describes the life of his citizens from birth to boyhood, but says nothing about their judicial or political duties.

13. 2. ἔκκεται καλῶς.

'Stands out well,' or 'distinctly.' For the thought, cp. Eud. Eth. ii. 11, 1227 b. 20, ἔστι γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνειν.

13. 3. In this passage, of which the connexion is obscure, Aristotle seems to say that the good man is superior to the ordinary conditions of existence, and so to a certain extent, but to a certain extent only (ἐλάττονος τοῖς ἄμεινον διακειμένοις), the legislator may make his citizens superior to external conditions. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. cc. 9-12.

13. 4. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστι τῆν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἰδεῖν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἄριστ' ἔν πολιτεύοιτο πόλις, ἄριστα δ' ἔν πολιτεύοιτο καθ' ἣν εὐδαιμονεῖν μάλιστα ἐνδέχεται τῆν πόλιν, ὁτῆλον ὅτι τῆν εὐδαιμονίαν δεῖ, τί ἐστι, μὴ λανθάνειν.

The connexion is as follows: 'In various ways men mistake the nature of happiness, but we recognise it to be the great object of a state, and therefore we should ascertain its nature.'

13. 5. Φαμέν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄφελος.

It is difficult to say why Aristotle should speak thus doubtfully or depreciatingly of a principle which lies at the basis both of his ethical and political philosophy. Is the expression to be attributed only to the Greek love of qualifying language?

13. 5. καὶ ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς.

These words are not found in the Nicomachean Ethics (see references in note on text),

and therefore may be supposed to be added by Aristotle as an explanation.

13. 5, 6. λέγω δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.

'Happiness is an absolute good, whereas punishments are only good under certain conditions;' they are evils which prevent greater evils. The negative and the positive senses of the word 'just,'—just punishments, just actions,—needed to be distinguished in the beginning of philosophy.

13. 6. οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰς δικαίας πράξεις αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ' ἀρετῆς μὲν εἰσιν, ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως ἔχουσιν (αἰρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ μηθενὸς δεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων μήτε τὸν ἄνδρα μήτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας ἀπλῶς εἰσὶ κάλλιστα πράξεις.

'They have their rightness, not as ends, but as means or conditions of something else which is an end.' For the use of ἀναγκαῖον, cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 2, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεταί, αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς.

Under the common notion of ἀναγκαῖα and ὑποθέσεως, by a play of words, Aristotle appears to comprehend not only the external goods which are the conditions of individual life, but the penalties imposed by law, which are the conditions of the existence of states.

αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς πράξεις, sc. φέρουσαι, τείνουσαι or γινόμεναι.

13. 7. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον κακοῦ τινὸς αἵρεσις ἐστίν.

'The one is a voluntary choice of an evil,' i.e. for the sake of removing some other evil. For example, punishment puts an end to crime.

The conjecture ἀναίρεσις, which is adopted by Schneider, Coraes, Bekker (2nd edition), and Susemihl, is unnecessary.

13. 7. χρήσαιτο δ' ἂν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ καὶ πενίῃ καὶ νόσῳ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς Φαύλαις καλῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐστίν.

Compare Nic. Eth. i. 10, especially the noble words in § 12, ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἔπειδαν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας μῆ δι' ἀναλγησίαν ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὦν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος.

13. 8. δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαῖον σπουδαίας καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταύτας ἀπλῶς. διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἴτια τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμπρὸν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιῶτο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης.

'The good man will make a use of external goods which is absolutely good. And because (διὸ) this use of external goods is good in him, men think that external goods are the causes of happiness, which is just as if we were to attribute the melody to the lyre and not to the player.'

αἰτιῶτο, sc. τις, gathered from ἄνθρωποι. τις occurs in one MS. (P⁵) and is inserted by Bekker in his 2nd edition.

13. 9. διὸ κατ' εὐχὴν εὐχόμεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν ὧν ἡ τυχή κυρία.

1) 'Since therefore some things must be presupposed (διὸ), our prayer and desire is that our city may be so constituted as to have the goods of fortune,' sc. εἶναι ἐξ ἐκείνων ὧν, etc.; or 2) 'we desire that her constitution in respect of the goods of fortune may answer to our prayer,' making κατ' εὐχὴν, sc. εἶναι, the predicate, ὧν, sc. ἐν ἐκείνοις ὧν; or 3) 'we ask if we could only have our prayer,' or 'though it be only an ideal,' as above, κατ' εὐχὴν, iv. 11. § 1, πολιτείαν τὴν κατ' εὐχὴν γινομένην.

13. 10. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαιούς εἶναι, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἰρετώτερον, ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ πάντας.

He seems to mean that although there might be some common idea of virtue which the citizens attained collectively, such as patriotism, yet it would be better that each individual should be virtuous, for each implies all. Compare, ii. 3. § 2, τὸ γὰρ πάντες διπτόν, κ.τ.λ., where he distinguishes 'each' from 'all.'

13. 11. ἕνιά τε οὐθὲν ὄφελος φύναι· τὰ γὰρ ἔθη μεταβαλεῖν ποιεῖ, κ.τ.λ.

Lit. 'Some qualities there is no use in having by nature; for habit alters them; and through nature,' or 'such is their nature that, they are swayed by habit both towards good and towards evil.' To us the reasoning of this passage appears singular. Yet probably what Aristotle means to say is, that moral qualities, if given by nature, would cease to be moral, and in so far as they are moral would cease to be natural. Nature in this passage is used for 'instinct,' or 'natural impulse.' From another point of view (Nic. Eth. ii. 1. § 2) he shows, using the term φύσις in a somewhat different sense, that things which are purely natural cannot be altered by habit; but that nature supplies the conditions under which habits may be cultivated. Cp. also infra, c. 15. § 7.

14. 1. ἑτέρους . . . ἢ τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ βίου.

'Are rulers and subjects to differ at different times, or to be the same always?'

14. 2. τοῖς ἀρχομένοις.

1) *Dative of reference: 'In relation to their subjects,' or, 2) with a more obvious construction, but with a feebler sense, τοῖς ἀρχομένοις may be taken after φανεράν, 'so that the superiority of the governors is manifest to their subjects.'

14. 3. Σκύλαξ.

The same who is mentioned in Herodotus (iv. 44) as sailing down the Indus by order of Darius Hystaspes. Whether the writings passing under his name with which Aristotle was acquainted were genuine or not we cannot say. The short summary of the geography of the habitable world which has come down to us under the name of Scylax contains allusions to events later than the time of Herodotus, and is therefore certainly either spurious or interpolated.

14. 4. πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν.

Not country as opposed to town—the country people combine with the malcontents of the town;’ but, ‘all the inhabitants *minus* the rulers,’ i.e. the perioeci, metics, or any others, who, though personally free, had no political rights, make common cause with the subject classes and desire revolution.

14. 5. ἥ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τῆν αἴρεσιν, ποιήσασα αὐτῷ τῷ γένει ταῦτόν τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὧν τοῖς μὲν ἄρχεσθαι πρέπει, τοῖς δ’ ἄρχειν.

Lit. ‘For nature herself has given the principle of choice when she created in the very race the same element, i. e. the same human beings, partly young and partly old, of whom the one are fitted to obey, the others to command.’

αὐτῷ τῷ γένει ταῦτόν. The word αὐτῷ has less MS. authority than αὐτό, and is omitted altogether in one MS. and in Aretino’s translation. Αὐτό may be translated: ‘In the human race nature has created the very same thing, making a distinction of old and young, corresponding to that of rulers and subjects.’ The correction τῶν αὐτῶν for αὐτῷ is unnecessary.

14. 8. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολίτου καὶ ἄρχοντος τῆν αὐτῆν ἀρετὴν εἶναι φάμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀριστοῦ ἀνδρός.

i. e. in the best state which he is here discussing.

14. 11. ὡσαύτως οὖν ἀνάγκη διπληθῆσθαι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δῆλον ὅτι, καὶ τὰς πράξεις δ’ ἀνάλογον ἐροῦμεν ἔχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς τοῦ φύσει βελτίονος αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγχάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν.

ὡσαύτως . . ἔχειν. ‘And as there must be a division of the soul, in like manner there must be a division of the actions of the soul;’ ὡσαύτως answers to ἀνάλογον ἔχειν, and is to be taken closely with καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, sc. τὸ λόγον ἔχον.

ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν, sc. τῶν πράξεων. ‘The simple action of the highest principle is better than the mixed action of all or of two, that is the union of the higher with the lower, or the practical and speculative reason combined (τοῖν δυοῖν).’ Aristotle is here speaking of that life of mind which in the Ethics he conceives to have a separate existence (ἢ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ [sc. εὐδαιμονία] κεχωρισμένη Nic. Eth. x. 8. § 3). But we are unable to understand how this pure mind condescends to take a part in human things—the analogous difficulty in Aristotle to the relation of τὰ νοούμενα and τὰ φαινόμενα in Plato. We know that within the sphere of practice thought and reflection must always be reappearing if the legislator is endowed with them. But Aristotle nowhere explains how the speculative, either in private or public life, is related to the practical, or what is the higher training which fits the citizen for either.

14. 16. ἐπαινοῦντες γὰρ τῆν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν ἄγανται τοῦ νομοθέτου τὸν σκοπόν, ὅτι πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν· ὃ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐστὶν ἐυέλεγκτα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελέγηκεται νῦν.

Cp. Thuc. ii. 39, καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει (sc. οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) εὐθύς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι οὐδὲν ἴσσοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰσοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν.

καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελήλεγται νῦν. Alluding to Leuctra and Mantinea. Cp. c. 11. § 8, about walls, and ii. 9. § 10, about the women.

14. 17. οὕτω καὶ Θίβρων.

Who Thibron was is unknown. But we have an example of a treatise such as he might have written in the 'de Republica Lacedaemoniorum,' attributed to Xenophon. Was he more likely to have been a Spartan, or only an admirer of Sparta, like the Philolaon in other states of Hellas? The name is Lacedaemonian. The words τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος τῶν γραφόντων περὶ πολιτείας αὐτῶν remind us how large a literature of political philosophy must have existed in the time of Aristotle, although we are apt to imagine him the first writer on such subjects. Cp. ii. 1. § 1; c. 7. § 1; c. 12. § 1.

14. 18. ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζῆν καλῶς.

'If their greatness depended on their laws, it is ridiculous to suppose that they can have retained their laws and lost their happiness.'

14. 19. ὅτι κρατεῖν ἠσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν.

'If states are trained in virtue only that they may rule over their neighbours, the same principle will impel individuals to usurp the government in their own states.'

14. 20. Πausanίῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ.

See note on v. 1. § 10.

14. 21. ταῦτά γὰρ ἄριστα καὶ ἰδίῳ καὶ κοινῷ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐμποιεῖν δεῖ ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

There is a slight flaw in the text, which may be corrected (with Susemihl) by adding τε after τόν.

14. 22. τῆν γὰρ βαφῆν ἀφιδῶσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἄγοντες.

Cp. Soph. Aj. 650 (Dindorf):—

*καὶ γὰρ, ὅς τὰ δειν' ἐκαρτέρουν τότε,
βαφῆν σίδηρος ὧς, ἐθελύνθη στόμα
πρὸς τῆσδε τῆς γυναικός.*

15. In the Nic. Eth. x. 7, Aristotle dwells at length on the thesis that the true happiness of man is to be sought in leisure and contemplation. But we have a difficulty in realizing his meaning. For we naturally ask how is the leisure to be employed? and on what is contemplation to feed? To these questions his writings supply no answer. We have no difficulty in understanding that by a philosopher the mind and the use of the mind is deemed higher than the body and its functions, or that the intellectual is to be preferred to the moral, or that the life of a gentleman is to be passed in liberal occupations, not in trade or servile toil. But when we attempt to go further we can only discern a negative

idealism; we are put off with words such as θεωρία, οὔσια, and the like, which absorbed the minds of that generation, but which to us appear to have no context or meaning.

But if in the sphere of the individual the idea of contemplative leisure is feeble and uncertain, much more shadowy is the meaning of the word when applied to the state. We can see that peace is to be preferred to war; that the Athenians 'provided for their weary spirits many relaxations from toil' (Thuc. ii. 38); that 'they could fix their minds upon the greatness of Athens until they became filled with the love of her' (ib. 43); that into education an element of philosophy should enter; that sleep is sweet to weary mortals; that to the Greek leisure was a necessity of the higher life. But we fail to perceive how the leisure of a state, the interest of a spectacle, the tranquillity of wealth is better than some great struggle for freedom; or how the sons of those who fought at Thermopylae and Salamis were more fortunate than their fathers. Aristotle himself seems to acknowledge that greater virtues of some kind would be required in 'the islands of the blest' than in the ordinary life of man. The contemplative end which he imagines is not suited to the human character and is nearly unmeaning. To us there appears to be more truth in the sentiment, which has been repeated in many forms, that 'the search after knowledge is a greater blessing to man than the attainment of it.'

15. 2. δεῖ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαιῶν ὑπάρχειν, ὅπως ἐξῆτι σχολάζειν.

'The virtues of leisure imply the virtues of business, for business supplies the means of leisure.'

15. 3. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν.

Cp. Tennyson's Maud I. vi.-xiii.:—

'Why do they prate of the blessings of peace?

Peace in her vineyard—yes!—but a company forges the wine.'

Yet there is corruption in war as well as in peace, now as of old, in furnishing the commissariat of an army, in making appointments, in conferring distinctions, sometimes followed by a fearful retribution.

15. 6. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γενέσθαι ταῦτα μᾶλλον διὰ τινος ἀρετῆς.

'The Lacedaemonians agree with the rest of mankind that the good life is the end, but they differ in supposing the end to be obtained by military virtue alone.'

Cp. (though a different point of view from that which is here taken) ii. 9. §§ 34, 35: 'Although the Lacedaemonians truly think that the goods for which they contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them.'

15. 6. ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τῆν ἀπόλαυσιν τῆν τούτων ἢ τῆν τῶν ἀρετῶν, καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτήν, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον.

The construction of the sentence is as follows: ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν ἐκ τούτων μείζω [εἶναι] τὰ ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἀπόλαυσιν τῶν τούτων ἢ τῶν τῶν ἀρετῶν [sc. ἠθικῶν ἢ πολεμικῶν χρῆσιν understood from ἀπόλαυσιν] καὶ ὅτι [αἱ ἀρεταὶ] εἰσὶ δι' αὐτῶν [sc. τῶν τούτων ἀπόλαυσιν].

πῶς δὲ introduces the apodosis which is resumed in τοῦτο δὲ θεωρητέον.

ἀρετῶν goes back to διὰ τίνος ἀρετῆς in the previous sentence.

15. 7. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διημαρτηκῆναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑποθέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίως ἵχθαι.

The meaning of ἵχθαι is simply 'trained;' whether for good or evil depends on the sense given to ὁμοίως. Either 1)* 'in the same i. e. a mistaken way'; or 2) 'all the same' = 'nevertheless.' The first is most in accordance with the context διημαρτηκῆναι καὶ τὸν λόγον. The καὶ is needlessly bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. 'For even reason (which we might least expect to err) is not infallible.'

15. 8. φανερόν δὲ τοῦτο γε πρῶτον μὲν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τίνος ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τέλους· ὁ δὲ λόγος ἡμῶν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος.

1) *The connexion is as follows: 'We have to consider whether men are to be trained by reason or by habit: Thus much is clear—that there is a succession of means and ends: every birth having a beginning and every end having a beginning in some other end; and the end of nature being reason and intelligence.' That is to say: 'In every birth there are previous elements and in like manner in the end or intellectual perfection of human nature other antecedents, such as education, are implied, which from other points of view are themselves ends.'

2) According to Susemihl the words are to be taken as follows: 'It is clear that generation implies some antecedent principle and the end which springs from an antecedent principle is in turn relative to a further end.' According to this way of taking the passage γένεσις in the 1st clause is equivalent to τέλος in the 2nd. Generation has an antecedent principle of which it is the end. The end which thus springs from an antecedent principle has a further end, namely, intelligence and reason. But two objections may be offered to this way of translating the words. a) τίνος has no meaning. b) The less natural construction is adopted instead of the more natural. For ἄλλου τέλους would naturally depend upon the words which immediately precede, ἀπὸ τίνος ἀρχῆς.

3) Once more, Mr. Postgate proposes to take the passage as follows: 'So much then is evident—first here, as in other cases, coming into existence is the beginning of all, and what is the end, viewed from a certain beginning, is itself directed towards a further end.' To this interpretation it may be objected that ἀπ' ἀρχῆς is taken in a different sense from ἀπὸ τίνος ἀρχῆς and that τοῦ τέλους, as in the preceding explanation, is construed unnaturally.

16. 5. See infra note on § 9.

16. 7. τὸν χρησμόν.

The oracle ἢ τέμνε νέαν ἄλοκα' which is found in the margin of two MSS. is probably made up from the context. Out of these words Götting has constructed a hexameter ἄλλὰ νέας, Τροίζην, ἄλοκας μἢ τέμνε βαθείας. The equivocation may either consist in the double meaning of νεᾶς 'fallow ground' (in Attic used for νεῖᾶς) and νέας 'the young maiden:' or the disputed point may have been only whether the oracle was to be taken literally or metaphorically.

16. 9. διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττει περὶ τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἑτῶν ἡλικίαν συζευγνύναι, τοὺς δ' ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα, ἢ μικρόν.

The words ἢ μικρόν probably mean 'thereabouts' or 'nearly,' like μικροῦ; or some word such as πλεῖον may have dropped out.

The disparity of age between the man and woman appears to be great; but as Aristotle extends the term for the women from 18 to 50, and for the men from 35 to 70 years, the time allowed for cohabitation in either would nearly coincide, i.e. 35 and 32 years. There is therefore no reason for doubting the reading.

The relative ages to us appear singular. Malthus, On Population vol. i. p. 237, remarks that this regulation 'must of course condemn a great number of women to celibacy, as there never can be so many men of thirty-seven as there are women of eighteen.' But the real and great disparity is between the total number of women after eighteen and the total number of men after thirty-five.

Plato in the Republic (v. 460) makes the interval less. He assigns twenty to forty as the marriageable age for women: for men, from the time 'when they have passed the greatest speed of life' (twenty-five?) to fifty-five. In the Laws (iv. 721) the citizens are required to marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five; but in another passage (772 D, E) between twenty-five and thirty-five.

In the History of Animals (Aristotle?) the age proper for marriage in men is limited to sixty, or at the utmost seventy; in women to forty, or at the utmost fifty.

16. 10. ἔτι δὲ ἢ διαδοχῇ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένης ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίγηται κατὰ λόγον εὐθύς ἢ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἑτῶν ἀριθμόν.

According to this way of reckoning Aristotle seems to consider the prime of life to be thirty-five. The father having begun to keep house at thirty-five years of age would at seventy give up to the son, who might be expected to begin family life over again at thirty-five.

In speaking of the succession of children to their parents Aristotle takes account only of the fathers.

16. 10. τοῖς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄραν χρόνοις, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χροῶνται καλῶς καὶ νῦν, ὀρίσαντες χειμῶνος τῶν συναυλίαν ποιεῖσθαι ταύτην.

Sc. δεῖ οὕτως ποιεῖν, taking δεῖ from the previous sentence. The better MSS. read δεῖ χρῆσθαι after χρόνοις, but this is unnecessary, and the repetition of χροῶνται after χρ

ἦσθαι is unpleasant.

συναυλιαν, 'cohabitation' probably from ἀύλη not from ἀύλος.

16. 11. καὶ αὐτοὺς ἤδη.

i. e. 'themselves when they come to be parents as well as the writers on these subjects.'

16. 13. Like Plato, Aristotle prescribes gymnastics for women as well as men. Cp. Plat. Laws vii. 789; Rep. v. 457.

16. 15. διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων, ἐὰν τῆ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύη, μηδὲν ὑποτίθεσθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· ὥρισται γὰρ δὴ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος. ἐὰν δὲ τισι γίγνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδουασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωὴν, ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τῆν ἄμβλωσιν.

'But when there are too many children (for we have settled that there is to be a limit of population), they must not be exposed merely for this reason. If, however, it should happen that a couple exceed the number allowed by law, then abortion must be practised before sense and life have begun.'

ὥρισται γὰρ δὴ . . . τὸ πλῆθος gives the reason for introducing the previous remark. 'I speak of this because population has been limited.' Cp. ii. 7. § 5, where Aristotle says that the legislator who fixes the amount of property should also fix the limit of population; and ii. 6. § 10, where he censures Plato for supposing that population will be kept down even if nothing is done to secure this object: and Rep. v. 461, where abortion and exposure are allowed, or in certain cases enforced; also a curious and interesting passage quoted from Musonius a Stoic philosopher (about 60 A.D.), by Stobaeus § 15. p. 450, in which he denounces abortion and similar practices as offences against Zeus the god of kindred.

16. 17. Respecting the seven ages, see *infra*, note on c. 17. § 15; and for the regulations of Aristotle respecting marriage, the time after marriage, procreation and nursing of children and their early education, cp. Laws vii. 788-794.

17. 1. οἶεσθαι.

sc. δεῖ. To be gathered from the previous paragraph.

17. 6. τὰς δὲ διατάξεις τῶν παιδῶν καὶ κλαυθμοὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις· συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὐξήσιν.

This is another misrepresentation of Plato, who only says that when children are silent they are pleased, and that they ought to have as little pain as possible in early childhood lest they grow up morose in character. ('When anything is brought to the infant and he is silent, then he is supposed to be pleased, but when he weeps and cries out, then he is not pleased. For tears and cries are the inauspicious signs by which children show what they love and hate.' Laws vii. 792 A). Yet the words ἐν τοῖς νόμοις sufficiently show that Plato is the writer to whom Aristotle is referring.

τὰς διατάσεις, 'the passions or struggles,' a neutral word to be interpreted by κλαυθμοῖ which follows.

17. 7. εὐλόγον οὖν ἀπελαύνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὄραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας.

A thought enlarged upon by Plato Rep. ii. 377 ff.

Bekker in his 1st edition has unnecessarily altered ἀνελευθερίαν, the reading of the majority of the MSS., into ἀνελευθερίας. In his 2nd edition he has substituted ἀνελευθέρων, which has some MS. authority. Neither alteration is necessary; τηλικούτους ὄντας may be taken as an accusative of the remoter object. ἀπελαύνειν has been altered by Susemihl into ἀπολαβεῖν, a change which is partly grounded on a various reading ἀπολαύειν, and partly on the 'absumere' of the old translator.

καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. 1)* 'Even when they are at this early age,' i. e. although they are so young, care must be taken about what they see and hear; or 2) καὶ may be emphatic, 'especially at this early age when they cannot take care of themselves.'

17. 10. ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσι μὴθὲν μῆτε ἄγαλμα μῆτε γραφῆν εἶναι τοιούτων πράξεων μίμησιν, εἰ μὴ παρά τισι θεοῖς τοιούτοις οἷς καὶ τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀφίησιν ὁ νόμος τοὺς ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν πλέον προήκουσαν καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφεῖν τοὺς θεούς.

οἷς καὶ τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος. Such as the Phallic improvisation at the Dionysiac festival of which Aristophanes furnishes an imitation in the Acharnians 263 ff.

The words πρὸς δὲ τούτοις introduce a second exception: 'indecent may be allowed in the temples of certain Gods;' πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, 'and also to persons of full age whom the law allows to worship in such temples.' Cp. once more Plat. Rep. ii. 378: 'The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which his son in turn inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and simple persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and in order to reduce the number of hearers they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim.'

17. 13. Θεόδωρος.

A great Athenian actor and performer of Sophocles who took the part of Antigone: Aeschines was his tritagonist who played Creon. Dem. Fal. Leg. 418. He is mentioned in the Rhetoric of Aristotle ii. 23. 1400 b. 16, iii. 13. 1414 b. 13.

17. 15. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἑβδομάσι διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς, δεῖ δὲ τῆι διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν.

It is uncertain whether we should read *οὐ καλῶς or οὐ κακῶς in this passage. The authority of the MSS. and the immediate context confirm the former. On the other hand οὐ κακῶς is the more idiomatic expression, and is not irreconcilable with the context:—'Those who divide the ages of men by seven are not far wrong, and yet we should rather observe the divisions made by nature;' or, 'and we should observe the divisions made by nature, i. e. the divisions into sevens' (Bergk 25). This is also

confirmed by the passage in c. 16. § 17, αὕτη [sc. ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀκμῆ] δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἦν περ τῶν ποιητῶν τινὲς εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες ταῖς ἐβδομάσι τῆν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πενήκοντα ἐτῶν.

It may be observed too that Aristotle himself in this passage divides ages by sevens—seven, fourteen (puberty), twenty-one.

The 'sevens' of Aristotle agree with the 'sevens' of Solon (?) in the years which he assigns to marriage (35) and to the highest development of the mind (49 or 50):—

*Παῖς μὲν ἄνηβος ἐὼν ἔτι νήπιος ἔρκος ὀδόντων
 φύσας ἐκβάλλει πρῶτον ἐν ἑπτ' ἔτεσιν·
 τοὺς δ' ἑτέρους ὅτε δ' ἡ τελέσῃ θεὸς ἑπτ' ἐνιαυτούς,
 ἡβης ἐκφαίνει σήματα γεινομένης·
 τῆι τρίτῃ δὲ γένειον ἀεξομένων ἔτι γυίων
 λαχνοῦνται, χροίης ἄνθος ἀμειβομένης·
 τῆι δὲ τετάρτῃ πᾶς τις ἐν ἐβδομάδι μέγ' ἄριστος
 ἰσχύν, ἦν τ' ἄνδρες σήματ' ἔχουσ' ἀρετῆς·
 πέμπτῃ δ' ὄριου, ἄνδρα γάμου μεμνημένον εἶναι
 καὶ παίδων ζητεῖν εἰσοπίσω γενεῆν·
 τῆι δ' ἕκτῃ περὶ πάντα καταρτύεται νόος ἀνδρός,
 οὐδ' ἔρδειν ἔθ' ὁμῶς ἔργ' ἀπάλαμνα θέλει·
 ἑπτὰ δὲ νοῦν καὶ γλώσσαν ἐν ἐβδομάσιν μέγ' ἄριστος
 ὀκτώ τ' ἀμφοτέρων τέσσαρα καὶ δέκ' ἔτη·
 τῆι δ' ἐνάτῃ ἔτι μὲν δύναται, μαλακώτερα δ' αὐτοῦ
 πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετῆν γλώσσά τε καὶ σοφίη·¹
 τῆι δεκάτῃ δ' ὅτε δ' ἡ τελέσῃ θεὸς ἑπτ' ἐνιαυτούς,
 οὐκ ἔν ἄωρος ἐὼν μοῦραν ἔχει θανάτου.*

Compare an interesting note of Mr. Cope's in his edition of Aristotle's Rhetoric, vol. ii. p. 160.

BOOK VIII.

1. 2. δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάστην πολιτεύεσθαι.

Here Susemihl has adopted παιδεύεσθαι after Aretino's translation. But πολιτεύεσθαι the reading of the Greek MSS. is also confirmed by William de Moerbek, 'politizare,' and is more in accordance with the context: 'For the life of the citizen should conform to the state, because the state is of one character, and this unity in the end of the state necessitates unity in the education of the citizens.'

1. 3. φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν.

Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. § 14, κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθήν, where he goes on to show that public education can be best enforced, but that, since it is generally neglected, we must have recourse to private education, which moreover will take into account the peculiarities of the individual case; also that the education of individuals must be based upon general principles, and these are to be gathered from the science or art of legislation.

1. 4. ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦνται σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ κοινῇ ταύτην.

Aristotle appears to praise the Lacedaemonians, not for the quality of their education (cp. infra c. 4), but for the circumstance that it was established by law. According to Isocrates Panath. 276 d, the Spartans fell so far below the general standard of education in Hellas, that they did not even know their letters, τοσοῦτον ἀπολελειμμένοι τῆς κοινῆς παιδείας καὶ φιλοσοφίας εἰσὶν ὥστ' οὐδέ γράμματα μανθάνουσιν: and according to Plato, or rather according to the author of the Platonic Hippias Major (285 C), 'not many of them could count.'

καὶ τοῦτο. καὶ is found in all the MSS., and was the reading of Moerbek. There is no difficulty in explaining it: 'One may praise the Lacedaemonians for this also,' as he has already praised their common use of property in ii. 5. § 7. Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. § 13, ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίῳ πόλει μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιθῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

2. 1. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται περὶ τῶν ἔργων.

'We are agreed about the necessity of a state education, but we differ about the subjects of education' or 'about the things to be done in education;' cp. infra § 3, τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων.

2. 2. ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἐμποδῶν παιδείας.

'The customary education' or 'the education which meets us in life'—without any idea of obstruction.

2. 2. παραχώδης ἢ σκέψις.

'It is impossible to consider the theory of education apart from the prevalent custom; and it would be equally impossible even if we could frame a perfect theory to carry it out in practice.'

2. 2. τὰ περιττά.

Lit. 'things in excess,' i. e. not included in the ordinary training either for life or virtue, in modern language 'the higher knowledge.' For the use of the word cp. ii. 6. § 6; Nic. Eth. vi. 7. § 4.

2. 2. κριτάς τινας.

Cp. for the use of the word De Anima i. 405 b. 8, πάντα τὰ στοιχεῖα κριτῶν εἴληφε πλὴν τῆς γῆς, 'All these views have found approvers.'

2. 6. καταβεβλημένοι,

'laid down and so established:' cp. c. 3. § 11, καταβεβλημένα παιδεύματα. Cp. supra, ἡ ἐμποδῶν παιδεία.

2. 6. ἑπαμφοτερίζουσιν,

'are of a double character,' partly liberal, partly illiberal.

3. 1. ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα κ.τ.λ.

μουσικῆ is here separated from γράμματα, which in Plato's Republic are included under it.

We may remark the form of sentence: 'There are four;' but the fourth is introduced with a qualification, τέταρτον ἕνιοι.

3. 2. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων.

Not φύσις but ἡ σχολή, as is shown by the clause which follows, ἵνα καὶ πάλιν εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς referring to vii. 15. §§ 1, 2, and perhaps to Nic. Eth. x. 6.

3. 3. ὅλως.

Either, 1) 'the general question must be asked;' or 2) *taking ὅλως in an emphatic sense, 'the question must be surely' or 'absolutely asked.' In what follows §§ 3-6, Aristotle passes on to discuss the more general subjects of refreshments or relaxations, and returns to music in § 7.

But ὅλως is only a conjecture of Victorius. All the MSS. read τέλος, except one (P⁵), which reads τελευταῖον. (Cp. the old trans. 'finaliter.') The reading τέλος gives a sufficient but not a very good sense ('lastly'), nor can any objection be made to it on the ground that the word occurs in the following line with a different meaning. For such false echoes are not uncommon. Cp. συνάγειν, used in two senses, iv. 15. § 8, note.

3. 6. τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν.

Cp. infra § 8, τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴν. The two expressions are nearly equivalent: 1) 'the leisure occupied in διαγωγή:' 2) 'the διαγωγή of leisure.' It is hard to find any satisfactory phrase in English to express what Aristotle throughout this book terms διαγωγή. The first sense of the word is that employment of leisure which becomes a gentleman (cp. πότερον παιδεῖαν ἢ παιδιᾶν ἢ διαγωγὴν. εὐλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἢ τε γὰρ παιδιᾶ χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστὶ, τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἰατρεία τις ἐστὶν)· καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν infra c. 5. §§ 9, 10). Further it is joined with φρόνησις (c. 5. § 4. init. πρὸς διαγωγὴν συμβάλλεται τι καὶ φρόνησιν) and therefore seems to mean the rational or intellectual employment and enjoyment of leisure. It is always distinguished from παιδιᾶ and ἀνάπαυσις 'amusement' and 'relaxation,' which are properly, not ends, but only means, to renewed exertion (cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 6); and so means to means, whereas διαγωγὴ and σχολὴ are ends in themselves. The idea of 'culture,' implying a use of the intellect, not for the sake of any further end, but for itself, would so far correspond to διαγωγή.

3. 8. ἦν γὰρ οἴονται διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάττουσιν.

ἐν ταύτῃ, sc. τῇ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῇ.

τάττουσιν, sc. αὐτῶν or music. 'They reckon music in that class of intellectual enjoyments which they suppose to be peculiar to freemen.'

3. 8. ἀλλ' οἷον μὲν ἐστὶ καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαίτα θαλεῖν.

The line is not found in our Homer. There is no doubt that in the original θαλεῖν is to be taken with δαίτα; but it is probably quoted by Aristotle in reference to the Muse Thalia: and καλεῖν Θαλίην is said in the same way as καλέουσιν ἄοιδόν in the following quotation.

3. 11. ἦ γὰρ μουσικῇ τοῦτο ποιεῖ δῆλον.

i. e. 'the fact that the ancients included music in education proves thus much, that they considered it a noble part of education';—they would not have included what was purely utilitarian.

4. 1. οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν μάλιστα συμφέρον.

'The Lacedaemonians do not run into the error of spoiling the frames of their children, but they spoil their characters.'

4. 2. εἴ τε καὶ πρὸς ταύτην, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐξευρισκουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις οὐτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὀρώμεν τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἦθειςιν.

'And even if they train with a view to courage they do not attain to it; for courage is not to be found in brutal but in mild and lionlike natures, whether (the comparison is made) of animals or of barbarians.' Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 375 and Aristotle's Criticism on this

passage in the Politics vii. 7. §§ 5-8.

4. 3. τῶν ἠπειρωτικῶν ἔθνῶν.

Not 'of Epirus,' which would be wholly disconnected from the Pontus and could hardly have been described as in this state of savagery, nor as in the translation 'there are other inland tribes,' for the Achaeans are not inland tribes (unless indeed the tribes 'about the Pontus' are called continental with reference to the Mediterranean), but more accurately 'other tribes on the mainland.' For another mention of these cannibals in Aristotle, cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 5. § 2.

4. 4. μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας.

Said for πρὸς μὴ ἀσκοῦντας. But the fall of Sparta was not really due to the improvements of the other Hellenes in gymnastics; though the equal or superior military discipline of Macedon at last overpowered them.

4. 4-7. The fall and decay of Sparta is a political lesson which greatly impresses Aristotle, cp. notes on vii. 11. § 8 and c. 14. § 16 ff.

So in modern times the superiority of nations has often been due to their superior organization. Those who organize first will be first victorious until others become in their turn better trained and prepared. By organization Frederick the Great crushed Austria, as she was afterwards crushed once more in 1866; again the military organization both of Prussia and Austria crumbled before Napoleon at Jena, as the French organization was in turn overpowered by the new military development of Germany in 1870. The Germans have still to prove, εἴτε τῷ τοῦς νέους γυμνάζειν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διέ φερων, εἴτε τῷ μόνον μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν.

4. 6. ὡς φησὶν ὁ λόγος.

Cp. Plato (e. g. Phaedo 87 A, Soph. 238 B) for a similar personification of the argument.

4. 8. A warning against overstraining of the faculties in youth which may be applied to the young student of modern times as well as to the young Olympic victor.

4. 9. καταλαμβάνειν τῆν ἡλικίαν.

'To occupy,' 'engage,' 'employ.'

5. 1. ἵνα ὡσπερ ἐνδοσίμον γένηται τοῖς λόγοις.

A musical term and therefore appropriately used in speaking of music = 'the keynote,' 'that what we have to say may be a sort of keynote to any future discussion of the subject.' Cp. Arist. Rhet. iii. 14. § 1, 1414 b. 22, καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀύληται, ὅτι ἄν εἴ ἔχωσιν ἀύλησαι τοῦτο προαυλήσαντες συνῆψαν τῷ ἐνδοσίμῳ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεῖ οὕτω γράφειν.

5. 2-4. Aristotle suggests three reasons which might be given for the cultivation of music:

1) παιδιᾶς καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἕνεκα, like sleep, wine, dancing (cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 6), amusement and relaxation being the means to renewed exertion.

2) Because of its influence on character. Hence its value in education (παιδεία).

3) πρὸς διαγωγὴν καὶ φρόνησιν, as an end.

In c. 7. § 3 he speaks of music as being used for *a*) παιδεία, *b*) κάθαρσις, *c*) διαγωγή; *a*) corresponds to 2) of c. 5 (πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν), *c*) to 3).

This leaves *b*) κάθαρσις to correspond to the use of music as a relaxation, and would seem to show that Aristotle gave the lower meaning to κάθαρσις (i. e. 'purgation' rather than 'purification'). Cp. c. 3. § 4, Φαρμακείας χάριν, and c. 7. § 4, ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. See note on c. 7. § 3.

5. 2. καὶ ἄμα παύει μέριμναν, ὥς Φησὶν Εὐριπίδης.

Goettling and Bekker (in his second edition), against the authority of the MSS. of the Politics, have altered ἄμα παύει into ἀναπαύει, an unnecessary change, and unsupported by the MSS. of Euripides, which cannot be quoted on either side; for the citation, like many others in Aristotle, is inaccurate. The words referred to occur in Eur. Bacch. 380:—

ὅς [Βρόμιος] τάδ' ἔχει,

θιασεύειν τε χοροῖς
μετά τ' ἀύλοῦ γέλασαι,
ἀποπαῦσαι τε μερίμνας.

5. 3. τάπτουσιν αὐτήν.

Sc. εἰς παιδιᾶν καὶ ἀνάπαυσιν understood from the words preceding.

5. 3. Reading ὕπνω for οἴνω, gathered from ὕπνου καὶ μέθης supra, with Bekker's 2nd edition, but against the authority of all the MSS. and of William de Moerbek.

5. 4. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγὴν τε παισὶν ἀρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναί ταῖς τοιαύταις.

The particle τε is not easily explained. It may be suggested either that 1) it should be omitted, or 2) should be changed into τι or τοῖς, or 3) that καὶ φρόνησιν should be added after it from the corresponding words in § 4, ἢ πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ φρόνησιν.

5. 4. οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος.

A singular and almost verbal fancy. 'The imperfect is opposed to the perfect, and therefore the immature youth is not intended for reason and contemplation.' Yet the meaning of τέλος is obscure, cp. infra §§ 12, 13, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀλιγάκις γίνεσθαι.

5. 5-8. §§ 5-8 are a series of ἀπορίαι which take the form of a suppressed dialogue. 1) But a

child may learn music with a view to a time when he will be grown up; 2) But why should he learn himself? 3) He will not appreciate unless he does; 4) Then why should he not learn cookery? 5) And how will his morals be improved by playing himself rather than by hearing others perform? Yet infra c. 6 these cobwebs are dashed aside; and it is acknowledged that the truer and deeper effect of music can only be produced on the mind by actual practice.

5. 7. ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὄμως δύνανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὡς Φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν.

Cp. what Plato says of the 'timocratic man,' in Rep. viii. 548 E, ἀθύραδέςτερόν τε δεῖ αὐτόν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, εἶναι καὶ ὑποαμουσώτερον, φιλόμουσον δέ· καὶ φιλήκοον μὲν, ἑητορικὸν δ' οὐδαμῶς.

5. 8. οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ᾄδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους.

In II. i. 603 it is Apollo, not Zeus, who plays to the assembly of the gods.

5. 13. ἔχει γὰρ ἴσως ἡδονὴν τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν· ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην, λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων ἔχειν ὁμοιωμά τι.

There is a finality about pleasure, which leads to a confusion with happiness. Like the greater end of life it comes after toil; it is sensible to the eye or feeling; it is the anticipation of we know not what: no account can be given of it. ταύτην, sc. οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, 'the higher pleasure;' ἐκείνην, 'the lower pleasure.'

5. 14. δι' ἣν μὲν οἶν αἰτίαν κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 13. § 6, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτῆ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἣν οἴονται οὐδ' ἣν ἔν φαίνεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον· ἀλλ' εἰλήφασιν τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἰσωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οἶν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας μόνας οἴονται εἶναι.

5. 14. οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην,

sc. ζητοῦσιν.

5. 17. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ἔυθυμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν.

i.e. 'any imitation, whether accompanied by rhythm or song or not, creates sympathetic feeling.'

5. 18. παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις.

'Near to or not far removed from their true natures.'

5. 20. συμβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἓν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ὁμοίωμα τοῖς ἡθεσιν, οἷον ἓν τοῖς ἀπτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γευστοῖς, ἀλλ' ἓν τοῖς ὄρατοῖς ἡρέμα· σχήματα γὰρ

ἔστι τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρόν, καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν.

'As to the senses [other than the sense of hearing], objects of sight alone furnish representations of ethical character; (for figures are 1) objects of sight, or 2*) are of an ethical character); but to a certain extent only, and this intellectual element (though feeble) is common to all.'

The obscurity of the passage has led to the insertion of οὐ before πάντες; but the construction is then abrupt and the meaning thus obtained, 'all do not participate in the sense of figure,' would be a strange statement.

5. 20. ἔτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἡθῶν, ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον.

'Yet such figures and colours (which have been previously called representations) are not really representations but more truly signs and indications.'

5. 21. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ περὶ τῆν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφῶν ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἔστιν ἠθικός.

Cp. Poetics 2. 1448 a. 5, Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παύσων δὲ χεῖρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἴκαζεν.

5. 21. ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς.

'But though hardly discernible in painting we have the very expression of the feeling in music.'

5. 25. καὶ τοῖς ἔυθυμοῖς εἶναι.

Bekker in his 2nd edition has inserted πρὸς τῆν ψυχὴν before εἶναι. Cp. a reading which is confirmed by one MS. of the old translator, 'cognatio ad animam.' Aretino's translation suggests ἡμῶν, but the same sense can be got out of the Greek as it stands, ἡμῶν (or πρὸς τῆν ψυχὴν) being supplied from τῆν φύσιν τῆν τηλικαύτην or οἱ νέοι in the previous sentence.

For the doctrine that the soul is a harmony, cp. Plat. Phaedo 86, 92-95; Timaeus 35, 36.

6. 6. ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λεχθέν,

sc. τὸ ποιεῖν βαναύσους.

6. 6. πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὕστερον.

Though there is no variation in the MSS., or in the old translator, there seems to be a corruption in this passage. Susemihl transposes χρήσεις and μαθήσεις. Goettling omits both. If retained in their present order, they must be translated as in the text, and may be supposed to mean that practice precedes theory. In the Republic practical life precedes philosophical leisure, and at the end of the Ethics (x. 9. § 20) Aristotle says

that the sophist having no experience of politics cannot teach them (cp. Plat. Tim. 19 D).

But a fatal objection to this way of interpreting the passage is the word μάθησις, which elsewhere in this chapter, and even in the next sentence, means 'early education,' not 'mature philosophical speculation.'

6. 7. Compare Plat. Rep. ii. 411. In the Laws vii. 810 he limits the time allowed for the study of music to three years.

6. 10. τῷ λόγῳ.

'Speech,' as in bk. i. 2. § 10.

6. 11. The singular outburst of intellectual life at Athens, which we may well believe to have arisen after the Persian War, belongs to a period of Greek history known to us only from the very short summary of Athenian history contained in a few pages of Thucydides. It was the age of Pindar and Simonides and Phrynichus and Aeschylus, of Heraclitus and Parmenides, of Protagoras and Gorgias.

6. 12. Ἐκφαντιδῆ.

A very ancient comic poet who flourished in the generation before Aristophanes.

6. 15. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὀργάνων κ.τ.λ.

This, like many other sentences beginning with ἐπεὶ, is an anacoluthon, of which the real apodosis is to be found in the words διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τῆν ἐργασίαν ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν.

7. 1. ἢ τρίτον δεῖ τινὲ ἕτερον.

Three alternatives are given: 1) Shall we use all the harmonies and rhythms in education? 2) Shall we make the same distinctions about them in education which are made in other uses of them? Or 3) Shall we make some other distinction?

τρίτον δεῖ has been suspected. τρίτον is certainly not symmetrical because it introduces not a third case but a subdivision of the second case. Yet other divisions in Aristotle are unsymmetrical (cp. supra c. 3. § 1 and vii. 11. §§ 1-4).

7. 2. νομικῶς.

'After the manner of a law,' i. e. ἐν τύπῳ explained by the words which follow.

7. 3. τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες.

These distinctions are but feebly represented by modern styles; the first is in some degree analogous to sacred music, the second to military music, and the third to the music of the dance.

πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος,

7. 3. sc. τῆς ψυχῆς οἱ *τῶν μελῶν.

7. 3. τί δὲ λέγομεν τῆν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σαφέστερον.

This promise is very imperfectly fulfilled in the short allusion to κάθαρσις in Poet. c. 6.

7. 6. διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἁρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις μέλεσι θετέον τοὺς τῆν θεατρικῆν μουσικῆν μεταχειριζομένους ἀγωνιστάς.

'Therefore it is for such harmonies and for such melodies that we must establish the competitions of musical performers,' i. e. we must leave such strains of art to regular performers.

7. 7. παρακεχρωσμένα.

παραχρώσεις are explained to mean 'deviations from the received scale in music.'

7. 9. ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τῆν φρυγιστὶ μόνην καταλείπει μετὰ τῆς δωριστῆ, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμάσας τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν αὐλόν.

This criticism of Plato appears to be just.

7. 11. καὶ διότι Φιλόξενος ἐγχειρήσας ἐν τῇ δωριστῆ ποιῆσαι διθύραμβον τοὺς μύθους.

The emendation Μύσους (adopted by Bekker in his 2nd edition) is unnecessary. The words may also mean 'to compose a dithyramb called the "Fables."' Whether fables could be written in a dithyrambic form or not, the difficulty which Philoxenus experienced was of another kind: what he found hopeless was the attempt to compose dithyrambic poetry adapted to the severe Dorian music.

7. 15. δῆλον ὅτι τούτους ὄρους τρεῖς

is abruptly expressed and possibly something may be omitted. The general meaning is 'that if there be a harmony suited to the young it must be tested by the three principles of education; the mean, the possible, the becoming.'

7. 15. Without assuming that Aristotle wrote a complete treatise on the subject of education, in which he includes gymnastic, music, drawing, and literature (cp. c. 3. § 1), it is hard to imagine that, if the work had received from his hands its present form, he would have broken off in this abrupt manner.

ENDNOTES

[*] δεισόζου = stinking; cp. Suidas, s. v. δεισαλέος;—δεισαλέος, κοπρώδης. δεῖσα γὰρ ἢ κόπρος.

[1] al. lect. σώμα τε καὶ δύναμις.
